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ABSTRACT
St Thomas Aquinas on Affectivity: A Way Forward for Seminary Formation, is a theological
argument that St Thomas’ teaching can be applied to the affective formation of men preparing to
be Catholic priests. St Thomas’ teaching provides a very helpful understanding of affective
maturity and its integral importance for a truly Christian and priestly life in the service of others.
It flows from a theological anthropology that recognizes proper affective growth as an integral part
of human life and interpersonal relationships. Affective maturity is an essential attribute for the
seminarian to acquire because he is preparing to be a priest who has to fulfill his responsibilities
to others in a loving, mature and virtuous way. The thesis is divided into three major sections. The
first section lays the theological and anthropological foundation for the thesis. Since Pope St John
Paul II called for the promotion of affective maturity in seminary formation, the influence of St
Thomas’ teaching on St John Paul II’s understanding of affectivity is analyzed. Then, it is argued
that St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity in Christ gives a firm foundation for affective formation in
the life and example of Christ. Finally, through a discussion of St Thomas’ teaching on the passions
such as love, hope and anger, a set of principles is set before the seminarian to reflect upon and
articulate his affective experiences so that he may be understood and guided by his formators. The
second section argues that St Thomas’ teaching on the Cardinal and Theological virtues can be
applied as principles of affective formation. The Gifts of the Holy Spirit and the Fruits of the Holy
Spirit are presented respectively as principles of affective development and a pattern by which
affective maturity is recognized and assessed. The third section analyzes how St Thomas’ teaching
on the capital vices, such as pride and vainglory, can help the seminarian to respond to his affective
inordinateness. It also examines how St Thomas’ teaching on infused virtue can be applied as a
principle of affective growth to order his desires and affections to the good. As a test case, chastity
is examined as a virtue that enables him to properly form his sexuality in relation to others and
responsibly love and care for others as a pastor. A significant finding of this thesis is that affective
formation needs to be given a proper theological and Christological foundation. Only in this way
can the seminarian become a man and a priest who reflects the life of Christ the Good Shepherd
to those entrusted to his pastoral care.
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INTRODUCTION

My desire to present this research on the teaching of St Thomas Aquinas on human affectivity, and
its relevance to the affective formation of seminarians, flows from my work as First Year Director
at Good Shepherd Seminary in Sydney, Australia, from 2009 to 2016. One of the courses I taught
the First Year seminarians, the men commencing their preparation to become Catholic priests, was
about St Thomas’ understanding of human affectivity. This work was undertaken in the conviction
that a man who is affectively mature will become a better shepherd for God’s people.
On a number of occasions St Thomas appeals to Psalm 83.3 as the theological source of his
reflections on the importance of affectivity: “My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living
God: where by heart we are to understand the intellectual appetite, and by flesh the sensitive
appetite”.1 St Thomas applies this to the fervor or “intensity of the inclination of the lover for the
beloved”.2 In regard to God fervor involves both the will and the passions “so that both the heart
and the flesh in some way praise God”.3 St Thomas also appeals to this principle to justify his
position that it is proper for our passions to contribute to our “moral or human good”. 4 It belongs
to our moral perfection, no less, that we be moved to the good not only in respect of our will but
also in respect of our passions.
This brief example indicates St Thomas’ conviction that human affectivity ought to be included in
a serious theological study. His thought on affectivity is grounded in a theological anthropology
which studies the human person in accord with the truth that God is our Creator. It respects the
body/soul unity of the human person who has an inherent need for personal relationships.
The more complete development of this affective capacity in the Christian’s heart, in our present
case, the heart of the seminarian, is affective maturity. By affective maturity I mean the virtuous
1

Summa Theologica I-II, q.24, a.3, resp. Complete English Edition in Five Volumes, trans. Fathers of the English
Dominican Province (Westminster, Maryland: Christian Classics, 1981). The sensitive appetite is the faculty for the
affective acts we experience in response to what our senses and our minds perceive as suitable or unsuitable for us,
such as joy, delight, hatred or anger. Please also note that all Latin and Greek words and titles will be in italics.
2
On Evil (De Malo), q.VII, a.2, ad 17, trans. Richard Egan, ed. Brian Davies (New York: Oxford University Press,
2003).
3
On Evil, q.VII, a.2, ad 17.
4
Summa Theologica I-II, q.24, a.3, resp.
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development of the seminarian’s affections and passions in order to responsibly love others. This
affective maturity is a basic condition for the seminarian’s future priestly life, relationships and
pastoral service. Without such maturity he cannot conduct himself in a manner that is caring and
respectful of those entrusted to his pastoral care.

1. The Main Parts of the Argument
The aim of this thesis is to unfold the teaching of St Thomas on affectivity and show that it is
profitable for the formation of men who are preparing to be priests in the Catholic Church. It is
chiefly in this way that St Thomas’ insights into affectivity provide a way forward for seminary
formation. To focus the study of this thesis I have chosen three main areas of St Thomas’ teaching.
There is much more material I could have included. I have excised, for example, a chapter on the
main principles of the passions in created things which would have acted as a metaphysical
background to the appreciation of passion in the human person. This is not, however, directly
related to the present task of reflecting on the development of human affectivity for the sake of
seminary formation. The following topics are most clearly applicable to the seminarian’s affective
development and what he can teach others as a priest.
The first section (Chapters 1-6) analyses the general principles of St Thomas’ teaching on
affectivity. To set the context of the thesis, Chapter 1 will discuss three points. First, a summary
of what the Church teaches about the importance of affective maturity in a sound preparation for
the priesthood. Second, a brief study of the relationship between Pope St John Paul II’s teaching
on affective formation and St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity. Third, as a point of comparison,
the chapter will also consider the difference between the teaching of the Theological Manuals and
that of St Thomas.5 Chapter 2 will then reflect on the theological basis of affective formation by
considering St Thomas’ teaching on affection in God and in Christ, the incarnate Son of God.
Chapters 3 to 6 will focus on the basic principles of affectivity, especially the two basic sets of
affective acts, the concupiscible and the irascible passions, together with their causes and effects.6

The Manuals were books used up until the 1960’s to prepare seminarians to give moral guidance to the faithful.
Craig Steven Titus describes the first set of passions as “desiring”, from the word concupiscible which refers to a
desire for pleasure. He calls the second set of passions “initiative-taking”, from the word irascible which comes from
5
6

12

This will be done for the purpose of educating the seminarian in a more complete view of his own
affective life. More specifically, Chapter 3 will analyze St Thomas’ teaching on the nature of
passion and how the external and internal senses are integral to the seminarian’s affective growth.
Chapter 4 will consider the formation of love, desire and joy with the aim of helping the seminarian
to learn how these are to be developed in his various relationships. Chapter 5 will consider the
formation of hatred and sorrow. Chapter 6 will consider the passions that respond to the good that
is difficult to attain or the evil that is difficult to avoid: hope, despair, fear, daring and anger. The
seminarian can draw upon these passions as inner resources that help him grow in affective
resilience and so cope with personal and pastoral challenges. The passions listed by St Thomas
and discussed in this thesis as the main passions are not exhaustive. They are offered as affective
responses that are basic to our human experience and which need to be formed if someone is to
become affectively mature. In studying these passions the seminarian acquires an understanding
of what is particular to each passion, what causes it, what effects it has on him, and the moral
principles that form passion for his own good and the good of others.7
The second section (Chapters 7-9) deals with how the virtues act as formative principles of
affective growth. As abiding perfections of the seminarian’s affective capacities, the virtues bring
affective acts to their proper perfection both in himself and in his relationships with others. This
process of maturation, to be considered in Chapter 7, is mainly accomplished through the cardinal
virtues. Prudence develops his capacity to make good judgments about the welfare of himself and
others. Justice forms in him a determination to look to the true need of his neighbor and express
his affectivity accordingly. Temperance perfects his desires so that he may avoid that which

the Latin for anger, the passion that takes the initiative to correct evil. Craig Steven Titus, “Passions in Christ:
Spontaneity, Development, and Virtue”, The Thomist 73 (2009): 64.
7
An example in the modern psychological literature of a basic list of affective experiences is found in a book by
Erika Hunter, written to help the reader become more emotionally articulate, grow in a capacity to listen and speak
in a more helpful manner about emotional experiences with others, and work through emotional blockages. Hunter
writes: “There are five basic emotions: anger, fear, gladness, sorrow, and shame”. Erika M. Hunter, Little Book of
Big Emotions: How Five Feelings Affect Everything You Do and Don’t Do (Center City, Minnesota: Hazelden,
2004), 19. While there are very good reasons for Hunter’s order of emotions, such as anger being mentioned first
because it is such a problematic emotion for many people, St Thomas’ approach is more balanced. By mentioning
love, desire and joy first he establishes the proper understanding of affectivity and its development upon the basic
principle that love of the good is fundamental to a healthy affective maturity. The other passions that respond to the
experience of evil can only be fully understood in light of the experience of evil as what interferes with the
culmination of love and the desire of the good in its enjoyment.
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undermines pastoral relationships. Fortitude moderates his fear and strengthens his sense of daring
to attain more difficult pastoral tasks. Chapter 8 will examine three examples of how virtue forms
affectivity: friendship, eutrapelia and beauty. In Chapter 9, the study will move to an analysis of
the role of the theological virtues of Faith, Hope and Charity, the Gifts and Fruits of the Holy
Spirit, and the Beatitudes, as principles of affective formation.
The third section (Chapters 10-11) analyzes how the seminarian can respond to his disordered
affections and how they can impact upon his pastoral ministry. The first step in this section of the
study - Chapter 10 - is to follow St Thomas’ analysis of these inordinate affective acts in their root
causes, what he calls the Capital Vices. Some examples are pride, vainglory and envy. These
proceed from an essentially good affective faculty; however, it is a wounded faculty which can
obscure the perception of both human needs and the acts necessary to fulfill them. In Chapter 11,
the analysis will move to a consideration of how infused virtue - the Christian’s capacity to act for
the good that flows from the life of grace - can be a principle of renewal. As a test case we will
look at the role of infused virtue in relation to the inordinate desire of lust and the renewal of the
seminarian’s capacity to live a chaste life.
As well as its detailed treatment of affectivity, the importance of St Thomas’ teaching for affective
formation is its healthy realism. As Nicholas Lombardo explains, St Thomas’ teaching avoids two
extremes. It avoids an overly suspicious concern about human emotion that “seeks to guard against
it, restrain it, and prevent it from taking control”.8 It also avoids an exultation “in emotion and
desire” that “glorifies following wherever it might lead”.9 St Thomas recognizes both the inherent
goodness of human affectivity and “that, in a fallen world, human affectivity is prone to
distortions”.10 This is both a helpful approach for the seminarian’s affective development and it
provides a detailed body of reflections that will help him to guide others when he becomes a priest.

8

Nicholas Lombardo, The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of
America Press, 2011), xi.
9
Ibid, xii.
10
Ibid.
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2. The Main Sources of Literature
A number of scholars in recent years have brought to light St Thomas’ interest in affectivity as an
integral element of human development. The main contribution of this thesis is to apply both St
Thomas’ teaching and the insights of these scholars specifically to the seminarian’s affective
formation.
The primary sources in St Thomas’ works are extensive. In the First Part of Summa Theologica,
St Thomas considers the spiritual affections, such as love, that can be attributed to God who is the
source and exemplar of human affectivity. In Summa Theologica I-II, qq.22-48, St Thomas offers
a detailed treatise on the main human passions, their causes, effects, and their morality. His
treatment of the role of the virtues in forming human passions and actions follows in Summa
Theologica I-II, qq.49-70. In the Third Part of Summa Theologica St Thomas offers his reflections
on Christ’s affectivity as an integral element of his true humanity through which he saves us.
Another important source is St Thomas’ treatise on the sensitive appetite as the source of the
passions in De Veritate qq.25-26. In De Malo, furthermore, St Thomas examines the main
dynamics of affective distortions that incline the human heart to sin.
Certain contemporary works have greatly assisted the research of this topic. Robert Miner’s
Thomas Aquinas on the Passions: A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48 provides a fine study
of St Thomas’ teaching. The strength of this work is that it concentrates on explaining the Treatise
on the Human Passions. The Logic of Desire by Nicholas Lombardo complements Miner’s study
by making more explicit the wider theological context of St Thomas’ thought on affectivity. The
significance of Lombardo’s treatment for affective formation is that he brings to light how the
principles of grace form affectivity. Paul Crittenden’s, Reason, Will and Emotion: Defending the
Greek Tradition against Triune Consciousness, provides a crystal clear defense of St Thomas’
understanding of human affectivity as both intellectual and sensitive love. In Resilience and the
Virtue of Fortitude: Aquinas in Dialogue with the Psychosocial Sciences, Craig Steven Titus
examines St Thomas’ teaching on the affective capacity for coping with the difficulties of life.
Titus’ study offers a clear explanation of St Thomas’ understanding of the formative role of virtues
such as fortitude. This can be applied to the development of the seminarian’s affective growth
through personal and pastoral challenges.
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The Passions of Christ’s Soul in the Theology of St Thomas Aquinas, by Paul Gondreau, is a
thorough investigation of St Thomas’ thought on human affectivity. It makes clear St Thomas’
deep respect for affectivity as an integral dimension of the truth of the Incarnation. The most
important implication is that the goodness of affectivity in the human person is affirmed in the
Incarnation.
Basil Cole’s The Hidden Enemies of the Priesthood: The Contributions of St. Thomas Aquinas, is
a careful application of St Thomas’ teaching to the issue of how inordinate desires interfere with
the priest’s ability to live his vocation. In Glittering Vices: A New Look at the Seven Deadly Sins
and their Remedies and Vainglory: The Forgotten Vice, Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung brings to
light St Thomas’ insights into the affective dynamics of the main principles of human sin. In
particular, DeYoung shows how vice truly harms individuals and their personal relationships.
Conrad W. Baars, a psychiatrist and counsellor, sought to place the insights of St Thomas at the
service of the emotional development of priests. He lamented the neglect of St Thomas’ teaching
in seminary formation which deprived seminarians “of what should be one of the most important
sources of maturity and priestly identity - the authentic anthropology of St Thomas Aquinas”.11 I
will apply Baar’s consideration of such afflictions as the inability to delight in the good, and how
that person can be healed, to the seminarian’s affective formation.
This study draws together insights from these works, according to a close reading of St Thomas,
so as to find direct applications for the formation of seminarians. It involves an overlap between
the affective development common to any responsible Christian and that which is specific to the
seminarian. One reason for this overlap is that the seminarian should have the same level of
affective maturity as anyone else entrusted with the welfare of others. Another reason is that while
the seminarian should possess a maturity specific to his future role as a shepherd he also has a
basic right to an education which contributes to the development of his own affectivity. This is the
solid basis for him to understand the affective life and then to guide others in its virtuous
development.

11

Conrad W. Baars, M.D., A Priest for All Seasons: Masculine and Celibate, in I will give them a New Heart:
Reflections on the Priesthood and the Renewal of the Church, edited by Suzanne M. Baars, M.A. & Bonnie N.
Shayne, M.A. (Staten Island, New York: St Pauls, 2008), 178.
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I wish to make it clear, from the outset, I am not arguing that the study of St Thomas’ teaching
alone enables the seminarian to become affectively mature. Human beings, as persons of flesh,
blood and feeling, do not develop according to the neat structures of academic works because each
person has his own unique experiences, capacities and temperaments. However, the argument of
this thesis is that St Thomas’ teaching on human affectivity and its development can make a very
positive contribution to affective formation. Since it provides both seminary formators and
seminarians with a sound body of knowledge to guide the seminarian’s affective development.
Furthermore, this thesis does not employ the method or form of dialectical argumentation found
in Summa Theologica where St Thomas posits a question, outlines various objections, gives his
response, and then replies to the objections. In this respect, it should be noted that there is more
than one method of developing an argument in St Thomas’ theological writings. He wrote
commentaries on Sacred Scripture and a number of them are integral to this thesis. For example,
this thesis includes discussions about St Thomas’ Commentary on the Gospel of John in which he
develops a line of argument for how we understand Christ’s affectivity and human relationships.
The argument here is more direct in its exposition and does not use the structure St Thomas uses
in Summa Theologica as mentioned above.
St Thomas also employs a different method in Summa Contra Gentiles, which is a theological
account of the truth of the Christian Faith and includes refutations of any errors that oppose that
Faith. It is divided so that each chapter discusses a point of reflection about Christian belief,
worship and morality. The chapters are divided into subsections that explain the truth of Christian
belief and at times clarify misunderstandings that would inhibit someone assenting to it. It is true
that some chapters deal explicitly with objections to the Christian faith to be followed by another
chapter which responds to these objections, for example, in relation to the doctrine of the
resurrection of the body. However, the general method is to systematically explain and argue for
the truth of the Christian faith and not in a way that adheres to the structure of Summa Theologica.
This thesis does not follow any one of these methods in particular. Rather, it develops a theological
argument about the elements of St Thomas’ reflections on affectivity that can be applied to help
our seminarians become affectively mature priests.
Furthermore, the focus on St Thomas’ teaching in this thesis should not be misconstrued as a
dismissal of other voices on affectivity in the Catholic theological tradition. This thesis briefly
17

refers to writers such as St Augustine, St Gregory the Great, St Bonaventure, Blessed Duns Scotus
and St Francis de Sales. In a different kind of study these writers and others such as St John of the
Cross, who provided light on the relationship between Christian holiness and the reordering of
affectivity through grace, would have been given a greater say in the discussion. Moreover, as a
canonized saint and Pope, Karol Wojtyła (1920 - 2005) is another voice in the tradition who makes
a significant contribution to the understanding of affective formation. His reflections on affectivity
will be explored in some detail because they help us to better understand how important it is to
study St Thomas’ teaching on affective development. However, the main focus of this thesis will
remain the study of St Thomas’ reflections on affectivity and how his insights can be applied to
the benefit of the seminarian’s affective formation.
On another point, it is not within the scope of this thesis to consider in detail the question of St
Thomas’ Aristotelianism or his Augustinianism. It will become apparent during the thesis that St
Thomas carefully studied Aristotle, for example, by writing a commentary on Aristotle’s
Nichomachean Ethics and quoting him extensively in Summa Theologica. However, in his treatise
on the human passions in Summa Theologica St Thomas also demonstrates knowledge of St
Augustine’s work, namely, his reflections on human affectivity as an integral part of authentic
human life in De Civitate Dei. The salient point to note here is that apart from the various times St
Thomas refers to both these authors in his treatment of human affectivity, on issues such as
applying remedies to ameliorate sorrow, St Thomas has appropriated their respect for the
importance of affectivity. For them, as for St Thomas, the proper development of human affectivity
is an integral part of the overall moral development of the human person according to a life of love
for God and for one’s neighbor. This treatment includes not only investigating the nature of
different experiences of affectivity, such as love and anger, but also seeking to articulate the moral
principles that guide the discernment of the morality of these experiences.12

12

See Mark D. Jordan, Rewritten Theology: Aquinas After His Readers (Malden, USA: Blackwell Publishing,
2006), 60-88, for a discussion of this issue. Jordan makes the point that Aristotle is only one of a number of
philosophical and theological authors that St Thomas draws upon to develop his own position on various issues of
ethics. Jordan refers to the fact that St Thomas’ commentaries on Aristotle’s works add up to 13% of St Thomas’
corpus. Still, St Thomas sees it as very important to write extensive commentaries on Aristotle’s works and in
particular, his Nichomachean Ethics, whereas his other commentaries are on such topics as the exposition of St
John’s Gospel. This shows that St Thomas thought it very important to reflect upon Aristotle’s works and, where
possible and helpful, incorporate them into his theological reflections on the ethical life of the Christian.
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Finally, one worthwhile line of future enquiry would be to review the current affective formation
programs of various Catholic seminaries in light of St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity. I have not
taken this approach here. Instead, I have concentrated on the theological argument that St Thomas’
teaching offers a way forward for seminary formation because it can help seminarians to
understand how to become more affectively mature shepherds in the service of others.
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SECTION 1
THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF AFFECTIVITY
Section 1 examines St Thomas’ general teaching on affectivity in its relevance to affective
formation. Chapter 1 reflects on the Church’s requirement that the priest be affectively mature, the
influence of St Thomas on Pope St John Paul II’s teaching on affectivity, and a comparison
between St Thomas’ approach to affective development and that of the Theological Manuals.
Chapter 2 examines St Thomas’ teaching on affections in God and affectivity in Christ to establish
a theological basis for affective formation. Chapter 3 reflects on the nature of human passion and
how the seminarian can develop his capacity to feel appropriately in response to good and evil.
Chapter 4 discusses the first three concupiscible passions - love, desire, and joy - and their
importance for the affective development of the seminarian. Chapter 5 examines St Thomas’
teaching on how hatred and sorrow can be integrated into the seminarian’s affective maturity.
Chapter 6 reflects on how the proper formation of the irascible passions of hope, despair, fear,
daring and anger can help the seminarian to cope with challenges.
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CHAPTER 1
ST THOMAS AND ST JOHN PAUL II ON AFFECTIVITY
This Chapter will set the context for the study of St Thomas’ theology of affectivity and its
contribution to the seminarian’s affective formation. The aim is to show that affective formation
is important and to open a way to investigate how St Thomas’ teaching can help its development.
This chapter first briefly explains why affective formation is a requirement of the Church for
someone preparing to be a priest. Then it considers the link between St Thomas’ teaching on
affectivity and that of Pope St John Paul II, who gave a major impetus to affective formation in
the Church document Pastores Dabo Vobis. A final consideration concerns a short comparison
between St Thomas’ approach to affectivity and that of the Moral Theological Manuals to highlight
the specific nature of St Thomas’ approach.

1. The Church’s Teaching on Affective Formation
The Church views affective formation as an integral part of developing the seminarian’s human
qualities of mind and heart. It is within the context of the communities of formation (seminaries)
established by the Church that this formation normally occurs.13 To be admitted to the seminary
the Church requires that the individual candidate possess the physical and psychological health to
dedicate himself permanently to the sacred ministry. He is to cultivate the virtues which are highly
valued in human relationships so that there is a harmony between the human and supernatural
values of Christian life.14 The specific aim of affective formation is to foster the development of
both the seminarian’s affective life and its role in his personal and pastoral relationships.

A further question is: how much of the seminarian’s formation should also take place in a setting outside the
seminary? For example, should there be an extended time of formation in a parish, under proper supervision, to see
how the seminarian can relate to others in a context outside the confines of seminary life? However, that is a
question that is not addressed here because it is not directly relevant to our present consideration.
14
See Ernest Caparros, Exegetical Commentary on the Code of Canon Law, Volume II/1, Canons 244-245, English
Language Edition (Montreal, Canada: Wilson & Lafleur, 2004). This thesis is concerned with the formation of those
in the major seminary, that is, those who have entered formation for the priesthood. The minor seminary, on the
other hand, is an institute that promotes vocations by providing a religious formation in connection with the overall
education that is appropriate to those who are still very young. See Canon 234, n.1.
13
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The importance of affective formation is drawn from the vocation and life of the priest.
Presbyterorum Ordinis, the Second Vatican Council’s Decree on the Ministry and Life of Priests,
teaches that by ordination, and according to their mission, priests are incorporated into the service
of Christ as teacher, priest, and king. Through this threefold service priests share in Christ’s
ministry to build up God’s people by preaching God’s Word, interceding for the people, and
guiding them to the fullness of Christian maturity. They are chosen for this ministry from among
their Christian brothers and sisters to act on their behalf before God, offering sacrifice for them
and interceding for them. Yet, in imitation of Christ they are also called to live among them and
so both witness to the life of Heaven and serve their flock.
For this task priests need to cultivate “those qualities which are rightly held in high esteem in
human relations; qualities such as goodness of heart, sincerity, strength and constancy of mind,
careful attention to justice, courtesy”.15 The logic here is straightforward: without such qualities
the ministry of the priest lacks the power to form the relationships underpinning his role as teacher,
sanctifier, and shepherd. For example, if he is not able to control his excessive anger, the priest
can preach in a way that fails either to appeal to the reason of the congregation or to win their
hearts to the love of Christ.
Moreover, the Second Vatican Council’s Decree on the Training of Priests, Optatam Totius,
requires the Christian education of the seminarian to be supplemented by the findings of sound
psychology and pedagogy. A properly formed formation program will develop in the seminarian
“a proper degree of human maturity, showing itself in a certain stability of character, in the ability
to make carefully considered decisions, and in a sound judgment of events and people”.16 Optatam
Totius also mentions habits of self-control, strength of character, fidelity to promises, modesty,
charity in speech, and the wise use of personal freedom.
Furthermore, Optatam Totius recommends St Thomas as one who holds the “principal place”
among the Doctors of the Church, on account of his sincere love of truth and his great wisdom in

15

Austin Flannery, O.P., Decree on the Ministry and Life of Priests: Presbyterorum Ordinis, n.3, 7 December, 1965,
in Vatican Council II: Constitution, Decrees, Declarations, (North Port, New York: Costello Publishing Company,
1996).
16
Austin Flannery, O.P., Decree on the Training of Priests: Optatam Totius, n.11, 28 October, 1965, Vatican
Council II: Constitution, Decrees, Declarations, (North Port, New York: Costello Publishing Company, 1996).
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investigating the deepest truths and linking them together.17 This principle of seminary education
is also referred to in the Code of Canon Law, which recommends St Thomas as the seminarian’s
“teacher” in penetrating the mysteries of salvation in Sacred Scripture and Sacred Tradition.18
Following St Thomas’ approach, therefore, this study will respect the connection of truths between
the development of affectivity, the life of virtue and the preparation of the seminarian to live as a
priest after the example of Christ.
More recently, in Amoris Laetitia Pope Francis referred to the need for seminarians “to explore
their own psychological and affective background and experiences”.19 The Pope acknowledged
that seminarians can come from families that are “troubled, with absent parents and a lack of
emotional stability”.20 Thus the formation process ought to help seminarians achieve “the maturity
and psychological balance needed for their future ministry”.21 Thus, Pope Francis recognizes the
serious challenge posed to seminary formation, if the seminarian comes from a family background
that has not provided him with sufficient emotional stability.
Another recent Church document on priestly formation emphasizes the importance of the
seminarian’s human growth. The Gift of the Priestly Vocation: Ratio Fundamentalis Institutionis
Sacerdotalis, was published by the Congregation for the Clergy in 2016. It sees the integration of
the various dimensions of the seminarian’s formation in terms of helping him to be configured to
Christ in his attitudes, feelings and characteristic ways of relating to others.22 The goal of formation
is that the seminarian should form in himself a heart, and a life, that enables him to be a sign of
God’ love for each person.23 In this context, the seminarian’s human development is “the

Ibid, n.11, f.n.36. These qualities of St Thomas’ thought are drawn from Paul VI, Address in Gregorian
University, 12 March 1964: AAS 56 (1964) p.365.
18
Canon 252, n.3.
19
Pope Francis, Amoris Laetitia: The Joy of Love, Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation On Love in the Family, n.203
(Cittá del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2016/Strathfield, St Pauls, 2016).
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid. In the same passage, Pope Francis also mentions that families ought “to be part of the seminary process” and
that family bonds deepen a “healthy self-esteem”. Moreover, for the sake of their future work with families,
seminarians ought to have “greater contact with the concrete realities of family life”.
22
See Congregation for the Clergy, The Gift of the Priestly Vocation: Ratio Fundamentalis Institutionis
Sacerdotalis, Introduction (Vatican City: L’Osservatore Romano, 8 December, 2016). See also n.39: “The priest is
called to have within himself the same feelings and attitudes that Christ has towards the Church, loved tenderly
through the exercise of the ministry.”
23
Ibid, n.40.
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foundation of all priestly formation”.24 In developing such virtues as justice and fidelity, the
seminarian is aiming to become a priest who is “a living reflection of the humanity of Jesus and a
bridge that unites people to God”.25 In this way the document highlights the connection between
the seminarian’s human formation and his call to represent Christ to others as an ordained minister.
The seminarian also needs to manifest “a gradual emotional development, openness to live in
community, capacity for cultivating brotherly friendships, a sense of responsibility”. 26 He needs
to maintain healthy relationships with his families and peers, so as to foster “a healthy
psychological development, especially where the affective life is concerned”.27 He needs to
integrate his gifts and talents, as they are shaped by grace, with a proper response to his “limits
and frailty” so that he may personally mature.28 To become “a man of communion, mission and
dialogue” he needs to overcome “every form of self-promotion or emotional dependency”.29 He
ought to set aside such vices as vainglory, ostentatious display in the Sacred Liturgy and instead
form the virtues of “simplicity, sobriety, serene dialogue and authenticity”.30 Forming his faculties
of mind and body, he ought to act with prudence and judge well of the consequences of his actions,
discern his motivations and set aside disordered affections.31
Formators should help the seminarian to grow humanly as well as spiritually, recognizing that this
growth is fostered by personal relationships with his family and peers, within the community of
the seminary, and in the various meetings with others in social, educational and pastoral settings.
He should not progress through the various stages of seminary formation without attaining the
necessary human maturity as well as a proper Christian and priestly maturity. 32 In terms of forming
a disciple’s heart in the seminarian, so that he can learn to follow Christ, the document writes:
“Special attention is given to the human dimension, in harmony with spiritual growth, so as to help
the seminarian mature in his definitive decision to follow the Lord in his ministerial priesthood”.33
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However, the strongest statement the Congregation for the Clergy makes is in relation to the
seminarian’s suitability for ordination. “For priestly formation”, the Congregation explains, “the
importance of human formation cannot be sufficiently emphasized. Indeed, the holiness of a priest
is built upon it and depends in large part upon the authenticity and maturity of his humanity. The
lack of a well-structured and balanced personality is a serious and objective hindrance to the
continuation of formation for the priesthood.”34 This is an emphatic statement about the
fundamental importance of human maturity for the seminarian to be ordained to the priesthood.
The development of the seminarian’s human maturity is not to be conducted in isolation from his
spiritual formation. “Growth in human maturity” is not a matter of the seminarian relying on his
own resources without the help of God. It is, rather, “assisted and brought about by divine grace,
which gives direction to the growth of the spiritual life”.35 In seeking to configure himself to Christ
the seminarian needs to contemplate the life of Christ, as “the beloved Son of the Father, sent as
the Shepherd of the People of God”.36 Christ thus becomes, as “the perfect man”, the model and
source” for developing the seminarian’s personality. This is the basis for the proper integration of
the human and spiritual dimensions of formation. As the document states: “A correct and
harmonious spirituality demands a well-structured humanity”.37 And here St Thomas is appealed
to, in his assertion that grace does not supplant nature but perfects it (Summa Theologica 1, q.1,
a.8, ad 2). It is for this reason that the cultivation of human virtues such as “humility, courage,
common sense, magnanimity, right judgement and discretion, tolerance and transparency, love and
truth and honesty” should be cultivated.38 In Chapters 7 we will turn to St Thomas’ teaching on
virtue to argue that it can make a substantial contribution to the seminarian’s affective formation.
The need for developing the seminarian’s humanity is referred to in others ways by The Gift of
the Priestly Vocation. There is a call for the development of the seminarian’s psychological,
maturity through a “stable personality, characterized by emotional balance, self-control and a well
integrated sexuality”.39 The seminarian should become a responsible person with “an objective
perception of persons and events”, a proper sense of self-respect, and a capacity for social
34
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interaction.40 Another sign of the seminarian’s maturity “is a mature capacity for relations with
men and women of various ages and social conditions”.41 Also, the Congregation for the Clergy
views the seminarian’s ability to relate well to women “in a positive light”, given his future pastoral
role in parish life and “many ecclesial contexts”.42 Indeed, the document sees such “familiarity
with the feminine” as “beneficial and essential”.43 In relation to this point, in Chapter 11 we will
consider St Thomas’ teaching on virtues such as chastity, which help the seminarian to relate to
members of the opposite sex in a mature way.
Another issue addressed by The Gift of the Priestly Vocation is the use of digital media. While this
can be used to bring people together and help them to know Christ, the seminarian should avoid
the risk of “various forms of addiction”.44 Beyond the study of technical proficiency, it is necessary
“above all to familiarise seminarians with their balanced and mature use, avoiding excessive
attachment”.45 The need for the virtue of temperance, as a formative principle of the seminarian’s
desire to use created things, is apparent here. Thus, St Thomas’ teaching on the virtue of
temperance, in its role of forming the desire for pleasure, will be considered in Chapter 7.
In relation to celibacy, the document refers to the need for the seminarian to “enjoy free and serene
affective maturity”. It “would be gravely imprudent to admit to the Sacrament of Orders a
seminarian” who is immature in this matter. The seminarian “must be faithful to celibate chastity
through the exercise of human and priestly virtues, understood as openness to the action of grace,
rather than the mere achievement of continence by will power alone”. The reception of the gift of
celibacy from God requires “a proper emotional formation, understood as a journey towards the
fullness of love.”46 This makes clear that emotional maturity is essential for a life of celibacy, a
point that will be reflected upon in Chapter 11.
A last point to be noted concerns the role of psychological experts in the human formation of the
seminarian. Psychological expertise can be a valuable help “in the assessment of personality,
expressing an opinion as to the psychological health of the candidate; and in therapeutic
40
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accompaniment, in order to shed light on any problems that may emerge and to assist in human
maturity”.47 The seminarian ought to co-operate with such help in his affective development.
However, when seeking the help of such experts the seminary needs to ensure that, as well as their
human qualities and their professional competence, “their faith must also be taken into account”.48
Also, in giving advice, such experts are to limit themselves to their “field of competence, without
making judgments as to the suitability of the seminarians for the priesthood”.49 Moreover, they
should share an anthropology that reflects the Christian vision of the human person, sexuality,
priesthood and celibacy.50 An important implication here is that the person who counsels the
seminarian must always advise him in a way that respects the moral teaching of the Church.

2. St Thomas and Pope St John Paul II on Affectivity
In the Introduction of The Gift of the Priestly Vocation the Congregation points to Pope St John
Paul II’s Post Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Pastores Dabo Vobis as a “ground-breaking”
document.51 While the Congregation does not state why Pastores Dabo Vobis is groundingbreaking, one reason for this statement could be that the Church became more keenly aware that
the human crises of the time required a greater emphasis on the human formation of the seminarian.
St John Paul II himself points to problems such as an “individualism”, which closes someone in
on himself and renders him “incapable of true human relationships”. The flight from loneliness
leads young people to find refuge in “hedonism” or a “flight from responsibility”. And, St John
Paul II also mentions the impact of “the breakup of the family and an obscuring or distorting of
the true meaning of human sexuality”.52 All these issues touch upon the seminarian’s
understanding of himself as a human person, his experience of himself as a human being and his
capacity to properly express his emotional life and build true relationships. It is clear from such
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challenges that the human formation of the seminarian should not be neglected but be developed
with great care.
In Pastores Dabo Vobis, a response to the reflections of the 1990 Synod of Bishops, St John Paul
II reflected on the identity of the priest and the various dimensions of the formation process that
would help seminarians to be shepherds after the heart of God.53 He insists that the human
formation of the seminarian is essential to his overall preparation for the priesthood. While the
spiritual, intellectual and pastoral dimensions of formation are clearly indispensable, the
seminarian’s human maturity also needs to be developed in accord with the priest’s vocation to
reflect the human perfection of the Good Shepherd.54 This Christologically centered “human
formation” is the “necessary foundation” of preparation for priestly life. 55 It follows that such
human qualities as affability, generosity and forgiveness enable him to relate well to others and so
make it easier for them to know the Lord Jesus.56
It is within this context that St John Paul II discusses the development of the seminarian’s
“affective maturity” which requires “an education in true and responsible love”. 57 This affective
maturity is an integration of the priest’s emotional life with the true good of those entrusted to his
pastoral care. Such qualities as chastity and the capacity for true friendship, prudence and esteem
for women, are necessary for the seminarian to truly express his love for others.
Now, to set the work of this thesis on a solid foundation we need to consider the Thomistic
background to St John Paul II’s thought on affective maturity. If a connection can be established
between the reflections on affectivity of St Thomas and St John Paul II, it will give credence to
the application of St Thomas’ teaching to the formation of seminarians. Granted, there is no
explicit reference in Pastores Dabo Vobis to St Thomas’ teaching on the process of affective
maturity. However, a study of St John Paul II’s writings before he became Pope indicates a
significant knowledge of St Thomas’ thought on the principles that form a person’s affectivity.
Ibid, n.3. St John Paul II quotes Jeremiah 3.15 early in Pastores Dabo Vobis: “I will give you shepherds after my
own heart” – connecting it to the Church’s renewed “pastoral commitment to care for vocations and the formation of
priests” (n.4). The end of the quote from Jeremiah 3.15 is “who will feed you with knowledge and understanding”.
The context is that God is calling the straying children of Israel and Judah to return to God (3.11-18).
54
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This is important, because it indicates that St John Paul II’s teaching on affective formation can be
complemented by a study of St Thomas’ thought on affectivity and its development.
This line of reflection is also in harmony with the teaching of St John Paul II who as Pope strongly
recommended the study of St Thomas’ works in relation to the human person. For example, in
Inter Munera Academiarum, in which he gives St Thomas the title Doctor Humanitatis (Doctor of
Humanity), St John Paul II reaffirms the study of St Thomas’ philosophy. This recommendation
especially refers to the study of St Thomas’ reflections on human culture, the human person,
human dignity and human reason.58 For the sake of the present discussion, it is pertinent to note
that for St Thomas human affectivity and its proper development is included as an important
dimension of his consideration of the human person. It seems reasonable to conclude that the study
of this dimension of St Thomas’ anthropology is in keeping with St John Paul II’s vision of the
study of the human person. It also seems reasonable to consider its application to the affective
formation of seminarians.
To establish a connection between the teaching on affectivity of St Thomas and Karol Wojtyła
before he became Pope John Paul II, the following analysis will be considered under two headings:
a) Karol Wojtyła on Affectivity; b) St Thomas on the Subjectivity of the Person. It is hoped that it
will become clear there is a real connection between St Thomas’ reflections on affectivity and
those of St John Paul II. Another goal is to introduce some basic tenets of St Thomas’ teaching on
affective development that will be discussed in detail as the thesis progresses.

58

See Inter Munera Academiarum, n.4. This document is included in full in Thomas Aquinas: Teacher of Humanity,
edited by John P. Hittinger and Daniel C. Wagner (Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015),
xxi-xxiv. It could be asked whether St Thomas has a philosophy in the proper sense in contradistinction to the use of
philosophy within the context and at the service of theology. While it is not within the scope of this thesis to decide
this question, I think it should be noted that St Thomas’ philosophical works, such as his commentaries on
Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Ethics are genuine attempts to engage in a philosophical discourse as an effort of reason
to understand the greater questions of human life. For a discussion of the difference between philosophical discourse
and theological reflection in St Thomas’ thought, see Ralph McInerny’s “Introduction” to St Thomas’ Commentary
on Aristotle’s De Anima, trans. Kenelm Foster, O.P., and Silvester Humphries, O.P. (Note Dame, Indiana: Dumb Ox
Books, 1994) xi-xv. McInerny comments that St Thomas’ view of philosophical discourse is that it needs to
genuinely proceed by the light of reason. Theology, however, proceeds by the light of faith which accepts as its
starting point what God has revealed and which reason can then reflect upon.

29

a. Karol Wojtyła on Affectivity
Karol Wojtyła’s treatment of affectivity concentrates on the relationship between the selfgoverning nature of the human person and his emotional life. From Aristotle and St Thomas,
Wojtyła gained the insight that the person becomes more perfect through his acts, when they are
truly good acts. In such acts the person experiences the fulfilment of himself.59 This contrasts with
Max Scheler’s “emotional intuitionism”: the feeling of moral values and the arrangement of these
values into a hierarchy of importance by the person who feels them. Wojtyła rejects this as a
principle of moral development, because emotion is only properly formed when it is integrated
with the willing of the person’s true rational good.60 Even though Wojtyła accepts that emotion is
a significant factor in ethical experience, he asserts that the element of willing, as it is guided by
reason, is central to forming that experience.61
The fundamental background to Wojtyła’s approach to ethics is that of a philosophical realism that
he shares with St Thomas. For Wojtyła, ethics must be based in reality otherwise actions do not
bring about the true perfection of the human person. It is only in this context that a true discussion
of the ethical importance of affectivity can be fruitfully undertaken. As Thomas Petri writes,
Wojtyła’s approach reveals that he has “a fundamental trust … in the ability to grasp reality. As a
Thomist, he is a realist moral theologian, that is, a theologian who believes that the human mind
can know objective reality.”62 The capacity to know reality extends to a knowledge of how the
human person’s capacities can be properly developed, including the capacity of the person for
emotion.
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Wojtyła’s insistence on the importance of how choices move the human person from potency to
actual fulfilment is also relevant here.63 The will, guided by reason, develops the person through
actions that accord with both objective and subjective reality. This concerns a correct judgment
about the person who is the object of our attention and what kinds of acts promote his true good.
It also concerns making truthful judgments about my own inner affective life, and avoiding a proud
and self-absorbed attitude, that fails to seriously reflect on sound moral teachings that would
properly develop that affective life. This concerns the proper integration of emotion with truthful
judgments and good acts of the will.
To show how Wojtyła explains this principle of affective integration and how he draws upon St
Thomas’ teaching to develop it, the following discussion reflects on three points: i) Wojtyła’s
Teaching in Love and Responsibility; ii) Connections with the Teaching of St Thomas on
Affectivity; iii) the Virtues and Sexuality.

i. Wojtyła’s Teaching in Love and Responsibility
Wojtyła took a keen interest in trying to explain the Church’s teaching on human sexuality in a
coherent fashion to help people more deeply appreciate it in a time of great cultural upheaval. For
example, he was very conscious of the Church’s need to give a better explanation of the teaching
of the goodness of marital sex and how contraception was damaging to a married couple’s personal
union.64 His concern to give a more adequate account of sexuality, and the formation of the
affective dynamics it involves, is evident in such writings as Love and Responsibility, where he

For a discussion of Wojtyła’s understanding of how choices move the human person from potency to act and how
this must be in accord with objective and subjective reality for the true good of the person, see Aquinas and the
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writes: “The present book was born principally of the need to put the norms of Catholic sexual
morality on a firm basis”. The aim was to help the spiritual advisor “not only to command or forbid
but to justify, to interpret, to explain”.65 The motivation behind Wojtyła’s interest in exploring this
theme, as Petri explains, is that he “clearly believed that the Church’s difficulty in defending
Christian sexuality was due not only to cultural trends but also to what might be described as the
rigid objectivistic method of the manualist tradition.”66 The Manualist tradition will be discussed
below in relation to appreciating St Thomas’ approach to affectivity. For the moment, however,
the aim is to clarify how Wojtyła’s reflections on sexuality includes the experience and formation
of affectivity in our inner life and relationships.
In Love and Responsibility, Wojtyła carefully analyses various kinds of love, such as friendship
and betrothed love, describing the various forms of emotional involvement connected with them.
The overall aim is to study the truth of human affectivity, in the context of integrating it into a
deeply personal understanding of human sexuality and the relationships that express it. The theme
of integration is of great importance in Wojtyła’s reflections. It refers to the harmonizing of the
various dimensions of the person’s capacities and desires for the true good of the person and those
he relates to.67 This is a very Thomistic theme. As will be discussed below, Wojtyła draws upon
St Thomas’ notion of moderation and temperance, which forms the human person’s desires for
pleasure through the guidance of reason.
The deeper source of this Thomistic influence flows from St Thomas’ fundamental anthropological
tenet about the unity between the body and the soul in the human person. Let us spend some time
outlining St Thomas’ position on this issue, so that its importance for Wojtyła’s thought on
affectivity can become more apparent. For St Thomas’ position on the possibility of forming
human affectivity, through good reasoning and good acts, stands upon the unity of the human
person in body and soul. This, as we will see below, is fundamental to Wojtyła’s insistence on the
integration of reason and emotion in willing the good of another person.
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For St Thomas, the mutual influence of reason, will and passion, testifies to the intimate union
between the body and the soul, and hence the intimate link between the sensitive appetite and the
rational appetite.68 For example, a person who is angry is inclined to actions he would not consider
when he is calm. St Thomas argues for the unity of the human person even though he differentiates
the activities of the body and the soul: “it is one and the same man who is conscious both that he
understands, and that he senses”.69 Yet, intellectual activity is the distinctive operation of the
human person. This activity points to the reality of the soul, because “the nature of each thing is
shown by its operation”.70 The activities of the senses, such as seeing, operate for the sake of this
intellectual activity.71 It is the distinctive intellectual operation of the human person, and the fact
that it is the one person who both thinks and feels, that leads St Thomas to conclude: “the
intellectual principle is united to the body as its form”.72 The importance of this truth for the
formation of the person is that while the intellectual principle is the distinctive principle that makes
us human, the body is integral to our dignity. In Petri’s words, “the body is neither unimportant
nor a mere instrument of the human person.”73 It is in and through our body that we learn about
the world, and other people, and through our body that we express ourselves, our thoughts,
affections, intentions, and choices.
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Yet, the intellectual principle of the soul attests, for St Thomas, that the soul is greater and more
enduring than the body, so that St Thomas writes of the soul’s capacity to exist after death.74 Yet,
it also affirms that the proper mode of the human soul is to be the form of the body, so that it
exercises its proper operations through the body. Think, for example, of the mind which requires
the proper operations of the senses to perform its activities.75 For instance, we need to see many
things to gain knowledge of them.76
That the soul is the form of the body influences how St Thomas views the passions, which are the
acts distinctive of this intimate union of body and soul. As he writes: “certain modifications affect
soul and body together, not the soul alone”.77 The passions are acts, then, that are caused by the
awareness produced by the external senses, such as sight, and the internal senses, such as
imagination.
This is the basis for recognizing the development of affectivity, as an integral dimension of the
person’s overall perfection as a rational person, as one who understands and governs himself.78
Thus, ultimately, the work of integration is to express, in a true perfective unity, the capacities of
the person in his body and soul, both within himself and in his personal relationships. Wojtyła
explicitly affirms St Thomas’ appreciation for how this work of integration is grounded in the unity
of the human person. The sensitive faculties, both cognitive and appetitive, make their own
contribution to the development of the human person’s psychological and moral personality. As
Wojtyła observes:
St Thomas is well aware of this reality and formulates his characterization accordingly. The
spiritual aspect, he says, is eminently suited to unite into a substantial whole with the
corporeal, and thus also with the sensory. This union must, therefore, also play a special role
See Summa Theologica I, q.76, a.2, ad 2: “Now it is clear that the intellectual soul, by virtue of its very being, is
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in shaping the human personality. According to St Thomas, all the faculties of the human soul
work to perfect the human being, and so they all contribute to the development of the person.79

This clearly states Wojtyła’s appreciation for St Thomas’ anthropology, which lays a solid basis
for understanding the directive role of reason in relation to the various human faculties, and yet
recognizes the importance of these faculties in the development of the person’s character. An
implication is that the affective faculty is not to be negated, but properly developed by reason to
make its own particular contribution in each person’s life and personal relationships.
Wojtyła’s discussion of integration refers to such affective experiences as sensuality, which is an
experience embedded in the physical beauty of the person, and sentimentality, which is an
emotional love for the whole person. Wojtyła’s abiding principle is that these experiences need to
be integrated with the willing of the true good of the person who is loved. This person is to be
loved for her own sake and not to be used as a mere means to an end. 80 As Wojtyła writes in
Thomistic Personalism: if love is to be worthy of the human person it must subordinate “our
sensory energies and desires” to “a basic understanding of the true worth of the object of our
love”.81
In his reflections on the psychological experience of love, Wojtyła analyses the difference between
sense impressions and emotional reactions. Sense impressions are the sensory reactions we have
to external objects when we see, hear, touch, taste, or smell something. Sense impressions are
closely connected with the cognitive power of the senses, by which we gain knowledge of
particular objects in the world. Now, a particular sensory impression is often connected with a
particular emotional response. The content of a sensory impression reflects the image of an object,
“whereas in an emotion we are reacting to a value which we find in that object”. 82 Emotional
reaction relates, not just to the objects experienced in sensory experience, but to their value for
us.83
A consideration relevant to the proper development of the affective life is found in Wojtyła’s
rejection of “situationism”, a moral theory that teaches each situation is unique and of itself
See Karol Wojtyła, “Thomistic Personalism,” in Person and Community: Selected Essays, 168-169.
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supplies us with a norm for action. Hence, it is argued, there are no general principles guiding the
particular experience of love between two people. Wojtyła explains: “This view proclaims the
primacy of experience over virtue”.84 That is, the particular emotional experience of love is
appealed to as a self-justifying principle, without the evaluation of general moral criteria. This
entails the rejection of moral absolutes which, prior to any particular experience, prohibit certain
kinds of actions as intrinsically evil, such as fornication and adultery. Wojtyła’s point is that these
kinds of immoral actions always embody a disregard for the human person and human
relationships. For this reason they always harm the proper development of a person’s affectivity.

ii.

Connections with the Teaching of St Thomas on Affectivity

Wojtyła’s investigation of the experience of human love gives us an approach to affectivity which
is akin to St Thomas’, in no small part because it has Thomistic foundations. His description of
emotion is consonant with St Thomas’ description of the role of the senses in affectivity and its
capacity as a felt response to good objects. The balanced appraisal of love, as the fundamental
affective experience, reflects St Thomas’ reflections on love and its varied expressions, such as
the love of friendship. Wojtyła’s rejection of situationism is also in keeping with St Thomas’
teaching that the development of the emotional life is brought about by actions that accord with
right reason. These are all points from St Thomas’ teaching that will be discussed in the following
chapters.
More to the present point, on particular occasions Wojtyła refers to the teaching of St Thomas. For
example, in his discussion of the relationship between the will and the passions, Wojtyła references
Summa Theologica I-II, q.9, a.2.85 Here Wojtyła notes that while the will is defined as “a rational
appetite” by St Thomas still he recognizes how feelings can influence reason’s focus on certain
objects of desire.86 Also, in his analysis of “carnal concupiscence”, a strongly felt desire which
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arises in the body and “has as its object the body and sex”, Wojtyła draws upon St Thomas’
teaching on the sources of affectivity.87 He refers to St Thomas’ understanding of two major
affective “forces: appetitus concupiscibilis (desire) and appetitus irascibilis (the urge to act)”.88
These are the sources of the feelings - passiones animae (passions of the soul) - that are closely
connected with “sensual cognition”.89 Wojtyła gives thirst as an example of the first set of passions
and anger as an example of the urge to act. Petri observes that for St Thomas appetitus is a
foundational concept related to the notion of love. Appetitus is the tendency to perfection in all
things that moves them to go out of themselves to be completed by other beings. This tendency is
expressed as love, which is the principle that moves each thing to seek certain ends or goods that
perfect it through the acts that achieve union with this good.90 It is this principle of appetitus and
love that underlies the affectivity of the human passions, as an inclination to act for the good and
avoid the evil in personal relationships.
Wojtyła perceives a possible problem in the experience of carnal concupiscence. If the main object
is satisfaction of a person’s desire for the enjoyment of the body and sex, it fails to be a true willing
of the other person’s good. It falls short of loving the person for her own sake and it fails to properly
incorporate the value of the emotional responses to her body, in accord with this personal love.91
This is the “non-integration of love”, that is, the impelling of man and woman to sexual union
without a true personal ethical union.92 Rather, the development of love requires a process of
integration - the establishing of “correct connections between all that originates in sensuality or
emotion, so that it is part of an ethically complete relationship between two persons”. 93 As Petri
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notes, St Thomas articulates such a principle when he writes of the need to avoid isolating the
goods of pleasure from the overall rational good of the person.
It is for this reason that St Thomas carefully considers virtues such as prudence and temperance,
which guide love according to the true nature of the human person as a unity of body and soul, as
a person of reason and emotion. As Petri observes, St Thomas’ understanding that love can be
disordered is what Wojtyła refers to as disintegration, and it is the capacity for virtue and selfmastery that integrates love in accord with the good of the person.94 Chapter 7 on the formative
role of the virtues will reflect upon St Thomas’ articulation of this integrative process through
prudence and the moral virtues.
Like St Thomas, then, Wojtyła finds the integrating principle in acts of the will guided by reason,
which “impose a shape on all the material that sensual and emotional reactions provide”.95 The
aim is to avoid the distortion of subjectivism, the over concentration on one’s own experience of
love to the detriment of an objective attitude. This objective attitude directs one’s attention to the
true good of the other person. The result of subjectivism, to the contrary, is a fixation with pleasure,
and an egoism which preoccupies a person with his own emotional experience of love.96

iii.

The Virtues and Sexuality

In his reflections on the moderating role of the virtues Wojtyła refers to St Thomas’ teaching in
Summa Theologica IIa-IIae, in which “there are certain main virtues which assist the functionings
of the main faculties of the human psyche”.97 Moderation (temperantia) in St Thomas’ view, forms
the passions for the true good of the person, so that he is not fixated on goods based upon the
responses of the senses and emotions. Wojtyła applies this teaching to the moderation of affections
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through the virtue of chastity, which gives a certain equilibrium to the person in matters of
sexuality.98 Chastity directs the emotional life in its connection with the value of sex to the good
of the person. In this way, it helps someone to properly love other people by infusing his capacity
for affectionate gestures with the guidance of reason. The result is that the person’s internal
feelings and external acts emotionally connect him to the true value of another, so that it is properly
felt.99 St Thomas’ approach to this issue will become clear in Chapter 7, where a major point of
discussion will be his teaching on modesty, by which someone harmonizes his words and deeds
with respect to proper relationships and circumstances.
An example of how Wojtyła applies this teaching is found in his approach to the co-ordination of
affectivity and external acts, in relation to the role of tenderness in personal relationships.
Tenderness refers to our awareness of the emotional ties with the inner affective world of another
person. It concerns our need to make that person aware that we want to enter into his interior world
of feelings and spiritual life. This tendency of one person to communicate his feeling of close
involvement to another, has “certain outward actions which of their nature reflect this inner
approximation to another ‘I’: pressing another person to one’s breast, embracing him, putting one’s
arms round him … certain forms of kissing.”100 St Thomas discusses such gestures in his
consideration of the virtue of purity, by which we moderate our actions in accord with chastity and
due social custom.101
Thus, Wojtyła applies St Thomas’ teaching on moderation to the formation of tenderness.
Continence, the virtue by which someone exercises self-control in matters of sexuality, moderates
the impulses of concupiscence when they are contrary to reason and the dignity of the other person.
Continence is the capacity to maintain an emotional equilibrium in the face of the strong stirrings
of passion, so that a person may still act for the true good of another.102 It is the role of the virtue
of continence to ensure that tenderness and its gestures do not become “merely forms of sensual
and sexual gratification”.103 Continence serves to bestow “a perfected inner control” and an “inner
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refinement” which enables the person to be delicate in his attitude to a person of the opposite
sex.104 Thus, continence is vital to forming proper personal relationships.
In the effort to grow in the virtues of chastity and continence, Wojtyła writes that “a certain
diplomacy” is involved, by which the elements of a person’s sensuality and sentiments are
deployed to the good of his affective life.105 Wojtyła does not explain how they can be so
persuaded. This principle of diplomacy is very important, nevertheless, because it avoids doing
violence to one’s affective inclinations by merely negating them. Instead, the strategy is to find
ways to develop what is best in one’s emotional life through what elicits and moderates them
according to the true good. Thus, the passions can make their proper contribution to the person’s
moral life and be brought to their proper perfection. This is really St Thomas’ idea of the politic
rule of reason over the passions, which does not tyrannize over them but respects their proper
nature as spontaneous acts of the sensitive appetite.106
There are other elements of St Thomas’ teaching that, in Petri’s judgment, either give a proper
philosophical underpinning to St John Paul II’s understanding of affectivity or introduce concepts
that complement it. The fundamental point of the philosophical background is St Thomas’
insistence on the unity of body and soul in the human person, which is the source of the passions
as will be discussed in chapter 3. For the present, it is sufficient to take an example of how this
principle influences St Thomas’ view of the goodness of the body as it is involved in virtuous acts,
namely, the goodness of marital sex. Given St John Paul II’s reflections on the human body as
having a spousal meaning, that is, as possessing the capacity to express the gift of the person in
love to another, Petri discusses St Thomas’ reflections on the importance of the body in sexual
love.107 As he writes: “A Thomistic anthropology is unable to separate the physical from the
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spiritual.”108 We will see in this line of reflection that St Thomas perceives the great importance
of the human body in human relationships.
St Thomas sees the love of marriage in terms of friendship, a virtuous sharing of life so intimate
that it binds the husband and wife together for life, in a mutual affection that opens them to the gift
of a child as the fruit of their marital relationship.109 Such a union is natural, in the sense that it is
virtuous as a free and mutual offering of the spouses to one another in the sharing of domestic life
and the education of their children.110 For Petri, it is both the unity of body and soul, and the
concept of marriage as friendship, that can give greater depth of meaning to the idea that the body
can be an expression of the gift of the person. Petri writes: “Since the human person is a body-soul
composite, the body is not simply the soul’s biological or physiological tool.”111 Rather, we could
state, the whole person expresses himself in his actions in the body and this is the basis for him to
communicate his affections to another, especially in marital intercourse. For Petri, this is a higher
example of St Thomas’ understanding of love as an inner need of every being to reach out of itself
to others and thus attain perfection through experiencing the good.
Moreover, reflecting Wojtyła’s thought, Petri explains that the sexual act has such profound
personal meaning because “the body and soul mutually implicate each other in action and in
thought”.112 This is shown in the need for man and woman to complement each other in the sexual
union for it to have its proper meaning, as an act of self-giving and as an act that is open to the gift
of a child. This line of reflection is seen clearly in St Thomas’ deep appreciation for the fidelity
and the respect that married couples should have for each other, as an expression of their marital
friendship. In relation to the union between spouses, St Thomas comments that “nothing is more
expressly significant of consent than carnal intercourse”.113 St Thomas’ language here is very
108
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significant: the marital act itself has a profound personal meaning as an act of deliberate and
intimate union with one’s spouse. As an act of faithful love in marriage, which sets aside lust, it is
holy and meritorious.114
In other words, the physical sexual act has personal meaning because it is the act of a person, which
expresses himself in union with another. It has personal significance, furthermore, because it is an
intimate act between two persons who profess their love for each other. This is in keeping with
Wojtyła’s reflections on Humanae Vitae, where he considers marriage in terms of human love,
which requires the capacity for a genuine friendship, a true sharing of life and a genuine
selflessness.115
It should also be noted that, by presenting marriage in terms of friendship, St Thomas paves the
way for an understanding of human sexuality as a capacity for relating to others, which involves a
language of self-giving. This principle is seen in St John Paul II’s understanding, Petri explains,
that “the body communicates the person, and it communicates love.”116 This point is implicit in St
Thomas’ understanding of modesty, for example, where he reflects upon the capacity of the person
to communicate the truth of their affection through appropriate words and deeds. This, as noted
above, will be discussed in Chapter 7 on the formative role of the virtues.
All of these points form a background to the seminarian’s affective formation because, not only
are they teachings that the future priest can communicate to others, they are also truths that he
needs to appropriate for himself. He needs to understand himself as a person who is capable of
love and called to give love to others. This is the context in which St John Paul II mentions the
spousal meaning of the body in relation to the seminarian’s affective maturation. For St John Paul
II, the seminarian needs to give and receive love in accord with this spousal meaning of his body
in a way that truly expresses his vocation to serve others as a shepherd after the Heart of Christ.117
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It is a genuinely human love which imitates the example of Christ, who truly loved others in his
earthly life with a human heart.118

b. St Thomas on the Subjectivity of the Person
Wojtyła is even more indebted to St Thomas than Wojtyła realizes. A criticism Wojtyła makes of
St Thomas’ teaching is that he does not pay sufficient attention to the “lived experiences” of the
human person. St Thomas, Wojtyła contends, concentrates on an objective description of the
existence and activity of the person.119 However, this does not do justice to St Thomas’ reflections
on affectivity, because there are clearly elements of St Thomas’ teaching that refer to subjective
and lived experiences. As will become clear in the following chapters, St Thomas’ understanding
of virtue respects the inner dynamics of the human person’s development. He does not see
affectivity as a loosely connected part of the rational person’s being. Rather, he understands the
rational person as having two distinctive spiritual faculties of intellect and will which are
intimately related. Both faculties are characteristic of the human person so that it is the knowing
person who is also capable of loving what and who he knows. Thus, affectivity of the will as the
capacity of the person to love, desire and enjoy the rational good is integral to the life of the human
person.120 These are points with which Wojtyła agrees and which he develops in light of his
philosophy of the human person.
Also, St Thomas recognizes that the role of the virtues is to form the faculties and acts that are
intimate to the person so that these acts attain their proper perfection. In this formative role the
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virtues of prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude shape the person’s higher and lower
affectivity, that is, the affections of the will and the passions of the sensitive appetite. Now, if the
virtues form the affectivity of the person they form his subjectivity, that is, his self-determining
choices and the responses of the passions. This is made clear in St Thomas’ recognition of the selfperfective nature of the acts of the mind, will, and the passions, when he discusses the development
of the person through the self-mastery of free choice, intention and the like.121 These are points
that St John Paul II would readily accept.122
Again, the importance of the interior impact of the passions, and their influence on a person’s
perception and external acts, is a major concern for St Thomas. Of many possible examples here
are a few. One example is St Thomas’ application of the principle that the affective state of the
person colors the way he sees other people and how to respond to them. The angry man, for
instance, considers a course of action he would not when he is calm.123 Another example is
afforded by St Thomas’ discussion of the passion of love, which consists in a change wrought in
the person’s capacity to appreciate the fulfilling power of a good and thus be moved to take
pleasure in it.124 Again, there is St Thomas’ analysis of love as a mutual experience of indwelling,
which brings about an intimacy with those who love and a propensity to share in the joys and
sorrows of one’s friend.125
St Thomas also appeals to lived experience when he observes the moderate fear of a man who
walks on a plank a little above the ground, in comparison with the greater fear of the man who
walks on a plank very high above the ground.126 A last example is found in St Thomas’ discussion
of the virtue of eutrapelia, which forms the passion for fun, games and witty conversation. In
defense of this virtue, St Thomas appeals to the experience of a holy person dedicated to the
religious life who is observed in a moment of recreation with his disciples.127
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This is not an exhaustive examination of the connection between St Thomas’ theology of
affectivity and the teaching of Pope St John Paul II, but it sufficiently indicates a real connection
between the two. The way is now open to discuss, in the following chapters, what specific
contribution St Thomas’ teaching can make to the project of affective formation that St John Paul
II calls for in Pastores Dabo Vobis. Before proceeding to this discussion, however, there is one
point left to examine, that is, a comparison between the teaching of the Moral Theological Manuals
and St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity. This will bring to light that St Thomas’ teaching provides
a more integrated approach for affection formation.

3. The Manuals and St Thomas on Affectivity
As noted earlier, Petri refers to Wojtyła’s concern to develop a more personalist view of Christian
teaching on sexuality, in part because the Manualist approach seemed too rigid and objectivist. In
developing a more adequate approach to moral development Wojtyła, as we have seen above,
appealed to various elements of St Thomas’ teaching. Examples we have given are St Thomas’
teaching on the unity of body and soul in the human person, and how the faculties of the person,
such as affectivity and sexuality, can be integrated with reason and right choices. Now, the aim of
this thesis is to argue for the application of St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity to the seminarian’s
affective formation. Moreover, its aim is also to show how this teaching complements Wojtyła’s
project to argue for a proper formation of affectivity. So, it will be helpful to explain the Manualist
teaching on affectivity in contrast to that of St Thomas, in order to highlight some fundamental
differences between the two. This will serve to show how St Thomas’ teaching can make a positive
contribution to affective formation.
The approach to moral theology found in the Manuals has its roots in the reorganization of moral
theological studies offered to seminarians by the Jesuits in the 16th century. Servais Pinckaers
refers in particular to the Institutiones Morales of Juan Azor (1536-1603) in which there is a shift
from organizing the content of moral theology according to the virtues. Instead, the content is
organized around a study of the external obligations imposed by the commandments, the
sacraments and the states of life. Azor, furthermore, omitted important dimensions of the moral
life that refer to the inner transformation of the Christian such as grace, the Beatitudes, the gifts

45

and the fruits of the Holy Spirit. His study of morals concentrated on external human acts, habits,
virtues, law, conscience and sin.128
Given this emphasis on external acts it is understandable that Azor diminished the consideration
of the person’s inner affective life in moral theology. Pinckaers observes that in Azor’s
Institutiones Morales the study of passions and affections, habitus and virtues “were confined to a
small section in Book III of the first part: chapters 1-19 for the passions, chapters 20-24 for habitus,
chapters 25-30 for virtues. These elements played only a secondary role in moral theology, as helps
or hindrances to free action”.129 Azor’s approach to moral theology and affectivity is reflected in
moral texts of the following centuries. The following discussion refers to some of the texts from
the twentieth century.
In Comparison and Evaluation of the Moral Significance of Emotions in Aquinas, the Manualists
and Catholic Moral Theology 1960-1990, Tom Ryan examined four Manuals from the thirty years
prior to the Second Vatican Council (1935-1963). As Ryan explains, the Manuals were used until
the 1960’s to prepare the seminarian to care for souls by providing him with “the knowledge and
skills to be a wise minister of the sacrament of penance”.130 Hence the importance of the Manuals
for forming the seminarian’s view of affectivity and its role in both his development and that of
those he is called to guide as a pastor.
Ryan found that there were positive elements in the Manual’s teaching on affectivity. The Manuals
taught, for instance, that emotions consequent on a good act of the will can increase its goodness.131
They had a positive approach to the development of affective virtues, which form the passions that
concern love, desire and pleasure (temperance) and those that concern fear and daring (fortitude).
Such virtues increase the goodness of the person and make his acts good.132 For instance, the virtue
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of decorum forms a sense of what is appropriate in social relations and a sense of shame helps to
form a respect for personal privacy.133 The Manuals also showed an increasing awareness of the
psychological pathologies that can interfere with someone’s responsibility for evil acts. 134
However, Ryan also observed that the Manuals gave “a relatively brief space” to a consideration
of the emotions.135 The Manuals regarded the emotions as gifts from God to help preserve the
human person. Nonetheless, they emphasized the propensity of the emotions both to distract
someone from the judgment of reason and to incline his will against the good. Moreover, the
primary focus was not on the positive development of emotions but on how they affected moral
responsibility in terms of divine, human or ecclesiastical law.136 There was “no development of
the relationship between emotions, virtue and character.”137 The virtues were seen mainly in a
function of “restraining the emotions”.138 Another shortcoming was a narrow focus on the
emotions as “obstacles”, “impediments” or “enemies of the human act”.139
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In contrast, St Thomas gives a positive place to affectivity in Summa Theologica I-II where he
considers the passions after man’s last end, happiness and voluntary acts. After the section on the
passions he reflects upon the role of the virtues, the Gifts and Fruits of the Holy Spirit, Sin, Law
and finally Grace which is the New Law. Sin and Vices are only considered “as failures to respond”
to God after the role of grace, virtues and the guidance of the Holy Spirit are studied.140 As Ryan
concludes, a key working assumption of St Thomas’ teaching is “that emotions are crucial to
psychological, spiritual and moral well-being and growth.”141 In the Manuals, conversely, the
treatment of conscience, law, sin and vice “take centre-stage” after the treatment of happiness and
human acts.142 For example, in the Noldin-Schmitt Manual the consideration of human acts and
passions is followed by the study of Laws, Conscience and then the Cardinal Virtues.143 The effect
of this approach is to focus too much on both the avoidance of sin and adherence to external laws.
This brings about a lack of due attention to the dynamism of “human flourishing” and the personal
growth that ought to take place from the “inner sources” of affectivity.144
Pinckaers comments that the Manualists’ concentration on the external elements of an act
pertaining to the regulation of law inclined them to “the danger of objectivism”, that is, “the
reduction of the moral act to its material object as opposed to all that emanated from the agent”.145
As Petri explains, the Manualists tended to identify the ends of human nature with the physical
structure of the body and they described human action as it could be observed exteriorly, neglecting
to look to the interior dimension of the moral act. There is less focus, therefore, on the development
of the person’s interior life of thought, desire, willing, emotion, and how these inner riches are to
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be shared with other people.146 Consequently, the importance of the person’s inner affective
disposition and its formation can be overlooked and undervalued.
Along with an abiding impression of negativity, a lack of references to Sacred Scripture, and the
neglect of Christ’s affectivity as a model for human affectivity, there is also a mechanistic imagery
associated with the emotional life in the Manuals.147 In this regard, Ryan refers to Davis’
description of the emotions as “part of a delicate machine directed by reason – a power extrinsic
to them”. This sharply contrasts with St Thomas’ “organic” model which respects the “internal
relationship of mutual interdependence of powers [as opposed] to one that is mechanical,
inanimate, where emotions are controlled by an external power. Human growth is through
conformity to an external criterion (Law) rather than through interiorization and inner
transformation.”148 The advantage of St Thomas’ teaching, as Ryan concludes, is that he portrays
affectivity as a part of human life that is “essentially positive and healthy”. 149 When the emotions
are properly formed they help the human person to do what is good and to avoid what is evil. The
Manuals, on the other hand, seem to struggle with seeing the constructive role that emotions can
play in the development of a healthy psychological and moral maturity.150 The significance of this
comparison between the Manuals and St Thomas’ teaching is that the latter clearly affirms
affectivity as an integral principle of a person’s life that is worthy of positive development.
St Thomas, moreover, situates that development within the living sources of the Christian’s moral
life, which transform his inner faculties of thought, willing and feeling, and their expression
through external acts. These sources are Grace, Virtue, the Beatitudes, the Gifts and the Fruits of
the Holy Spirit, and the Law as an articulation of God’s wisdom to guide us as we grow as human
persons. St Thomas places the development of the passions within this overall development of
Christian life and accords them an extensive treatment within it. Assimilating this teaching enables
146
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the seminarian to better grasp how important it is to properly develop his affectivity, both for the
enrichment of his own person and his capacity to relate well to others. The seminarian is thus better
prepared to guide those who will be entrusted to his pastoral care as a priest. He is equipped with
a sound and helpful teaching which is grounded in the principles of Christian life.
The point, it should be added, is not that Law is unimportant to affective formation. In St Thomas’
understanding law is an articulation of reason to properly guide human acts.151 It therefore also
concerns the guidance of acts that express affectivity in its impact on others.152 For this reason, St
Thomas meticulously analyses the various levels of law because they form our social relations.153
Rather, the point is that without neglecting external obligations the seminarian needs to develop
his affectivity and its expression through the formative influence of grace and virtue.

Conclusion
Three points have been considered in this chapter to set the context of the thesis. First, the
importance of affective formation as a Church requirement flows from the vocation of the priest
to reflect Christ’s human perfection in his personal relations. Second, that Pope St John Paul II’s
approach to affectivity is influenced by St Thomas’ teaching on affective development. This opens
the way to consider how that teaching provides a framework and an answer to St John Paul II’s
call for affective formation. Third, the comparison of the teaching of the Manuals on affectivity to
St Thomas’ more integrated view of emotion makes clear that St Thomas’ teaching is better suited
to affective formation. Now, the task in the following chapters is to examine St Thomas’s teaching
on affectivity and the advantages it offers for the maturation of the seminarian’s affectivity. This
work is a development of both St Thomas’ and Pope St John Paul II’s thought about affective
formation, particularly as it can impact on the formation of men for the priesthood.
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CHAPTER 2
THE THEOLOGICAL BASIS FOR AFFECTIVE FORMATION
Having discussed the connection between the thought of Pope St John Paul II and St Thomas, this
chapter will consider affectivity, first in the Trinitarian God, then in Christ, and then, more
specifically, how it has a role in the life of the seminarian. The discussion will mainly draw upon
St Thomas’ reflections on God and on Christ’s humanity in Summa Theologica, but it will also
draw upon his reflections on Christ’s humanity in his Commentary on the Gospel of John. The
goal is to provide a theological basis for the seminarian’s affective formation and motivate him to
it as a necessary dimension of his preparation for the priesthood. Therefore, this chapter will
examine how St Thomas’ teaching on affection in God helps the seminarian to recognize the
importance of properly formed affection and personal relationships. It will also examine how St
Thomas’ reflections on Christ’s affectivity help the seminarian to recognize that relating to others
in an affectively mature way is essential to a life that makes present the pastoral charity of Christ.154
This accords with St John Paul II’s teaching that human formation should prepare the priest to
reflect Christ’s attitude to others in his personal relationships.155
On a point of method, it could be argued that the reflection on Christ’s affectivity should be left
until after a consideration of human affectivity, because this is the order that St Thomas follows in
Summa Theologica. In Prima Secundae, St Thomas first considers affectivity as a part of our effort
to live a life that would lead us to beatitude. Christ’s affectivity is then considered in Tertia Pars
as a part of St Thomas’ consideration of the truth of the Savior’s humanity. In terms of presenting
a course to the seminarian on affectivity, there would be an advantage of following this order so
that he would reflect profoundly on his affective experience. This could dispose him to see the
importance of affectivity in Christ as a sign of the truth of his humanity. However, the order chosen
in this thesis is to consider Christ’s affectivity first, so that it is clear that affective formation has a
154

This approach respects the two basic principles of a valid theological anthropology, which, as Beáta Tóth
explains, looks to the Creator as “an ultimate source of meaning and an ultimate ground of interpretation” for the
human person. It extends to our awareness that we live in a relationship with “the divine community of the Trinity.”
Beáta Tóth, The Heart has its Reasons: Towards a Theological Anthropology of the Heart (Eugene, Oregon:
Cascade Books, 2015), 67.
155
See Pope John Paul II, Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation, I Will Give You Shepherds: Pastores Dabo Vobis
(Boston: St. Paul Books & Media, 1992), n.43.

51

sound theological and Christological basis. In support of this, it should be noted that St Thomas’
approach in Summa Theologica is not the only one he employs. In Commentary on the Gospel of
John, as we will see below, St Thomas begins with the life of Christ and draws implications from
it. The relevant point for the present discussion is that the contemplation of Christ’s life sheds light
on the proper expression of human affectivity. This makes a more persuasive case to the seminarian
that he needs to become affectively mature in order to properly represent Christ to others.
We now turn to the main discussion of this chapter, which will involve five topics: 1) Affectivity
in God; 2) Christ’s Humanity is our Way to God; 3) Christ’s Affectivity; 4) Christ and Friendship;
5) Christ and Pastoral Charity.

1. Affectivity in God
The study of affectivity in God sheds light on the importance of affection in the seminarian’s life.
As a priest he will be called to bear witness to the mystery of God’s life, which includes the
spiritual affections we will discuss below. This understanding of affectivity is deepened by St
Thomas’ teaching on how we are created in the image of the Blessed Trinity. The truth that love
and personal relations are essential to God’s life require that these two affective characteristics be
reflected in the seminarian’s life. The reason being that he should reflect God’s life in his future
priestly ministry. Now, when we conduct this discussion it needs to be recognized that some
seminarians may be unmoved by certain points of it because they may relate more readily to the
consideration of Christ’s human affectivity as a model for their own. Nevertheless, the language
of affectivity is part of the way we approach the mystery of God, it pertains to how we are made
in his likeness, and how the seminarian is to reflect God’s affectivity in his life and relationships.
To set this discussion in its proper context, the seminarian needs to reflect on how we can speak
of affection in God. There is a need for care in how we approach this issue because God exceeds
our capacity to comprehend him.156 This applies to the issue of affection in God because the word
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affection in human experience bears a sense of a change from one state to another. For example,
when we feel loved, this changes us to a state of feeling love in return. On this point, some
theologians argue that in God’s capacity for affections such as pity there is a certain passibility or
an ability to suffer. For them, Marcel Sarot writes, “God has a capacity for great distress and for
intense suffering” that flows from his love for us.157 Sarot, however, disagrees with the passibilist
position, on the grounds that it ascribes to God a suffering that implies an imperfection in the
Divine Nature.
The passibilist view raises a valid concern, though, to the extent that if we do not affirm a certain
affectivity of God our perception of the divine goodness will be diminished. God will seem
disinterested, distant, and, perhaps, uninvolved in our lives. It is important to note in respect of this
issue that Scripture speaks of a generosity in God who loved the world so much that he gave us
his only Son (John 3.16). However, there is no need to postulate an affectivity in God which
diminishes his perfection. It is precisely the infinite nature of God that ensures so great an
outpouring of love for us. Thus, while St Paul affirms that God is the Lord of all things he also
teaches that this same God gives all good things to us (Acts 17.24-25). It is because God’s love is
of a far higher order that he responds so generously to our need.
Yet, there is a particular way of speaking about God’s affectivity. St Thomas argues that we can
use sensible images and metaphors to raise our minds to the knowledge of divine truths.158 For
example, Scripture sometimes describes God as angry (Exodus 4.14). However, the passion of
anger cannot be ascribed to God because it is an experience we have as persons composed of body
and soul, whereas God is infinite spirit.159 Thus, passions like anger are attributed to God in
Scripture only in a metaphorical sense by which we take the purpose of a human passion and
compare it to the purpose of God’s action. In relation to the passion of anger, we see that its purpose
is to incline us to punish an offender. Now, while God cannot feel anger he does disapprove of evil
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and punish it. In this sense we speak of God being angry.160 An important implication for affective
formation is that anger has an appropriate place in the life of the person who seeks to imitate God,
but this anger needs to reflect God’s disapproval of evil in a way that is truly moderate and just.161
Moreover, there are truths we can affirm of God, aware “that these exist in him in a more excellent
way”.162 In this way, we attribute acts of the will to God, what St Thomas calls spiritual affections,
such as love, desire and joy. These are willed affirmations of the good. We too have these
affections of the will but in a more limited fashion according to our created nature. 163 The idea is
that as God knows the good, wills it, loves it and rejoices in it, we too know the good and can will,
love and rejoice in it, according to our human nature.164 This analogical language is based upon
our relationship to God, in which we are created in his image and therefore reflect something of
his knowing and willing of the good.
This leads us to another point about how this affectivity is expressed in relation to others. To form
an adequate understanding of God and how to reflect that love to others, the seminarian needs to
contemplate how love is essential to the life and action of God. Love exists in God as the willing
of his own good.165 Yet, God also loves all things inasmuch as they exist and are good. For God’s
will is the cause of all things and whatever good they have. This truth illuminates God’s love for
all things and the nature of our love. God’s love “infuses and creates goodness”, while our love is
called forth by the goodness of things and out of this love we act to attain their goodness.166 God’s
love is creative, in other words, and our love is ultimately a response to what is good. In addition,
God loves irrational creatures, “only on account of his goodness, and of the services they render
to us”, but God offers us, as rational creatures, the love of friendship.167 This understanding of God
is fundamental to affective formation because it recognizes God as one who seeks the good of all
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things but especially each person. The seminarian is called to receive this love and communicate
this same kind of love to others. We will explore this point below.
St Thomas also refers to the affective experience of joy, which is a resting of the will in the object
it loves and desires. He applies this principle to God who loves his own superabundant good and
therefore rejoices in himself.168 From this point St Thomas argues that God also takes joy in all
that is good because it reflects his own goodness.169 An implication we can draw for affective
formation is that God takes joy in the seminarian’s good and any good that he does. This
encourages the seminarian to rejoice in his own proper good and the good that he does for others.
An example of doing good for others is found in the performance of acts of mercy. St Thomas
mentions mercy because it is “especially to be attributed to God” and it “most properly belongs to
him to dispel … misery”.170 This is essential to the affective formation of the seminarian because
one of the principal works of the priest is to communicate God’s merciful help. Pope St John Paul
II mentions in Pastores Dabo Vobis that the priest, who is responsible for the community entrusted
to him, must be “quick to understand, forgive and console”.171 We see here that a reflection on
God’s affectivity can instill in the seminarian how important it is to reflect the affective disposition
of God to those in need.
These examples of how we speak of affectivity in God lead us to an integral dimension of affective
formation: God is the model for how we understand ourselves and how we relate to others.172 This
is pertinent to affective formation, in that the seminarian’s understanding of God heavily
influences his view of how he should respond to others. For example, if God is thought of primarily
in terms of anger then it is more difficult to think of his love and mercy and to communicate these

168

See Summa Contra Gentiles Book 1: God, Chapter 90, nn.4, 5, trans. Anton C. Pegis, F.R.S.C. (Notre Dame,
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975/2009).
169
“Moreover”, he writes, “each thing takes joy in its like as in something agreeable … Now, every good is a
likeness of the divine good, as was said above, nor does God lose any good because of some good. It remains, then,
that God takes joy in every good”. See Summa Contra Gentiles Book 1, Chapter 90, nn.4, 5.
170
Summa Theologica I, q.21, a.3, resp.
171
Pastores Dabo Vobis, n.43.
172
St Thomas describes God as our “exemplar”. Summa Theologica I-II, Prologue to the Treatise on the Last End.
He articulates the metaphysical foundation for this in Summa Contra Gentiles where he writes that all things receive
their being from God and bear his likeness. See Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 1, Chapter 93, n.8. The human
person bears this likeness in a unique sense as a rational creature who can direct himself/herself freely to attain
happiness. See Summa Theologica I-II, Prologue, to the Treatise on the Last End.

55

affective characteristics to others. Instead, the seminarian needs to contemplate the various
affections of God so as to gain a more balanced view of how he can reflect them in his life.
Another implication is that God is a model for the seminarian, in that love and personal relations
are essential to God’s Trinitarian life. The basis for developing this line of reflection lies in the
truth that we are created in God’s image and we are called to share in God’s goodness and love.173
It is true that St Thomas sees human intelligence as a reflection of the “Supreme Wisdom” of God
through which we imitate God by wisely ordering our lives.174 Yet, this wisdom is deeply
connected to the importance of personal relationships and how they are ordered to the good. This
becomes apparent when we recognize that we are created not only in the image of God’s Divine
nature but also in the image of the Blessed Trinity. The implication for the seminarian is that he
needs to view himself, not only as a rational being, but also as someone who is in need of
conducting personal relationships well, if he is to be faithful to his vocation to reflect the life of
God. 175
A point to observe, in relation to this issue, is that St Thomas’ understanding of grace is deeply
relational. St Thomas sees the indwelling of the Divine Persons in the Christian as a special mode
of presence. Through sanctifying grace God is in the Christian as the known in the knower and the
loved in the lover so that through his knowing and loving he “attains to God himself”.176 St Thomas
emphasizes this indwelling by teaching that the Divine Person of the Holy Spirit is given to us so
that we may “enjoy also the divine person Himself”.177 It is clear, from the way St Thomas writes
that he thinks of grace as a relationship of personal love. Thus, at the heart of St Thomas’
theological understanding of our relationship with the Trinity, the importance of affectivity is
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affirmed. In drawing upon the language of affectivity to speak about the Divine mystery St Thomas
applies a very Scriptural approach: “God is Love” (1 John 4.8).178
Moreover, St Thomas’ vision of the meeting between God and the human person is one of
profound intimacy which bears fruit in an affective experience. From the experience of God’s
presence in grace, St Thomas writes of the Christian tasting “God’s sweetness”, enjoying a
“complacency in God’s will”, and that the “taste” of these divine realities “produces love for
God”.179 Now, if this is the way God deals with us then we ought to make a like return of knowing
and loving God. St Thomas refers to this point when he reflects upon Christ’s call: “Come and
see” (John 1.39). This is a call not only to believe and act in a certain way but also to experience
God in Christ, and this kind of knowledge is achieved, in part, by tasting the divine sweetness.180
The seminarian needs to reflect on this sweetness, living so that he can experience it and help
others to do the same.
Moreover, St Thomas writes of the Trinitarian relations in terms of the connection between the
intellect and affection, which impresses on the seminarian’s mind the need to keep together these
two principles in his understanding of God. St Thomas writes of the relationship of the Father, the
Son, and the Holy Spirit in terms of the Word and of Love. The Word proceeds from the Father “the Speaker” - and he breathes Love.181 “Thus”, St Thomas explains, “the Son is sent not in
accordance with every and any kind of intellectual perfection, but according to the intellectual
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illumination, which breaks forth into the affection of love”.182 The Word, St Thomas continues, “is
born of God by the knowledge of himself; and Love proceeds from God according as he loves
himself”.183 Moreover, the Holy Spirit is the procession of Love from the Father and the Son.184
The point for affective formation is that we are created, not only in the image of the Divine Nature,
but, also of the Trinity of Persons. For, St Thomas writes, “in God himself there is one Nature in
Three Persons”.185 In light of this truth, the seminarian needs to develop his capacity for loving
relationships to reflect the Trinitarian life in his priestly ministry. The main way in which he will
do so is by becoming Christ-like. This may mean that his focus is primarily on the Second Person
of the Trinity. However, reflecting on the Trinity as such will make him more aware of the
relational and affective dimensions of his humanity.
These reflections on God’s Trinitarian life can influence the way the seminarian approaches the
study of theology in general and how it applies to his affective formation. St Thomas’ reflections
on affection in God and the Trinitarian relations point to the distinctive nature of theology as a
study that engages human affectivity. Theology, he explains, is a study of God and all things
inasmuch as they proceed from God and find their fulfilment in God.186 This includes the affective
acts inasmuch as they lead us to Beatitude.187 Furthermore, since it “is established on principles
revealed by God”, theology must respect what is revealed about God and how we are created in
God’s image.188 Essential to this Revelation is that God is a Trinity of Persons related through
love. Theology is a study, therefore, that requires affectivity be ordered to a loving union with
God, because we are created in the image of the Trinity of Persons who are in a relation of Love.
Unlike other sciences, for example, geometry, the truths of theology have “to be approved through
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the affection” so that the theologian aims to become “perfect according to understanding and
affection”.189 Theology requires the seminarian to grow in his ability to love God and others.
The seminarian’s study of theology requires him to pray and act so that he will obtain a wisdom
that flows from a loving union with God. The virtuous man, St Thomas teaches us, judges well of
what pertains to the virtue he exercises.190 This especially applies to Wisdom, the Gift of the Holy
Spirit. By this Gift, through our union with God in charity, the Holy Spirit disposes us to judge
well of divine things, leading us into all the truth (John 14.26). The implication is that the Christian
who loves God orders his life according to that love.191 Thus, the question of the seminarian’s
affectivity is found at the very heart of his openness to the truth and wisdom of God.
From our study of St Thomas’ teaching on affection in God the seminarian can be moved to open
his heart to a God who loves him, rejoices in his good, and regards him with mercy. God, moreover,
as St Thomas affirms, exercises a providential care “by reason of the abundance of his
goodness”.192 It is a generous love precisely because it gives out of a complete love for our good.
This acts as the background to the seminarian’s understanding of God. Thus, through these
reflections on affection in God the seminarian can grow in his awareness of the “personally
involved divine love”, as Anastasia Scruton writes.193 God is truly interested in the seminarian’s
welfare and desires his love and friendship.
Furthermore, a language drawn from human affectivity can help the seminarian to make sense of
certain Scriptural descriptions of God’s acts. For example, we feel anger in response to injustice.
When something is important, such as a deep friendship, we are angry at someone who damages
it. This can help us to understand Scripture when it presents God as angry because we have turned
away from the Covenant with him (Exodus 32.7-10). The inspired text uses the language of anger
to communicate that God is deeply concerned about our relationship with him and disapproves of
any action on our part to harm it.
189
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In a similar way we can talk of God’s hatred. In relation to this, St Thomas mentions God’s love
for sinners in so far as they have existence from him and yet God’s hatred for sinners in so far as
by sinning they “fall short” of their true good.194 These words are not to be misunderstood as a
tendency to a lack of mercy but as a disapproval of what harms the goodness God loves in us.195
This is an example of how the study of affection in God helps the seminarian to nuance Scriptural
language and clear away misconceptions of it when he will be called upon to preach as a priest.
From his study of affection in God the seminarian can also acquire a basic disposition for speaking
in a fashion that is aimed at reaching the hearts of the faithful. St Thomas writes that the one who
speaks in the Church not only instructs the intellect. He also speaks “in order to move the
affections” and “please his hearers” so that they listen willingly to the Word of God.196 In this way
the preacher seeks to lead the people to love God and do his will. In other words, the preacher
needs to present the truths of Scripture in a way that affectively engages the congregation to live
in accordance with them.

2. Christ’s Humanity is our Way to God
Having considered affectivity in God we will now examine St Thomas’ teaching on how the
Incarnation assists the seminarian to appreciate the importance of affectivity. The goal is to set the
theological background for the consideration of Christ’s affectivity by first contemplating the
humanity of Christ. For, it is in Christ’s humanity that the seminarian has the perfect revelation
both of God’s love and of his own life. Accordingly, this section will consider three elements of
St Thomas’ teaching on the Incarnation that are relevant to affective formation and the importance
of entering personal relationships. First, we will consider the fittingness of the Incarnation. Second,
that God’s desire for friendship motivated the Incarnation. Third, that the Incarnation encourages
us to imitate God by communicating his goodness to others.
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The first point concerns the fittingness of God’s action in saving us through the Incarnation. In his
treatment of the virtue of devotion, St Thomas explains that the Incarnation is the greatest of God’s
ways to draw us to himself in love.197 For, we need “sensible objects” to help us to love “Divine
things”, which we cannot see, and the greatest of these means “is the humanity of Christ”. 198 The
Incarnation is thus essential to St Thomas’ understanding of how we come into union with God.
In the Commentary on the Gospel of John, he writes: “the humanity of Christ is our way to God”.199
Moreover, St Thomas maintains that we come to our beatitude through the humanity of Christ who
revealed in himself “the way of truth” by which we can come to “eternal life by rising again”. 200
Therefore, the work of theology, and for our present purpose this includes the consideration of
affectivity, is only complete when Christ is contemplated as our Savior.201
At the center of this view of theology is the contemplation of Sacred Scripture, especially the
Gospels. “We ought not to say about God”, St Thomas states, “anything which is not found in
Holy Scripture either explicitly or implicitly”.202 Therefore, in the Third Part of Summa Theologica
St Thomas plumbs the depths of the various mysteries of the Life, Death and Resurrection of
Christ. He examines, for instance, Christ’s conception, manner of life, prayer and temptations. 203
The aim is to more accurately understand Christ as a pattern for human life and acquire wisdom
from the way Christ responded to the challenges set before him. This includes, as we will see
below, the consideration of Christ’s affective responses to challenges, people and sufferings.
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When considering, for example, the temptation of the Lord in the wilderness (Matthew 4.1-11), St
Thomas observes the method employed by the Evil One, which is to manipulate human desires.
Satan suggests a way of action that arises according to the affective inclination of each person and
leads them from one sin to another. For the first man this involved a threefold movement which St
Thomas gleans from the account of Genesis 3.1-5. First, Adam is enticed to eat the forbidden fruit.
Second, there is an appeal to Adam’s vainglory. Third, Satan leads Adam “to the extreme height
of pride”.204 The movement proceeds from a disordered desire for corporal goods, to an undue
desire for acclaim, then to a desire for “worldly riches and fame to the extent of holding God in
contempt”.205 These are considerations that are applicable to affective formation inasmuch as they
analyze the impact of our desires on our ability to do God’s will. An encouraging point for the
seminarian is that Christ suffered these temptations, as St Thomas writes, “in order to fill us with
confidence in his mercy”.206 For “we have the supreme high priest” who is compassionate toward
us because he “has been put to the test in exactly the same way as ourselves”, though he is without
sin (Hebrews 4.14-15). This reflection encourages the seminarian to persevere in times of trial and
to trust in God for mercy and help.
The second point concerns God’s desire for our friendship as a motivation for the Incarnation. The
striking nature of St Thomas’ approach can be seen by contrasting it with the way we often think
of human friendship, which requires a certain equality and similarity. Equality refers to the benefits
that flow from friendship which need to be in some way proportionate between those involved.207
Similarity refers to a likeness between the two friends, for instance, a similar temperament. Now,
given these two principles, we can ask: is there any possibility of friendship with God? Aristotle’s
answer is: “where there is a great gulf, as between God and man, friendship becomes
impossible”.208 St Thomas’ answer is that through Christ, God draws us into friendship with
himself (John 15.15).
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In Summa Contra Gentiles, St Thomas argues that we could have despaired of being united to God
on account of the “unmeasured distance between” the Divine and human natures.209 “But,” he goes
on to argue, “the fact that God was willing to unite human nature to himself” in the Person of the
Word “points out to men with greatest clarity that man can be united to God”.210 This is both an
affirmation of human dignity and an incentive to strive for our greatest good so that we will be
fulfilled “in the enjoyment of God”.211 Without this incentive we would rely too heavily on earthly
pleasures because we would lack the hope of a greater good, namely, eternal Beatitude.212 Thus,
for St Thomas, God chose the most effective way of proving his love for us by being united to us
in person, “for it is proper to love to unite the lover with the beloved so far as possible”.213 God
appealed to us through the humanity of his Son because we are moved to love someone when we
see that he loves us enough to share our life.
Moreover, St Thomas presents this union of love in terms of a friendship between God and us,
which is made possible by the Incarnation. In uniting to himself our human nature God overcomes
the great difference in nature and goodness between himself and us, establishing a certain equality
and similarity between us. In this way, “to get greater familiarity in friendship between man and
God it was helpful for man that God became man, since even by nature man is man’s friend”. 214
That is, there is a natural affinity between human beings and, in his Incarnate Son, God has entered
this common ground, as it were, to draw us into his friendship. 215 For the seminarian, there is an
important point about the establishing of relationships by which he enters the lives of others so
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that they know they are important to the priest. This makes present the same willingness to share
human life that God showed in the Incarnation.
The third point flows from a reason for the fittingness of the Incarnation that St Thomas writes in
Summa Theologica. St Thomas explains that what belongs to something by reason of its nature is
fitting to it. Now, God’s nature is goodness and therefore what belongs to the essence of goodness
is fitting to God. Since “it belongs to the essence of goodness to communicate itself to others”, St
Thomas argues, it “belongs to the essence of the highest good to communicate itself in the highest
manner to the creature”.216 This is accomplished in the assumption of human nature into union
with the Person of the Word. In this line of theological reflection, the generosity of God is at the
forefront of St Thomas’ mind. It is a theme that can be developed in terms of the dignity of the
human person as a cause of good for others.
Our capacity to contribute to the good of others is a share in the Providence of God, by which,
through “the abundance of his goodness”, God imparts “the dignity of causality” to creatures.217
All beings “tend toward the divine likeness” by acting as a cause of other beings. 218 In a greater
way, however, God constitutes human beings as intelligent and free persons who can act for the
welfare of others. God “shares his goodness with” others, “not only so that they will be good and
perfect themselves, but also so that they can, with God’s help, give perfection to others. Now, to
give perfection to other creatures is the most noble way of imitating God.”219 This is a guiding
principle of affective development, by which the seminarian can learn, like Christ, to communicate
his goodness through appropriate gestures of love.
We see this in the central principle of Christian life: to follow the example of Christ who is “the
way by reason of his human nature, and the destination because of his divinity”. 220 St Thomas
links this truth to Christ’s gesture of washing the feet of his disciples, an act of affection that is an
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example for Christians to serve each other (John 13.12-15).221 In this regard, St Thomas meditates
on the way Jesus gives the disciples “an example of humility and love” through washing their
feet.222 Jesus knew that the Father had given all things into his hands and that he was from God
and was going to God (John 13.3), “and he still did not neglect to do what was humble”.223 By
leading others to God, “especially by humility and love”, Christ gives good example for the
seminarian to do likewise.224 This too is a communication of goodness to others by which the
seminarian gains a very outward looking attitude to serve their true good.
St Thomas’ reverence for the humanity of Christ, considered as a pattern for how we live, is in
harmony with the teaching of the Church. This is why in the present day what he says about
Christ’s affectivity, as well as human affectivity in general, is valuable for considering the problem
of affective maturity in seminary formation. The Church’s view of Christ’s humanity is that it is
integral to the salvation God offers us. On the Feast of Mary’s Nativity, for example, the Church
prays that we “be given strength by the humanity” of God’s Son.225 Thus the Incarnation proclaims
the love of God who “wonderfully created human nature and still more wonderfully redeemed
it”.226 Essential to our contemplation of God is, therefore, an adherence to Christ, the Word
Incarnate, “who is himself both the mediator and the sum total of revelation”.227 This is a guiding
light for the seminarian’s affective formation which we will explore in the next section.228
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St Thomas’ contemplation of the Incarnation gives the seminarian four principles to guide his
affective formation. First, the Incarnation is a fitting instrument of human salvation because we
are drawn through love of Christ’s humanity to love the God we cannot see. By implication, it is
through the humanity of the priest that others can be drawn to Christ. Second, various experiences
and acts of Christ’s life shed light on the meaning of the seminarian’s life. For example, Christ’s
response to the temptations of Satan in their appeal to desires for glory and power, and, the
affectionate gesture of washing the feet of his disciples. Third, the Incarnation is motivated by
God’s desire to draw us into friendship with himself. Thus, at the heart of St Thomas’
understanding of the Incarnation is the importance of love and friendship, a theme we will consider
in Chapter 8. Fourth, to be like Christ the seminarian needs to communicate his goodness to others
and this includes the goodness of his affectivity.

3. Christ’s Human Affectivity
This section will concentrate on St Thomas’ reflections on Christ’s affectivity in Summa
Theologica and how this will help the seminarian to appreciate the importance of forming such
passions as sorrow, fear and anger. St Thomas considers Christ’s affective experience as an
integral dimension of his human nature.229 He writes that the passions “were in Christ, even as all
else pertaining to man’s nature” and he properly desired pleasures such as “food, drink and sleep,
and all else that is sought in right reason”.230 The basis for Christ’s affectivity is found in his body
which is formed by a human soul in which he was “passible”, that is, subject to change and
suffering and the affective experiences that correspond to this.231 Thus, he “truly hungered”,

with a human heart he loved.” Gaudium et Spes: Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, 7
December, 1965, n.22, in Vatican Council II: Constitutions, Decrees, Declarations.
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a.4, resp. As Nicholas Lombardo explains, since Christ was truly human “everything that can be attributed to our
nature must also be attributed to Christ’s human nature”. Nicholas E. Lombardo, O.P., The Logic of Desire: Aquinas
on Emotion, (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 205. For St Thomas, this is
integral to the authenticity and trustworthiness of the Incarnation. Since Christ is the Truth it is not becoming that
there be “anything fictitious” about his life. Summa Theologica III, q.5, a.1, resp.
230
Summa Theologica III, q.15, a.4, resp. See Summa Theologica III, q.15, a.2, ad 2.
231
Summa Theologica III, q.5, a.2, resp.

66

“thirsted”, and suffered “His passion” and “death”.232 A major reason for St Thomas’ insistence
on these points is that if Christ did not have a true affectivity he did not share the whole of human
nature, which needs to be redeemed in its totality.
While St Thomas affirms the full range of Christ’s affective experience, in Summa Theologica he
focuses on Christ’s negative affective experiences, which he calls “defects”. The Latin for defect
is defectus and, as Paul Gondreau notes, it “implies a lack or a privation of what should be
present”.233 St Thomas denies that Christ had the defect of sin but he affirms that Christ suffered
other defects that are a part of human life as a result of the Fall.234 These defects include the
experience of sorrow by which we feel sadness on account of the effects of evil.235 For St Thomas,
Christ’s vulnerability to sorrow is part of God’s saving action, by which Christ, the sinless one,
bears the effects of sin and gives his life to save us.236
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St Thomas’ reflections on Christ’s sorrow includes a consideration between properly formed and
improperly formed affective experiences. In considering Christ’s words, “My soul is sorrowful
even unto death” (Matthew 26.38), St Thomas distinguishes between “perfect passion”, a passion
that “dominates the soul, i.e. the reason” and “a propassion”, a passion which “has its beginning
in the sensitive appetite, but goes no further”.237 In the first case, the affective experience leads
one to act in a wrongful manner. In the second case, the passion is formed in accord with one’s
true good.238 In this context, “propassion” is the passion of someone who responds virtuously to
an intense trial, which Christ exemplifies.239
St Thomas also mentions fear, wonder, and anger as authentic affective experiences of Christ. In
Gethsemane Christ felt fear, which is caused by the anticipation of a future evil, as he contemplated
his impending sufferings (Mark 14.33).240 In regard to wonder, St Thomas observes that Christ
marveled at the centurion’s words of faith (Matthew 8.10). “Wonder properly regards what is new”
and unusual, St Thomas explains, which Christ could experience according to his acquired
knowledge, “in regard to which new things could occur to Him day by day”.241 Wonder is a desire
to understand and this “affection” of wonder was assumed by Christ “in order to teach us to wonder
at what He Himself wondered at”, the work of God and the goodness in people.242 Christ also felt
anger, St Thomas writes. Anger flows from the sorrow an injured person feels, which moves him
to desire a just punishment for the offender who caused the sorrow.243 The kind of anger that Christ
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demonstrated was moderated in accord with justice, as when he expelled the moneychangers from
the Temple (John 2.14-17).244
In pointing to the human experiences of fear, wonder, and anger in Christ, St Thomas is
emphasizing that Christ truly shared the limitations of our life and its vulnerability to sorrow. Yet
he is also helping us to meditate on Christ’s life so that we will reflect on how we respond to
similar experiences. Like Christ, the seminarian should not let his fear lead him to avoid God’s
will; he should wonder at the good in others and God’s work in them; and he should moderate his
anger in response to injustice. This line of reflection becomes more evident in St Thomas’
treatment of the different wills in Christ. Here St Thomas considers Christ in Gethsemane, where
he accepts the Father’s will even though he is repulsed by the suffering it involved.
The basic distinction St Thomas makes is between the “will of sensuality” and the “will of reason”.
The “will of sensuality” is a response of passion, the “will of reason” refers to an act of the rational
will. The crucial point is that human sensuality (the passions) participates in rationality when it
performs its proper role in accord with true reason. It is not against reason that the sensuality should
act according to its proper mode. However, it is against reason if sensuality should dominate the
spiritual faculty of the will of reason. As St Thomas explains: Christ possessed a true sensuality
and “allowed all the powers of His soul to do what belonged to them”.245 It is in this sense that he
felt repugnance at suffering, while he accepted it for the world’s salvation.
For St Thomas, this does not imply a contradiction in Christ, even though he wished “what the
Divine will did not wish”.246 Rather, the different principles of Christ’s humanity, his affective
response to evil and his capacity to follow the Father’s will, operated as they should. Christ knew
how to properly express and co-ordinate these two principles.247 In Gethsemane, St Thomas is
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arguing, Christ experienced a true agony as he contemplated his coming Passion (Luke 22.43).
This was not an agony in that he was making two different willed decisions in which he “wishes
one thing, and on its considering another, wishes the contrary”.248 Rather, Christ desired to fulfill
the Father’s will that the human race be saved through his suffering. Nevertheless, there was a true
affective agony in Christ who was fearful in the face of his approaching suffering.
In writing of this issue, St Thomas affirms that Christ prayed according to his sensuality. That is,
Christ gave voice in his prayer to what he experienced in the face of suffering. By this St Thomas
means that the affective experience can be made an act of prayer by being incorporated into the
expression of our “desire [for] something to be fulfilled by God”.249 In this sense, we place before
God our affective experience. In this way, Christ voiced his affective suffering and desire that it
be avoided before his Heavenly Father. St Thomas sees Christ teaching us three things through
this experience: that he had a true human nature, “with all its natural affections”; to show that we
may wish “what God does not wish”; and, “to show that man should subject his own will to the
Divine will.”250 These three truths show the seminarian how to respond in similar situations: to
bring before God his desire to avoid evil and to accept the Father’s will, enduring the Cross for the
sake of the joy to come (Hebrews 12.2).
St Thomas also takes great care to consider the various affective experiences of Christ on the
Cross.251 He writes of Christ’s pain and sorrow on the Cross as “most bitter”. 252 He mentions the
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pain Christ felt in highly sensitive areas of his body such as his hands and feet, the weight that
presses down on him as he hangs from the cross, and how long it takes him to die. He also mentions
Christ’s immense sorrow because he grieved for the sins of the human race and the loss of his life.
St Thomas sees in these sorrows something truly virtuous because sadness is praiseworthy when
it flows from a holy love, such as a sorrow on account of the sins of others.253 Moreover, if a man
did not grieve over the loss of goods such as his own life he would show, not virtue, but
indifference or even a hardness of heart.254 The key point for St Thomas, however, is that Christ
suffered on account of his love for us.255 Even more than the virtuous man who exposes his beloved
life “for virtue’s sake … Christ laid down His most beloved life for the good of charity”.256 Christ’s
love for us in his passion and death was truly immense.
The strength of Christ’s charity for us radiates through his painful experience of abandonment. St
Thomas gives three ways in which it could be said that the Father abandoned Jesus. The first way
is that God the Father “preordained Christ’s Passion for the deliverance of the human race”. 257 The
second way is that the Father delivered his Son to the Passion “inasmuch as, by the infusion of
charity, He inspired Him with the will to suffer for us”. 258 The third way is that God the Father
allowed Christ to be taken by his persecutors. For this reason Christ cried out “My God, My God,
why have you abandoned me?” (Matthew 27.46). The first and third reasons take their true
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meaning from the second, the infusion of the Father’s charity into the heart of his Son to give his
life for us. For this infusion of charity indicates the truth that the Son lovingly and willingly cooperated with the Father in saving us.259
Christ’s gift of love amidst the pain and sorrow of his sufferings points to the greatness of human
affectivity in the context of self-sacrifice. St Thomas’ detailed treatment of this dimension of
Christ’s affective experience points to his conviction that Christ chose the greatest act of friendship
possible to a human being, as the way to reveal the full depth of his love for us (John 15.13). 260 It
indicates an important point for the seminarian’s affective formation: affective maturity comes to
its greatest perfection in the most demanding experiences. 261 Perhaps, like no other affective
experience, sorrow challenges the seminarian to express his honest desire before the Father. Yet,
like Christ, he needs to integrate his desires in accord with a generous love for God and his
neighbor.
There is another important point that emerges from St Thomas’ contemplation of Christ’s affective
responses in the face of suffering. At no time does St Thomas understate or explain away the
prayers that flow from Christ’s heart in his agony and abandonment. This has an important
implication for the seminarian who is preparing to help those who suffer. If Christ expressed his
desire to avoid suffering and questioned why he was abandoned by God, then the Christian, who
seeks to conform his life to the mystery of Christ’s life, rightly does likewise. This requires the
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seminarian, as a future priest, to understand the impact of suffering on a person’s affectivity and
to respect his need to express to God his deep pain and bewilderment.

4. Christ and Friendship
Friendship is a major part of an affectively mature person’s life because it is through such personal
relationships that we form emotional bonds of mutual support. That Christ shared such friendships,
in which he felt a genuine and deep love for some who were especially close to him, is a great
affirmation of the value of friendship for the seminarian. Pope St John Paul II mentions friendship
as an important factor of priestly life. The seminarian, he teaches, needs to bring “to human
relationships of serene friendship and deep brotherliness a strong, lively and personal love for
Jesus Christ”.262 We could add, that contemplating the life of Christ will help the seminarian to
understand how he can appreciate the goodness of friendship and how to love his friends.
These reflections will prepare for the consideration of the seminarian’s desire for friendship in
Chapter 8. The discussion of this section, however, will involve St Thomas’ reflections on three
moments of friendship for Christ: his love for Lazarus, Martha and Mary; the expression of his
friendship for the disciples at the Last Supper; and, the way he called Peter to a more humble love.
This third consideration will refer to Peter’s personal experience of being tempted, which enabled
him to become compassionate to others in their struggle with temptation. It will lead into a
discussion of the significance of personal experience as a dimension of affective formation.
St Thomas’ reflections on Jesus’ love for Martha, Mary and Lazarus highlight Christ’s
compassion, his anger in the face of death and the trust that his friends placed in him. Jesus himself
openly professes this love for Lazarus and his two sisters. Upon deciding to go to Lazarus, he says:
“Our friend Lazarus is at rest: I am going to wake him” (John 11.11). St Thomas comments: “This
was to say: He was a friend because of the many things and favors he did for us; so we should not
neglect him in his needs.”263 This was a dangerous course of action because some in Judea intended
to kill him, but Christ revealed his love by visiting and consoling his friends in distress (John 11.8).
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John’s gospel witnesses to Jesus’ distress at the tomb of Lazarus when he sees Mary and others
weeping: “Jesus wept” (John 11.5, 33-35). Christ was deeply moved in spirit, which revealed “a
certain anger and resentment of the heart”, on account of the “pain and sadness” caused by “the
cruelty of death”.264 St Thomas, at this point, rejects the Stoic position, “that a wise man is never
sad”, because “it seems very inhuman not to be sad at the death of another.” 265 To the contrary,
Christ reveals his profound human feeling, for he “was a well-spring of compassion, and he wept
in order to show us that it is not blameworthy to weep out of compassion”.266 This is a great
example for the seminarian of how St Thomas sees Christ as a model of true humanity.
The depth of the friendship between Jesus and Lazarus, Martha and Mary, is revealed by the great
confidence the sisters showed in approaching Jesus. They simply inform him: “the man you love
is ill” (John 11.2). They do not request that Jesus come to Lazarus because it is sufficient to state
a need to a friend, who “wills the good of his friend as his own good”. 267 Nor did the sisters
personally deliver their message to Jesus. This also reveals “the confidence they had in Christ due
to the special love and friendship which he had shown for them”.268 They trusted that he would be
particularly concerned for their sorrow.269 The implication is that the sisters must have known him
to be both caring and trustworthy in his affection for them.
St Thomas’ teaching on Christ’s sorrow for his friends teaches the seminarian about important
affective characteristics that should mark the life of the shepherd: affection, trustworthiness,
generosity, compassion, and the ability to appropriately express emotion. In particular, Christ’s
capacity to respond to the sorrow of others enables the seminarian to see how important it is that
he respond likewise. In this regard, Richard Schenk argues for a theology of mourning, which
draws upon St Thomas’ ability to recognize in the Gospel account a portrayal “of the psychological
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reactions of Jesus to the events that he experiences”.270 St Thomas explains that when Christ is
troubled within himself, as he sees Mary weeping, he gives example of a moderated sorrow. Thus
he avoids an inhuman indifference because we should be sad for those who die.271 As Schenk
explains, the example of Christ, who shares the grief of Mary and Martha, encourages Christians
to share the grief of others.272 If the seminarian is to represent Christ to others he needs to be able
to respond with compassion to the grief of others and console them.
The second consideration is related to Christ’s words to the disciples when he calls them friends
at the Last Supper (John 15.13-15). St Thomas’ reflections on Christ’s command, that the disciples
love one another as he has loved them, is helpful to understand the generosity required in this
friendship (John 13.34; cf. 15.17). This is a command, St Thomas observes, that they exercise the
“mutual love” that is necessary for the “true and firm friendship” that Christ wanted for his
disciples.273 The standard for this love is found in the “ways” in which “Christ loved us”.274 He
loved us gratuitously and so we ought to love our neighbor without waiting for him to love us or
“do us a favor”.275 Christ loved us, according to the love of a friend, by giving himself for us and
we too ought to love one another “in deed and in truth” (John 15.13; 1 John 3.18). Christ “loved
us rightly” according to his love for the Father and we too ought to love in one another, “not so
much the pleasure or benefits the loved one gives to us”, but “what pertains to God”. 276 The
seminarian can learn from this consideration of friendship that he ought to love his friends
selflessly and in accordance with how God wills their true good.
Another point about Christ’s offer of friendship is how he contrasts it with a servile attitude. He
tells the disciples that he will no longer call them servants but friends (John 15.15). Instead of
serving God out of a servile fear, which inclines one’s heart to obey God on account of the fear of
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punishment, they should love God. Charity gives the friend of Christ a filial fear, that is, a fear
which flows from his love for Christ and which makes him avoid losing Christ’s friendship (1 John
4.18).277 This involves the friend of Christ in a loving freedom, by which he unites himself to “the
interests of Jesus” and the goal of seeking his neighbor’s salvation.278 Without this intention the
Christian becomes a bad servant, who is “darkened by the pride in his own heart” and “attributes
to himself what he does”, rather than recognizing God as the source of his goodness.279 In this
way, he ceases to see what God is doing because he is too caught up in himself.
Christ, however, gives the disciples the “true sign of friendship on his own part”.280 All that he has
heard from the Father he makes known to his disciples (John 15.15). Thus, “God reveals his secrets
to us by letting us share in his wisdom”.281 In this context, St Thomas quotes Wisdom 7.27, which
speaks of Wisdom passing into “holy souls” making them “friends of God and prophets”. 282
Among the qualities attributed to Wisdom are lucidity, benevolence, beneficence, friendliness and
dependability (Wisdom 7.22-23). These are virtues, firm dispositions of character, which enable
the seminarian to will and act for the good of others, as Chapter 7 will consider.
The third consideration, of how Christ expresses his affectivity through friendship, is brought to
light when the resurrected Lord asks Peter three times: “do you love me?” (John 21.15-17). St
Thomas comments that in doing this the Lord examined Peter, according to the spirit of 1 Timothy
5.22, that the bishop not be hasty to ordain a man. As St Thomas explains: “For just as he ought
not to punish swiftly, so he ought neither to promote unduly, that is, easily ordain men to sacred
orders”.283 St Thomas observes that Jesus asks these questions for the sake of Peter, to make him
more conscious of his love for the Lord and those entrusted to his pastoral responsibility. 284 St
Thomas draws some very sobering implications for priests. They should not be “self-lovers”.285
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Given the importance of the pastoral ministry, the Church ought to choose the best candidate, that
is, the one “who is better educated, more competent, more discerning, and chosen unanimously.”286
St Thomas gives “the honor of God and the benefit of the Church” as the guiding principles for
making such a decision.287 Now, these comments require a spirit of humble self-examination in
the seminarian about his character, and his motives, for becoming a priest. He must think like a
true friend of Christ, exercising a realistic judgment about how he is to promote the true interests
of Christ.288
The priest, moreover, should avoid arrogance and be humble like Peter, who learned not to be
overconfident in his love. At the Last Supper Peter stated that he would lay down his life for Jesus
and be faithful even if everyone else fell away (John 13.37; Matthew 26.33). Now, in answer to
the resurrected Lord’s question, “do you love me more than these”, he simply replies: “Yes, Lord,
you know I love you” (John 21.15), without further elaboration. Peter has been “conquered by his
own weakness”, but now he humbles himself before Christ and before “the apostles”, by not
claiming to have a greater love than they have.289 This shows the Lord’s chosen “are always better
after they are corrected”, St Thomas concludes.290 We are thus taught “not to rank ourselves above
others, but others before ourselves”, as St Paul teaches in Philippians 2.3. 291 Yet, Christ allowed
Peter to be tempted, in order that “he would have an unpretentious opinion of himself and have
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compassion for his subjects when they sinned”.292 To be like Christ the high priest, Peter must also
be able to sympathize with human weakness because he has been tempted (Hebrews 4.15).293
This leads us to an important principle of affective and pastoral formation: personal experience,
when the seminarian responds to it in a mature fashion, enables him to become a better person.294
We will pursue this point through a consideration of St Thomas’ reflection on Hebrews 4.15, which
helps us think of Christ as a compassionate high priest, because he was tempted like us in all things
but did not sin. Christ acquired this disposition through his incarnate human life. “He knows our
misery through experience,” St Thomas explains, “which as God, He knew from eternity through
simple knowledge”.295 Psalm 102.13-14 speaks of God’s compassion for those that fear him
because he knows of what we are made, but the experience of temptation causes Jesus, in his
humanity, to have compassion. “For if He would have been without temptations”, St Thomas
explains, “He would not have known them by experience, and thus He would not have been
compassionate.”296 The depth of painful experience involved in being tempted formed in the Heart
of Jesus his compassion for us.
Now, in Peter’s case, the experience of having to acknowledge his weakness in failing to remain
faithful to Christ, made him humble and compassionate in relation to others. Yet, this principle
needs to be respected as a general principle of affective formation. We are well guided in this
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matter by St Thomas’ point about the art of politics and making laws, which can be applied, mutatis
mutandis, to the seminarian’s formation. St Thomas writes that even though experience is not
enough, it still “contributes not a little towards making a man a statesman”. 297 People with
experience are better able to make “correct” judgments about things, like the appropriate means to
achieve certain results and the activities that are suited to different persons to do things well. “But
the inexperienced are understandably ignorant whether a work is done well or badly on the basis
of what they read in books, for they do not know how to put into practice what is in the books.”298
This does not deny the importance of other areas of formation, such as a proper academic
education.299 However, personal experience exerts a major influence on the seminarian’s capacity
for practical wisdom, emotional maturity and caring for others.
Craig Steven Titus’ comments on the importance of experience for moral maturity will help the
seminarian to understand why experience is so necessary for his affective and pastoral formation.
“‘Experience’”, he explains, “etymologically finds it roots in the practical knowledge, skill, or
competence (peritia) that we draw from a trial or danger (periculum) once overcome.”
Furthermore, we need to listen to the experience of others:
The dialogue between our own experience and that of others is made possible through (1)
being in relationship with others; (2) understanding the other person as another self; (3) having
confidence that other human being’s experiences are real and can be critically integrated to
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serve as a source for one’s own moral judgments; and (4) believing that we share a common
humanity between people of all genders, cultures and times.300

This is relevant to the seminarian’s affective and pastoral formation, because he needs to
experience various forms of pastoral work and relationships to grow in his ability to work well
with people.301 Such experiences also help him to grow in self-knowledge about how he responds
to others, for example, when they are suffering or angry. This will enable him, with the help of
formators, to reflect on why he responds as he does and what he can do to respond in a more mature
and helpful manner. For example, when someone is angry with him does he react with great anger
in return? If so, can he understand that either such a response only further inflames the situation
or that he is dealing with a person who needs a calm response to help him become more reasonable?
Through sustained and supervised experiences, like the visitation of the sick in hospitals, the
seminarian’s mettle will be tested. Also, he will be enabled to see the struggles of others, which
challenge him to refine his ability to apply pastoral principles with emotional balance, wisdom,
and humility.
In this section we have considered three moments in which Christ exercised a tender capacity for
friendship with Lazarus, Martha and Mary; his disciples at the Last Supper; and, Peter after the
resurrection. He demonstrated to them compassion, generosity and the ability to call a dear friend
to a renewed friendship. These are all qualities that the seminarian needs to practice if he is to be
a true friend of Christ and those entrusted to him by God. Moreover, Peter’s experience of being
humbled and becoming compassionate highlights the general principle that the seminarian needs
to be formed through personal experience to become a more effective shepherd.
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5. Christ and Pastoral Charity
To extend our reflection on Christ as a model for affective maturity, we can turn to a consideration
of how the seminarian needs to imitate the love of the Good Shepherd. In this regard, Pope St John
Paul II recommends to seminarians a “strong and tender” devotion to Christ’s Sacred Heart, so
that they can “lead lives that are a response to the love and affection of Christ the priest and good
shepherd”.302 The goal of this devotion is to help the seminarian grow in his pastoral charity for
Christ’s disciples. The affective dimension of this pastoral love is shaped by the seminarian’s
attitude to how he is to love others as a shepherd. In relation to this, there are three points we can
develop from St Thomas’ commentary on John’s Gospel. The first concerns how the shepherd
needs to care for the sheep. The second relates to how the shepherd needs to see that the sheep are
entrusted to him in a relationship of belonging. The third is about having the right motive in being
a shepherd and avoiding an undue love of money.
The first line of reflection concerns the “solicitude” of the good shepherd who loves and cares for
the people entrusted to him. St Thomas quotes Paul’s Letter to the Philippians 1.7 to demonstrate
this attitude: “I hold you in my heart”. The evil shepherd, on the other hand, does not feel such a
bond with the sheep, he “has no care for them”.303 Furthermore, there is a difference “in their
affections”, for the good shepherd, who “loves his flock” is prepared to expose “himself to dangers
that affect his bodily life”.304 He defends the faithful when they are threatened by the devil’s
temptations, the deceits of heresy and the raging tyrant. The evil shepherd, to the contrary,
abandons the faithful when he is put to the test: “he is not willing to endure any inconvenience for
them.”305 The challenge for the seminarian here is to have an attitude of great generosity in his
service of God’s people. This generosity will enable him to serve others, even if it is at a cost to
himself.
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The second line of reflection relates to how the seminarian needs to see the people of God as
personally entrusted to him. Christ’s command to Peter was: “Look after my sheep” (John 21.17).
This pertains to the “office of a good shepherd”, who is to love Christ’s people and give his life
for them in imitation of Christ (John 10.11; 1 John 3.16).306 This attitude of love will lead him to
exercise the authority of the shepherd with charity. The sheep “must belong to him and he must
love them; the first without the second is not enough”, St Thomas comments.307 Here, St Thomas
is pointing to a true relationship of personal belonging in which the priest sees himself as someone
who has a responsibility to care for others. He is someone whose identity is explained in terms of
the relationship of love and care for Christ’s people.
Moreover, drawing upon the example of Christ, St Thomas refers to four actions proper to a good
shepherd who understands this relationship. First, the good shepherd “knows his sheep” and he is
familiar with them, “for we call by name those whom we know familiarly”. Second, he leads them
out “from the society of those who are evil”. Third, he brings “them into the sheepfold” and guides
them to walk the path to eternal life. Fourth, he goes before Christ’s faithful “by the example of a
good life”. Thus the good shepherd does not domineer over those in his charge (1 Peter 5.3) but
imitates Christ who gave good example and “was the first to die for the teaching of the truth”.308
This marks out a basic part of the affective formation of the seminarian. He ought to become a
man who can know and understand his people so that they know they are cared for by Christ.
The third line of reflection is about how Judas was corrupted by avarice, to the point that he gave
himself to following Satan’s suggestions to betray Christ for thirty pieces of silver (Matthew
26.16).309 In this connection, St Thomas reflects on Judas’ response to Mary who bought ointment
worth three hundred denarii and anointed Christ’s feet with it. Judas stated that the money should
have been given to the poor, but, unfortunately, he used to steal from the common purse entrusted
to him (John 12.1-6). St Thomas draws the lesson, remarking that Judas was one of the disciples,
and “that no one should presume on himself no matter to what dignity he has been raised”.310 Judas

306

Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 10, Lecture 3, n.1399.
Ibid.
308
Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 10, Lecture 1, n.1374.
309
See Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 13, Lecture 1, n.1742; Lecture 4, n.1810-1811. In these
passages St Thomas describes the different levels of co-operation with Satan, by which Judas’ heart is given over to
evil until Satan possesses him “more completely … to lead him to accomplish the evil” (n.1811).
310
Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 12, Lecture 1, n.1601.
307

82

“died spiritually from the aroma of the ointment”, because he was “displeased” that it was “poured
out as an act of homage to Christ” rather than being sold.311 He was “pained” to be deprived of the
“opportunity to steal, and it was this avarice that led to the betrayal”.312 The implication for
affective formation is that the seminarian needs to approach his vocation with a right motivation.
He ought to love Christ and his people first and put aside an inordinate love of money.

Conclusion
The significance of this chapter, in the overall structure of the thesis, is that it establishes the
importance of the seminarian’s affective formation on a theological basis. St Thomas’
consideration of God’s affections and Christ’s human affectivity lays the groundwork for a
reflection on some key affective dispositions the seminarian needs to develop. These include the
capacity to: love and rejoice in the good; show mercy; justly moderate zeal, fear, anger and hatred;
express compassion for those who are suffering; set aside the inordinate desires of avarice,
ambition, pride and arrogance; develop friendships of abiding trust and fidelity with men and
women; generously love others in imitation of the Good Shepherd. These are all necessary qualities
in the priest, who is called to reflect the goodness of God and the perfection of Christ’s humanity
both in his personal relationships and in his acts of pastoral service. Now, the next step in the
analysis of St Thomas’ teaching, and its relevance for the seminarian’s affective formation, is to
examine St Thomas’ teaching on the human passions (Chapters 3-6). This will lay the groundwork
for a discussion of how the virtues form the seminarian’s affectivity in Chapters 7-9.
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CHAPTER 3
THE SENSES AND AFFECTIVE FORMATION
The wise person puts all things in order, so that they can be properly connected and then developed
for the good.313 This is as much the work of reason in the development of affectivity as in any
other field of study. So, before examining each of the concupiscible passions it is necessary to
consider both the nature of passion and what causes it. This will help the seminarian to focus on
the particular field of personal experience he is studying. Attending to these basic principles of
affectivity assists the seminarian to avoid leaping over necessary steps of self-knowledge. This
would leave him with untested assumptions about the affective life that would hinder his
understanding of how to achieve affective maturity.
How does St Thomas’ teaching on the human passions further Pope St John Paul II’s call for
affective formation? St John Paul II does not use the term “human passions” in his treatment of
formation in Pastores Dabo Vobis but he does write that the affections and instinctive impulses of
the seminarian remain intact. He writes of the love of the seminarian being of a physical, psychic
and spiritual nature. Also, he writes of love as an expression of the nuptial meaning of the body,
that is, the capacity of the person to give and receive love. 314 In this regard, St Thomas’ teaching
provides a treatment of the faculties that are involved in the seminarian’s affective responses to
the good and evil he experiences. By attending to each faculty involved in his affective experience
the seminarian can more consciously seek to perfect its acts and so develop his affectivity in a
responsible way for his own good and the good of others.
One aspect of this issue is the seminarian’s ability to identify the cause of his affective experience,
which can in turn be modified to cause a different affective experience. For example, if an evil is
the cause of sorrow to him, he can try to rectify the situation so that he can return to a state of
enjoying what is good. Now, to understand the causes of affective responses, the seminarian needs
to know about both the external and the internal faculties involved in this process, such as his sense
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of touch and his sense of imagination. Especially relevant here too, as will be explained below, is
St Thomas’ teaching on the relationship between the senses and the particular reason.
The deeper issue is one of acquiring an accurate self-knowledge so that the seminarian can
understand the influence each affective experience exerts on his desires and attitudes. Affective
experiences provide emotional energy and incline us to think and act in various ways. To become
articulate about the sources of his affective responses within himself and in the way he is acted
upon by external events or the actions of others, enables the seminarian to better understand why
he responds in a particular way. Such articulateness is also necessary to deciding how he should
respond. For example, out of his love for someone he desires to speak with her and enjoy her
company. Knowing the cause of this love and how it affects his attitude to this person, is part of
the information needed to properly discern why the seminarian wants to be with her, in what
circumstances and how to respond to her with courtesy and sensitivity. If he is not sufficiently and
wisely aware of his real desires, for example, for a romantic attachment in a dishonest fashion as
opposed to a friendship in a proper setting, he will act in an inappropriate way.
The knowledge of what causes his romantic love for this person also provides helpful knowledge
about how he can respond to his feelings for her and seek to develop a healthy relationship with
her. For example, imagining being with her to an excessive degree or communicating with her
excessively will inappropriately promote his romantic love for her. Instead, the seminarian can
seek to moderate his affective experience of love by moderating both his thinking about her and
his communication with her. This will increase his ability to relate to her as a friend rather than as
a prospective romantic partner when he is committed to living in formation for the priesthood.
On a deeper level, the concern to develop an accurate knowledge of his affective responses touches
upon the seminarian’s need to understand who he is and how he can present himself in a truthful
manner to build appropriate relationships of trust. The capacity to say to another person, in the
appropriate circumstances, what he in fact is in need of, how he is affected by what another does
to him, and his desire to avoid what may harm himself or another, enables him to present a truthful
picture of himself to another person. This kind of honesty becomes the platform for good decision
making about how those involved in various personal relationships, such as friendship, work, and
pastoral care, can be properly informed about how to respond to each other. It is the kind of
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truthfulness that builds trust because the parties involved know that they are dealing with someone
who seeks to give an accurate picture of themselves, their capacities, and their intentions.315
Accurate knowledge of oneself and appropriate openness with others is an integral part of affective
maturity because it is essential to the development of personal relationships of trust. Without such
maturity the seminarian lacks a basic element in his ability to relate well to others in the pastoral
situation. If he cannot be seen to be truthful about himself he will not be trusted by others when
they approach him for help and advice. They will lack confidence that he can be trusted and so
they will avoid seeking his help in those moments of doubt and confusion when they need the
pastoral care of the priest. The aim to help the seminarian achieve such self-knowledge is also an
important reason for the following chapters (4-6) which investigate the main passions.316
This present chapter, however, covers the general nature of the passions, their basic causes and the
role of the external and internal senses in the development of the seminarian’s affectivity. The
discussion will be divided into two parts: 1) What is Passion? 2) What Causes the Passions?

1. What is Passion?
In the most general sense St Thomas uses the word passion to refer to the capacity of each created
thing to receive the action of another. This involves a change of the receptive being’s state for the
better or for the worse. For example, someone can become warm by standing near a fire or a person
can lose his state of good health.317 Through this power of receptivity a being can both receive
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from the action of another what it needs to develop and be drawn into a response to the one
performing that action.318 In other words, the principle of passion or receptivity is a basic principle
of relationships between things inasmuch as they act on each other for their good or harm.319
In St Thomas’ understanding, all of the faculties of the human person are receptive (passive) to
some degree.320 The mind needs to be open to reality as its measure and be ready to receive
instruction from others as it moves from a lack of understanding to a grasp of the truth.321 This
principle is shown in St Thomas’ understanding of prudence, in which a diligent person seeks good
advice so that he can make good decisions about his own welfare and that of others. To the
contrary, as St Thomas writes, “the imprudent man despises counsel”, and this is “negligence in
striving to have prudence”.322 It is the mind therefore that guides the development of affectivity.
The will is also passive in the sense that it relies on the understanding of the mind to open up
possibilities for the good. As St Thomas explains: the will relies on the intellect such that “good
which is understood moves the will”.323 In other words, what you know is the basis for what you
love and desire. St Thomas calls the will the “higher affective power”, which is moved to respond
to the good by spiritual acts such as love, joy and delight. In doing this the will also has the role of
integrating “the lower affectivity” of our passions with the good of the human person.324
It might be objected that the will is not passive in any significant sense. This objection assumes an
understanding of the human will as the power of choice or the capacity to decide between one
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course of action and another. Without denying the importance of this understanding it also should
be stated that without the underlying intellectual awareness of the good, that is, the capacity of a
certain object or activity to fulfill the person, there is no rational motivation to make decisions. In
this respect, it is very important to note St Thomas’s definition of the will as the “intellectual
appetite”.325 In other words, St Thomas sees the rational person who is capable of understanding
the good as consequently capable of experiencing an affective desire to experience that good as
loved and desired. None of this affective experience can occur without the intellect which “moves
the will, as presenting its object to it”.326 In the first step of its affective act the intellectual appetite
is passive in the very significant sense that it is informed by an intellectual apprehension of the
good in its capacity to fulfill the human person. Without this informing act of the intellect the will
cannot be aware of the good and so cannot decide for it. In this sense there is a true passivity in
the human will as the intellectual appetite.
This is true of our experience of willing in which we are first drawn to the goodness and beauty of
another person and then have to make deliberate choices about how to develop a relationship with
that person. For example, one could love another person and desire to share her life and enjoy her
presence. Yet, practical questions need to be answered about how to conduct that friendship for
the true good of the other person, such as how does this friendship harmonize with one’s vocation
to the priesthood and the other’s vocation to marriage?
There is another significant sense in which the will is passive. The capacity to will the good that
is understood can be heavily influenced by the human passions which will be discussed below.
One outstanding component of human affectivity is that passions change us so that we feel
disposed to things, situations, and other persons in a certain way. St Thomas gives the example of
anger which disposes someone to regard another in a way that is different when he is calm.327 We
could offer many other examples, such as the hope we feel that a difficult situation will turn out
well for us. With such hope we can engage in a more energetic commitment to obtain a certain
good. The will is passive in so far as passions can influence the way we think and draw our
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attention to certain objects and regard them in a certain way. Certainly, this influence needs to be
moderated by the will in terms of making wise decisions that integrate affective experiences with
our good and the good of others. Nevertheless, the will is passive in the sense that it is influenced
by the passions in the way described above. We will return to this point a number of times
throughout the thesis by way of a discussion of how the seminarian is to form his affective life in
accord with the relationships that are appropriate to his vocation as a future priest. For example,
in Chapter 7 there will be a discussion of how virtue forms the passions according to prudent
decisions and Chapter 10 will discuss how strongly felt and disordered passions can incline the
will to evil behavior.
In a more particular sense, St Thomas writes of the passions as passive acts of the human soul. As
Etienne Gilson explains, using the word “emotion” where St Thomas uses “passion”, an emotion
“is an activity which consists in the soul’s undergoing something”. 328 St Thomas describes this
passive act as an alteration of the sensitive appetite. The sensitive appetite is also called
“sensuality”, because it is the capacity to feel in response to things inasmuch as their impact is
perceived by the senses as positive or negative, pleasing or displeasing to us.329 This perception
disposes us a certain way in regard to the object of the passion which is a particular good or evil,
person or situation.330 Robert Miner writes that examples of this kind of experience are found in
statements like “I am delighted” or “I am frightened”.331
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The nature of this experience of passion is explained by St Thomas in his commentary on
Aristotle’s De Anima. St Thomas writes that the distinctive characteristic of passion is that “certain
modifications affect soul and body together, not the soul alone”.332 This is the basis of affectivity,
the capacity to be acted upon (affected) and drawn to respond to the good or bad impact of another
person, thing or situation.333 A simple example is a person blushing when he is embarrassed. When
some circumstance makes him feel self-conscious, uncomfortable or ashamed it causes a
spontaneous reddening in his face which reveals his emotional state of awkwardness.334
There are different ways of referring to this experience of passion. According to Pierre-Marie
Emonet, the manner in which someone has an affective experience determines it as a sentiment,
an emotion or a passion. A sentiment is a balanced and mature affective movement which is
grounded in the truth. An emotion is an intense and extreme affective movement, such as panic,
which disturbs a person’s clear judgment, bodily equilibrium and behavior. A passion is a crisis of
emotion that lasts and narrows his focus. Such passion can end in an obsession, like that of the
greedy man who thinks only of money. “Passion jumbles the sentiments,” Emonet writes,
“draining them of all psychic energy of the soul for its profit. It dominates, subjugates, and finally
kills affectivity”.335
Emonet’s description of these affective experiences highlights the difference between properly
formed and disordered affective experiences. In these pages, nonetheless, the word passion will be
used in St Thomas’ sense. St Thomas would readily agree with the essential point that disordered
emotions are not to the good of the person experiencing them. However, he has a way of speaking
of this matter that differs from Emonet’s. For St Thomas passion is an act of a person’s sensitive
appetite which is in itself a good faculty. The question is whether the passion is or is not moderated
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according to the human good by true judgment and right choices. As St Thomas writes: “it belongs
to the perfection of man’s good that his passions be moderated by reason. For since man’s good is
founded on reason as its root, that good will be all the more perfect, according as it extends to more
things pertaining to man.”336
In fact, for St Thomas, human acts can lack something important when they are not enhanced by
due passion. In De Veritate, for instance, St Thomas defines pity “as sadness about the adversity
of someone else in so far as it is regarded as one’s own evil”, which shows love for the other person
by sharing his sorrow.337 In St Thomas’ judgment, the person who helps someone in need “with a
certain compassion of pity” merits more.338 In his explanation for this conclusion he argues that a
passion can be a sign of the will’s dedication for the good and it can enable the person to perform
a virtuous deed “more promptly and easily”.339 So, the performance of a properly charitable act
with the compassion of pity merits more.

2. What Causes the Passions?
Passion is an act of the sensitive appetite in response to good or evil, but what causes this kind of
change in a person’s affectivity? To discuss this issue the following reflections will be broken into
two parts: a) The Causes of the Passions; b) The Causes of the Passions and Affective Formation.

a) The Causes of the Passions
The basic cause of the passions is a love for objects inasmuch as they are perfective of the one who
loves them. St Thomas writes that the passion of love is a response to a good which causes “a
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certain inclination, aptitude, or connaturalness in respect of good”.340 In particular, connaturalness
refers to a certain proportion between the object loved and the one loving it.341 As Paul Crittenden
explains: connaturality “points to the inclination of one type of thing towards a certain outcome,
along with the idea of a ‘natural fit’, and of (pleasurable) satisfaction in the outcome in the case of
sense and intellectual love”.342 Furthermore, the affective experience of the good involves
complacency which is a certain satisfaction in the good.343 Each of these terms, most of all,
connaturality, points to the fulfilling nature of relationships that involve love for the good. 344
This basic experience of love engenders the passions of desire and joy. St Thomas explains that
the good loved but “not yet possessed” causes desire.345 Then, “when the good is obtained, it causes
the appetite to rest, as it were, in the good obtained: and this belongs to the passion of delight or
joy”.346
The apprehensive powers of the soul – the human faculties by which someone is aware of other
beings - activate the passions. St Thomas writes of sensation as the power to feel according to the
senses of sight, touch, hearing, taste and smell.347 The “common sense” is the capacity to integrate
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the information of the five senses to discern “between various sense objects”, such as “sweet” and
“white”.348 By the common sense a person distinguishes the different sensory qualities of an object
and yet have a unified experience of it.349 As Diana Fritz Cates explains: “the common sense makes
it possible to discern sensible qualities of multiple kinds so that an object can appear as white,
sweet, soft, and fragrant, all at the same time.”350
There is also a faculty by which the person interiorizes the data gained from the senses. St Thomas
describes the “imagination” as the internal sense that receives the forms of sense objects and retains
them.351 Imagination is “the image forming faculty”.352 When we imagine something we “state
that such and such seems or appears to us”.353 Moreover, imagination is a power to “retain a distinct
image of things” even when the one imagining is “not actually sensing things”.354
These images, also called “phantasms”, can be deceptive.355 Just as the senses arouse various
passions the images of the sense impressions retained by the imagination likewise arouse the
passions. However, the higher faculty of the intelligence sometimes does not properly form the
imagination. This can happen on account of a passion such as anger, fear or desire or a person may
be of unsound mind “through delirium or insanity”.356 Thus, the faculty of imagination can help
or hinder a person’s faculty of judgment. St Thomas gives the example of a man who fails to walk
on a plank high above the ground because he “suffers a disturbance of his imagination, through
fear of the fall that is pictured to his imagination”.357
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All the information gained through the senses and held in the imagination needs to be sifted in
terms of its positive or negative significance for the person. The “cogitative sense” is the ability to
judge the evidence of the senses in relation to a particular thing as to whether it is helpful or
harmful.358 St Thomas also refers to this as the “particular reason” which performs a task similar
to universal reason but on the level of sensation and the sensitive appetite.359 Robert Miner explains
that the function of universal reason is to abstract “universals from concrete objects perceived by
the senses”.360 Particular reason, on the other hand, is a capacity to collate information about
individual objects beyond what is “directly perceivable by sensation or imagination” so as to
estimate a particular object’s usefulness or danger.361
The memorative power acts as “a storehouse” of experiences which activate the passions by
recalling particular reason’s judgment about the usefulness or danger of an object, person or
event.362 The memory stores the impressions of the senses, subsequent imaginations and the
judgments of particular reason and associated affective responses. It is through this process that
negative experiences can damage a person’s affectivity. 363 Passions, however, can be “modified
and excited” through the universal reason, as St Thomas explains.364 That is, good reasoning can
help someone to better understand and respond to a memory and its associated passion. Miner
gives the example of a woman who was abused by her uncle and felt fear every time she saw a
man. With the help of a counsellor she gradually realized that she need not be fearful of every man.
This process of rational reflection was facilitated through a focus on her experience of the virtuous
men in her life. Thus her fear gradually subsided.365
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b) The Causes of the Passions and Affective Formation
The development of the seminarian’s external senses is necessary for his affective growth. The
affective responses are caused by the good that is loved, desired and enjoyed. This orientation to
the good needs to be nurtured in order for the seminarian to grow in a healthy contact with the
world and other persons. The senses are channels of communication. They inform the mind about
reality and so lead the mind to ponder the nature of reality. The senses are also formed by the
particular way each object draws them into act. For example, the experience of touching a tree is
a particular way of feeling that is different to the holding of a person’s hand. Each act leads the
mind into contact with the particular nature and the specific significance of the being that is sensed.
The seminarian’s practical intelligence cannot be formed without the data the senses provide.
Without these sources of information he cannot have the basis for judging whether or not his
affective responses are in proportion to the reality of a situation. For, the development of the sense
experience of the seminarian is a basic step in the process of grounding him in the external world
and the lives of other people. It gives him an orientation that is objective; that is, by it he looks
outward to the reality of things, persons and events with the aim of really meeting, receiving and
understanding them.366 This kind of experience is a first step in educating him in the reality of
relationships, which require him to look carefully at the other person and seek the information
necessary to understanding his or her real needs. This is necessary for knowing how to respond to
another and help him or her in the various pastoral situations the seminarian will encounter in his
life as a priest.
The faculty of imagination also needs to be developed for the sake of the seminarian’s affective
growth. Through the imagination the mind can take images and rework them to explore possible
courses of action. The associated benefit is that the passions connected to these images can also be
produced. An example of how this assists in affective formation is that the seminarian can imagine
himself going back to the place where he failed to act virtuously. At this point the seminarian can
imagine himself responding in a more virtuous way to the moral challenge. For instance, if he has
Emonet notes the relational nature of the objective order of knowledge. The word object “comes from the Latin
ob, which means ‘athwart,’ ‘across the path of,’ and jacere, ‘to place’. In order to be known, all realities are placed
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a problem with becoming unduly angry during conversations he could in times of reflection
imagine himself being silent and content to listen to others without overreacting. One benefit is
that this process enables him to have an anticipatory experience of the joy that occurs when he has
respectful and friendly interactions.367 Thus affectively engaged he will feel a greater impetus to
act with calm and courtesy.
The particular reason is the nexus between the senses, universal reason and memory. The salient
point is that the particular reason can be distorted by negative experiences that impede the
seminarian’s accurate view of a situation and the appropriate affective response. If, for instance,
he has experienced undue criticism by significant people in the past so that he feels he is not a
person to be relied upon, he may find it difficult to confidently engage in pastoral work. This
requires a careful effort on the part of seminary formators. They need to form the seminarian’s
particular reason through positive experiences of pastoral work, constructive criticism to help him
be more effective in his work, and the generous offering of praise for work well done. These
experiences form the seminarian’s affectivity by giving him memories that instill a deeper sense
of his self-worth, competency and trustworthiness. They instill a proper self-confidence for future
and more challenging forms of work. They also give him the emotional resilience to engage in an
open conversation about how to improve the way he relates to others as he works.
The study of the senses in affective experience steers the seminarian away from a false
intellectualism, which seeks to exalt the life of the mind but neglects the principles that are
necessary for its true development. Vaguely aware of his affective inclinations and the role of the
senses as their causes the seminarian would be deprived of a basic part of his self-knowledge.
Without such self-knowledge he cannot judge well about what he is inclined to do, why he is doing
it, and its impact on another person. This is in fact a lack of practical intelligence about the human
person and his relationships.368 In this state, he could do violence to his affective life because he
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grasps neither its personal significance nor its laws of growth. This would constitute a serious lack
of knowledge in someone who is called to be a source of wise guidance for those seeking to live a
virtuous life.369

Conclusion
The main concern of the present chapter has been to reflect upon the various meanings of the word
passion and how this influences our understanding of affective formation. St Thomas sees the
principle of passion in the nature of created things as a capacity for receiving the good. This
principle of receptivity is found in a higher way in the human person’s capacity to be open to the
truth and form his choices by truthful judgements. It is in this context that the seminarian needs to
develop his affectivity in response to objects, situations, and other persons inasmuch as he
perceives them to be for his good or against it. This is achieved by first intelligently reflecting on
the significance of his affective responses and how to shape them. This process of reflection then
needs to be put into action by making decisions that accord with the truth. Now, the next chapter
will begin to unfold St Thomas’ teaching on the passions that first concern the good, namely, love,
desire and hope, and their importance for affective formation.
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CHAPTER 4
THE FORMATION OF LOVE, DESIRE AND JOY
The purpose of the previous chapter was to discuss the basic principles of the passions that are
involved in the experience and formation of affectivity. This chapter will reflect upon the
formation of the concupiscible passions of love, desire and joy as a necessary first step in laying
the groundwork for a discussion of the formative role of the virtues. The term “concupiscible”
points to the relationship between the experience of loving a good and desiring the pleasure of
attaining it.370
Before we proceed further it is helpful to ask about what is the advantage of looking in detail at
each of these passions and the other passions we will study in subsequent chapters? Studying St
Thomas’ teaching on each passion educates the seminarian to carefully reflect on his experience
of its particular causes and effects. That is, the seminarian learns to reflect on what is the source
of the particular affective state he experiences and he also learns to discern how this affective state
inclines him to certain attitudes and actions. It enables him to understand himself more accurately
as to why he feels as he does and to be careful of what he does on account of this affective
experience. As Robert Miner explains: “to acquire real knowledge of the multiple ways in which
I am acted upon, I will gain little by simply thinking about the passions in general. Rather, I must
pose specific questions”. For example: “What do I love? What causes me to experience desire?
How do I respond to sorrow?”371 This is the first step in evaluating the significance of the passions
and how to form them.
In the analysis below there will be a description of each particular passion in terms of its nature,
causes and effects and then a reflection on how it can help the seminarian’s affective formation.
The order of topics will be: 1) The Passion of Love; 2) The Strong Desire of Concupiscence; 3)
Pleasure and Joy.
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1. The Passion of Love
The experience of love is fundamental to the seminarian’s affective maturity. As Pope St John
Paul II states in Pastores Dabo Vobis: “Affective maturity presupposes an awareness that love has
a central role in human life”.372 This involves understanding the various dimensions of this love in
terms of the “physical, psychic and spiritual” dimensions of the person, which are expressed
through the “‘nuptial meaning’ of the human body”.373 This “nuptial meaning” refers to the
capacity of the seminarian to give himself “to another” and take another person to himself in
love.374 However, without the affective maturity that enables the seminarian to appropriately show
love, and receive it from others, he lacks the wherewithal to develop chaste relationships, which
is a prerequisite for his future life as a celibate priest.
St Thomas’ teaching on the passion of love (amor) enables the seminarian to understand in greater
depth how this experience of love influences how he relates to others. This is shown in the
following parts of St Thomas’ reflections on love: a) St Thomas’ teaching provides a language for
the analogical nature of love, which enables the seminarian to perceive how different kinds of love
operate in his heart; b) St Thomas’ teaching on the love of concupiscence (amor concupiscentiae)
and the love of friendship (amor amicitiae) presents the seminarian with a principle of review
about what motivates him in his relationships; c-d) a study of St Thomas’ reflections on the causes
and the effects of love gives a sharper awareness of how a person comes to love and what real
impact that love has upon him; e) this section will end with an analysis of the implications for
affective formation.

a. The Analogical Nature of Love
Love is an analogical term for the study of human affectivity. 375 It refers to experiences that flow
from both the will and the passions. In a general sense, St Thomas writes that love “consists in a
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change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object”, that is, the capacity for love is activated
by a desirable and suitable good.376 Love thus refers to the capacity of one being to appreciate the
goodness of another and strive to be fulfilled by it or contribute to its fulfilment. This sense of
union with a suitable good is present in the human person’s affective experience of love.
St Thomas sees a certain reflection of the passion of love in the will’s affections. While sensitive
love is a passion in the sensitive appetite, he writes that love is called a passion “in a wider and
extended sense, according as it is in the will”.377 “Complacency” is an example of an act that is
analogously present in the two levels of affectivity of the will and of the passions. If complacency
is the pleasure taken in a good that is loved due to the “affinity” between the lover and the good
that is loved, then analogically there is a certain complacency in the will. As Etienne Gilson
explains: “The complacency of a will in its object is called intellectual love … Intellectual love is
the soul’s complacency in a good decreed by a free judgment of the reason.”378
The analogical nature of human love is relevant to the seminarian’s self-knowledge, his ability to
discern between various affective experiences, and his capacity to judge well of the actions that
express his affective state. The question for the seminarian’s discernment is: would this suggested
action be in harmony with the properly willed good of the other person? To answer this question
another more fundamental question needs to be answered: what is the nature of this love and what
kind of affective bond does it forge? The affective content of the experience indicates something
important both for its proper interpretation and the discernment of the proposed course of action.
St Thomas’ understanding of the analogical structure of love is found in his articulation of the four
basic kinds of love: sensitive love (the passion of amor), dilection, friendship and charity. The
English the word “love” is used in varying contexts: “I love classical music” has a different meaning to “I love you”
when a man speaks with his wife. The meaning of “love” in any particular context is different according to such details
as who is involved and what kind of behavior is appropriate to the particular relationship. In this way the nature of
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affective experience of amor as an appreciation for the good of another person is seen as the
foundational experience for the next levels of love. Thus St Thomas writes about dilection
(dilectio) which implies, in addition to amor, a choice (electio) and as such is an expression of love
in the will. Then there is friendship (amicitia), which implies an abiding habit of regarding another
as one loved as oneself. Here there is the idea of love as a virtue. Charity (caritas) is next and this
is derived from the Latin word carus meaning “high-priced”, “dear” or “costly”.379 Charity denotes
a certain perfection of love, “in so far as that which is loved is held to be of great price”.380
St Thomas’ recognition of the analogical experience of love is also linked to his understanding of
how God draws the human person to himself through the passion of love. For St Thomas, love as
a passion is “more Godlike than dilection”. This is so from the point of view that through love the
human person is “as it were passively drawn by Him, more than he can possibly be drawn thereto
by his reason”.381 To make sense of this the reader needs to refer to St Thomas’ teaching that the
affective state of the person predisposes him to see matters in a certain light. As St Thomas
explains, given “that the sensitive appetite is a particular power, it has great influence in disposing
man so that something seems to him such or otherwise, in particular cases”. 382 For a man is
changed “to a certain disposition” by the sensitive appetite, and thus “something seems to him
fitting, which does not seem so when he is not so affected”.383 One thing will seem good to a
person when angry, for example, “which does not seem good when he is calm”. 384 Thus “in this
way” passions influence the will.385
St Thomas’ point about the divine quality of amor pertains, then, to how we are drawn to God
through our passion of love, which disposes us to will according to a love for God. St Thomas is
highlighting a basic human trait that is manifested in personal relationships: we are inclined to love
others when they touch our hearts through love. Even more so, God moves us to him by amor. St
Thomas is insisting on the power of amor to overcome the lethargy of a person and incline him to
love God. In this regard, Miner touches on an essential point of authentic spirituality: “Allowing
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oneself to be passively helped by God is the precondition of dilectio, of inclining oneself toward
God by rational means. Amor sensitivus turns out to be the seed out of which the highest amor
rationalis grows.”386 Indeed, Miner notes, without the proper development of sensitive love the
intellectual love of God “will be weak”.387
Every kind of intellectual love involves this dimension of passion. Friends, for example, often have
to take the initiative and show affection for another for their bond of affection to develop. A
principle relevant to this context is found in St Thomas’ statement: “it is not possible for the will
to be moved to anything intensely, without a passion being aroused in the sensitive appetite”.388
This is an affirmation of the need to appeal to the heart and feelings of someone so that he can
more easily respond to the one who loves him.389

b. Amor Concupiscentiae et Amor Amicitiae
St Thomas’ treatment of amor leads him to consider the distinction between the love of
concupiscence (amor concupiscentiae) and the love of friendship (amor amicitiae). For St
Thomas, “that which is loved with the love of concupiscence, is loved, not simply and for itself,
but for something else”.390 In love of concupiscence a person apprehends the beloved primarily as
being of help to his well-being. Gilson explains that amor concupiscentiae “arises then out of the
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fact that two beings are complementary, or to speak in technical fashion, out of the fact that one is
in potency what the other is in act”.391
St Thomas further specifies amor concupiscentiae in terms of “usefulness” and “pleasure”.392 In
friendship of use, one person can obtain something through another’s agency and as long as this
lasts there is friendship. In friendship of pleasure, while there is enjoyment between the two parties
there is companionship. Friendship based on usefulness or pleasure “preserves the character of
friendship” to the extent that the friend wishes “some good” to his friend.393 St Thomas,
nevertheless, qualifies the perfection of these two experiences of amor. He writes: “But since he
refers this good further to his own pleasure or use, the result is that friendship of the useful or
pleasant, in so far as it is connected with love of concupiscence, loses the character of true
friendship.”394
The affective experience of friendship in the fullest sense, St Thomas continues, is found in amor
amicitiae in which the object of a person’s love is loved “simply and for itself”.395 In amor
amicitiae someone wills the good to his friend “as to himself” and thus the lover sees the one he
loves “as his other self”.396 In Commentary on the Gospel of John, St Thomas refers to the love of
friendship in terms of the sharing of oneself. He writes:
With the love of concupiscence we draw external things or persons to ourselves, and we love
these others insofar as they are useful to us or give us pleasure. But in the love of friendship
we have the opposite, for we draw ourselves to what is external to us, because those we love
in this way we treat the same as ourselves, sharing ourselves with them in some way. 397

The deeper affective experience of amor amicitiae inclines a person to share the good of himself
with another and thereby he more richly participates in the good of friendship. The question that

391

The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, p.276.
Summa Theologica I-II, q.26, a.4, ad 3.
393
Ibid.
394
Ibid.
395
Summa Theologica I-II, q.26, a.4, resp.
396
Summa Theologica I-II, q.28, a.1, resp.
397
Commentary on the Gospel of John: Chapters 13-21, Chapter 15, Lecture 4, n.2036, trans. Fabian Larcher, O.P.
and James A. Weisheipl, O.P. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010).
392

103

arises for the person experiencing amor is: what is my chief motivation in this particular
relationship, to look to either what can be received from another or what is shared with him?

c. The Causes of Love
The basic idea of this section is how one might encourage the seminarian to reflect on what causes
the love he experiences. This will help him to develop his rightful love for others through recourse
to the appropriate causes. St Thomas outlines four major causes in his analysis of the experience
of love: the good, knowledge, likeness, and other passions.
St Thomas affirms the good as the basic cause of love because love implies a certain connaturalness
for the thing beloved. He writes: “to everything, that thing is a good, which is akin and
proportionate to it”.398 Christopher Malloy explains this connaturalness in terms of similitude and
compatibility. He writes: “The union of similitude is the fittingness or compatibility of one thing
for another, without which love is not possible.”399 There is also a certain incipient pleasure taken
in the loved object. As Gilson writes: “Such pleasure or complacency is, so to speak, an immediate
experiencing of natural affinity, of the fact that the living being and the object it is meeting are
somehow complementary.”400 Even the person who loves evil, St Thomas argues, does so “under
the aspect of good, that is to say, in so far as it is good in some respect”. Iniquity is only loved
inasmuch as it is a means to gain some good like “pleasure, for instance, or money”.401 Thus, even
in the love that involves evil actions the person is motivated by his love of a good, albeit in a
disordered fashion.
A basic principle of human affectivity is that good only appeals to us when we are aware of it.402
However, something “is loved more than it is known; since it can be loved perfectly, even without
being perfectly known”.403 St Thomas gives two examples: loving a science even though we know
it imperfectly and loving God even though he is incomprehensible. Some love the sciences, St
398
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Thomas writes, “through having a certain general knowledge of them: for instance, they know that
rhetoric is a science that enables man to persuade others; and this is what they love in rhetoric.”404
Also, we can never comprehend God even though we can know him to a certain degree.405 By
love, nonetheless, we are in union with God and gain an understanding not otherwise accessible to
us.406 St Thomas’ idea is that there is a resemblance of minds through the union of love and by
which those who love order their actions to the good of the people they love. As Walter Farrell
and Dominic Hughes explain: “Likemindedness is the climax of true love. Those who love each
other find ever fewer moments when their minds fail to meet. In the communion of their affection
they discover a deeper communication and a more intimate conformity of thought.” 407 Thus, love
forms a personal unity of mind and will.
There are two kinds of likeness that cause love. The first arises from each thing having the same
quality. The second “arises from one thing having potentially and by way of inclination, a quality
which the other has actually”.408 St Thomas explains that “the first kind of likeness causes love of
friendship”.409 Since the friends share some quality they are inclined to a unity of affection by
which one friend wishes good to the other “as to himself”.410 The second kind of likeness “causes
love of concupiscence”.411 For in this case one desires to have and enjoy for himself the quality
that the other possesses. If, however, he sees the other as a hindrance to “gaining the good that he
loves, he becomes hateful to him, not for being like him, but for hindering him from gaining his
own good.”412 St Thomas gives two examples: that potters quarrel among themselves “because
they hinder one another’s gain”, and that the proud contend with others “because they hinder one
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another in attaining the position they covet”.413 Thus, the experience of likeness can be a cause of
either unity or discord, depending upon the affective disposition of the persons concerned.
A final point is that every passion implies either an inclination to something that fulfills us or an
inclination to avoid something that is harmful to us. In this way, each of the passions is a cause of
love, in the sense that it either contributes to our good or helps us to respond to what harms our
good. For example, St Thomas writes that “hope strengthens desire, since we do not desire so
intensely that which we have no hope of receiving. Nevertheless hope itself is of a good that is
loved”.414 One implication of this truth is that the seminarian needs to identify the good that he
loves because this love is the basis for his other affective responses. By considering the good that
he desires he refocuses his affectivity on the reason for a worthwhile course of action. For example,
by considering how he helps others to rediscover their dignity by being patient with them, he
deepens his affective desire to conduct his pastoral work in a charitable way.

d. The Effects of Love
St Thomas writes about six effects of love: union, mutual indwelling, ecstasy, zeal, and the wound
of love, as well as the four proximate effects of love: melting, enjoyment, languor and fervor.
These effects act as indicators of what the seminarian is in fact experiencing in relation to others
and therefore they are very helpful for the seminarian to grow in his self-awareness. They witness
to both how love changes the seminarian and influences the way he relates to the people he loves.
“Union” refers either to the affective bond between people when they are in each other’s presence
or the tendency to desire the presence of the beloved when that person is absent.415 Thus St Thomas
points to love as an abiding experience within the person. As Gilson comments: “To appreciate
the closeness of this union, it is well to observe the curious transference of personalities which
naturally accompanies love. In some way the personalities can be said to pass into each other.”416
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“Mutual indwelling” refers to the desire to “gain an intimate knowledge of everything pertaining
to the beloved, so as to penetrate into his very soul”.417 St Thomas gives the Holy Spirit, “Who is
God’s love”, as the greatest example of this indwelling because he searches all things, even the
depths of God (1 Corinthians 2.10).418 St Thomas describes this indwelling as “intimate” from the
Latin intimus meaning “inmost”.419 The effects of mutual indwelling and intimacy witness to the
profoundly shared emotional involvement of love.
“Ecstasy” implies the affective experience of being “placed outside oneself”.420 In regard to love,
ecstasy refers to the way the lover’s attention is directed beyond himself to the person he loves.421
Zeal “arises from the intensity of love” and inclines the lover to remove whatever hinders the union
of love.422 For example, St Thomas mentions envy, which regards the good of others as a hindrance
to the envious person’s own excellence. However, St Thomas also writes about a zeal which in the
“love of friendship seeks the friend’s good”.423 When this love “is intense, it causes a man to be
moved against everything that opposes the friend’s good”.424 St Thomas gives Elijah and Jesus as
examples of those who were zealous for the worship of the true God (1 Kings 19.10; John 2.17).
Another effect of love is that it can be a wounding experience.425 To properly grasp St Thomas’
point the reader needs to first recognize that a love that perfects the person is a good.426 As Gilson
explains: “Taken in itself, love is not necessarily that destructive passion which the poets have so
often described. Quite the contrary, it is natural, and therefore beneficial, to desire something we
lack in order to attain our perfection. Love of what is good can only improve the lover.”427
However, the corollary to this, as St Thomas explains, is that the “love of a good which is
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unsuitable to the lover, wounds and worsens him”.428 He quotes the prophet Hosea: “They became
abominable, as those things which they loved” (9.10). Thus loving wrongfully and excessively can
damage the lover by wronging his affections.

e. Implications for Affective Formation
St Thomas provides us with a description of how amor impacts us and how it influences the way
we relate to others. For St Thomas, love is the fundamental motivating power of all a person does.
Accordingly, amor is a significant part of affective experience which must be rightly formed if the
seminarian is to responsibly love his neighbor. The center of gravity in this consideration of love
is the good that is perfective of the person who loves. This gives a starting point by which the
seminarian can reflect on whether the love he experiences has a truly good object which he regards
in a truly good way.
Moreover, love as a passion (amor), love as a deliberate choice (dilectio), love as an abiding
friendship (amicitiae), and love as it implies that another is very dear to the one who loves
(caritas), involve different ways of relating to another person. By focusing on their respective
objects the seminarian can be more perceptive about the kind of love he is experiencing in regard
to another and the way it disposes him to relate to that person. For example, the seminarian can
seek to know whether he is choosing according to the rationally judged good of the other person –
dilectio or is he experiencing the very strong passion of amor for someone? It is not a matter of
disregarding amor as an evil but recognizing that it must be brought into harmony with a proper
judgment of how to conduct a personal relationship. Moreover, aware of his own experience of
amor, he has the first step in discerning when he is being unduly driven by this emotional
experience to a relationship that is contrary to his vocation to the priesthood.
St Thomas’ explanation of the two basic tendencies of amor, the love of concupiscence and the
love of friendship, sheds further light on the seminarian’s affective experience in relation to others.
The love of concupiscence is an affective inclination to love a good or a person for the sake of
something else. It is more directly related to the seminarian’s desire for his own good. This is a

428

Summa Theologica I-II, q.28, a.5, resp.

108

proper desire in terms of the seminarian’s self-care. He is inclined by the love of concupiscence to
acknowledge his need and how it can be properly fulfilled.
Nevertheless, there is another important side of the seminarian’s affective development. Amor, in
its inclination as the love of friendship, is an affective impetus to enjoy friendships with a view to
the shared good of the relationship. It is, as St Thomas teaches, a sharing of oneself with the loved
person. The experience of amor is only deeply fulfilled as a mutually shared experience in which
each person wills his friend’s good as his own. Now, the seminarian will be far less capable of
living a generous priestly service if he does not appropriate this inclination. If he relates to others
primarily in terms of the satisfaction of his own particular desires he lives an impoverished
affective life.
St Thomas’ discussion of the relational dimension of amor amicitiae, which looks primarily to the
good of the friend, also points to how it is developed through the common good of the friendship.
William C. Mattison III writes: “ultimately the good of self and the good of others cannot be
rivals”.429 Rather, the common good is experienced through cooperation in accord with a true
sharing of love. As Ezra Sullivan writes, in our generosity we can place the good of another person
before our own. This is a particular fulfilment of our personhood. For instance, Sullivan writes of
parents, who in loving their children “are dignified in their persons precisely because they are more
greatly promoting their family of which they are integral members and for which they act”. 430
Another example for the seminarian is that of a generous parish priest who faithfully serves his
people.

William C. Mattison III, “Movements of Love: A Thomistic Perspective on Agape and Eros”, Journal of Moral
Theology, Vol. 1, no. 2 (2012): 40. In accord with St Thomas’ thought, Mattison gives God as the ultimate foundation
for this sharing of the common good. Mattison focuses on the relationship between agape and eros but I am applying
his comments to reflect on St Thomas’ sense of amor as a passion of love. The Latin amor often conveys the meaning
of the Greek eros. This wider sense of eros as a passion for the unity of love is captured by Pope Benedict XVI in
Deus Caritas Est, where he insists on the rightful importance of eros in human life. In comparing eros and agape as
an “ascending” love and a “descending love”, or as a “possessive love and oblative love”, Benedict avoids calling
eros intrinsically selfish. Rather, eros, flowing from our created need, strives to fulfill it, leading “us beyond ourselves”
to seek personal union, even with God. Although, this striving needs to be complemented by agape if it is to come to
its true perfection. See Pope Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est: On Christian Love, nn.5, 7 (Libreria Editrice Vaticana,
2006/ Strathfield, NSW: St Pauls, 2006).
430
Ezra Sullivan, O.P., “Natural Self-Transcending Love According to Aquinas”, Nova et Vetera, English Edition,
Vol. 12, No. 3 (2014): 923.
429

109

While there are goods specific to the individual, the common good is “a good that is shared
naturally; it is mine and yours simultaneously”, as Sullivan explains.431 This is an outlook that is
essential to the seminarian’s affective development because he is called to serve others as a priest.
As Pope St John Paul II emphasizes, the seminarian’s capacity to relate to others “is truly
fundamental for a person who is called to be responsible for a community”.432 The mature person
recognizes that by extending his love to others he is more deeply participating in the good with
them. As Sullivan writes: “Self-love perfects itself in giving itself away to the one most worthy of
love.”433 In other words, the affective capacity for generously sharing in the common good of a
relationship is perfective of the person who loves another. This capacity disposes the seminarian
to share in the relationships and community life of the people he is called to serve. We can rephrase
St Thomas’ statement from his Commentary on the Gospel of John, which was quoted above, to
refer to the affective capacity to share in the lives of others. Instead of drawing external things or
persons to himself, and loving them insofar as they are useful to him or give him pleasure, the
seminarian can draw himself to those he is called to love and serve as a priest.
St Thomas’ teaching on the causes of love can be taken as a program of action for developing the
seminarian’s affectivity. St Thomas intends it as an explanation of what brings about the
experience of amor. It also serves to provide a pattern that enables the seminarian to reflect on
what he is experiencing, why he is experiencing it, and how to better develop it. The seminarian
ought to promote the causes St Thomas mentions so as to develop his capacity for loving others.
For instance, since knowledge of the good is a cause of love the seminarian needs an eager desire
to both learn about the good and be open to experiences that develop his capacity to enjoy it. This
is why, for example, working with those who are in need of mercy forms in the seminarian’s
affectivity a capacity to love and relate to them. Through such experiences he grows in his
awareness of the need for mercy and he acquires a greater ability to show mercy. Another example
is to look at likeness as a cause of love which, in St Thomas’ view can encourage a love of
friendship. By sharing some common interests with others, for example, in conversation about
matters of everyday interest, the seminarian can learn to establish a relationship in which the other
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person finds him approachable. This mark of approachability makes it easier for someone to talk
with him about deeper matters when the need arises.
When St Thomas writes about the effects of love such as union, mutual indwelling, ecstasy, and
zeal, he is acknowledging the transformative power of amor and how it involves someone in the
lives of others. Reflecting on these effects enables the seminarian to be aware of the experience of
love as it both impacts upon his own affectivity and as it forges bonds with others. The effects of
amor witness to its presence in the heart of the seminarian and impress upon him the real change
that it causes in him, in terms of his passions and how these incline him to certain choices. By
being attentive to these effects he can be more conscious of where his heart is leading him. He can
see the signs of a love which is either in keeping with his vocation or is a corruption of it. If, for
instance, he feels a deep zeal for someone’s friendship he will be inclined to spend much time with
him. However, he must be careful not to neglect the other people who have a legitimate call on his
attention and affection.
An extension of this self-knowledge is that the seminarian needs to be aware of the effects of love
on others. The seminarian is more capable of adjusting his behavior in accord with both his
circumstances and his responsibilities if he is aware of the effects of his behavior on others. St
Thomas’ explanation of ecstasy, for instance, explains how someone is drawn into a personal
relationship through focusing his attention outside himself on another person he finds loveable.
Given the real impact of amor upon his affectivity, and the affective bonds it forges, the seminarian
needs to be responsible about this inclination. St Thomas points to how an instance of amor can
involve a wrongful object. Loving a person in a way that does not respect her person, affective
balance, and relationships with others, harms both the person wrongly loved and the affectivity of
the person who wrongly loves. Also, from the point of view of the bodily change involved in amor,
too intense a love can give the seminarian an affective overload. By implication, his thoughts,
imaginations, words and deeds, the time he spends with someone, can be more than is good for the
other person concerned. Thus, from within the experience of amor arises the need for moderation,
if the experience is to be to the true benefit of the people who love each other.
Amor also plays a helpful part in the development of the seminarian’s understanding of how people
are drawn into union with God. It pertains to the simple need of the human heart to be moved by
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God’s love.434 For St Thomas, the more intellectual kinds of love, dilectio, amicitia, and caritas,
cannot ignore the fundamental significance of amor as a love for the other person. What friendship
or marriage, for instance, can last very long without appropriate expressions of sensitive love?
Mutatis mutandis, the proper expressions of sensitive love also embody the priest’s affection for
his people. Various expressions of kindness, gratitude and support, communicate the priest’s love
for them and draws them into the love of God who is sacramentally represented by the priest.

2. The Strong Desire of Concupiscence
It is true that in this present life, which bears the wound of Original Sin, the desire for pleasure and
joy can be experienced in a distorted fashion. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the faculty of
concupiscence, (concupiscentia - a strong desire or craving), is a proper part of the human person’s
affectivity, it energetically moves a person to seek fulfilment in the good he loves. It is thus a
necessary affective principle which moves a person to act for his own proper perfection. It is this
faculty that deserves to be rightly formed in the seminarian. To unfold St Thomas’ teaching on this
issue and its implications for affective formation, the following topics will be presented: a) A
Craving for the Pleasurable Good; b) The Implications for Affective Formation.

a. A Craving for the Pleasurable Good
St Thomas writes that “concupiscence is the craving for pleasurable good”.435 It is a very strong
desire for the good that is loved and will give pleasure when it is attained.436 Thus Gilson defines
desire as “the form which love takes when its object is absent”.437 St Thomas does describe
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concupiscence as an experience in the sensitive appetite where there is a craving “for a thing under
the aspect of something delightful to the senses”.438 Yet, he also applies the term to what is
experienced in the rational or spiritual appetite. As he explains:
The craving for wisdom, or other spiritual goods, is sometimes called concupiscence; either
by reason of a certain likeness; or on account of the craving in the higher part of the soul being
so vehement that it overflows in the lower appetite, so that the latter also, in its own way, tends
to the spiritual good, following the lead of the higher appetite, the result being that the body
itself renders its service in spiritual matters, according to Ps. lxxxiii. 3: My heart and my flesh
have rejoiced in the living God.439

St Thomas further explains the difference between the desire for spiritual pleasures and the desire
for sensitive pleasures in terms of natural and non-natural pleasures. By “natural” pleasures he
means they are “common and necessary” to sustaining life, for example, sufficient food.440 By a
pleasure being “not natural” he does not mean that it is anti-natural, that is, against a person’s
good. Rather, he intends that it is pleasurable because it is “proper to men, to whom it is proper to
devise something as good and suitable, beyond that which nature requires”.441 Thus, St Thomas
views the desire for pleasure as something appropriate to human affectivity. Although, as Chapter
7 will explain, he sees the virtue of temperance as a necessary formative principle which moderates
the desire and experience of pleasure.
Since natural concupiscence concerns that which nature requires as common and necessary for the
sustenance of life, it ever tends to what is “finite and fixed”.442 Someone can, for example, eat only
so much at one meal for his enjoyment and good health. “Hence”, St Thomas concludes, “man
never desires infinite meat, or infinite drink”.443 However, there is in this regard a succession of
goods one after the other. After one meal a man will need another at a later point in time.444 St
Thomas describes non-natural concupiscence, however, as “altogether infinite”.445 He is here
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referring to the open-ended way that non-natural concupiscence flows from reason, which enables
us to think up pleasures beyond what is common and necessary to nature. This manifests a quality
of reason “to proceed to infinity. Hence he that desires riches, may desire to be rich, not up to a
certain limit, but to be simply as rich as possible”.446 As Gilson comments: “As for desire of goods
not needed by nature, they are plainly infinite in all senses, for we control such desires by what
reason tells, and our reason never wearies of conceiving beyond that which we already have”.447
This is a great gift, but, as we will discuss below, it can have serious pitfalls for the proper
development of the seminarian’s affectivity.
St Thomas draws another reason for the difference between the two kinds of concupiscence from
the difference between the end and the means of an action. The “concupiscence of the end is always
infinite: since the end is desired for its own sake, e.g., health: and thus greater health is more
desired, and so on to infinity”.448 Conversely, “concupiscence of the means is not infinite, because
the concupiscence of the means is in suitable proportion to the end”.449 For example, the particular
means to good health are geared to that end and only desirous to the extent that they are helpful in
this regard. For St Thomas, then, the end is somewhat without measure, in the sense that a person
desires as much of it as possible. However, the particular means to achieve this end is limited
inasmuch as it is relative to and determined by this end. That is, the means is determined by its
relation to the end.
St Thomas applies this to the way a person can appoint a particular end for himself and then orders
the means to attain it. If a person places his end in riches he will “have an infinite concupiscence
of riches”. The person who desires “on account of the necessities of life”, however, will “desire a
finite measure of riches, sufficient for the necessities of life”.450 St Thomas’ point is that the
capacity to desire riches beyond what is necessary can get out of control. It can become an affective
disorder of the human capacity to proceed to infinity in desiring non-natural pleasures. This is an
example of identifying a limited means to procure certain human goods with an ultimate end of
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human desire. This is an inversion of values, which engenders a disordered desire for certain goods
at the expense of a proper desire for other greater goods.
On this point, it is good to keep in mind Gilson’s explanation of the kind of desire for goods that
is distinctive of our capacity to reason. Gilson calls this “cupidity”, which “is proper to man. It
extends to whatever knowledge, rightly or wrongly, represents to us as good.” However, Gilson
makes a vital distinction for how a moral person should regard the desire of such goods: “Although
acts of cupidity are reasoned acts, they are not always reasonable.”451 Therefore, there is a need
for cupidity to be moderated in accord with a proper understanding of human need. For example,
a parish priest should raise money to support the works of the parish family. However, he should
not unduly give his time to thinking about raising money. Otherwise, he will neglect giving
sufficient time to serving the spiritual needs of his parishioners.

b. Implications for Affective Formation
It is significant for the seminarian’s affective formation that St Thomas does not reject the inner
goodness of concupiscence. Yet he does argue for a wider and more enriching perspective on what
concupiscence involves. St Thomas extends the range of concupiscence to “spiritual goods”, such
as “wisdom”, while still acknowledging the role of “the body itself” in rendering “its service in
spiritual matters”.452 As Miner explains: “As part of our nature, concupiscentia, desire for things
pleasing to the senses, is in itself good. It goes wrong only when it refuses to be subordinated to
the rational appetite for the immaterial good. But even here, blame lies less in the passion itself
and more in the will’s decision to choose the lower good as if it were the higher good.” 453 The
crucial issue is whether the person rightly desires goods.
St Thomas’ reflections on concupiscence do not undervalue the importance of desire for pleasure.
Rather, they help the seminarian to better understand the psychology of his desires. There is a
proper desire for experiences of natural pleasures, such as eating. However, the experience of
pleasures that are generated by the exercise of reason are altogether infinite due to the power of
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reason to proceed to infinity. This is a manifestation of the greatness of reason and the way it can
open the affectivity of the seminarian to a deeper and a wider range of experiences of the good.
The point is to encourage the seminarian’s desires for true goods so that he can energetically
develop his capacity to both enjoy and communicate what is good to others. Still, the seminarian
must also be aware that in this capacity to stretch towards infinity lies the capacity for a profound
weakness. For the human person can conceive of many pleasures that can, at times, overstretch his
true and limited capacity for them. By the same power of reason he can focus too much on one
desire to the neglect of another. He can also think that his experience of the common pleasures can
fill the lacuna of his unfulfilled spiritual desires. Hence the desire for an activity like eating can
become exaggerated due to feelings of loneliness or low self-esteem.
St Thomas’ teaching on how someone can set a particular end to life, and thereby adjust the means
to attain it, opens the seminarian to a reflection on how he can integrate his desires with the ultimate
goal of Christian life. He is in formation for the priesthood, which at its deepest level flows from
a desire to love God and to share in Christ’s mediating role of bringing God’s children to the
Father. All goods, of the sensitive or rational appetite, find their true unity in the seminarian’s
vocation to love God, the source of all that is good, and to love his neighbor.
Moreover, concupiscence can be developed to help the seminarian strive for the noblest of goods,
such as the virtues and the relationships these virtues develop. This disposes the seminarian to
desire the completion of all these goods in the fulfilment of eternal beatitude, the ultimate aim of
his priestly vocation. That is, his desire for the greatest good, God, is educated and exercised by
properly desiring limited goods. St Thomas expresses this desire, in his prayer: “For the
Attainment of Heaven”. Addressing the “God of all consolation”, St Thomas prays that “after this
life has run its course”, God might grant him “knowledge” and “enjoyment” of the “divine
majesty”.454 Then, he prays to God for “an abundance of Your riches, a river of delights, and a
flood of other goods. So that I may enjoy Your solace above me, a delightful garden beneath my
feet, the glorification of body and soul within me, and the sweet companionship of men and angels
around me.”455 This prayer draws upon the goodness of many earthly desires, such as pleasure
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taken in the good things of nature and the pleasure of being with others. From the experience of
desiring these earthly goods, St Thomas leads us to desire the pleasure of enjoying them perfectly
in Heaven.
Thus, concupiscence can be a kind of a ladder, by which the proper desire for lesser goods prepares
the heart to ascend to the desire of greater goods. Accordingly, St Thomas sees beatitude in terms
of the fulfilment of human desire. In his exposition of the Creed’s article on everlasting life he
writes:
Eternal life is the perfect fulfilment of desires, since each of the blessed will have more than
he desired or hoped for. The reason is that in this life no man can fulfill his desires, nor can
any creature satisfy a man’s craving, for God alone satisfies and infinitely surpasses a man’s
desire, which for that reason is never at rest except in God.456

Furthermore, properly directed desire can draw the seminarian to engage in actions that fulfill him
in the good. Yet, he needs to be aware that these limited experiences of goodness only partially
fulfill him. There is a twofold affective experience at work here: a continuity of desire and a
discontinuity of satisfaction. Desiring the good disposes the seminarian to seek a more perfect
share in it. Yet, the same faculty that seeks satisfaction in created goods also educates the
seminarian’s heart through their limited capacity to satisfy. God alone is the infinite good and only
he can satisfy the seminarian for eternity. Consequently, God provides the ultimate unity for the
seminarian’s desires, which come to their perfection when they are developed in harmony with the
one great desire for God. It is this great desire which motivates the seminarian to set aside whatever
is incompatible with his vocation and desire whatever promotes it.
Moreover, helping the seminarian to articulate his desires is one dimension of affective formation
that relates to the discernment of his vocation. There are a number of factors involved in helping
someone to decide whether he ought to enter or remain in formation for the priesthood. For
example, a sufficient presentation of priestly life is needed to give a clear idea of what he is
discerning. However, there is a basic question that can help the seminarian to focus his
discernment: Do you experience a desire to be a priest? This basic desire and the ability to
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articulate it is fundamental to discernment because it can witness to the seminarian’s awareness of
the goodness of priestly life and that it attracts him. In this way it can be a witness to the call of
God who prepares a person from within, according to the gifts of nature and grace, to desire and
to do what he asks of that person. Otherwise, the seminarian may be forcing himself to follow a
vocation that is not in accord with his true desires as they are given to him by God.

3. Pleasure and Joy
In a consideration of Christ’s life of prayer, St Thomas comments that Christ’s life of passion could
ascend to the Living God. This would be done by Christ’s rejoicing, “not by the act of the flesh
mounting to God, but by the outpouring of the heart into the flesh, inasmuch as the sensitive
appetite follows the movement of the rational appetite”.457 St Thomas’ approach here is instructive
for the seminarian. There is a proper sense of rejoicing in the good that is a hallmark of Christian
life and it has physical, emotional, and spiritual dimensions. What does this have to do with
affective formation? St Thomas offers a balanced treatment of the affective experience of pleasure,
as it is based on a knowledge of the good, the actions of others, and our actions for them. He is
also attentive to the beneficial effects of pleasure on our motivation to continue acting for the good.
Yet, he is realistic too about the way excessive pleasure can interfere with our pursuit of greater
goods such as virtue.
To unfold the importance of these themes for affective formation this section will consider the
following topics: a) The Perfective Nature of Pleasure; b) The Pleasures of Sight and Touch; c)
The Causes of Pleasure; d) The Effects of Pleasure; e) Implications for Affective Formation.

a. The Perfective Nature of Pleasure
For St Thomas, pleasure consists of “rest in the good, and perception of this rest”. 458 That is, the
person experiencing pleasure both experiences a union with the good that he loves and he is aware
of this union. However, by “rest in the good” St Thomas does not mean there is a cessation of
457
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activity, as though the pleasure is solely a matter of attaining an external good. Rather, St Thomas
thinks of pleasure as an activity that can be perfective of the human person. To understand this,
we need to see that acts such as “to understand, to feel, to will, and the like … are themselves a
certain good of the agent”. That is, they are acts that perfect the one who acts. Thus, pleasure is
experienced, not only from the external “objects” of actions, but when these actions are wellperformed, so that they perfect the agent himself.459 Moreover, in writing of pleasure as a rest in
the good, St Thomas means that the activity comes to its perfection in a way that is both properly
suitable to the person and that the action is “unhindered”, so that “delight follows”.460 It is in this
way that pleasure is a “state of completion”.461 For example, it is in the proper and unhindered
activity of swimming that the swimmer enjoys it and is perfected by it.
St Thomas connects some delights with changes in the body (passions). However, by the word joy
he refers to the act of taking delight “in those things which we desire as a result of reason. But we
do not speak of joy except when delight follows reason”.462 Joy is a consent to the good that we
want.463 Although, this joy can be expressed through one’s body and felt as a passion too, as is
clear in the various effects of joy explained below. According to St Thomas, “intellectual pleasures
are much greater than sensible pleasures” because the acts of the spirit are greater.464 As an
example he gives the greater pleasure we take “in knowing something, by understanding it, than
in knowing something by perceiving it” with our senses.465 St Thomas observes that we would
rather “forfeit” our “bodily sight” than our “intellectual vision”. 466 Thus, we have a greater love
for “intellectual knowledge”.467
Moreover, the goods of the spirit are greater and “incorruptible”.468 Thus, the enjoyment of the
spiritual good is more enduring and of greater meaning. On account of the mind’s capacity to grasp
“what a thing is”, St Thomas writes, there is a “more intimate, more perfect and more firm” union
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with reality.469 These are greater pleasures than those “of the table” or “sexual pleasures” which
are “passing away”.470 The implication of this is that intellectual pleasures more intimately shape
the person. Our sense of honor also reveals how we treasure spiritual pleasures. “For… men abstain
from even the greatest bodily pleasures, rather than suffer loss of honor which is an intellectual
good”.471 Still, St Thomas grants that “in relation to us, bodily pleasures are more vehement”.472
They are more easily known to us because they are “accompanied by some alteration in the body”
and they are “sought as remedies for bodily defects or troubles”.473 Thus bodily pleasures, due to
the way they can follow “griefs … are felt the more, and consequently are welcomed more than
spiritual pleasures”.474 This requires a careful discernment because the strength of a pleasure can
often be more easily acknowledged, absorbing our attention and making it more difficult for us to
perceive a spiritual joy. For instance, the seminarian could have an inordinate attachment to the
pleasure of indulging in various forms of entertainment that can be accessed through the digital
media. This can so absorb his attention that he can fail to see the joy which he can experience when
he spends time with others in healthy forms of social recreation.

b. The Pleasures of Sight and Touch
Comparing the pleasures of sight and touch, St Thomas refers to pleasure on account of knowledge
and pleasure on account of usefulness. Things give pleasure inasmuch as they are loved but to love
them we first need to know them and know how to act so as to attain them. We therefore love the
senses due to their role in acquiring knowledge of things and people. In regard to pleasure caused
by knowledge, sight affords the greatest pleasure since it “is the handmaid of the mind”, helping
us to distinguish many things.475 Sight, most of all the senses, makes the lover aware of the object
so as to delight in it. Yet, it is our ability to reason and understand that endows our physical sight
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with personal meaning. In this respect, as Miner comments, we need to develop our “capacity for
intellection, so that the pleasures of sight give way to the pleasures of insight”.476
In regard to usefulness, the pleasures of touch afford the greatest pleasure. Such pleasures regard
things that are vital to the preservation of our bodily life, like keeping warm in winter. Therefore,
these pleasures are felt strongly, often more so than the pleasures of sight. Food, for the
preservation of the individual, and sexual union, for the preservation of the human family, are
examples. St Thomas comments that “pleasure, especially that which is afforded by the touch, is
the final cause of the friendship which is for the sake of the pleasant”.477 That is, gestures that
involve touch are very important for encouraging the bonds of friendship between people who
desire to share pleasant experiences. Such gestures of touch enable friends to give each other the
pleasure of feeling close to each other in moments of mutual delight. For example, friends can
delight in an embrace when they meet after a long time away from each other. Yet, we could extend
this principle to other senses when we consider the pleasure that is sought and can be
communicated in friendship. For example, there is a pleasure in seeing the face of a beloved friend
and there is also a particular pleasure experienced upon hearing that person’s voice.

c. The Causes of Pleasure
St Thomas gives various examples of how pleasure is caused in us. He considers that knowing the
good while we are united to it as the principal source of pleasure. If we did not know we had riches,
for instance, we would not be able to enjoy them.478 And if what we seek to find pleasure in is not
truly suitable to us we cannot enjoy it. Thus, “a certain measure” has to be respected if the good is
to be enjoyed.479 If that measure is exceeded, it will become, not “proportionate or pleasant, but,
on the contrary, painful and irksome”.480 Change is also a cause of pleasure because “that which
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is suitable to us at one time is not suitable at another, - thus to warm himself at a fire is suitable to
man in winter and not in summer”.481 Thus, it is important to have a sense of appropriate change
so that we can properly benefit from the present circumstances.
St Thomas considers other causes of pleasure too. Hope causes an anticipatory pleasure by
inclining us to look forward to obtaining the arduous good and memory causes pleasure by
recalling the good that was received.482 St Thomas observes that sadness causes pleasure, both by
bringing to our mind an object that was loved and by making us remember that a certain sadness
has passed.483 Miner gives the following example: “a father is sad because his son has died. The
absence of his son causes sorrow. Sorrow may prompt him to think about his son, which proceeds
to give him pleasure. Thus does sorrow in actu cause pleasure.”484 In this way, even a sense of
sorrow can be accompanied, to some degree, by an experience of pleasure.
The actions of others can also cause us pleasure. We can obtain goods through the action of others
and they can make us aware of our own good. For example, one person can praise another for a
good deed.485 Furthermore, through the love of friendship the good actions of a friend can be
considered “as one’s own good, by reason of the power of love, which makes a man regard his
friend as one with himself”.486 On the other hand, doing good to others can give us pleasure. For
example, we can hope to receive some good by acting generously to another because he feels
grateful to us on account of our love for him. Also, someone can think of himself as being
generous, so that he has “an imagination of abundant good existing in him, whereof he is able to
give others a share”.487 For instance, we see the way adults give to children, “on which they bestow
a share of their own good”.488 Another way of experiencing pleasure is to act according to a good
habit, so that performing a virtuous action is pleasant because it has become second nature to us
to act in this way. As an example, St Thomas writes: “the liberal man takes pleasure in giving to
others”.489 A final example of causing pleasure, is that a “a man is moved by one whom he loves,
481
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to do good to someone; for whatever we do or suffer for a friend is pleasant, because love is the
principal cause of pleasure”.490 Now, in these examples, we can see St Thomas’ awareness of the
personal dimension of pleasure, which is felt due to actions that communicate the goodness and
love of one person to another.

d. The Effects of Pleasure
When discussing the general meaning of delight in De Veritate, St Thomas mentions certain effects
of joy. Gladness (laetitia) refers to “an interior expansion or dilation of the heart” connected with
joy and “is spoken of as a sort of expansiveness (latitia)”.491 Exultation refers to the “bursting
forth” of “inner joy” into “outward signs”, “for exultation is so named from the fact that inner joy
in a way outwardly leaps (exilit)”.492 Exultation is shown, “either in a change of countenance”,
which is then called the passion of mirth, or it is called “cheerfulness” or “good humour”,
“inasmuch as one’s words and deeds are influenced by the intensity of the inner joy”.493 This line
of thought is continued in Summa Theologica I-II, where St Thomas considers other effects of
pleasure. Metaphorically, we can speak of pleasure effecting a certain expansion in the human soul
by which a person’s “mind is said to be magnified or expanded by pleasure”.494 As Gilson explains:
“pleasure has for its chief effect a kind of enlargement of the soul, which widens to gather in the
good of which it becomes aware … So, pleasure guides an act, done by a power of the soul, to its
full achievement”.495 The expansion of love also reaches out, St Thomas explains, so that man has
“care, not only for his own interests, but also for what concerns others”.496 The development of
this vocabulary, to describe these different experiences of joy, reveals St Thomas’ interest in how
such affective experiences affect the human heart. They also show his awareness that emotional
experiences communicate our affective state to others.
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Furthermore, pleasure can help reason because “we are more attentive in doing that which gives
us pleasure, and attention fosters activity”.497 Nevertheless, bodily pleasures can also hinder the
proper functioning of reason. Since “we attend to that which pleases us”, pleasure can distract us
from a necessary or noble task which may be difficult.498 Furthermore, pleasures can be “contrary
to reason” because they are either “in excess” or in themselves “contrary to the order of reason”.499
These disordered pleasures can impede our ability to estimate the prudent course of action. This is
“seen in the case of drunkards, in whom the use of reason is fettered or hindered”. 500 For reason,
St Thomas explains, requires the proper use of the internal and external senses, such as the
imagination and sight, which are adversely affected by a serious lack of good health.501
Another point from St Thomas’ reflections is that pleasure can perfect an action, in the sense that
every good “which is added to a thing and completes it” furthers its perfection.502 A connected
point is that when we take pleasure in an action, we are “more eagerly intent on it” and thus perform
it “with greater care”.503 To argue for the goodness of pleasure, St Thomas takes the temperate
man as a model who “does not shun all pleasures, but those that are immoderate, and contrary to
reason”.504 Moreover, he quotes the exhortation of Psalm 36.4: “Delight in the Lord” and draws
the conclusion that therefore some form of pleasure must be good.505 And, against the Stoic
position that since we are prone to immoderate pleasure virtue lies in abstaining from it, St Thomas
replies that “none can live without some sensible and bodily pleasure”. 506 His basic point is that a
good moral action can involve “a good pleasure” where the will and the passions are “in accord
with reason”.507 Such good pleasures are “akin” to the good action they accompany and complete
it.508 For example, the intense pleasure of marital intercourse is in accord with the love of the
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married couple.509 For St Thomas, as Gilson explains, “the morality of pleasures does not, then,
directly depend upon either their intensity or causes”.510 In fact, such good pleasures “only become
better by being more intense”.511 Thus, the morality of a pleasure is decided by whether it accords
with a virtuous act and not according to how great the pleasure is.
There is, furthermore, a pleasure that is the supreme good. Our supreme fulfillment lies, St Thomas
writes, in “the enjoyment of God, which implies a certain pleasure in the last end. And in this sense
a certain pleasure of man may be said to be the greatest among human goods”.512 As St Thomas
explains, this is due “not to the mere fact that it is pleasure, but to the fact that it is perfect repose
in the perfect good”.513 So, that pleasure is the greatest good which consists in the enjoyment of
union with God, the Supreme Good. Aligned with this point is another: pleasure in a certain way
is a measure of virtue. “Moral goodness or malice depends chiefly on the will”, St Thomas reminds
us, and so it is most of all from the end that we discern whether the will is good or evil. 514 Since
the repose of the will and of the passions in the good is pleasure, a man can be “reckoned to be
good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure of the human will; since that man is good and
virtuous, who takes pleasure in the works of virtue”.515 As Miner explains: “... what we take
pleasure in shapes our affections, and thus serves as the ultimate regula by which our characters
may be judged”.516 In this way, a proper sense of taking pleasure in virtuous deeds is a sign of a
person’s good disposition of character.

e. Implications for Affective Formation
St Thomas’ teaching challenges the seminarian to have a richer and a more mature view of the
experience of pleasure, rather than a view which equates pleasure and joy with only a narrow band
of physical or self-indulgent pleasures. The seminarian’s understanding of pleasure and joy needs
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to be situated within the context of what truly fulfills the human person and enables him to enjoy
truly fulfilling experiences with others. St Thomas affirms the goodness of pleasure and joy
inasmuch as it is conjoined with good moral action. However, he establishes the affective
experience of pleasure in the good of the whole bodily person. The change that is wrought in the
person’s affectivity cannot be dismissed as an ephemeral event but rather as a change for the better
of the “acting subject”.517 This entails a more accurate grasp of the matter, than in the approach of
the Manuals of theology, of how pleasure is not so much an external object that is attained but
rather pertains to the completeness of a good action.
St Thomas’ understanding of pleasure is that it can be a formative influence on the person, who is
perfected by good actions that accord with right reason. The virtuous measurement of pleasure is
not to unduly restrain it but to insist on a principle vital to its true personal experience. The
principle of proper measurement is directly related to the sense of affective balance in the
enjoyment of goods. In regard to the pleasures of touch, for instance, St Thomas provides the
beginning of a necessary reflection for the seminarian on how to communicate affection
appropriately through physical gestures. It requires a certain care for the form of one’s gestures,
according to one’s role in another’s life and the true need of that person.
For example, during the Sacrament of the Anointing of the Sick the priest prayerfully lays his
hands upon the patient’s head, then anoints his head and hands with the sign of the Cross.518 Such
a gesture makes present the healing and consoling touch of Christ (Mark 8.22-25). Now, St Thomas
observes in relation to the healing of the man born blind that our Lord performed some miracles
by touch to reveal his humanity as the instrument of his Divinity’s healing power (John 9.6-7).519
Thus Christ incorporated the gesture of touch into his messianic mission to heal “the entire
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man”.520 The priest’s ability to show affection through this form of touch, in imitation of Christ,
enables the recipient of the Sacrament to open his or her heart to God. The violation of this
principle through inappropriate behavior subverts the communication of God’s goodness to the
person concerned.
St Thomas’ point about the pleasure someone can take in an act of generosity is pertinent to
affective formation. The affectively mature person takes joy in doing good to others that they may
have a greater share in the good. St Thomas, as related above, gives the example of adults caring
for children, but the implication is that these kinds of acts can be communicated to any person.
This is something that the seminarian can develop by continuously acting with generosity for those
he serves in his pastoral work. He can prepare the way for this kind of action by meditating upon
the fulfilling nature of caring for others and asking God to maintain in him an abiding attitude of
giving to others. Finally, he can look back on the moments in which he helped others and take
grateful joy that he has positively contributed to the development of their character. This is an
essential attitude for him to exercise as a priest, who by his vocation is called to make present the
generosity of Christ.
Another point can be drawn from St Thomas’ teaching for the seminarian’s appreciation of the
role of pleasure in Christian life. The seminarian is called by God to live according to celibacy
which requires him to sacrifice the possibility of sexual love within marriage. Yet, he has to be
careful to avoid a negative view of sexuality and the enjoyment of the sexual union as an
expression of married love. For, he is called to guide the faithful in a proper understanding of what
is truly good for them according to their vocation. Perhaps, he might be inclined to a negative
attitude in this matter, on account of a defense mechanism to diminish the pain he may feel because
he cannot experience such a union. Or, he may have acquired a certain negative attitude to sexuality
through the influence of poor teaching.
St Thomas, however, affirms the inherent goodness of virtuous pleasure. He recognizes, moreover,
the goodness of greater and more intense experiences of pleasure which accord with a right
relationship.521 He sets this consideration within the overall good of the personal union of
520
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marriage. For instance, in Summa Contra Gentiles, Book Three, he argues for the goodness of the
sexual union from such reasons as the good purpose of the sexual organs as “instruments of the
soul”, the goodness of giving life to other people, that Scripture affirms the goodness of marriage
(1 Corinthians 7.28) and that “bodily things” are good and come from a good source, ultimately,
God.522
Another point for the seminarian’s affective formation can be taken from St Thomas’ teaching that
a person takes pleasure in being made aware of the good within him. The experience of such
pleasure opens the mind to receive more of the good and it also inclines the person to give
generously to others. Apart from the education of the seminarian to be more open to the more
refined pleasures of the intellect, the arts and virtuous relationships, there is a further point that
concerns the appreciation of his own good. Here we can note the affective need of the seminarian
to experience a rightful pleasure in being praised for his good deeds. This will also help him to
learn to praise others. This suggests a point for seminary formators.
It should not be overlooked that the formators need to know when and how to point out the good
in the seminarian. The seminary is a demanding environment in which there is necessarily much
challenging of the seminarian’s character. Yet, to encourage affective balance in the seminarian
the seminary staff have to treat him in a balanced way. This includes telling him his good character
traits to establish a positive relationship with him. Then, other necessary comments about the areas
of formation in which he needs to improve have far more chance of being received in a spirit of
respect and trust. The formators should also see if the seminarian has the ability to encourage
others, through giving them the pleasure that comes from being praised for their good qualities. A
spirit of criticism, to the contrary, reveals an excessive tendency to point out the negative qualities
of others. This is a manifestation of a bitter zeal, an anger that proceeds from pride so that, as
Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange writes, we “see the mote” in our “neighbor’s eye” but “do not see the
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beam” in our own eye.523 This kind of approach would only do harm to the seminarian’s ability to
listen to advice when it is required for the improvement of his character.
St Thomas’ positive approach to the proper role of pleasure and joy as perfections of the person
highlights the plight of those who are afflicted with a certain joylessness. This pertains to a state
of affectivity in which someone has lost a healthy engagement with both the attitudes and activities
that enable him to enjoy the good. It is clear from our discussion of St Thomas’ reflections on
pleasure that affective maturity requires us to integrate, rather than unduly diminish, the delights
of the sensitive appetite and the joys of the rational appetite.524 Yet, the seminarian can be affected
by a sense of joylessness and this deserves some discussion about the nature of this state.
In Feeling and Healing your Emotions, Conrad Baars writes about Emotional Deprivation
Disorder (EDD) which occurs when a person “has not been affirmed (i.e., strengthened by another
human being)”, for example his parents.525 Thus he is “deprived of the gift of feeling his own
unique goodness and lovableness”.526 His capacity to take joy in his own goodness has been
wounded. He is “unaffirmed”, as Baars calls it, and thus may not know how to show and receive
affection. Thus he may “attempt to affirm himself. This means he will try to attain by his own
efforts and means what he did not receive as a gift from others.”527 This can lead him to act
according to an exaggerated competitiveness to win affection. Enjoying affective experiences that
nourish his heart are neglected. They fade into the background because he is fixated on proving
his worth.
Moreover, in Healing the Unaffirmed: Recognizing Emotional Deprivation Disorder, Conrad W.
Baars and Anna A. Terruwe give a description of their experiences with people who are afflicted
with EDD. Some of the symptoms noted are feelings of inferiority and inadequacy. This includes
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“a feeling that nobody loves them and that nobody could possibly love them”.528 It can extend to
feelings both of physical inadequacy and intellectual incompetence.529 It is also manifested in a
serious lack of development of the external and internal senses due to a lack of affectionate love
communicated to the person. This affects the person’s capacity to relate to other people. For
example, they note, while one woman could recall impressions of the touch and smell associated
with others, she could not remember the sight of another person’s face.530
Integral to the healing of this person’s affectivity is a sense of authentic pleasure and joy. This is
connected to a regaining of his dignity as a person to be loved for himself and who therefore is
called by God to take pleasure and joy in what is good. Baars gives a short list of some of the
activities that help to restore the person who has fallen into this joyless state:
He must create opportunities and time for plentiful exposure to the immediate sources of
nourishment of his ‘heart’: the beauty of nature; pleasurable activities (fishing, playing,
swimming, skiing and many others), the arts, philosophy, the Scriptures, meditation, divine
contemplation – in short, all that is good, beautiful and true. Such exposures stimulate his
emotions of love, joy and desire.531

In light of this, it can be recommended that the seminarian needs to inculcate St Thomas’ approach
to the proper enjoyment of good activities. By enjoying good activities he perfects his humanity
in the good and he is further encouraged to keep on this path. Without such an attitude his future
priestly life will be diminished. He will be predisposed to overvalue work. He will feel empty of
pleasure and joy in his relationships, chiefly because he does not enjoy being with people and
sharing their lives in conversation and other activities. He will be inclined to give a jaundiced view
of the role of pleasure and joy to the faithful in his dealings with them. However, a more balanced
way of living nourishes his heart so that he is sustained to live his vocation for God and others
with a greater vigor of soul.
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Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to discuss the first three concupiscible passions and their
importance for the affective development of the seminarian. St Thomas’ teaching on love enables
the seminarian to be more articulate about his experience of love, how it affects him in relation to
others, and the different kinds of love he can experience. His teaching on concupiscence is very
positive about its place in striving for the pleasures and joys that perfect a person. However, a very
significant part of St Thomas’ teaching concerns the need to differentiate between the desire for
the goods of the sensitive appetite and the goods of the spiritual appetite. These need to be properly
coordinated so that the seminarian learns to develop his desires for the greater intellectual and
spiritual goods of knowledge and virtue. Furthermore, St Thomas understands authentic pleasures
and joys as affective experiences that perfect the person’s capacity for understanding, willing and
feeling. This encourages the seminarian to develop his capacity to engage in activities that fulfill
him in the good. It also cautions him to deepen his understanding of what causes him joy so that
he may truly grow in his appreciation for the good in himself, in others and in God. Now, the next
chapter will reflect upon the application of St Thomas’ teaching on hatred and sorrow to affective
formation.
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CHAPTER 5
HATRED AND SORROW IN AFFECTIVE FORMATION
Having reflected on the passions of love, desire and joy, which are the fundamental passions that
regard the good, it is necessary to turn to the passions of hatred and sorrow which regard evil. The
central concern here is to understand the nature, causes and effects of the two main passions that
register the affective experience of what is unsuitable or damaging to a person. A careful
examination of hatred and sorrow is required both for the seminarian’s formation and to equip him
to counsel others when they experience evil. In regard to hatred, there is need to distinguish
between its nature as an affective response to evil and the sin of hatred. In regard to sorrow, the
pastoral need is to help the seminarian grow in his capacity to communicate compassion and
alleviate sorrow. The question for affective formation is, then: how can the experiences of hatred
and sorrow be integrated into the project of attaining affective maturity?

1. Hatred
St Thomas’ teaching on hatred is helpful because he gives a balanced approach both to the affective
and the moral significance of hatred. Certain affective experiences are geared to respond to the
human experience of suffering evil. So, the question for affective formation is: can the affective
response of hatred ever be a proper response to evil? To explore this question the following topics
will be considered from St Thomas’ examination of hatred: a) Hatred is Opposed to Love; b)
Hatred Properly Speaking; c) Hatred as a Vice; d) The Implications for Affective Formation.

a. Hatred is Opposed to Love
For St Thomas, while love is experienced as a harmony between the person who loves and what
is loved, hatred is experienced as a “dissonance of the appetite from that which is apprehended as
repugnant and hurtful.”532 As Miner explains: “Dissonance is not a thing in itself; it presupposes a
532
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prior harmony that has been altered or distorted.”533 Hatred can only be understood in terms of
what interferes with the good that we love.534 If love concerns what is suitable to our perfection in
the good, then hatred concerns what is unsuitable and “bears the aspect of evil”.535
A person hates something because he sees it as something that damages or hinders what he loves.
An implication of this is that it is reasonable to expect a certain passion of hatred in the affectively
mature person. The person who loves deeply ought to experience a hatred for that which harms
what or who he loves. As Miner writes: “hatred is not simply an undesirable passion. Though
hatred should not be cultivated as a good in itself, it is the legitimate corollary of love.”536 As such,
hatred can motivate us to avoid, or alleviate, the damaging effects of an evil that is unwanted
because it interferes with the good that we love. For St Thomas, this hatred is praiseworthy if it is
rightly directed against what is evil. However, if hatred is a mistaken response, so that the good is
hated, then that hatred cannot be good.537
Moreover, St Thomas sees that hatred cannot be stronger than love “absolutely speaking”, because
“turning away from evil”, which is the object of hatred, “is directed as a means to the gaining of
good”.538 St Thomas does grant, though, that hatred can seem stronger than love because hatred
“is more keenly felt than love”.539 Just as love can be “felt more keenly” when the object loved is
not present, so too the object hated can elicit a vehement hate on account of its unbecomingness.540
This requires the seminarian to be careful when he experiences a deeply felt hate for another
person, which will be discussed below.
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b. Hatred Properly Speaking
For St Thomas, it is impossible for a man to hate himself “properly speaking”.541 His reason is that
“everything naturally desires good, nor can anyone desire anything for himself, save under the
aspect of good”.542 In support of this he quotes Ephesians 5.29 where St Paul writes that no man
ever hated his own flesh. In the case of suicide, St Thomas argues that the person who takes his
own life is not willing evil to himself as such and therefore not hating himself directly. Rather, he
desires his death under the aspect of a good, that is, he desires to end his “unhappiness or pain”.543
However, while it is impossible for a man to hate himself “properly speaking”, it is possible for a
man to hate himself “accidentally”.544 In making this careful nuance St Thomas uses the phrases
per se loquendo and per accidens.545 The contrast is between what is of itself (per se) and what is
indirectly, but nevertheless, associated with it (per accidens).546 A man can hate himself
“accidentally”, in St Thomas’ view, because he can choose a course of action that is good in one
respect, yet evil in another. He may not intend evil directly, but due to some factor in the action
evil is done. It is not, as St Thomas puts the matter, an action that is “good simply”. 547 Rather,
there is evil done to him through his action in spite of his desire for the good.
St Thomas suggests two ways in which a man can hate himself per accidens. “First, on the part of
the good the man wills to himself.”548 In this case, “what is desired as good” is, “in some particular
respect”, evil.549 Second, in regard to himself he doesn’t sufficiently appreciate that there is more
to himself than his sensitive nature. He does not love himself as he really is in the completeness of
himself as a body/soul unity. Thus, he neglects his spiritual good, and this constitutes “an
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inordinate self-love, in respect of which, man desires temporal goods for himself more than he
should”.550 In other words, he loves himself improperly because he seeks the accumulation of
lesser goods at the expense of the greater good of a virtuous life.
For St Thomas, good is a description of being inasmuch as it is desirable and thus, in itself, good
cannot be the object of hatred. In regard to the truth, he draws the implication that since truth is
the good of the intellect we do not hate truth in itself. However, a particular truth may be the object
of hatred, “in so far as it is considered as hurtful and repugnant”.551 One person can wish that some
painful truth were not true, for instance, that a loved one has died.552 Another person could desire
not to know the truth so that he can do what is sinful. Yet another person can hate that someone
else knows what he has done, for example, that he has done something dishonorable. St Thomas
concludes that while “knowledge of the truth is lovable in itself … the knowledge of truth may
become hateful, in so far as it hinders one from accomplishing one’s desire”.553 In this way, what
is desirable to an honest person becomes hateful to someone who is dishonest.

c. Hatred as a Vice
After considering hatred as a part of his reflections on the passions, St Thomas returns to the topic
of hatred later in Summa Theologica II-II where he focuses upon hatred as a vice opposed to
charity, by which we love God and our neighbour. By hatred we regard God and our neighbor as
evils because they are impediments to our good. God is seen as someone who hinders us by
reminding us that we should not sin and who will punish us for our wrongdoing. Furthermore,
hatred of our neighbor directly contradicts the goodness of our fellow human beings, by regarding
them as evil and a hindrance to our own good.554 However, we ought to love in our neighbor what
he has from God, that is, the gifts of nature and grace, while we rightly “hate the sin” our neighbor
may commit.555 St Thomas gives two examples of what we rightly hate in another. First, that while
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we love our parents we hate that they might oppose our advancement in holiness.556 Second, that
while we love those who have received goods from God, we hate that they “show hostility towards
us”.557
For St Thomas, hatred as a willed disposition against the good is the worst sin against our neighbor.
From the point of view of the external action and its effects on others, other sins are worse, for
instance, murder. Still, St Thomas maintains that “hatred is a more grievous sin than external
actions that hurt our neighbor, because hatred is a disorder of man’s will, which is the chief part
of man, and wherein is the root of sin”.558 Hatred in this sense is equivalent to seeing one’s
neighbor as an evil. Thus, “if there be anything sinful in a man’s outward sins against his neighbor,
it is all to be traced to his inward hatred”.559 For without such a willful choice of harm there would
be no expression of this hatred in outwardly harmful actions. Indeed, St Thomas sees hatred as a
vice that is fundamentally opposed to our vocation to love others.560 Hatred is not so much the
source of many other moral evils but the utmost point of moral corruption. This is so because,
while it is most natural to us to love both the good in God and the good in our neighbor, hatred is
directly opposed to such love.
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d. Implications for Affective Formation
The affective experience of hatred is part of a valid response to evil. Once the seminarian loves
the good he is rightly displeased with what harms it. Nonetheless, it is necessary to exercise a right
judgment to ensure that he does not harm the good out of either a wrongful or an excessive hatred.
St Thomas’s essential point on the vice of hatred is that it contradicts the human person’s vocation
to love God and his neighbor. Nevertheless, loving the good in one’s neighbor is compatible with
disapproving of what may be evil in any one of his attitudes and actions. Thus, the seminarian
must be balanced in his assessment of how to respond to an evil, both avoiding a reaction that is
disproportionate to the evil perpetrated and maintaining a truthful stance against it.
Another example of the need for an affective and moral balance concerns the seminarian’s
response to St Thomas’ statements about loving, yet hating, family members who may oppose his
vocation. St Thomas’ point is not to hate someone in the sense of the vice of hatred but to
disapprove of a wrongful attitude or action. This point needs to be clarified for the seminarian who
encounters major opposition from his family and may mistakenly think that he should cut ties with
them. Rather, St Thomas’s teaching would lead him to love his family while not allowing their
opposition to prevent him following his vocation.
St Thomas’ teaching about the human propensity for loving truth in general, but hating particular
truths, is very relevant to the seminarian’s self-knowledge. As a general principle, the seminarian
can sincerely love the truth and desire to study it. However, he needs to be cognizant that he can
hate particular truths that pain him. This principle applies to himself but it helps him to have a
better understanding of those he will serve as a priest. In regard to himself, particular truths can be
experienced as demanding and, consequently, they can be hated. This can generate the passion of
aversion, by which he would want to avoid whatever causes him pain. Given some hurtful
experiences from his past, for example, he may avoid talking to his spiritual director about his
affective wounds and shortcomings. This would diminish his ability to gain a proper explanation
of the nature of his affective struggles and how to effectively respond to them.
Think, for instance, of the young man who was never allowed to disagree with his father and felt
demeaned by him. Perhaps, this is at the source of the young man’s reticence to speak out in formal
discussions, for example, about pastoral experiences, and so be a part of the group’s conversation.
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In this case, the seminarian needs an education in principles that can guide his reflections and lead
him to a deeper understanding of why he responds as he does. This reflection can become part of
a conversation with members of the seminary staff, who will then better understand how to help
him become more confident in making his own contribution to group sessions.
The humility the seminarian gains by being honest about his particular hated truths equips him
with a deeper perception of the difficulties people can have to accept certain moral truths. Part of
his future work as a priest will be to understand that the person before him may be grappling with
his perception of what is good and what is evil. There are two points that the future priest can apply
as he keeps in mind the affective dimension of the pastoral situation. First, to ask the question:
why do you find this truth disagreeable? In this way the person he counsels can be given the
chance to articulate his thought process and affective stance. Thus, the person can both
communicate what he experiences and know that he is heard as a fellow human being who
experiences the matter as a difficulty. The second point is to try to clear away the misunderstanding
of the issue that makes the teaching appear injurious. By explaining the good of the teaching the
person can be made aware of its fulfilling qualities and this can affectively engage him to seek the
good through the proper moral course of action.561
Another implication comes from St Thomas’ teaching about the way a man can hate himself not
directly but per accidens. One part of self-knowledge requires the seminarian to become aware of
his affective inclination to overemphasize the importance of certain goods to the detriment of other
more important spiritual goods. There is a second implication, however, relevant to the
seminarian’s appreciation of the affective disposition of his neighbor. In particular, there is the
plight of those who can experience an inclination to self-harm and suicide. In some way, according
to St Thomas’ teaching, the person thus afflicted is not motivated by the direct intention to do evil.
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There is, however, a distorted affective motivation to see this course of action as a solution to a
problem. While not affirming the self-hatred or its resultant actions the seminarian can develop in
himself a merciful understanding of why the person is inclined thus. For example, the person may
have endured great sufferings in life which exert a very negative pressure on his affective
responses. The seminarian is required to develop a capacity for attentive listening and speaking
words that instill in this person a sense of his dignity, to show support for him in a time of great
trial.
Furthermore, the seminarian will often encounter pastoral situations that are uncomfortable due to
the people, place or the kind of work he is called to do. This could also be due to his particular
sensitivity and character, for example, that he finds it challenging to enter unfamiliar surroundings
and learn a new regime of work. St Thomas’ teaching about the need to properly orient our sense
of hatred so that it is directed at what is in fact evil is helpful here. The avoidance of what is hated
can be a response that is not in keeping with the reality of the situation. The seminarian can learn
to look again and see that there are good people involved in this pastoral work; that he will learn
much about himself and acquire new skills; that he has perhaps misjudged himself and he is
capable of entering new situations with confidence. In other words, he can look and see the good
that is present rather than too quickly assuming that it is an evil to be hated.

2. Sorrow
In his treatment of human formation Pope St John Paul II writes of the example of Christ who
“knew what was in humanity” (John 2.25). The Pope infers that “the priest should be able to know
the depths of the human heart, to perceive difficulties and problems”, and that the priest should
demonstrate “compassion” and “console” others.562 He also emphasizes that Christ the Good
Shepherd felt “compassion for the crowds because they were harassed and helpless, like sheep
without a shepherd”.563 The task of seminary formation, then, is to help the seminarian acquire
these qualities in preparation for the pastoral ministry through various pastoral experiences.
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To help in this regard, we can look to St Thomas’ teaching on sorrow in Summa Theologica I-II,
which is a significant part of his overall consideration of affectivity and its importance within the
Christian’s development. It can be applied to the seminarian’s affective development to help him
become a more compassionate person who recognizes the significance of suffering for the human
person. St Thomas offers a description of the nature of sorrow and its effects on human affectivity.
His reflections on sorrow present it as an appropriate human response to evil, which both needs to
be expressed and is rightly ameliorated. To further explore how St Thomas’ teaching can
contribute to affective formation the following topics will be examined: a) The Types, Causes and
Effects of Sorrow; b) Remedies for Sorrow; c) Sorrow as an Appropriate Response to Evil; d)
Implications for Affective Formation.

a. The Types, Causes and Effects of Sorrow
St Thomas writes that there are two things necessary for the experience of the passion of pain
(dolor): “conjunction with some evil … and perception of this conjunction”.564 He uses a different
word “sorrow” (tristitia) to refer to the inward pain that is caused by “the interior apprehension of
the intellect or of the imagination”.565 Pain and sorrow are affective responses to evil which can
have the benefit of helping someone to seek the good “more eagerly” to replace the pain and sorrow
that is felt.566 On the other hand, the desire for a pleasure can move us to cope with an experience
of pain. St Thomas writes that “from a strong desire for a certain pleasure, one does not shrink
from undergoing pain, so as to obtain that pleasure”.567 By looking forward to the glory of Heaven,
for example, a person can gain the strength to endure hardships to attain it.568
St Thomas also compares the intensity of sorrow and pain. The “interior sorrows of the heart” are
greater than outward pain.569 Since the spiritual apprehension is greater than that of touch, inward
pain is more keenly felt than outward pain.570 Inward pain is “caused by a greater evil”, a violation
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of the rational order, and “evil is better known by” the apprehension of the intellect.571 That is why
we can willingly undergo “outward pain in order to avoid inward pain”.572 It is also why we accept
certain outward pains that become “in a manner pleasant and agreeable by way of inward joy”.573
A father, for example, takes joy in working to pay for the education of his children even though
he endures stress and fatigue on account of that work.
St Thomas writes that “the proper object of sorrow is one’s own evil”.574 However, he applies this
basic notion of sorrow to different objects, causes and effects. Pity “is sorrow for another’s evil,
considered, however, as one’s own”.575 Envy is sorrow “for something that is neither evil nor one’s
own, but another’s good, considered, however, as one’s own evil”.576 St Thomas further observes
that the “proper effect of sorrow consists in a certain flight of the appetite”.577 Sorrow inclines us
to flee from the evil that presently afflicts us. Anxiety and torpor are effects of sorrow. Anxiety
“weighs on the mind, so as to make escape seem impossible: hence it is called perplexity”.578 When
torpor is experienced the mind is so weighed down “that even the limbs become motionless”. The
effect of torpor is so drastic that it can deprive a person of speech. This is such a profound effect
because “of all the external movements the voice is the best expression of the inward thought and
desire”.579 Here we see St Thomas’ awareness of how sorrow interferes with the human need for
personal communication.
How quickly we forget joy when sorrow darkens our lives, St Thomas notes, quoting
Ecclesiasticus 11.29: “A moment’s adversity, and pleasures are forgotten”.580 The effects of
sorrow are real and mainly negative. Sorrow distracts us from good activities and enervates us so
that we feel unable to act for the good. In light of these negative effects, Gilson describes “sorrow
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or sadness” as “a veritable disease”.581 For example, given the finite energy of the soul pain absorbs
our attention and makes it difficult for us to learn something. 582
Another effect of sorrow is that someone can feel “depressed”. This refers to a state of feeling that
someone is “hindered in his own movement by some weight.”583 Sorrow thus hinders the soul
“from enjoying that which it wishes to enjoy”.584 The experience of contraction is akin to that of
depression “because the soul, through being depressed so as to be unable to attend freely to
outward things, withdraws to itself, closing itself up as it were”.585 Furthermore, an evil not only
depresses but “is said to consume man, when the force of the afflicting evil is such as to shut out
all hope of evasion”.586 It follows that sorrow weakens our activity for we never do actions “with
sorrow, so well as that which we do with pleasure, or without sorrow”. 587 Finally, St Thomas
mentions that sorrow can be severe enough to deprive a person “of the use of reason: as may be
seen in those who through sorrow become a prey to melancholy or madness”.588 All these points
reveal St Thomas’ keen awareness of the detrimental effects of sorrow on our psychological health.

b. Remedies for Sorrow
In alleviating sorrow and pain we rightfully care for ourselves and others. We must be careful not
to confuse the Cross with a harsh or neglectful attitude. As Craig Steven Titus notes, a wrongful
interpretation of the Christian doctrine of suffering has sometimes lead to “the glorification of
suffering per se (dolorism)” and “the denial of any benefit from human effort”.589 To the contrary,
St Thomas thinks it right to take appropriate action to assuage the effects of pain and sorrow. He
gives five examples: pleasure; tears; the sympathy of friends; the contemplation of the truth; and,
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the refreshment of sleep and baths.590 As Gilson explains: “Nothing in the line of soothing remedies
is to be despised”.591 This is a balanced way of approaching the issue of self-care and is, as such,
helpful to the seminarian, as we will discuss below.
The general principle is that pleasure alleviates sorrow.592 St Thomas writes that “all repose of the
body brings relief to any kind of weariness ... so every pleasure brings relief by assuaging any kind
of sorrow”.593 This is due ultimately to the deep union of body and soul in the human person. Tears
and groans also have a relieving effect. As St Thomas explains:
a hurtful thing hurts yet more if we keep it shut up, because the soul is more intent on it:
whereas if it be allowed to escape, the soul’s intention is dispersed as it were on outward
things, so that the inward sorrow is lessened.594

Another consideration is that “an action, that befits a man according to his actual disposition, is
always pleasant to him”.595 So, expressing one’s grief has a relieving effect because it is in keeping
with one’s present affective state of sorrow.
Yet another remedy for sorrow is the great comfort afforded us by sympathetic friends. Sorrow
has a depressing effect, “it is like a weight whereof we strive to unburden ourselves”.596 Yet, when
a man sees another saddened by his sorrow “it seems as though others were bearing the burden
with him”.597 A “better reason” St Thomas offers for the assuaging effect of our friends’ sympathy,
is that “when a man’s friends condole with him, he sees that he is loved by them, and this affords
him pleasure”.598 Here, St Thomas reveals a keen awareness of the importance of the love and
affection of friends for each other when they suffer.
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Below, in the section on the implications for the seminarian’s formation, we will apply the
remedies of expressing one’s grief and the comfort of friends to the priest’s need for consolation.
The next remedy for sorrow concerns the role of contemplation in alleviating sorrow. Earlier in
Summa Theologica, St Thomas reflects on human happiness, inasmuch as it consists especially in
“man’s highest operation … of his highest power in respect of its highest object”. 599 This is the
contemplation of “the Divine Good”.600 In his reflections on the remedies of sorrow he returns to
the theme of contemplation. For St Thomas, “the greatest of all pleasures consists in the
contemplation of the truth”.601 Now, every pleasure assuages pain and this is more the case when,
“in the midst of tribulations”, we rejoice to contemplate Divine things and our “future
Happiness”.602 Indeed, contemplation can overflow into the body of the person experiencing
pain.603 St Thomas gives the example of the martyr Tiburtius who was preserved from distress as
he walked on burning coals.
Finally, according to the principle that “whatever restores bodily nature to its due state of vital
movement, is opposed to sorrow and assuages it”, St Thomas recommends taking a bath and
having sleep as remedies for sorrow.604 Such remedies “bring nature back to its normal state”, he
comments, and as such are a cause of pleasure which ameliorates sorrow. 605 One implication of
this teaching is that the seminarian is right to seek proper remedies to restore his vitality in
moments of sorrow.

c. Sorrow as an Appropriate Response to Evil
Since sorrow is an experience implying the hindrance of a person’s repose in the good, can it be
considered as an evil?606 St Thomas’ view is that sorrow is an evil in terms of how it negatively
impacts upon the person. However, it is a good in terms of it being a proportionate response to the
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negative impact of evil.607 He gives the example of shame, which “is said to be good, on the
supposition of a shameful deed done”.608 In other words, it is a fitting response to the evil of the
shameful deed.
In fact, St Thomas regards the lack of pain or sorrow on account of an evil as evil. His reason is
that such a response manifests a lack of proper feeling in response to evil or a lack of proper
judgment about what is evil.609 To the contrary, “the perception and rejection of bodily evil is the
proof of the goodness of nature”.610 Likewise, a sorrow which ensues from a correct judgment that
something is evil is virtuous because it is in accord with reason.611 Sorrow is thereby a part of the
mature person’s response to evil. As Gilson writes: “The grief which is a protest against evil is
morally praiseworthy.”612 However, “excessive sorrow”, which “oversteps” the rule of reason, is
not virtuous.613 This unreasonable response is found in those who are sorrowful over what is not
of true importance. Another mistake is to be sorrowful for what is good as if it were an evil. For
example, a man giving “alms sorrowfully”, as if generosity is a burden.614

d. Implications for Affective Formation
St Thomas’ treatment of sorrow is an example of his attention to the wider spectrum of affective
experiences. He perceives that affective responses to evil have a proper role to play in human life,
inasmuch they are in accord with the truth that we suffer. The goodness of the sensitive appetite
which registers love, desire, and joy in regard to the good also registers the affective dissonance
of hatred and sorrow in response to evil. Thus, even though sorrow involves depleting effects, such
as the feeling of depression, it is a truly human act by which a person grieves the loss of the good
he loves.
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The seminarian is preparing for a ministry that is often deeply touched by sorrow. Anything from
the normal setbacks in life to the worst tragedies of unforeseen death can be among the challenges
he faces with the people entrusted to his pastoral care. He needs to acquire a wisdom about the
importance of sharing the sorrows of others and consoling them. To persuade the reader that this
affective formation is helped by St Thomas’ teaching, we will consider these background points:
i) The Duty of Being a Consoler; ii) The Compassion of Pity; iii) The Benefits of St Thomas’
Teaching on Sorrow.

i. The Duty of Being a Consoler
This first point concerns the importance of being a consoler. St Thomas considers this in his
reflection on the debate between Job and his friends - Eliphaz, Bildad and Zophar - about God’s
Providence and Job’s suffering. St Thomas notes that Satan upset Job “through his friends, who,
although they came to console him, nevertheless proceeded to words of rebuke”.615 They came as
friends, consoling Job “by offering him their company”. They spoke no words, out of respect for
his need for silence, “for when someone’s mind has been engrossed by pain he does not accept
words of consolation”.616 Matters turn for the worst when Job protests his innocence and his friends
argue that his misfortune indicates he has sinned, otherwise God stands accused of being unjust.
After much argument, Job has had enough and he accuses his friends of being “sorry comforters”
who do not understand his plight (Job 16.2-5). “For the duty of a consoler”, St Thomas explains,
“is to say things by which pain may be softened. A burdensome consoler, then, is one who speaks
the things which exasperate the spirit even more”.617 Job’s friends have become a burden to him
when they should be a source of comfort and encouragement.
Job’s accusers fail to understand him because they are not in his place of suffering. As St Thomas
explains, Job rebukes his friends, not from hatred or spitefulness, but “that they might be recalled
from the cruelty which they were practicing in exasperating Job by their words when they realized
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that similar words would be rough on them if they were spoken to them”. 618 In the end, it is not
the friends of Job who are pronounced righteous by the God they tried to defend. To the contrary,
God rebukes them “for not having spoken correctly about me as my servant Job has done” (Job
42.7). This kind of insensitivity to the sorrow that someone could be experiencing is to be avoided
by the priest, who is called to help the sorrowful through his kindness and prayerfulness. He needs
to know the right order of responding to someone in sorrow and avoid taking the easy path of
explanations that do not capture the painful mystery of suffering. He often needs to console first,
and then later, when it is opportune, apply the light of Sacred Scripture to help someone understand
a little more the ways of God.

ii.

The Compassion of Pity

One implication that emerges from a consideration of St Thomas’ teaching on the human
experience of sorrow is that the capacity for responding to the sufferings of others is an important
part of a mature person’s character. Here is a very good example of the interpersonal quality of
affective maturity. A major part of our consideration of affective development concerns the
seminarian’s inner experience of emotion and how this can be formed. This concerns his own
affective balance and the formation of his own life. But this focus on his own affective fulfilment
should not neglect the development of his capacity to share the emotional experience of others and
to form his affective capacity to respond appropriately to them. If he can properly share their
experience he will be able to deepen his personal relationship with them and enable them to feel
that their emotional need for support has been answered. If he cannot answer this need in an
appropriate manner the person may feel that the seminarian is either indifferent or immature on a
point where there is a reasonable expectation that he should be able to help.
This expectation flows from the interdependent nature of the human person and our need to engage
in personal relationships of mutual help. It is true that many of our virtuous qualities relate to our
ability to exercise our intellectual and physical capacities to achieve worthwhile and noble goals.
However, on account of our vulnerability to sorrow, we also need to attend to the affective need
for the human person to be supported and consoled. The ability to recognize and respond to this
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affective need builds personal bonds of respect, gratitude and trust because it is an ability grounded
in a true respect for the human person. The ability to recognize and respond to the suffering of
another through compassion is precisely a matter of affective maturity because it directly relates
to helping another person when he is in a state that afflicts him and weighs him down. The maturity
of the person who shares and responds to this sorrow is shown in that he is prepared to stand with
someone who is weighed down by a certain loss of the good. Sharing this heaviness and loss
weighs down the one who compassionately attends to the person suffering but who nevertheless
supports a fellow human being. It is an expression of a genuine and practical charity.
This capacity for compassion finds it basis in a mature awareness of the seminarian’s own need
for compassion, as he has experienced it in the past or as he realistically perceives that he will need
help in the future. Acknowledging his own need enables him to acknowledge that people like him
also need affective support. It is for this reason that affective formation has to help the seminarian
to gain insight into his own vulnerability and need for compassion. One way to achieve this kind
of insight is to help him review and discuss his experiences of difficulty and sorrow. But, his
capacity for compassion also needs to be developed by placing him in situations where he will
directly experience the sorrows of others. Such experiences will require a review of how he felt
and responded to those who were suffering, how he could more deeply acknowledge that they were
in need of his support, and how he could more effectively show them compassion.619
St Thomas’ teaching brings to the fore the interpersonal quality of sorrow and this is something
that can be applied to the seminarian’s capacity for communicating with those who suffer. In
Chapter 3 there was a consideration of St Thomas’ principle that good actions which incorporate
good passions are better moral actions.620 This principle can be applied to words and gestures that
communicate affections and attitudes to another person. Such actions better express the humanity
of the acting subject, and they enable him to better communicate and build relations with others.
619
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They more clearly communicate the good will of one person to another and how he appreciates
the plight of that person. An example of this is found in St Thomas’ teaching on pity. In De
Veritate, q.26, a.4, St Thomas defines pity “as sadness about the adversity of someone else in so
far as it is regarded as one’s own evil”.621 Integral to this experience is the capacity to be aware of
suffering in oneself and in the other person. St Thomas calls this capacity a “compassion of pity”.
In De Veritate, q.26, a.7, St Thomas asks: “who merits more, he who helps a poor man with a
certain compassion of pity, or he who does it without any passion solely because of a judgment of
reason?”622 St Thomas responds that a passion can be a sign of the will’s energy to do what is good
and it can enable the person to perform a virtuous deed “more promptly and easily”. 623 So, the
performance of a properly charitable act with the compassion of pity merits more. In constructing
this reply, St Thomas quotes St Augustine who asserts that “we do not live correctly” in this life
if we have no passions. “For”, St Augustine explains, “not to grieve at all while we are in this place
of misery … takes place only at the great cost of inhumanity in the soul and stupor in the body”.624
This applies as much to the grief we experience for others as it applies to the grief we feel on our
own account.
The compassion of pity needs to be formed in the seminarian because it is a sign both that he
respects the suffering of another person and that he wills that person’s good in a time of sorrow.
This is an application of St Thomas’ teaching that someone who sees another sharing his sorrow,
or a friend showing him love, feels that his burden is halved. He thus experiences the pleasure of
knowing that he is loved and this is a great consolation to him. Such experiences can become a
more perfect communication of compassion through appropriate gestures of consolation. Above
we discussed the need to communicate sensitive love as an integral part of intellectual forms of
love such as friendship. Likewise, there is a true need to communicate compassion by kind words
and deeds. This enables the suffering person to receive compassion and be consoled. The
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seminarian’s capacity to experience such compassion and communicate it to others is essential.
For, as a priest he will be called to reflect the attitude of Christ, who feels compassion for those
who are harassed and helpless (cf. Matthew 9.35-36).

iii.

The Benefits of St Thomas’ Teaching on Sorrow

St Thomas’ teaching on sorrow assists the seminarian in becoming a consoler and experiencing
the compassion of pity to help those who are sorrowful. It first of all gives the seminarian a
language to articulate his experience of sorrow and be aware of the indications of sorrow in himself
and others. For example, the description of depression indicates an affective state of being weighed
down and the reduction of the capacity to experience the good. This is the first stage of responding
to alleviate the sorrow because the consideration of sorrow and its effects enables the seminarian
to appreciate its real impact upon himself. It also enables him to see that a balanced approach to
counselling someone in sorrow is to help him moderate that sorrow. That is, by looking at the truth
of what has happened, we can seek to have a more proportionate response, rather than exaggerating
the extent of the difficulty.
It is very important to also acknowledge that St Thomas’s discussion of the remedies for sorrow
impart to the seminarian an attitude of properly caring for himself and others. St Thomas’
explanation of various remedies gives a basic program that the seminarian can practice and also
communicate to someone who is suffering. The essence of it is to ameliorate the suffering by the
replacement of some kind of pleasure or joy, that is, the experience of a physical or affective good
to restore the person’s emotional balance. The examples St Thomas gives indicate basic remedies
from the physical, such as taking a bath, to the deeply spiritual, such as contemplating and trusting
the promises of Heaven. It is important to communicate to the seminarian St Thomas’ attitude that
the needs of the whole person are to be respected. It is true that the seminarian should not sacrifice
the greater goods of the spirit, such as the moral virtues, for the sake of wrongful physical and
emotional pleasures. Still, it is equally important that he be educated to respect his true physical
and emotional needs. Therefore, he rightly seeks proper remedies to restore his vitality when he
feels the enervating effects of sorrow.
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Furthermore, St Thomas’ teaching that sorrow is in accord with the human need to affectively
respond to evil steers the seminarian away from failing to respect his need to express his sorrow.
As St Thomas notes, to express our sorrow is a relief to our soul. This is relevant to how the
seminarian needs to learn to articulate his sorrow, for the sake of his affective health, when he
faces shocking events or feels weighed down by the negative experiences of life. Our culture is
now more aware of the effects of negative experiences on the emotional well-being of those who
have to deal with very emotionally demanding kinds of work. For example, we talk about the
experience of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), when people such as soldiers, medical
practitioners, and emergency personnel encounter situations involving the effects of violence and
great personal loss. Such people, who serve others at the worst moments of their lives, require
counselling in which they can express the sorrow they feel in the face of human suffering. They
are also greatly helped by friends who listen to them and console them with their affectionate
support. St Thomas’ teaching on the need to express one’s sorrow is very applicable here and it is
relevant to the life of the priest who often supports others to cope with the sufferings of life. The
difficulty the Diocesan priest can have is that he will often be alone after being called to a tragic
accident or attend to a grieving family. He can also experience a kind of PTSD that will shock,
enervate, and unsettle his affective resilience. As a seminarian he needs to learn to give voice to
his sorrow and not leave it pent up within himself. He needs the support of others such as a spiritual
director and a psychological counsellor, who can listen to him when he feels stressed by the
sorrowful experiences of life. He also needs to open his heart to his friends so that he is consoled
by their love and affection in moments of such stress.
However, a counterbalancing point is that the experience of sorrow needs to be tempered by a
consideration of the truth of a situation. Grieving past the point of due proportion can be the cause
of a failure to receive opportunities for joy that would ameliorate the sorrow. St Thomas’ teaching
on applying remedies for sorrow gives the seminarian a very healthy attitude for himself, an
attitude that he can encourage in others who are too prone to concentrate on the sorrows of life. To
the contrary, he can make the effort, encouraging in others the same positive attitude, to experience
the consoling pleasures, delights, and joys he rightly receives with thanksgiving. This calls for an
attitude of seeking the good and the joyful, while avoiding a morose obsession with what is
sorrowful. One example of the difference in attitudes is afforded us in St Thomas’ teaching about
the person who gives alms sorrowfully. The cause of sorrow here lies in the failure to understand
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that performing a good deed for another can be a true source of joy. This attitude would spoil much
of the seminarian’s future joy as a priest. For, in giving to others through his pastoral work with
an exaggerated sense of sorrow he would be deprived of the joy of assisting them in their need.
Rather, he can develop the attitude of seeing the delight and joy he can feel when he gives to others
so that they can live a better life. This generous attitude will give him joy and be a consolation to
him when he feels sorrowful, since he will be moderating his sorrow by being attentive to the joy
that he gives to someone else.

Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to seek a better understanding of hatred and sorrow so that
these two affective experiences can be integrated into the seminarian’s affective maturity. The
experience of the good is primary in affective development, but there is a need to develop the
seminarian’s capacity to respond properly to the experience of what is displeasing and harmful.
Hatred can have a positive role in affective development, in the sense that it can be a proportionate
affective response to the experience of evil. However, hatred needs to be properly oriented to what
is in fact evil and not become the sin of hatred which is a negation of charity for one’s neighbor.
Sorrow too can be the expression of a mature person, who recognizes the significance of what is
good for the human person and the damage caused by its loss. From St Thomas’ teaching the
seminarian can acquire a language to articulate this experience of sorrow, and be aware of the
indications of sorrow in himself and others. He can recognize in the remedies for sorrow a call to
properly care for himself and others by communicating compassion and alleviating human sorrow.
Now, having reflected upon these passions of hatred and sorrow the major concern of the next
chapter will be to examine the formation of the seminarian’s affective resilience
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CHAPTER 6
THE FORMATION OF AFFECTIVE RESILIENCE
In Pastores Dabo Vobis, Pope St John Paul II writes about the qualities needed for the priest to be
“a bridge and not an obstacle for others in their meeting with Jesus Christ”. One example he gives
is that in carrying out his ministry the priest ought to be “capable of bearing the weight of pastoral
responsibilities”.625 We should also take into account the Pope’s teaching that the seminarian needs
to be formed in “interior discipline, a spirit of sacrifice and self-denial, the acceptance of hard
work and of the cross”.626 An essential attribute required for this demanding aspect of priestly life
is affective resilience. The aim of this chapter is to discuss how St Thomas’ teaching can contribute
to its development. Resilience is the affective capacity of the seminarian to respond well to the
inevitable stresses of priestly life. These stresses include the challenges of supporting people who
must cope with painful experiences, such as injustice. As a priest he will help others by guiding
them to harness their affective resources in such trials.
Craig Steven Titus notes that “resilience” is a term taken from the science of physics which refers
to “a material’s quality to resist deformation or destruction”.627 Resilience is a measure of the
“material’s capacity to return to its original form after being bent, compressed or stretched”.628 In
psychology, resilience is the individual and social capacity to face the challenges of life. It is the
“capacity to do well in adversity”.629 The aim is to help someone “to cope with hardship; to resist
the possible deformation of the competencies and integrity of one’s community, family, and self;
and to achieve a new proficiency out of the unfavorable experience.” 630 This is a proficiency that
will help the seminarian to fulfill his vocation as he responds to its inevitable challenges.
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St Thomas discusses the irascible passions which help a person to become resilient by resisting
those things that either keep him from attaining what is good or cause harm. 631 Thus the irascible
passions help him to deal with difficulties and “rise above obstacles”.632 For example, the affective
experience of daring can be shaped by the virtue of fortitude to develop resilience through
“initiative taking and endurance”.633 “Indeed”, as Titus writes: “human development depends upon
challenges.”634 People grow through challenges, acquiring new levels of skill, experience and
virtue. Affective resilience is necessary to this growth and to show how St Thomas’ teaching can
help to develop it in the seminarian the following will be discussed: 1) Hope and Despair; 2) Fear
and Daring; 3) Anger. The consideration of each of these passions will include comments about
its significance for affective formation.635

1. Hope and Despair
St Thomas considers hope as the first irascible passion. It is an affective inclination to look forward
to the future good that is desired but which remains difficult to attain.636 Focusing on the good in
this way gives a proper affective balance to a person’s life. It leads him to judge the worthwhileness
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of his efforts by the good that they achieve.637 The significance of hope for affective formation can
be explained with the help of St Thomas’ teaching that the affective state of the person influences
him to act in accordance with it. As he explains: “when a man is affected by a passion, things seem
greater or smaller than they really are; thus to a lover, what he loves seems better; to him that fears
what he fears seems more dreadful.”638 Likewise, the person who has been formed in hope focuses
on what can be done to make a situation better. With this hopeful stance the seminarian will
possess, for example, a greater aptitude for challenging fields of apostolic work.
However, given the various levels of physical and psychological competence, the seminarian also
needs to rely on the help of others. Expectation, from the Latin expectare (to wait) implies, St
Thomas explains, “keeping one’s eyes on another (ex alio spectare)”. It is a form of hope through
which a person attains the difficult good through the help of another.639 This requires the
seminarian to progress from thinking in terms of his own affective life and looking outward to how
he can be helped by others. Furthermore, he also needs to be more conscious of how he can
encourage affective growth in others, by helping them to strive for the good of which they are
capable.
Whereas hope moves someone to attain what is difficult but possible, despair is the affective
response to what is impossible.640 Despair implies a feeling to withdraw from the good.641 In doing
this it can serve to help a person avoid expending his energy on what is unobtainable. Miner offers
this insight: “Rather than suppress despair, we should acknowledge that our efforts might be more
profitably spent seeking a good that we can attain.”642 The affective response of despair is
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proportionate to the nature of created reality.643 This enables us to make an important distinction
about the moral quality of despair. We have limited resources to attain the good and finite reality
has a limited capacity to fulfill us. Nonetheless, despair as a choice would be wrong when we give
up pursuing a particular good without due reason.
In relation to God, however, we have every reason to hope in his promises for he is infinitely good
and merciful. St Thomas locates the origin of the sin of despair in the appetitive movement that is
“conformed to a false intellect”, that is, a false judgment.644 However, he continues, “the true
opinion of the intellect about God is that from Him comes salvation to mankind, and pardon to
sinners …”645 This is an enduring source of encouragement to turn to God for help and part of the
priest’s service is to help people be convinced of God’s merciful attitude. He can recommend to
those who experience doubts about God’s mercy, for example, Luke 15.11-31, which relates how
the father generously welcomed home his repentant son. He can also recommend prayers such as
the Act of Hope.646
A person needs to be made aware of the good reasons for hope and the possibility of attaining the
difficult good it strives for. As St Thomas explains: since hope regards the difficult but possible
future good, something may be a cause of hope “either because it makes something possible to a
man: or because it makes him think something possible”.647 Among the various resources that
foster hope St Thomas mentions “experience: since by experience man acquires the faculty of
doing something easily”.648 He also refers to “teaching and persuasion” which can help someone
“think that he can obtain something”.649 As well as acquiring knowledge through experience, there
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is also the formation of someone in accordance with “a certain habit, by reason of custom, which
renders the action easier”.650 Miner gives the example of a person who having perfected her
knowledge of Greek will be encouraged to learn other languages.651 In regard to the seminarian,
we can think of various experiences, such as engaging in pastoral challenges, which help him to
gain confidence in dealing with difficult situations.
Hope engenders good relations and a confidence to perform good activities. By hoping for a good
through another, “we are moved towards him as to our own good; and thus we begin to love
him”.652 Furthermore, as Robert Miner points out, giving hope to others encourages them to love
us.653 Moreover, hope promotes good activity. Miner comments that while smugness can “diminish
action”, a proper confidence fosters good action.654 Otherwise, a man could be “paralysed by
fear”.655 Hope also promotes good human activity because the perception that a good is difficult
to attain “arouses our attention”.656 People often rise to the occasion when they see a challenge,
especially those who are gifted. Also, hope causes pleasure by way of making us look forward to
attaining the difficult good which requires greater effort and thus is more pleasing.657
There is a point of realism, though, in St Thomas’ teaching on hope that is well recommended to
the seminarian. False hope is based upon a poor judgment of the capabilities of both the person
involved and the circumstances in which the action must take place. Youthfulness, for instance,
can be a cause of hope because youths have little to remember of the past, and they have “much of
the future” ahead of them and they look forward to it.658 Also, they “are full of spirit” and can feel
uninhibited by a sense of failure or the consequences of certain courses of action. Thus youths,
“through inexperience of obstacles and of their own shortcomings, easily count a thing
possible”.659 Drunkards and foolish and thoughtless persons can attempt anything heedless of the
consequences both for them and others, because “they are indeed unsteady in reality: but, in their
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own estimation, they are capable, for they know not their shortcomings”. 660 A sober life, which
disposes a person to a cautious judgment of what is possible, counteracts such imprudent behavior.
An important dimension of St Thomas’ discussion of hope is how it is properly formed by the
virtue of magnanimity, by which a man has greatness of soul and stretches toward noble things. St
Thomas distinguishes magnanimity from the theological virtue of hope, by which we are assisted
by God to attain union with him.661 As a human virtue, which perfects the passion of hope,
magnanimity leads a man to strive for that which is humanly greater. This also predisposes him to
strive for the greatest good, union with God himself. In this regard Miner asks a very penetrating
question: “Why should we suppose that persons who lack the habit of aiming for the arduous good
in earthly matters are nonetheless well prepared to attempt the most difficult of goods?”662 Here is
an example of how a proper love for what is proper to our earthly life disposes us to have a desire
for greater heavenly goods.
The seminarian should strive for what is noble in human matters to dispose himself to work for
God’s glory. Those lacking magnanimity often limit their horizon to lesser pleasures and do not
see the fulfilling nature of spiritual goods.663 This has special relevance to the seminarian’s
vocation. Impelled by magnanimity hope empowers him to strive for the difficult good of
committing himself to the service of God and his people. This needs to be tempered by a realism
about his true capacity to live such a life. However, without the disposition of magnanimity he will
be too easily inclined to forego his vocation in the face of difficulties. In his way, he may fail to
attain the noble character of which he is capable in the service of others.
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2. Fear and Daring
The human heart can be inclined to a disordered love for the things of this world and hence an
inordinate fear to lose them. As St Thomas writes, we are often “more moved by fear than by
love”.664 Yet Christ broke our greatest fear through giving his life for us and opening the way to
eternal life.665 A major task of the affectively mature Christian is to reflect in his own life this
victory of Christ over fear. The Christian does this by moderating his own fears, so that he is not
intimidated into doing evil, and by developing the passion of daring that equips him to struggle
against evil. An application of this truth to affective formation is that the seminarian needs to
reflect on his experience of fear so that he can better understand how it affects his decision making.
He also needs to understand how daring needs to be properly formed by due deliberation. In
relation to these matters, the teaching of St Thomas will offer the seminarian both a more accurate
way of describing his experience of fear and how to develop the passions of fear and daring.
St Thomas defines the object of fear as the avoidance of an evil that is difficult to resist.666 He
describes various kinds of fear. Laziness is the shrinking from work out of fear that it is too much
of a burden.667 This is not “simply disinclination to work”, Miner explains, but a “feeling of anxiety
experienced by anyone confronted by an unavoidable labor that surpasses his inclination”.668 There
is also a fear of disgrace about something still to be done – shamefacedness – or about something
that has been done – shame.669
Other fears flow from the feeling that an evil can surpass our capacity to resist it. If a person finds
it difficult to estimate the magnitude of an evil he experiences amazement.670 The feeling of
“stupor” is caused by something that is out of the ordinary and therefore appears great.671 Anxiety
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is a fear of unforeseen misfortunes.672 There is also a fear of being in the power of another. For
example, when someone knows that we have committed a crime and may reveal it to others.673
A person’s fear is intensified by an evil that takes him by surprise because it leaves him little time
to consider what he can do to respond to it.674 Yet, while it helps him to think about the evil he
will face, undue thought can diminish his capacity to respond to it, because the evil seems larger
in his mind when he thinks too much about it.675 Fear is further intensified when it is not remedied.
Due to the human person’s sense of time the fear of evil is very oppressive when it is longlasting.676 However, the underlying cause of fear is love, inasmuch as we perceive that something
or someone will deprive us of the good we love.677 Thus defects - our experiences of our lack of
power to resist an evil - cause fear in two ways. First, “it is owing to some lack of power that one
is unable easily to repulse a threatening evil”.678 Second, it is through “power and strength” that
one man can cause fear to another, for example, by inflicting an injustice. 679 This amounts to an
abuse of power and a lack of charity. Hence it is an affective and moral defect.
Fear involves a contraction of the person’s affective experience, in the sense that fear implies a
lack of power to overcome the threatening evil.680 However, paradoxically, fear can also make
people flee from danger.681 Hence fear can provide a great energy for preserving a person’s life.
Yet, the reaction of fear, if not moderated, can freeze a person in the face of a seemingly irresistible
evil. Moderated fear, however, can help a person to respond well to a difficulty. Realizing that he
has to deal with a painful problem, someone can seek counsel from another who is in a better state
of mind than himself or of greater experience and wisdom.682 Conversely, a strong fear can
interfere with someone’s capacity to give counsel.683
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Such is the effect of fear that it can cause a person to tremble in his speech and limbs. 684 Fear can
then hinder action because “the bodily members” are instruments of our choices when we act.685
However, even though fear can interfere with good judgment, if it is moderated, it can help
someone to work with greater attention to escape what he fears.686 Furthermore, the moderation of
fear entails the moderation of a person’s imagination, which can have a big impact on how he feels
and acts. St Thomas gives the example of the man who walking on a plank on high can fall through
his fear of being so high, whereas he would not feel such fear when walking on a plank that is
closer to the ground. This happens because the man “suffers a disturbance of his imagination,
through fear of the fall that is pictured to his imagination”.687 The main point for the seminarian’s
affective formation is that he restrain his fear so that it does not lead him to make wrongful
decisions.
Daring is the opposite passion to fear. Daring inclines someone to turn on the danger to defeat it.688
It ensues from hope, in the sense that there is a desire to defeat an evil and this would remove a
threat to the good can be enjoyed.689 Some of the things that foster daring and help “us reckon
victory as possible are” the power we have from “bodily strength, experience of dangers,
abundance of wealth, … a great number of friends or any means of help, especially if a man trust
in the Divine assistance”.690 St Thomas also notes that those of a particular physical constitution
are more naturally inclined to daring.
St Thomas also refers to those who are drunk and feel more daring because the wine dilates their
heart and makes them “think greatly” of themselves.691 A false knowledge of our abilities, or an
illusionary imagination of our excellence, can also lead to a very imprudent daring. A wise person,
however, duly deliberates about the circumstances and difficulties involved, as well as his ability
to succeed in those circumstances. People who deliberate are at the advantage, because “they
experience nothing unforeseen” and “sometimes the difficulty turns out to be less than they
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anticipated; wherefore they are more persevering”.692 The impulsive, on the other hand, can face
unanticipated dangers which therefore seem greater, or the dangers take them unprepared without
time and means to cope.693 False daring is thus opposed to the virtue of fortitude, which moderates
the passion of daring according to a judgment about a person’s capability to succeed.694
St Thomas’ analysis leads us to appreciate that a proper understanding of fear is integral to the
seminarian’s affective formation. Fear is not to be seen as a purely negative emotion because it
manifests an awareness that one’s good and the good of others is to be cherished and preserved.
Appropriate fear demonstrates a rightful care for one’s own safety and the welfare of others which
is threatened by the presence of what may harm them. As Erika Hunter explains, fear “puts us in
touch with our need for safety”.695 If properly moderated, fear serves to make the seminarian
cautious and it inclines him to avoid harm. This is a legitimate part of the affectively mature
person’s character, by which he properly seeks to avoid damaging experiences for both himself
and others. The first step in the discernment of how fear affects him and the need to moderate it,
is to be aware of its symptoms, such as coldness and the impulse to flee. However, instead of
seeing this experience as a hindrance to good action, the seminarian ought to harness the energy
of fear by allowing it to make him both careful and inclined to seek counsel.
These points are relevant to many kinds of possible harm but one in particular concerns how the
seminarian ought to develop a proportionate sense of fear and caution in relation to his own
emotional welfare and that of others. In view of his future pastoral role as a confidant for those
who need to discuss aspects of their lives which are highly sensitive, the seminarian needs to
develop a healthy attitude of respecting the limits of his own emotional balance. For example, in
conducting interviews with those of the opposite sex he needs to take diligent care of when, for
how long, and where he meets someone to discuss matters of a deeply emotional nature. On
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occasion he will need to ask someone to desist from her descriptions of what has happened to her
or what she has done because enough has been said to make a reasonable person aware of the
circumstances. For example, some married people can see in the priest someone who will be
unaffected by detailed descriptions of a sexual nature. This is naïve and the seminarian has to
acquire the confidence to guide the conversation on to another point. The seminarian needs to act
so that it will be clear, if he had to make an account of himself to someone in authority, what was
done and how he met with someone in circumstances that ensured her emotional security. This
applies mutatis mutandis in many other instances involving highly emotional situations, such as
meeting with those who are grieving or those who are vulnerable on account of their being very
young or mentally unwell. In each case a healthy sense of fear for his own personal emotional
welfare and the proper care of others will help him to act in an appropriate way.696
The passion of daring, on the other hand, provides the affective energy to combat whatever
jeopardizes both our good and the welfare of the people we love. Properly moderated, daring is
part of the affective makeup of the mature person. However, the seminarian needs to learn that
daring should be governed by a deliberation on the reality of the situation he faces and his capacity
to respond to it. Otherwise, he will act injudiciously and so both diminish his chances of success
and even unduly risk harm to others. Moreover, the study of St Thomas’ reflections on how daring
is caused, by looking at the reasons that give someone a hope of success, will help the seminarian
to perform difficult tasks. For example, the seminarian needs to both consider his own personal
competencies and seek the help of others when he faces pastoral challenges, such as the
rejuvenation of a parish that has become indifferent.
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3. Anger
St Thomas’ consideration of the causes and effects of anger assists the seminarian to have a more
mature grasp of anger’s role in his life, and how he needs to respect the difference between just
vengeance and vindictiveness. By reflecting on the various tendencies to anger, the seminarian can
learn to understand how he experiences it on account of his perception that he has been treated
unjustly. An equally important point can be taken from St Thomas’ reflections on how showing
contempt for others can provoke anger. As Pope St John Paul II teaches, the priest ought
“especially, to be balanced in judgment and behavior”.697 This entails setting aside undue anger
and the effort to avoid giving unnecessary offence.
A person becomes angry, according to St Thomas, when he suffers an injustice and desires some
form of vengeance. Vengeance is the correction of the injustice and the imposition of a punishment
on the unjust person.698 This movement of anger, as “a desire for vengeance”, involves an act of
reason by which someone compares “the punishment to be inflicted and the hurt done”.699 In this
case, anger follows reason, “in so far as the reason denounces” an injury.700 Unfortunately, St
Thomas explains, anger does not listen perfectly to reason, “because it does not observe the rule
of reason as to the measure of vengeance. Anger, therefore, requires an act of reason; and yet
proves a hindrance to reason”.701 As Miner explains: “Immoderate anger leads a person to take a
partial, distorted view of the situation, and thus to contemplate means of vindication that he would
renounce in a cool hour.”702 Hence, the need for this issue to be addressed in the process of the
seminarian’s affective formation so that he does not do harm, out of an immoderate anger, in his
future pastoral ministry.
St Thomas is careful to distinguish between vengeance and vindictiveness. He uses the word
vindicta for the vindication or, as Miner writes, “setting things right”, that anger aims at. 703 St
Thomas uses a different word, ulciscor, to refer to an improper desire for vengeance. Ulciscor is
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an inclination to vengeance which does not intend the good that comes from a just punishment,
“for instance that the sinner may amend, or at least that he may be restrained and others not be
disturbed”.704 The words “vindicate” and “vindictive” highlight the difference between vengeance
and unjust revenge. Vindicate comes from the Latin vindicare, which means “claim” or
“avenge”.705 In English vindicate refers to justifying a person by evidence or argument, for
instance, in a courtroom. 706 The word “vindictive”, however, refers to an attitude of “tending to
seek revenge” and inflicting punishment to an exaggerated degree.707
St Thomas gives various descriptions of those who are prone to anger by temperament or habit. A
bilious man becomes angry quickly. Anger caused by an increase in grief which stays in the
memory for a long time is called ill-will. An increase in the desire for vengeance which never rests
until it is avenged is called rancor. The choleric person is easily angered, the bitter person retains
his anger for a long time and the ill-tempered person never rests until he has got revenge.708 Some
can be angry over things of lesser importance. They can imagine wrongs against them and
habitually respond with anger without reflecting on other more helpful responses.
We can also feel an injury done to another as done to us because we love him or her on account of
kinship, friendship or our common humanity.709 Another cause of anger is to slight a person. To
give someone a slight is to show disrespect for his excellence, contempt for his position or unduly
hindering him from doing his will.710 For example, we can unduly forget others; not hesitate to
give them pain by our remarks; or show “signs of hilarity when another is in misfortune”.711 A
man can also be angry when someone despises something of “very great interest” to him.712
Moreover, keeping silence can provoke anger in someone if he thinks we are treating him with
“contempt”.713 A man can be offended when he receives an unjust slight in a “matter in which he
excels.” St Thomas gives the examples of “a wealthy man in his riches, or an orator in his
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eloquence…”714 Likewise, if someone possesses an excellent ability he can become angry with
those who do not appreciate his greatness.715 Thus we see the “susceptibility to anger displayed by
talented artists, musicians, writers, actors, and athletes who lack the moral virtues”.716 Another
cause of anger is being despised by a friend because it is felt as “a greater indignity” when he hurts
us or fails to help us.717
One aspect of the experience of anger concerns the deliberateness with which an unjust action is
committed. This is revealed in the fact that anger is often more easily appeased when a harm is not
deliberately done, while we are particularly angry with those who deliberately cause us harm.718
Another aspect of this issue concerns the need to make an apology to someone we have offended.
An apology appeases anger when the offender repents of his evil and humbly asks for pardon.719
For “they seem not to despise, but rather to think much of those before whom they humble
themselves”.720 Hence, the importance of the seminarian learning to express his sorrow to others
when he has offended them, in order that they may know they are respected and esteemed. This
will enable his future parishioners, for example, to know that he cares for them, he is humble
enough to admit his mistakes, and he gives them good example to do likewise for others.
The seminarian needs to be careful of the fervor that anger induces. The angry person can
experience great fervor and impetuosity to inflict vengeance.721 Love increases this fervor of anger
because when hurt is inflicted on “the excellence” we love, we therefore feel the hurt “the more”.722
It is true that the fervor of love “has a certain sweetness and gentleness; for it tends to the good
that one loves”. However, “the fervor of anger has a certain bitterness with a tendency to destroy,
for it seeks to be avenged on the contrary evil”.723 Although, the passing of time has an alleviating
effect on the fervor of anger because the memory of the injustice tends to fade.724 Also, “by reason
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of its vehemence” anger “soon dies away”.725 The lesson here is that anger passes soon enough
and the wise person waits until he comes to a point of emotional balance to make a better decision.
The major benefit of St Thomas’ teaching on anger for the seminarian’s affective formation is that
he accords it a proper place in the development of human affectivity as a response to evil. In fact,
St Thomas argues that if there is not a strong experience of the passion of anger it can indicate that
the movement of the will is “altogether lacking or weak”.726 He sees this as a vice because it lacks
a proper appreciation for the good that is harmed.727 Moreover, anger can be “useful, as being
conducive to the more prompt execution of reason’s dictate: else, the sensitive appetite in man
would be to no purpose”.728 That is, anger is a passion that can assist us to perform virtuous acts
that rectify injustice and help us to endure evils. An example of harnessing anger for a good
purpose is given to us by Dr. Conrad Baars who relates that anger helped him survive the
concentration camp at Buchenwald. Shipped to Buchenwald with one thousand French prisoners,
he was one of only six who survived the ordeal. He writes that after his faith in God, it was “his
constant anger” at the Nazis for imprisoning him and “their inhumane treatment of their prisoners”
that made him determined to survive.729 Baars describes anger as an emotion given to us by God
to help us overcome great obstacles through our endurance and determination.730 The seminarian
too has to learn to properly harness the energy of anger to help him respond well to injustices and
endure times of difficulty.
The seminarian’s knowledge of the effects of his anger, such as the hindering of reason, urges him
to acquire a realistic self-knowledge. The angry person can exaggerate what has been done to him
and cease to see other factors that would moderate his anger. St Thomas’ teaching on how those
gifted with a certain excellence can react strongly to a lack of appreciation for their gifts is pertinent
here too. St Thomas’ observations can help the seminarian to see a profound psychological truth
about the experience of anger, which “gives clues”, as Erika Hunter writes, “as to who we are,
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what we value, and how we prefer to live”.731 In the seminarian’s experience of anger or in the
intensity of his anger he can find reflected an undue attachment to his own excellence and the need
for it to be acknowledged by others. This touches upon the expectation he may have that others
openly give him credit for the good he has done as worthy of special acclaim. This is a problem
for the seminarian who is preparing to be a pastor of the Christian community. By virtue of his
calling to reflect the selfless and dedicated love of the Good Shepherd, there is a certain selfeffacement that is appropriate to his role as a friend and servant of God’s people. There is also a
great patience required because he will often have to work quietly for the good of others without
public recognition or without obvious and quick results. This is fitting because he shares in the
work of Christ which is very often quiet and goes unappreciated.
It could also be that the seminarian’s anger, when he is not acclaimed, points to an affective stance
by which he does not have his heart truly set upon the good of the people entrusted to his pastoral
care. Rather, he may be given over to the acclaim that is given for doing good rather than doing
the good for others to help them. A part of the answer to this anger is to reflect upon the joy of
knowing that when he has performed his duty for others he has had a part to play in the personal
growth of his fellow Christians. None of this denies the real need to be given due honor and the
virtuous disposition to graciously receive praise when it is rightfully offered. I will address other
aspects of this question about the need for acclaim and a balanced response to the question of how
to distinguish true and false glory in Chapter 10.
Instead of denying and ignoring his anger the seminarian can act more intelligently by
acknowledging it and measuring its appropriateness by the truth of a situation. Instead of doing
nothing so that he becomes more frustrated he can learn to communicate his anger when it is
appropriate. He should not be burdened with the incorrect assumption that all anger is wrong. He
should ask: is this anger just and is the response it influences me to make in accord with justice?
This is an essential question of self-knowledge because, as Titus explains: “Emotions are steepingstones to action. Etymologically, emotion, which comes from motere, involves a movement or
change in the person’s ‘action readiness’; we approach or withdraw from an object.”732 Thus, selfawareness is crucial to affective maturity because a person can act before being fully aware of the
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course of action to which the passion inclines him. As Titus notes: “A first step in educating
emotional reaction involves self-observation.”733 So, the first step the seminarian needs to take in
properly forming his anger is to grow in his self-awareness of when his anger is immoderate.734
Additionally, the seminarian may be prone to anger in a way that reflects St Thomas’ description
of the various tendencies to anger such as ill-will and bitterness. This requires him to reflect on
why he is angry; whether he speaks in anger without need and by force of habit; whether he
expresses his anger appropriately and in proportion to the cause of his anger. The seminarian’s
self-knowledge in this matter will be deepened when he is attentive to the reactions of others to
the way he speaks and acts. He will also be humble enough to learn that he may be too easily
inclined to anger. Thus he will not trust his anger but refrain from responding until he is in a more
balanced affective state.
There is a further consideration in relation to anger, which is best dealt with now rather than in
Chapter 10, which will consider the other capital sins such as pride and vainglory. This
consideration concerns both how anger can be sinful and what virtues help to purify it. It is true
that St Thomas refers to the anger that accords with the proper judgment of reason as “zealous
anger”.735 Anger, however, is sinful when it goes beyond what is just. For example, when an
innocent person is punished or when an excessive punishment is inflicted. 736 Anger is also
attractive inasmuch as it appears to seek justice and because it “precipitates the mind into all kinds
of inordinate action”.737 Motivated by the desire to correct injustice someone can convince himself
that his proposed action is correct and he can act without reflecting about such factors as
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ascertaining the relevant facts. Thus, he seriously limits his ability to respond helpfully to a
situation.
St Thomas articulates six main expressions of sinful anger which the seminarian can reflect on as
he learns to discern his propensity for anger. Indignation is anger with another because we think
that he acted in a way beneath our dignity. By swelling of the mind our thoughts are filled with
devising “various means of vengeance”.738 Clamor occurs when a man is disordered and confused
in his speech. Blasphemy is when he “breaks out into injurious words … against God”, and
contumely is when he speaks words “against his neighbor”.739 Quarrels occur when one man
contradicts the statement of another out of a lack of love and courtesy.740 Ridicule (derision and
mockery) is the expression of angry words to make another “confused and ashamed”.741 As Basil
Cole explains, this is done “by making fun of his seeming defects” and with “the intention to inflict
private or public embarrassment on another”.742 For the seminarian, the importance of avoiding
these unjust forms of anger is that they undermine the trust and mutual esteem that the priest needs
to build with others, through the courtesy and moderation of his speech.
The seminarian also needs to moderate both his external actions and his internal experience of
anger.743 This has implications both for the good of the seminarian himself and the good of others,
because internal passions are also principles of external actions. Thus, by the virtue of meekness
the seminarian needs to moderate his desire for vengeance and through the attitude of clemency
he needs to moderate the external punishment for wrongdoing.744 For St Thomas, these two virtues
are appropriate to the love we ought to have for others and which inclines us to take no pleasure
in punishment for its own sake. Rather, we ought to look with a proper sense of calm to correct
the person concerned and mitigate the punishment when this is right to do so.745
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Clemency and meekness help the angry person to remain “self-possessed” and therefore more
capable of judging well of what to do in difficult situations.746 As St Thomas writes, by inclining
us to mitigate the punishment we inflict on another, clemency is closely connected to charity which
inclines us to do good to others rather than evil.747 Moreover, epikeia is a virtue, connected to
clemency, by which we understand the limits of the law giver’s intention and mitigate a
punishment that was not intended for a particular kind of case. The application of the law according
to this kind of valid exception is equity.748 Clemency assists the virtue of equity by influencing the
angry person to inflict punishment only when it is necessary.749
Reflecting on St Thomas’ teaching on anger, Cole asks about how a priest should act with his
parishioners even if his anger is justified? “The difficulty in the priesthood”, he writes, “is that one
may reasonably use anger to solve a problem, but often it only creates more problems causing
some bad people to become worse and discouraging good people from becoming better.”750
Therefore, the priest should strive to be prudent to know when and how to express anger and
“cultivate a love of gentleness while not becoming a wimp in the face of evils in his parish
community.”751 It is also helpful for him to be aware of what makes him vulnerable to excessive
anger, for example, tiredness, loneliness or discouragement. He can, besides, as St Thomas
advises, avoid thoughts that cause anger even though he may not be able to “prevent disordered
movements from arising”.752 In this way he can moderate his anger by focusing on thoughts and
matters that properly absorb his attention and distract him in a healthy way from what causes him
to feel anger.
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The seminarian also needs to temper his zeal and not allow it to be driven by a self-righteous anger.
Zeal is the intensity of love which sets aside any obstacles to union with the beloved and it moves
us to counteract what opposes the beloved’s good.753 So, the greater the love and the greater the
zeal to protect the beloved, the greater the anger is when the beloved is hurt or offended. This can
be a challenge for those who love God and seek his glory and feel hurt that God is treated with
indifference and arrogance. Zeal and anger thus need to be tempered so that they do not become a
hatred for others, by which we desire “another’s evil for evil’s sake”.754 For we are prone to sin by
way of excess, even though we begin with a just cause. Thus, we can sin, St Thomas reminds us,
when we seek “vengeance with the aim of doing away with the sinner rather than the sin”.755 The
seminarian needs to ask for the grace to seek God’s honor, but to do this in a way that reveals
God’s true justice and mercy.
In summary, the teaching of St Thomas on the affective experience of anger is a call for the
seminarian to take responsibility for himself and others. To become responsible in regard to anger
he needs to first recognize that it is a legitimate part of an affectively mature person’s character.
Anger can enable him to respond to situations that need to be reformed because attitudes or actions
have harmed people and personal relationships need to be returned to a healthy state. Yet, he also
needs to be wary of anger’s propensity to incline him to exaggerated responses that would badly
affect his capacity to make a just decision about what should or should not be done. Virtues, such
as clemency, that incline him to moderate his anger and reflect upon the truly good course of action
that should be taken are also necessary if he is to become a responsible person. These virtues give
internal balance to the seminarian’s affective responses and enable him to bring his anger into
proportion with the truth of a situation. The fruit of such maturity is the ability to be responsible
for others in situations of injustice and to work in a truly helpful manner for the rectification of
attitudes and actions that inflict harm on others.
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Conclusion
This chapter has reflected upon St Thomas’ teaching on the irascible passions and how this
teaching can deepen the seminarian’s understanding of how to develop affective resilience.
Essentially, the irascible passions provide an affective impetus to strive for the arduous good and
respond to the evil that is difficult to repel. In this way, the precise object of the irascible passions
is to help the seminarian to cope with challenges and deal with obstacles. Each irascible passion
has a part to play in the development of the seminarian’s affective resilience. The passion of hope
enables the seminarian to strive for the arduous good, which is the more fulfilling because it
requires both greater effort and a greater investment of the person to attain it. Despair can also be
a helpful passion, in the sense that it inclines the seminarian to leave aside that which is beyond
his power to attain and be free to strive for what brings him fulfilment. Fear inclines him to avoid
the evil and seek counsel from others. Daring equips him to face challenges, while he relies upon
external resources, personal competencies, the help of others, and deliberating well before
confronting a major challenge, to help him succeed. Finally, while anger provides him with the
energy to restore the balance of justice, the seminarian must also take care to develop moderating
virtues such as clemency. Otherwise, he may be prone to an excessive anger and even an
immoderate zeal, which will damage the relationships of trust and esteem he should enjoy with his
future parishioners. Now, having considered St Thomas’ teaching on the human passions, the next
chapter will explore both how virtue forms them and how St Thomas’ teaching on virtue can be
applied to the seminarian’s affective formation.
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SECTION 2
THE VIRTUES AS FORMATIVE PRINCIPLES
Section 2 looks at virtue as a principle of formation for the seminarian’s affectivity. Chapter 7
considers how the cardinal virtues shape the affective capacities of the seminarian so that he can
responsibly love others in a prudent, just, temperate, and courageous way. Chapter 8 considers the
implications for affective formation of St Thomas’ teaching on virtue for the proper development
of the love of friendship, the desire to delight in beauty, and the capacity to properly rest the soul.
Chapter 9 considers how the Theological Virtues, the Gifts of the Holy Spirit, the Beatitudes and
the Fruits of the Holy Spirit, shape the affectivity of the seminarian.
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CHAPTER 7
THE FORMATIVE ROLE OF THE VIRTUES
In Pastores Dabo Vobis Pope St John Paul II writes of attributes such as justice that help the
seminarian to better reflect the Good Shepherd’s attitude to others. These are virtues, that is,
abiding perfections of the seminarian’s character that facilitate his ability to act for the good. They
enable him to relate to others in such a way that his ministry will be as “humanly credible and
acceptable as possible”, and that he may be responsible for a community of people.756 St John Paul
II also writes of other virtues that are necessary for the seminarian’s affective maturity, “a
significant and decisive factor” in his formation. Chastity requires “a strong training in freedom”,
mastery of self, and the capacity to avoid selfishness and individualism, so that the seminarian can
love others by making a sincere gift of himself.757 Given that the priest’s “affections and instinctive
impulses” are left “intact”, the priest, furthermore, needs “prudence” by which he can avoid
whatever is not in accord with his vocation.758 Moreover, the Pope writes of an education of the
seminarian’s conscience so that he can exercise a “responsible freedom”.759 In other words,
without certain virtues the seminarian cannot fulfill his vocation.
From St Thomas’ teaching on virtue we can glean a set of principles to guide the development of
the seminarian into the affective maturity that Pope St John Paul II envisages. This maturity is
essentially formed by the cardinal virtues, which serve to enable the seminarian to relate
responsibly to those he is called to serve as a priest. To demonstrate this the following points will
be examined: 1) The Nature of Virtue; 2) Prudence and Affectivity; 3) The Mean of Virtue; 4)
Passion and Moral Virtue; 5) Virtue and the Growth of Freedom; 6) Implications for Affective
Formation. While the aim of this chapter is to consider St Thomas’ teaching on virtue in relation
to affective formation, the next chapter will consider his teaching in regard to three important areas
of affectivity: friendship, beauty and eutrapelia.
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1. The Nature of Virtue
The aim of this section is to examine the wider context of the development of the intellectual and
volitional capacities in which affective formation is conducted. For St Thomas, the passions are
virtues in the more general sense of providing the capacity to act in a certain way. “Virtue denotes
a principle of action”, he writes, “wherefore, in so far as the interior movements of the appetitive
faculty are principles of external action, they are called virtues”.760 Anger, for instance, equips us
with the energy to correct a perceived injustice. To attain affective maturity, however, the passions
need to be formed in accord with wise judgement and right willing. This is the purpose of the
virtues in a more particular sense. “Human virtue”, as St Thomas defines it, “is a habit perfecting
man in view of his doing good deeds”.761 Virtue forms the faculties of the person so that he can
act for the good.762 Thus, the person develops himself by freely directing himself to the good.763
St Thomas’ understanding of how habits perfect human powers underlies his teaching on how
virtues perfect the human person. He refers to power and habit as the intrinsic principles of human
acts.764 The powers of the human soul are capacities to act in particular ways, for example, the
power of the intellect is directed to understanding.765 Now, a power is fulfilled by acting well in
accord with its proper end, but “habits are necessary that the powers [of the soul] be determined
to good”.766 Without this kind of perfection the power would be ill directed.767
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The English word “habit” is derived from the Latin habitus, which, St Thomas explains, “is derived
from habere (to have)”.768 In a more general sense, habit is a “quality” which inheres in a being
by which it is disposed a certain way to good or ill.769 “For”, St Thomas explains, “when the mode
is suitable to the thing’s nature, it has the aspect of good: and when it is unsuitable, it has the aspect
of evil”.770 For example, health, a state of well-being and a disposition to this state, is a habit.
Moreover, habit is a quality implying more than a disposition, for habit “implies a certain
lastingness”.771 St Thomas gives a person’s knowledge of science as an example. If someone has
an imperfect grasp of the subject, “we say that he is disposed to that science, rather than that he
has the science”.772 The deeper grasp of the science, which is a more perfect and lasting perfection
of the intellectual power, is called the habit of science. The significance of the language of habit
is that it indicates the real change in the person through the exercise of his faculties. The person
becomes more, has more and can do more by perfecting his faculties.773
The habit that forms a power is perfected through “many” acts.774 However, while “repeated acts
cause a habit to grow”, if a particular “act falls short of the intensity of the habit, such an act does
not dispose to an increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening thereof”.775 The habits of the
intellect, for instance, can be diminished by incorrect conclusions or deception. Habits of the will,
“either of virtue or of vice, may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever its motion is
contrary to such virtue or vice, whether through ignorance, passion or deliberate choice”. 776 For
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example, corruption can occur “when a man fails to make use of his virtuous habit in order to
moderate his own passions or deeds”.777 Thus, the need to continually practice the habit so that he
can both maintain and improve himself.
For St Thomas, there is an intrinsic link between love and virtue. Virtue gives order to love so that
we can properly will the good of other people.778 In other words, by properly developing the
respective faculties of mind, will and passions, we can develop the capacity to care for others. For
example, the development of justice, as we will see below, disposes a person to attend to the
objective need of another. To the contrary, bad habits distort these same faculties and so corrupt
the communication of love. On account of this damage to the human good, bad habits are called
vices.779 We will consider the impact and healing of the vices in Section 3.
Since, in a general sense, “virtue is a habit by which we work well”, we can attribute virtues to the
intellect, such as the development of science, which in the context of St Thomas’ discussion of the
intellectual virtues refers to the ability to make valid deductions from necessary truths.780 Gregory
Reichberg comments that these virtues “ensure expertise in our scientific, artistic, and technical
endeavours”. They are called intellectual virtues because “they are stable dispositions for
apprehending truth”.781 The intellectual virtues perfect the speculative and practical intellect.
These two terms refer to the intellect acting for two different purposes. The speculative intellect,
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St Thomas explains, considers the principles of reality and truth in itself.782 As Reichberg explains,
the “proper good” of the speculative intellect is “the pronouncement of true judgments (assent to
true propositions)”.783 On the other hand, St Thomas explains, the practical intellect considers what
is to be done.784 Its practical virtues, as Reichberg explains, guides “agents in their tasks that have
yet to be performed”.785 The seminarian’s proper formation involves the development of both his
speculative and practical thinking, because he needs to be both a good student and serve others
through his practical abilities as a pastor. The development of these practical abilities, as we will
see below, includes the virtues that form his affective life.
The three virtues of the speculative intellect are “wisdom, science and understanding”. 786 In
explaining these virtues St Thomas contrasts knowing a truth in itself and knowing it through
another. The habit of knowing “self-evident principles” - truths that are known in themselves - is
called understanding.787 Of truths that are known through the inquiry of reason there are two
virtues: wisdom and science. Wisdom “considers the highest causes” and therefore “rightly judges
all things and sets them in order”, and science concerns “the different kinds of knowable matter”.788
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There are two virtues of the practical intellect, that is, the intellect inasmuch as it regards what is
“contingent” and “can be effected” by our will and action.789 Art “regards things to be made” and
prudence “regards things to be done”.790 Art is “the right reason about certain works to be made”.791
It concerns an external work to be completed with material elements. Art does not of itself imply
a right ordering of the will. St Thomas refers to the need for moral virtues such as justice “which
rectifies” the artist’s “will, to do his work faithfully”.792 The implication of this point is that all
activities, in some way, need to be directed by a proper concern for moral goodness.
Prudence, however, is “the right reason of things to be done”, guiding the will rightly to act for
happiness.793 As St Thomas explains: “Prudence is of good counsel about matters regarding man’s
entire life, and the end of human life”.794 In its role of making good judgments prudence is vital to
affective maturity. Prudence is “most necessary for human life because a good life consists in good
deeds”.795 Prudence ensures that not only what a man does is good but that how he does it is good,
that is, “that he do it from right choice and not merely from impulse or passions”. 796 By the
guidance of prudence a man knows the end toward which his action is directed and what is suitable
to attaining that end. So, it is prudence that ensures an action or passion is properly directed
according to the good grasped by reason.797 For example, as Kent writes: “A person needs
prudence to judge correctly which dangers would be good to face.”798 This leads us to the integral
role of prudence in forming the seminarian’s affectivity and personal relationships.
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2. Prudence and Affectivity
An important dimension of affective maturity is the relationship between prudence and the moral
virtues. It is integral to affective maturity not only to think well but to act well. 799 Without good
decisions and actions the affective power remains poorly developed as a part of the seminarian’s
character.800 This is the importance of examining the moral virtues which perfect the will in its
capacity to act for the good. The word moral comes from the Latin mos, which can refer to a
custom or “a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action”.801 St Thomas
applies this concept to the will, which exercises a kind of inclination by directing human acts.
Virtue most of all resides in the will because by it all the “other powers that are in some way
rational” are moved.802 As St Thomas explains, if we talk of a man doing “well actually, this is
because he has a good will”, or he exercises that good will through another of his capacities.803
There are two reasons for calling a habit a virtue: “because it confers aptness in doing good” and
“besides aptness, it confers the right use of it”.804 A habit of the will is thus called a virtue because
it enables a choice in accord with moral good.805 Even though a man has the habit of science, for
This is implied from St Thomas’ understanding that virtue in general, “denotes a certain perfection of a power”.
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example, it does not necessarily follow that he will use it for the good of his neighbour. 806 Moral
virtue, however, “is a habit of choosing, i.e., making us choose well”. 807 The role of the moral
virtues is to ensure that the will is rightly inclined to the good in accordance with prudence. St
Thomas gives the analogy of a blind horse:
The natural inclination to a good of virtue is a kind of beginning of virtue, but is not perfect
virtue. For the stronger this inclination is, the more perilous may it prove to be, unless it be
accompanied by right reason, which rectifies the choice of fitting means towards the due end.
Thus if a running horse be blind, the faster it runs the more heavily will it fall, and the more
grievously will it be hurt.808

As Josef Pieper explains, the various abilities we have as persons only achieve their perfection
“when they are founded upon prudence, that is to say upon the perfected ability to make right
decisions”.809 Prudence pertains to the practical ability to apply principles to the concrete case, so
that when we argue about “particular cases” we need “not only universal but also particular
principles”.810 Without such prudence, someone can be wrongly swayed by passion so that a
universal principle “is destroyed in a particular case”.811 St Thomas gives the example of someone
“who is swayed by concupiscence, when he is overcome thereby, the object of his desire seems
good, although it is opposed to the universal judgment of his reason”.812 The development of
prudence enables the seminarian to maintain a consistency between what he knows to be true and
what he does. However, the ability to make good judgments also requires the overall development
of the volitional and affective capacities of the human person.
The moral virtues ensure that the will and the passions are in right order and do not interfere with
the judgment of prudence. They properly dispose a person to good ends and means through
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perfecting man “by certain habits, whereby it becomes connatural, as it were, to man to judge
aright to the end”.813 St Thomas establishes this point on the way that “the virtuous person judges
aright of the end of virtue”, because he judges according to his character which influences the way
he views the end.814 Pieper draws the implication that we must have a basic and diligent stance for
the truth, a receptivity to “the objective reality of being”.815 This attendance to truth in our
judgments about what to do for others informs all the other virtues. As Pieper writes: “Truth, then,
is the prerequisite of justice”.816 And so it is for the formation of our affections and passions.
The four basic virtues that develop the moral life in its application to affectivity are the Cardinal
Virtues of Prudence, Justice, Temperance and Fortitude. These apply the measure of reason to the
main powers of the human soul.817 The cardinal virtues are the “principal” virtues from which the
other moral virtues flow.818 For instance, from temperance flows the virtue of chastity which we
will consider below in the implications for affective formation. In this role the moral virtues are,
as Reichberg explains “attitudinal dispositions: thus in addition to ensuring the right sort of
behavior with respect to the concrete situation confronting the agent, they also prompt an
appropriate emotional response. Prudence, similarly takes into account how the agent’s appetite is
affected while performing a particular action. ‘For in order to good deeds,’ Thomas notes, ‘it
matters not only what someone does but also how he does it’ (Ia IIae, q.57, a.5)”.819 The distinction
St Thomas makes here, between what is done and how it is done, is important because it concerns
the expression of someone’s affective response in relation to others. It is not enough for him to say
that what he does is good because he also needs to be careful of how that action expresses his
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emotional life and affects the person to which the action is directed. Think, for example, of the
priest who gives the greeting to the congregation at the beginning of Mass but who says these
words in a hurried or perfunctory way. What he does is good - to give the words of greeting to the
congregation. The way he performs the action, however, is imperfect, given that the congregation
needs to be greeted in a prayerful and considerate manner to draw their hearts into the time of
liturgical prayer.
Prudence, as we have seen, perfects the power and acts of reason about moral matters. Justice
perfects the power and acts of the will for the purpose of reason putting order into our actions in
relation to our neighbor. Temperance perfects the concupiscible power and its acts so that our
tendency to pleasure is formed according to our true good, and our tendency to inordinate pleasure
is curbed. Fortitude perfects the irascible power and its acts so that we follow reason even in the
face of the “fear of toil and danger”.820 Without these virtues the seminarian’s character and his
relationships become too fragile to be deeply fulfilling, because he will neither judge correctly of
the good works that properly promote relationships nor will he persist in them. This refers to both
his friendships and his commitment to the relationships involved in his pastoral ministry.
The importance of prudence for affective development can be explored through the close
connection between our knowledge and our will. In regard to human action St Thomas writes: “the
act of the will is nothing else than an inclination proceeding from the interior principle of
knowledge …”, so that each “act of the will is preceded by an act of the intellect …”821 “As a
result,” Michael Sherwin comments, “the moral goodness of the will, and thus also of the agent
him or herself, depends upon knowledge”.822 Also, while knowledge specifies the object of love,
the will moves the mind to discern an object to love and decide for it. There is, then, a mutual
influence exercised by mind and will. St Thomas writes: “Love ranks above knowledge in moving,
but knowledge precedes love in attaining”, for we cannot love something without knowing it.823
The significance of this point is that a sound knowledge of human affectivity and the principles
that properly develop it, must always be the basis for the seminarian’s affective formation. Love
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can only ever be to the good if it is guided by a true practical grasp of how that love is to be
expressed and communicated. It is also the case that a sound education in affectivity opens the
mind of the seminarian to new possibilities that he has not considered before. Unless he is
presented with a knowledge of how to properly develop he will be hampered in his ability to
affectively grow. Knowledge and right judgment are the basis for true affective development.
On this point, St Thomas compares prudence to sight. Prudence seeks knowledge of the future by
comparing knowledge of the past and the present with “things afar off, in so far as they tend to be
a help or hindrance to that which has to be done at the present time”.824 In this way prudence
“includes application to action, which application is an act of the will”.825 Without this application
of prudence to action the other faculties of the person cannot be perfected. Fortitude, for example,
forms a man’s character so that he “should not stray from the right judgment of reason through
fear or daring”.826 Exercising prudence is, then, an essential part of being affectively and ethically
mature. As Pieper explains:
The virtue of prudence … being the perfected ability to make decisions in accordance with
reality – is the quintessence of ethical maturity (of which, of course, teachability is a great
component). And the pre-eminence of prudence over justice, fortitude, and temperance means
simply that without maturity truly moral life and action is not possible.827

Our affectivity must therefore be educated by a true prudence. “And education to prudence means”,
Pieper explains, “to objective estimation of the concrete situation of concrete activity, and to the
ability to transform this cognition of reality into concrete decision.”828 In this way prudence “is
not only the quintessence of ethical maturity, but in so being is also the quintessence of moral
freedom”.829 An intelligent grasp of both the reality within the person and the world external to
him is the only authentic basis for developing affective maturity and being free to act well in
relationships. Without accurately understanding his affective faculties the seminarian cannot form
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them, nor can he develop them without being properly attentive to the people and the realities he
encounters.

3. The Mean of Virtue
The virtuous mean concerns the practical judgment of what is appropriate given the circumstances
and needs of the person concerned. St Thomas comments that “the principal act of virtue is
choice”.830 This choice is according to reason and the judgement of the wise man. This “does not
refer to one who is wise simply, knowing the ultimate causes of the whole universe, but rather to
one who is prudent, that is, wise in human affairs”.831 In other words, it applies to a person who is
capable of making good practical judgments about the good in the particular concrete case.
The mean of virtue is not the arithmetical mean, the mid-point between two quantities, but is the
proper mode of an action for the true good of those concerned. For example, liberality is the mean
between prodigality, by which we spend too much, and illiberality, by which we do not spend
enough. Moreover, not only should we consider the objective content of things but their relative
significance for the particular person. St Thomas writes:
… the mean is relative in regard to us inasmuch as it neither exceeds nor falls short of a
proportion suitable to us. Hence this mean is not the same for all. If we apply the relative mean
to a shoe, it will not be more than the length of the foot or less. It will not be the same for all
because not all have the same size foot.832

Likewise, in regard to the amount of food to be given to an athlete, St Thomas writes: “The wise
man avoids excess and defect, and wants to find the mean not objectively but relative to us.”833
Another example is found in the way workers strive for the mean of their work, which is found in
neither more nor less than the perfection of the work requires. Moreover, in Disputed Questions
on Virtues, St Thomas considers that the good of a thing is in accord with its “standard or measure”.
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It is for this reason that “we say that what is good is neither more nor less than it should be”. 834
Indeed, in any area of skill the good is found in what conforms “to the measure that the skill in
question demands”.835 Now, in a similar way, since “reason is the measure and standard of all
human emotions and activities”, the proper limits set by reason mark out what is good in affective
acts.836 St Thomas writes:
The mid-point of a virtue … consists in having things and emotions properly proportional to
and measured in accordance with the person. The appropriate measurement is different for
different people. What is too much for one person is too little for someone else. That is why
what is virtuous is not exactly the same for everyone.837

St Thomas’ explanation of the mean is very important for the development of the seminarian’s
capacity to make practical judgments and to guide others. This is not detrimental to a proper respect
for moral absolutes. Some “actions and passions by their very name imply vice: passions such as
ill-will, shamelessness, envy and actions such as adultery, theft, murder. All of these and their like
are evil in themselves and not only in their excess or defect”.838 But the mean of virtue does guide
the seminarian to prudently attend to those matters that admit of proper adaptation to the person
concerned. For example, a person who has suffered the loss of a beloved relative is not expected
to work with the same strength as someone who is without such grief. What might be laziness in
one person is something very different in a grieving person. Again, one mother can emotionally
cope with the responsibility of many more children and another cannot. The personal qualities,
dispositions, and circumstances of others, are to be taken into account by the priest who is virtuous,
affectively mature and pastorally responsible.
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4. Passion and Moral Virtue
Passion needs to be developed as an integral dimension of moral virtue. In St Thomas’
understanding, virtue does not deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities
because these powers are proper to the human person. Rather, these powers are integrated within
the overall good of the human person by the correct understanding of their purpose. The role of
virtue is to make these subordinate powers carry out the command of reason through the exercise
of their proper acts.839 Thus virtue orders the passions to their proper perfection. Paul Gondreau
concludes from this line of thought: “To attain the state of moral perfection we need to become
good in our emotions and desires as well as in the choices of our will”.840 Here lies the basic
difference between St Thomas’ view of the formation of passion and that of theologians such as
St Bonaventure and Blessed Duns Scotus, who hold that virtue only tames the passions. For St
Thomas, to the contrary, the passions are formed so that virtue resides in them.841 Virtuously
formed passions become a positive expression of the reason and the will of the person.
Gondreau refers to the difference between continence and chastity as an example of how the moral
life is incomplete without the virtuous formation of the passions. St Thomas describes chastity as
a virtue that moderates a person’s actions in sexual matters, “in accordance with the judgement of
his reason and the choice of his will”.842 Continence can refer to the abstention from all venereal
pleasure or it can refer to the resistance of evil desires which are vehement. In this second sense
continence is a virtue to the extent that “the reason stands firm in opposition” to disordered passion.
But it is not a virtue in a complete sense because the capacity to experience passion is not in
harmony with reason but is unruly and in need of restraint.843 Gondreau sees the problem in “the
continent individual” performing “the virtuous deed through raw will power alone, not with the
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help of his passions”.844 Thus, there is something lacking in terms of this person’s development as
an affectively mature and virtuous person.
The significance of this is that a truly mature person has developed his emotional responses so that
they reflect his proper understanding of the good and they assist his virtuous action. They become
part of the good actions he performs. This requires a deliberate development of his emotional
responses so that they grow in harmony with what he wills. The opposite of this is to neglect the
specific development of his affective responses, so that he attempts to act virtuously through will
power alone. This can be exhausting because the energy of the passions is pulling against the
choice of the will as it is guided by the judgement of the mind. It is also immature from the point
of view that the specific capacities within the person remain imperfect and do not reflect the
person’s grasp of the true good. There is, in other words, a disintegration between the person’s
reason and the person’s unformed affective responses. To this extent one dimension of his
maturation as a human person is left unfulfilled.
For “complete moral perfection”, however, there needs to be an internal ordering of the passions
in regard to created bodily goods.845 The temperate person performs the good with the help of his
passions so that “even his desires are morally praiseworthy”.846 Chastity, as an expression of
temperance in relation to sexual desires, is an example of an act of the sensitive appetite that is
harmonized with the virtuous good.847 The continent man, however, acts according to virtue but is
still lacking a certain unity of life. The counter-movement of the still yet to be fully integrated
emotions foils the orientation of his psychology to virtue and holiness. Gondreau writes: “His
desires speak a different voice from his reason.”848
This is an example of how St Thomas’ teaching on the virtues and passions is one of integration.849
St Thomas comments: “we say reason holds the place of a father giving guidance and of friends
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offering advice.”850 The role of the moral virtues is thereby one of intelligently gathering our
passions into harmony with our good actions and virtuous relationships. For St Thomas, virtues
can be in the sensitive appetite inasmuch as its acts are under “the command of reason”.851 The
concupiscible and irascible passions, as acts of the sensitive appetite, are not as such the subject of
virtue but since “they have a natural aptitude to obey reason”, they can be “considered as
participating in reason”.852 St Thomas has, then, in Gondreau’s words, a “participated
psychology”, where the acts of the sensitive appetite are brought to their true perfection by sharing
in and expressing reason and will.853
It is true that for a virtue such as justice, which concerns the direction of the will in regard to our
neighbor, the direct matter of the virtue is not a passion. However, there is still an intimate
connection between justice and passion. St Thomas writes: “joy results from the act of justice …
And if this joy be increased through the perfection of justice, it will overflow into the sensitive
appetite; in so far as the lower powers follow the movement of the higher … Wherefore by reason
of this kind of overflow, the more perfect a virtue is, the more does it cause passion.”854 As Robert
Miner comments, such passions indicate “the flourishing of that virtue”. 855 In other words, the
person’s willing of the good of justice and his affective responses are in a unity and express his
maturity of character. Furthermore, given the way a good habit shapes the character of the person,
we can state that the habitual disposition formed by a just will affectively inclines the person to
desire what is just for the other person. In this way, Lombardo writes of justice, not as “an abstract
ideal against which we measure ourselves. Rather, justice “denotes an affective disposition toward
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others, and a constant inclination to give them what they are owed.” 856 Justice gives an objective
guide for the expression of affectivity in relation to others.
That is, justice regulates external action so that it is “commensurate with someone else” and thus
forms and integrates passion.857 It regulates matters such as “buying and selling” and the actions
we perform for others, such as refraining from undue acts of violence. 858 Thus, justice concerns
acts that regulate our relations with others.859 From this point of view, all the moral virtues that
concern the regulation of the passions in some way concern the notion of giving to another what
is due to him.860 There is, then, a relationship between the virtues that regulate our actions in
relation to others and our internal experience of the passions. This is so because in actions directed
to another justice is damaged by an inordinate passion that exceeds its “due measure” and is
expressed in a disordered fashion.861 In destroying “the due measure of the external act” justice is
destroyed.862
Justice is vital for the affective life because it gives an objective rule for the expression of the
passions in our personal relationships. As Pieper writes: “Justice says: That is another person, who
is other than I, and who nevertheless has his own peculiar due. A just man is just, therefore, because
he sanctions another person in his very separateness and helps him to receive his due.”863 In justice
we reflect an essential quality of goodness in its respect for the other, namely, diffusiveness,
because goodness by its very nature is meant to be shared. As St Thomas writes: “because the
better a thing is, the more does it diffuse its goodness to remote beings”.864 This justice is expressed
in our various relationships. In regard to God we have the justice of religion; in regard to our
parents and our country we have piety; in regard to our benefactors we have gratitude.865 There is
a justice for those entrusted to our care, such as parents exercise for their children and parish priests
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for their parishioners. Justice then guides the development of the seminarian’s affectivity so that
he can properly express himself in relation to those who rely upon him. It also restrains his worst
impulses so that he can avoid violating the rights of others. Thus justice ensures that his
relationships are rightly ordered in their affective reality.
Temperance and fortitude are the two cardinal virtues that directly concern the integration of the
passions. Temperance regulates the six acts of the concupiscible power: love, desire, joy, hatred,
aversion and sorrow. The word temperance comes from the Latin temperare, which means to set
bounds or keep within limits. Temperance refers to the observation of proper limits, moderation,
and self-control.866 As a virtue, it forms the capacity for acts that concern pleasures both within
the person, either according to “bodily sense, or to the inner apprehension of the mind”, and in
relation to others, for example, in matters of sexuality.867 Temperance also moderates the pleasures
by which a person seeks to assuage the negative impacts of evil that cause hatred, aversion and
sorrow. For example, that a person in sorrow not drink alcohol to a level of harmful excess.
Temperance can be seen as a general virtue which implies a “moderation, which reason appoints
to human operations and passions”.868 It also refers to withdrawing “from things which seduce the
appetite from obeying reason”.869 Thus, temperance disposes us to have due proportion in our
affective experience and its expression through our words and deeds. Pieper writes of this virtue:
“The primary and essential meaning of temperare, therefore, is this: to dispose various parts into
one unified and ordered whole.”870 That is, the desires and experiences of pleasure are brought into
a unity with the true good of the person and the persons he loves. We will refer to chastity as an
example of how temperance develops affectivity and the relationships it involves in the
implications for affective formation. A major point to be noted here, however, is that St Thomas’
teaching on the virtue of temperance “affirms the goodness” of the various desires that it perfects,
such as food, drink, sex, or anger. The point of the specific virtues of abstinence, sobriety, chastity
and clemency is not to squash desire, but to “permeate it with reason, so that it instinctively inclines
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toward what will bring the human person to the greatest flourishing”.871 There is a twofold benefit
of temperance for the seminarian. Temperance both develops his desires in harmony with his true
good and it develops his ability to properly express his desires in his personal relationships. A
simple example is that moderation in drinking enables him to think clearly about what he will say
to others.
The irascible passions are ordered toward different objects, as St Thomas explains, “for daring and
fear are about some great danger; hope and despair are about some difficult good; while anger
seeks to overcome something contrary which has wrought harm”.872 The three virtues that form
these irascible passions are fortitude, which regulates “fear and daring”; magnanimity, which
regulates “hope and despair”; and meekness, which regulates “anger”.873 Fortitude especially
concerns “the pains of the mind and dangers”, most of all those “which lead to death, and it is
against them that the brave man stands firm”.874 Thus, as Pieper writes, fortitude allows us to have
the courage “to accept injury” and to act according to a sense of self sacrifice.875 Also, fortitude is
not a matter of feeling no fear in the face of evil, “but”, Pieper explains, it consists “in not allowing
oneself to be forced into evil by fear, or to be kept by fear from the realization of good”.876 The
formative influence of fortitude will be discussed below in relation to virtue and the growth of
freedom.

5. Virtue and the Growth of Freedom
The virtues that we have discussed above form the various faculties of the seminarian so that he
can act for his true good and that of others. In this way virtue serves to develop the self-mastery
that Pope St John Paul II recommends as an essential quality for affective maturity. He writes in
Pastores Dabo Vobis that “freedom requires the person to be truly master of oneself”.877 Still,
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some would argue that virtues restrict freedom because they are habits and as such they are
determinations of powers and acts.878 By implication, then, are virtues restrictions of our
affectivity?
In relation to this issue, Benedict Ashley writes that virtues are not “routine habits which are rigid
and instinctual, but flexible skills by which we can meet ever-varying circumstances”.879 Ashley
describes virtue as a “skill in good moral decision and behavior”.880 Good character is, then, “the
possession of all the necessary moral skills or virtues”.881 Still, in what specific way does virtue
enable us to act freely? In The Sources of Christian Ethics, Servais Pinckaers gives two analogies
about how we exercise our freedom precisely through the exercise of good habits: learning to play
the piano and learning a language. In each case we begin with the desire to acquire a new skill.
This requires guidance and good practice until the person can perform the skill with facility. It is
precisely the acquired skill that enables a person to perform the task with freedom, increase his
own good and communicate it to others. In regard to the performance of music Pinckaers
comments:
… the person who really possesses the art of playing the piano has acquired a new freedom.
He can play whatever he chooses, and also compose new pieces. His musical freedom could
be described as the gradually acquired ability to execute works of his choice with perfection.
It is based on natural dispositions and a talent developed and stabilized by means of regular,
progressive exercises, or properly speaking, a habitus.882

The same process is followed in learning a new language. Through the study of this new language’s
vocabulary and grammar, and by practicing it in its native country, we learn to converse with other
people in their mother tongue.
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Pinckaers calls this “freedom for excellence”, because by following the necessary principles we
are set free to perform a skill.883 He then applies this concept to morality, taking the example of
courage. The desire of a young person to be brave is formed through various trials of varying
difficulty, so that he gradually acquires the ability to be courageous in the face of greater trials.
“Courage”, Pinckaers writes, “… is a characteristic of the morally mature person… courage
enables us to undertake worthwhile projects of high value to ourselves and others, regardless of all
interior and exterior resistance, obstacles, and opposition.”884 This is an excellence to freely act
for the good. This kind of freedom is not against our natural inclinations but develops them, so
that we may act well for our good and that of others.885 Pinckaer’s point here is very significant
for affective formation, because it enables the seminarian to see that his freedom to act for his own
good and that of others is positively promoted by the virtues.
The growth of our virtue and freedom requires a long process of development, which Pinckaers
articulates in “three basic stages of human life”: discipline, progress and the perfection of
freedom.886 These stages of growth in moral freedom and maturity reflect St Thomas’ threefold
articulation of growth in charity. In Summa Theologica II-II, q.24, a.9, St Thomas compares the
growth of charity with that of the body. These stages are distinguished “according to those
particular actions or pursuits to which man is brought by this same growth”.887 The three stages
are those of childhood before the age of reason, when he exercises the capacity of reason and
speech, and “when he begins to acquire the power of generation, and so on until he arrives at
perfection”.888
By analogy, we can talk of the degrees of charity which incorporate all the virtues in the love of
God and one’s neighbor. First, there are the beginners who are occupied “chiefly with avoiding
sin and resisting” inordinate desires which move them away from charity.889 In this stage “charity
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has to be fed or fostered lest it be destroyed”.890 The second stage is that of those who are proficient
in virtue, and “whose chief aim is to strengthen their charity by adding to it”.891 Thus while those
in the first stage are chiefly concerned with avoiding sin, those in the second stage are chiefly
concerned with “progressing in virtue”.892 Those in the third stage “aim chiefly at union with and
enjoyment of God”.893 This is the stage of the person who has grown fully mature with Christ’s
own fullness (Ephesians 4.13).
Pinckaers’ articulation of the three stages more explicitly links the growth of virtue to the growth
of freedom. He defines the first stage as that of discipline in which there is a communication of
knowledge from a teacher to his pupil for the sake of forming his mind and will. This is not the
matter of an imposition of the master’s will. It is rather a “relationship” in which the teacher
imparts “the principles and rules of some art or science, and particularly that art of living that is
morality or wisdom”.894 This kind of discipline “appeals to natural dispositions, to a spontaneous
sense of truth and goodness, and to the conscience of the child or disciple”. 895 The seminarian
undertakes this kind of education when he commences his formation for the priesthood.
The second stage is that of the development of virtue in which the person takes a deeper personal
hold of moral truths and seeks to practice them. It is the stage of progress. With this greater
maturity the person seeks to practice virtues such as justice and honesty, “even though such actions
require sacrifice or may be unnoticed by others”.896 Whereas in the first stage sensible pleasure
and the idea of reward and punishment acted as “supporting motives” to do good, now there is a
“love of virtue for its own sake” and “love of others for themselves”.897 There is a growing joy
because the person grows in his awareness of the fulfilling quality of his good actions. This stage
requires the seminarian to persevere so that he can develop his life of virtue, learn to enjoy the
improvement of his own good character, and see the fruits of his virtuous efforts for the good of
others.
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The third stage is that of maturity and the perfection of freedom. Pinckaers characterizes this stage
“by two features: mastery of excellent actions and creative fruitfulness”.898 The person in this stage
can view “his life in its entirety” and act according to “a higher goal which will profit himself and
others”.899 His maturity stamps his personality on his actions when he has appropriated moral
truths and lives according to them. To achieve the fullest integration of his human capacities he
cultivates a broad range of virtues relevant to many different activities and at the service of some
greater purpose with other people. John MacKenzie makes a comment that amplifies the point
made by Pinckaers and that is instructive for the seminarian:
… unless a man has, in some form, a broad human interest which lifts him out of himself, his
life remains a fragment, and the virtues have no soil to grow in. The first requisite, then, for
the development of the virtues, is to unite ourselves with others in the pursuit of some end or
ideal, i.e. something that has real value, intrinsic or instrumental.900

MacKenzie gives the pursuit of science, politics, poetry or religion as examples of such healthy
and unifying life-projects. The priesthood too gives a great unity of purpose for the cultivation of
virtue in the service of Christ and his people. Thus, the seminarian’s talents and energies can be
galvanized for the great task of sharing in Christ’s priestly ministry. In this is found the freedom
for the seminarian to develop himself over a life time in a truly worthy project. It is a project that
will contribute to the good of others through all the works of the priesthood, such as preaching,
celebrating the Sacraments, and helping those in need of right counsel and consolation. Yet, the
fundamental point is that a life of moral progress, as Pinckaers has described it, is the setting in
which the seminarian can develop his affectivity and be free to contribute to the lives of others.

6. Implications for Affective Formation
From St Thomas’ teaching seminary formation can gain a clearer understanding of the role of the
intellectual and moral virtues in affective formation. There is, firstly, a real connection between
the speculative and practical intellects. In the study of wisdom and the truths that are reflected
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upon through the virtues of understanding and science, the seminarian acquires a habit of clear
thinking about the intricate relationships of created things. The study of wisdom opens his mind
to the connection of all things to God as the First Cause. Thus the seminarian is disposed to seek
the truth of his affectivity, in light both of his love for God and how to develop his affectivity for
the good of others.
A connected issue is the seminarian’s care to study the matters that are specific to his vocation. In
the plethora of information in the modern media he can feel too easily distracted from applying his
mind to what is really needed. This requires him to sometimes surrender the acquiring of disparate
elements of information so that he can properly concentrate his energies on what is truly important.
This pertains to a formation of his desire for knowledge. St Thomas’ teaching on the avoidance of
curiositas (a vain curiosity) is pertinent here. This is not a criticism of a proper curiosity to discover
truly enriching and helpful knowledge. It is rather a call to attend to why he desires knowledge.
For example, is it to be used for sinful purposes such as pride? It is also a call to be careful of the
effects of pursuing knowledge, for example, is the time spent on this particular area of knowledge
distracting him from acquiring knowledge of matters that are necessary for his priestly ministry.
St Thomas’ teaching on this matter is an affirmation of the proper formation of the seminarian’s
desire for thought and reflection. The aim is to help him acquire the virtuous disposition of learning
well so that he can deepen his knowledge for his own good and for the sake of those he will guide,
as a priest, to the fullness of Christian life.901 This relevant virtue is studiositas, which is the
capacity to properly concentrate and focus our search for knowledge. It is the ability to properly
and keenly apply our mind to a certain area of intellectual endeavor, such as the understanding of
how to develop affectivity.902
Yet, the practical series of acts that are appropriate to the development of his various faculties
needs to be developed too, so that he can come to his proper affective perfection. By considering
St Thomas’ teaching on the development of his powers through good habits, the seminarian is lead
to reflect upon how his decisions and passions shape his character. Both thinking well about what
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to do and deciding to put this good thinking into practice is vital to the proper development of his
affectivity and relationships. Hence, there is need to develop the virtue of prudence as the
foundation of expressing his affectivity in a mature fashion.
The need for good judgment also requires the will to be properly formed in relation to others.
Justice develops affective maturity by orienting the seminarian’s will to the true need of the other
person. Without willing what is due to another there can be no willing of that person’s good, there
can be no authentic love. Justice is as such an essential pastoral attitude to be developed in the
seminarian. If the priest does not respect the just needs of the person or community he is called to
serve his pastoral ministry will lack credibility. It will not respect the basic conditions of a right
relationship.
Temperance is also an integral virtue for the seminarian’s affective development. It ensures the
proper integration of the seminarian’s capacity for pleasure and joy to be suffused with the proper
measure of reason. This enables him to direct the capacities of love, desire, joy, hatred, aversion
and sorrow in proportion to the person, relationship and situation before him. On the other hand,
the purpose of the virtue of fortitude is to integrate the passions of hope, daring, fear, and anger,
in accord with the good when a person is challenged by evil. Fortitude is an essential virtue because
there are serious challenges for the priest, as for anyone, in the way of life that is entailed in his
vocation and life of service. Examples include having to preach the gospel when it is not well
received and standing by those who have suffered the worst kinds of suffering. Without the
formative influence of fortitude, the capacity of the seminarian to fulfill his vocation is severely
hampered. For, lacking fortitude he is unable to perform good actions and persevere in them under
difficult circumstances.
St Thomas’ teaching on these four cardinal virtues indicates the four vital areas of affective growth
for the seminarian. Prudence points to the need for a practical grasp of the right way to behave, so
that the seminarian can direct his own life to the good and guide others to do the same. Justice
ensures that his will is oriented to the true good of those entrusted to him and hence it respects the
integral affective dimension of relating well to other people. Temperance ensures the development
of his concupiscible passions for his own inner emotional balance and how he expresses himself
before others. Fortitude ensures that he is virtuous when evil would force him to be otherwise.
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The seminarian also needs to understand the mean of virtue so that he can become a trustworthy
moral guide. The moral counsellor is right to admonish people to avoid violating moral absolutes.
Yet he also should know the principles which admit of adaptation. Regarding the application of
ecclesiastical laws of fasting, for instance, St Thomas points out that they need to be applied
appropriately.903 If, for example, one must do “much work, either for one’s bodily livelihood, or
for some need of the spiritual life and it be impossible at the same time to keep the fasts of the
Church, one is not bound to fast”.904 Thus, one ought to advise a particular person according to his
true physical and emotional capacity.905 If he becomes a priest, the seminarian will need to know
how to advise his parishioners about such matters, touching as they do on what is reasonable and
affective.
One finds that St Thomas’ idea of habitus involves a developmental perspective which can mark
out for the seminarian a way to attain affective growth. Craig Steven Titus comments that St
Thomas’ idea of habitus is “a key for understanding the development of human powers”.906 It
teaches the seminarian to focus his efforts on the specific development of his powers of thought
and action, and to review his progress in this development. The developmental perspective is also
manifest, continues Titus, in St Thomas’ idea of “connaturality” which amounts to “the need to
develop a second nature to act competently”.907 The seminarian can aim, then, to acquire the
qualities that make him an affectively mature person, by constantly practicing them in the various
pastoral situations afforded him. For example, he can learn to set aside a hasty judgment and
carefully consider the significance of his emotional states and inclinations. In this way he becomes,
(that is, it gradually becomes a connatural quality in him), a more reflective and discerning person
who is more inclined to make responsible decisions.
The three part process of growth in virtue and charity, which we gleaned from St Thomas and
Pinckaers, can guide the seminarian to gradually appropriate the truth of how to be affectively
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mature. The first stage is that of discipline in which, Titus writes, “growth in virtue involves a
disciplined distancing of oneself from what is destructive, empty, or undeveloped”.908 This stage
is grounded in the teachings of the Commandments. To understand this it has to be borne in mind
that, for St Thomas, law is “a rule or measure of acts, whereby man is induced to act or is restrained
from acting”.909 It is geared towards the common good so that it directs a person’s actions toward
proper relationships.910 Thus law acts as a training of the seminarian’s natural aptitude for virtue.911
At this first stage he can use law as a rule to guide the promotion of good affections and thoughts
and thus promote self-mastery.912
The second stage develops patterns of living that make for consistent growth in the capacity to
relate to such groups of persons as family and society. Qualities such as pardon, confidence in
God, generosity, prayer, and the like, “further structure the internal life of one who is making
progress in Christian virtue”.913 This growth is promoted by identifying “areas in which one must
engage in concrete action with real neighbors and personal challenges”.914 From this stage the
seminarian learns to be specific about developing the patterns of thinking and acting that promote
a virtuous life. In the third stage the seminarian has attained a maturity that gives him joy in the
works of virtue. This enables him to direct his desires and actions freely toward what is excellent.
This is the fruit of the grace filled efforts in the first two stages.
While the seminarian strives to progress through these stages the question for the seminary
formation staff is: does the seminarian manifest this maturation of virtue so that it is apparent he
can be trusted to act responsibly for others as a priest?
The final point concerns an example to demonstrate how St Thomas’ teaching on virtue guides the
positive development of affectivity in relation to others. It concerns chastity which is vital to the
seminarian’s relationships, given his commitment to celibacy. St Thomas writes of the
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development of sexuality through the virtue of temperance. “For it belongs to chastity”, he
explains, “that a man make moderate use of bodily members in accordance with the judgment of
his reason and the choice of his will.”915 Pieper explains that chastity “realizes the order of reason
in the province of sexuality”.916 That is, the person grasps the true personal significance of the acts
of affection that are connected with human sexuality and orders his relationships accordingly.917
St Thomas points out that the word chastity implies a sense of restraint, which is necessary given
our propensity for the pleasures of touch. These concern pleasures connected to the basic
necessities of life such as food and warmth.918 This is especially so regarding the pleasures
associated with sexual union, which “are more impetuous, and are more oppressive on the reason
than the pleasures of the palate”.919 However, Pieper notes that St Thomas’ concept of reason in
this matter respects the complete “sensuality and spirituality” of the human person.920 St Thomas
regards sexuality as a proper sphere of human expression. In response to a question about the moral
goodness of pleasure in marital intercourse, for example, he affirms its abundant pleasure as a true
good for the couple.921
Yet, St Thomas also disapproves of actions that violate the proper order of sexual relationships.
For example, fornication shows disrespect for the person who may be conceived outside of
marriage. Thus St Thomas writes of the need for “the mother’s care” and the guidance and
protection of the father which is properly expressed in the abiding commitment of marriage.922 In
other words, St Thomas grounds the expression of the affective experiences associated with
sexuality in the good of persons, in this case, the welfare of the child. Indeed, given the perfective
nature of the virtues, the chastity, fidelity and responsible care extended by the father and mother
to the child, ennobles them as self-giving and affectively mature persons.923 An implication to be
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drawn here is that within the social sphere of human flourishing and affective formation, the
capacity for renunciation for the good of others enables us to respect their dignity.
St Thomas’ thought could be unfolded for the seminarian by making more explicit how sexuality
intimately forms the personality. In an age when the gift of being male or female has been obscured
by the ideology of gender fluidity, the seminarian needs to reflect on the gift of sexuality as an
integral dimension of the human person. In the Vatican document The Truth and Meaning of
Human Sexuality, sexuality is discussed as a matter that touches intimately on human identity and
relationality. The document states: “Every form of love will always bear this masculine and
feminine character.”924 For sexuality informs every level of a human person’s being “on the
physical, psychological and spiritual levels influencing every expression of a man or woman”. 925
Sexuality is thus the well-spring of a person’s capacity to give and receive affection. As we read
in the document: “Sexuality is a fundamental component of personality, one of its modes of being,
of manifestation, of communicating with others, of feeling, of expressing and of living human
love”.926 Sexuality is a beautiful gift to each person and it is to be given as a beautiful gift to
another in true affection.
St Thomas’ teaching is in fact addressed to this interpersonal nature of sexuality, and how men
and women can relate to each other out of mutual care. Virtues such as chastity express reverence
for other persons. For example, as we saw above St Thomas is conscious of the need for parents
to conceive children within marriage so that they can care for them in the best possible way. The
virtue of modesty is also relevant to this interpersonal nature of sexuality. In regard to the outward
movements of the body, St Thomas writes that there is a “fittingness to the person” and then a
“fittingness to externals, whether persons, business or place”.927 This fittingness pertains to what
“is becoming in movement and behavior”, and as such it is referred to as “taste” and “to what is
becoming to the business in hand, and to one’s surroundings”.928 In other words, the affectively

whole range of domestic activity.” See Summa Contra Gentiles Book Three: Providence: Part II, Chapter 123, n.6,
trans. Vernon J. Bourke (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975/2009).
924
Pontifical Council for the Family, The Truth and Meaning of Human Sexuality: Guidelines for Education within
the Family, n.10 (Australian edition published by St Pauls Homebush, NSW, 1996).
925
Ibid, n.13.
926
Ibid, n.10.
927
Summa Theologica II-II, q.168, a.1, resp.
928
Ibid.

203

mature person is aware that what he says and does, how he expresses himself and how he dresses,
are important to the proper communication of himself to others.
Furthermore, what we do in the body makes known what is in our affections and attitudes. St
Thomas writes: “outward movements are signs of the inward disposition” which “regards chiefly
the passions of the soul”.929 Thus others form a judgment about us from the way we act, and it is
why “moderation of outward movements is directed somewhat to other persons” to properly
communicate our thoughts and feelings and build relationships.930 This pertains “to the virtue of
truthfulness, whereby a man, by word and deed, shows himself to be such as he is inwardly”.931
This is a deep form of affective integration, signifying a person’s maturity. We could also say that
appropriate gestures not only express the maturity of the person but develop it. In the very act of
the person expressing himself with affective integrity he deepens the unity of his inner affective
life and his gestures. Now, one application of this integrity is that to be authentic expressions of
affection, outward gestures must be in accord with the truth of the vocations of those involved.
Otherwise, there is an inherent inconsistency between the commitment of mind and heart of one
person to another, and how he integrates his other relationships with this more fundamental
commitment of himself. Gestures of affection for a married woman, for example, need to be in
accord with the truth that she is married to another and not to me. 932 The same holds mutatis
mutandis for the seminarian and priest according to his vocation to celibacy.
A related issue is that the seminarian needs to understand the fulfilling nature of virginity and how
it is a true expression of himself as a chaste person. To a culture saturated with the supposed
necessity of sex it can seem unreasonable to be celibate. St Thomas, however, argues that the
person giving up the marital union is acting contrary neither to reason nor his own fulfilment. Right
reason requires us to direct things to an end in “a measure proportionate to that end”.933 Now, our
good consists in more than external things, such as riches and “bodily goods”, but also “in the
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goods of the soul among which the goods of the contemplative life take precedence of the goods
of the active life”.934 It is reasonable to forego the good of marriage for the love of God.
The fundamental reason for celibacy is a loving attentiveness to God himself and his concern for
others. This moves the seminarian to set aside what is good in marriage for the sake of this greater
good. “Now holy virginity refrains from all venereal pleasure in order more freely to have leisure
for Divine contemplation”, St Thomas explains. 935 Here St Thomas quotes 1 Corinthians 7.34,
that one who gives up marriage is concerned with thinking of the things of the Lord rather than
what would rightly concern one’s spouse. Accordingly, some give “themselves to the
contemplation of Divine things, for the beauty and welfare of the whole human race”. 936 Such
persons stand as contemplators of God’s beauty and witness to its fulfilling power. This
fundamental relationship is the principle by which the seminarian integrates his expressions of
affection with other persons and carefully sets aside whatever is incompatible with it.
Without a sound understanding of himself as a sexual being the seminarian cannot relate well to
others through “the charism of celibacy”, as Pope St John Paul II teaches.937 The seminarian needs
to be “capable of esteem and respect in interpersonal relationships between men and women”.938
This is a call to a very positive way of life in connection with others and the service of their good.
Thus St John Paul II calls for the development of a “sexual education” that enables the seminarian
to understand love as involving the whole person, physically, psychically, and spiritually. For this
purpose, the proper self-governance of chastity impresses upon the seminarian a sense of
responsibility for the affective welfare of those he serves and befriends. It enables him to
understand that conducting his relationships in a chaste and modest fashion is a true expression of
affection for others.
Yet there is another important point to consider in relation to the seminarian’s reasons for
undertaking the life of priestly celibacy. Celibacy is not a call to set aside the beauty of sexuality
but to express it according to the gift of himself to God and God’s people. It should not involve an
undue fear of the intimacy of marital love but a free surrendering of its possibility, so that he can
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follow the call of God. The seminarian therefore needs to review his reasons for desiring to live a
celibate life. When St Thomas argues that the counsel of virginity does not violate reason and the
mean of virtue he explains: “Virgins abstain from all erotic love for an adequate purpose and in
the way that they should. Their purpose is God …” Yet, St Thomas continues to explain, if virgins
abstain
for a bad reason, for example, because they hated erotic love in itself, or the idea of having
children or a spouse, then this would be an example of the vice of unfeelingness. But to abstain
from all erotic love for a proper end is virtuous. Indeed, men who do this in order to devote
themselves to warfare for the benefit of their country are praised for their civic virtue.939

However, it could be asked: how can the seminarian avoid unfeelingness and still be capable of
affectionately loving others when he is called to surrender the love of marriage and family life?
Or, to put the question another way: is there a place for the expression of true and affectionate
friendships in the life of the seminarian while he surrenders the relationships of family life? An
essential dimension of this issue is brought to light in the way Christ loved others. This is the key
to reflecting upon the sublimation of the seminarian’s feelings by which he gives to others his love,
life and work, which could have been placed at the service of his wife and family. It strengthens
him to surrender the love of family life and yet enjoy the friendships that are appropriate to his
vocation. The salient point here is that if his life is to truly reflect the life of Christ the Priest and
the Good Shepherd then it has to include the capacity for affection and tenderness with friends.
To grasp this point, it is essential for the seminarian to contemplate the truth of Sacred Scripture
that Christ loved men and women with the love of friendship. Three examples suffice to establish
this truth and each one is presented to us in the gospel of St John. First, it is clearly noted of Christ
that he loved Martha, Mary, and Lazarus, and that they welcomed him into their home with great
affection, Mary tenderly anointing Christ’s feet and wiping them with her hair (John 11.5; 12.13). St Thomas describes this offering of affection in terms of Christ “being ministered to by his
friends” and “the kindness shown to Christ” by them.940
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Second, the beloved disciple lay close to the heart of Christ at the Last Supper, which along with
the first example clearly demonstrates Christ’s capacity for receiving physical affection and
enjoying the closeness of someone he loves (John 13.23-25). St Thomas writes that “lying close
to” Christ shows the beloved “disciple’s intimacy with him”.941 Third, the love of Jesus for Peter
is revealed in his tender threefold repetition of the question: “do you love me”? This reveals, not
only Peter’s need to affirm his love for Christ, but Christ’s ardent desire that Peter love him (John
21.15-19). St Thomas writes that in this part of his gospel the evangelist shows Christ “dealing
with his two especially loved disciples”.942 Thus, St Thomas emphasizes the special love Christ
had not only for the beloved disciple but also for Peter.
The fundamental point is that these three friendships reveal Christ as a truly loving and mature
person, who knows how to communicate and receive love through affectionate words and gestures.
Now, it is true that the seminarian ought to be humble and not presume he has the virtue of Christ,
and therefore self-knowledge and due care are essential virtues to be developed in him. This is a
matter of knowing how to act with courtesy, self-restraint, and respect for others, which are always
basic conditions for a true friendship and the sharing of mutual affection. Nevertheless, the truth
remains that the supreme model of priesthood and celibacy reached out to friends. To avoid a
serious consideration of this truth is to allow undue fear of what can go wrong to improperly
interfere with the seminarian’s right to true and lasting friendships.
Thus, Christ’s capacity for friendship acts as a guiding principle for the way the seminarian
conducts healthy friendships in accord with his vocation. The seminarian can become a true, kind,
and a tender friend to families, married people, men and women, both the young and the old.
Admittedly, there is much more to be said about this, but we first need to clearly state that the
importance of affectionate friendships flows from the example of Christ himself. Nevertheless, the
fundamental principles of how these friendships can be developed are clear from what has been
discussed in this chapter. Virtues such as chastity, modesty of gesture, and affective integrity with
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respect to one’s vocation and the vocation of others, remain abiding and essential principles to
guide any true expression of affection.943

Conclusion
The main point of this chapter has been to reflect on the importance of virtue as a fundamental
principle of affective formation. From St Thomas’ teaching we have seen that the cardinal virtues
can shape the affective capacities of the seminarian, so that he can become a prudent, just,
temperate and courageous person in his relations with others. As such he can love them properly
and take responsibility for their welfare. Attentive to the needs of each person through a well
formed judgment and right will, he will neither counsel the violation of moral absolutes nor require
of someone what is inappropriate to him, in matters that admit of a proper adaptation in keeping
with the mean of virtue. The seminarian will aim for the gradual maturation of his affectivity and
life of virtue by following the guidance of proper law. Then, he will aim to make his own the
principles that proper law embodies and which enable him to live a life of goodness in union with
others. Finally, through the development of chastity he will relate to others in a manner that is
consonant with his vocation to celibacy and the proper order of affection for others. In this way,
he will become an affectively mature person who will be free to communicate what is good through
a life both of sound judgment and perseverance in good actions. This leads us to the threefold
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consideration of the next chapter, which concerns St Thomas’ teaching on the formation of the
love of friendship, the desire for beauty, and the need for appropriate rest.
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CHAPTER 8
THREE EXAMPLES OF HOW VIRTUE FORMS AFFECTIVITY
The previous chapter considered the virtues as principles that form the seminarian’s affectivity.
This chapter will examine St Thomas’ teaching in relation to three dimensions of affective
formation, which are chosen as examples to show how virtue forms love in personal relationships.
Other examples could be chosen but these dimensions are chosen because they concern
relationships which are vital to the seminarian’s affective maturation. They require the capacity to
relate well to others and to maintain an affective balance in the seminarian’s love for his friends,
for beauty in others, and, for playful words and deeds (eutrapelia). These three dimensions of the
seminarian’s affective life need to be well formed because they touch upon fundamental personal
needs. Without friends he cannot develop a life that is shared in personal conversation and in
mutual support through the joys and sorrows of life. Without a sense of reverence for beauty in
other people he cannot be drawn to others through the radiance of their goodness in a way that
respects that beauty and goodness. Without the ability to receive and give pleasure to others
through witty conversation and an appropriate sense of fun he cannot afford others the rest and
recreation that is essential to the restoration of the human heart. In each of these matters, the
importance of St Thomas’ teaching for affective formation is that he respects the goodness of these
affective needs and he also reflects on the virtues that properly form them. So, to apply St Thomas’
teaching on these matters to the affective formation of the seminarian we will develop the
following lines of reflection: 1) Friendship and the Good of Virtue; 2) Beauty and Affective
Formation; 3) Eutrapelia and Leisure.

1. Friendship and the Good of Virtue
From St Thomas’ teaching on friendships the seminarian can gain a better understanding of what
friendship entails and how it can be formed for the true good of those involved. The following
points will be discussed to show how this is so: a) Virtuous Friendships; b) Love of Self and
Friendship; c) Implications for Affective Formation.
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a. Virtuous Friendships
For St Thomas, human fulfilment involves the development of friendships, which only attain their
true perfection when the friends possess certain virtuous personal qualities. He comments that of
“all things required for human living … friendship is especially necessary, to such an extent that
no one in his right mind would choose to live in the possession of great external goods without
friends”.944 St Thomas writes about three basic kinds of friendship. The first is the friendship of
utility, in which the friends love each other but only to engage in a kind of business arrangement
to gain some profit. Friendship for the sake of utility falls away “when utility ceases”. 945 In the
second kind of friendship the friends love each other for the sake of finding pleasure in each other’s
company. When the pleasure is offered but not reciprocated, however, friendships of pleasure fall
away. St Thomas gives the possible failure of sexual love between two lovers as an example. When
“the beauty of the beloved” and her “attractiveness” decreases, and the favors given her cease, the
“pleasurable friendship sometimes breaks up”.946 Yet, pleasant company is necessary for virtue’s
sake, because “no man can continuously endure something unpleasant; he could not even stand
good itself if it were displeasing.”947 Nevertheless, there is a more perfect form of friendship.
In the third and most perfect form of friendship the friends are virtuous and love each other as
another self, seeing the good of the friend as their own good. This is “perfect friendship built on
the good of virtue”.948 This kind of friendship endures but takes a long time to develop, requiring
persons who are capable of inspiring and exercising deep intimacy, trust and patience. Therefore
it is rare.
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St Thomas comments that “the principal act of friendship is to live with one’s friends”. 949 Hence
friends join together in activities such as conversation, games, sport and philosophy, that give
“them most satisfaction in their lives”.950 These activities help men become better “by exercising
their friendship and improving each other”, because “the traits that they admire in each other get
transferred to themselves”.951 Conversely, absence from friends can cause forgetfulness of the
friendship. Thus, “it has become proverbial that many friendships are destroyed through a man’s
neglect to call upon his friend, to converse and associate with him”.952 In this way, the neglect of
a friendship leads to a cooling of affection between friends.
Some can lack the qualities necessary to develop friendships. St Thomas maintains that some
people who are “morose”, “elderly” and “peevish”, “follow their own way. For that reason they
cannot agree with others: they have little taste for conversation with others both because they are
intent on themselves and because they are suspicious of others.”953 These people can be
“quarrelsome and critical of what others do”. Yet while they “can be benevolent inasmuch as they
affectively wish good to others and even effectively assist them in their needs”, they do not become
friends.954 For they do not take pleasure in the company of others or enjoy conversation with them.
To be fair, though, it might be observed that young people can also be lacking in friendliness
through defects like self-absorption and arrogance. Many older people, on the other hand, learn
mildness and acceptance of others through their own sufferings.955
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b. Love of Self and Friendship
St Thomas’ reflections on friendship include a consideration of the relationship between proper
love of self and the ability to know how to love others. The basic idea is that in recognizing our
own good we have a platform for perceiving the good of others and how to promote it. For we tend
to extend to our friends the same attitudes we have for ourselves, such as preserving our human
life, especially its rationality, and enjoying our own company. Moreover, the person who properly
loves himself knows that he is fulfilled in generously loving others. Such a person understands that
he is enriched by doing what is noble and thus manifests true self-love. St Thomas writes:
a person loves himself more, to the extent that he assigns to himself greater goods. But he,
who makes it his business to excel in virtuous works, assumes for himself the goods that are
noblest and best, i.e., the honorable kind. Therefore, such a one especially loves himself.956

This kind of self-love is conducive to true community life. Striving for the true human good such
a person “is eager to perform exceptionally good actions”. If everyone strove in this way the needs
of all would be satisfied. For “one would come to the assistance of another and the goods that are
best, viz., virtues, would become the property of each”.957 Such people “know themselves truly,
and therefore truly love themselves”. They understand the true worth of their rational nature, “the
inward man” that St Paul writes about in 2 Corinthians 4.16.958 In this way, proper self-love and
friendship have certain interchangeable characteristics. St Thomas explains:
For in the first place, every friend wishes his friend to be and to live; secondly, he desires good
things for him; thirdly, he does good things to him; fourthly, he takes pleasure in his company;
fifthly, he is of one mind with him, rejoicing and sorrowing in almost the same things. In this
way the good love themselves, as to the inward man, because they wish the preservation
thereof in its integrity, they desire good things for him, namely spiritual goods, indeed they do
their best to obtain them, and they take pleasure in entering into their own hearts, because they
find there good thoughts in the present, the memory of past good, and the hope of future good,
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all of which are sources of pleasure. Likewise they experience no clashing of wills, since their
whole soul tends to one thing.959

In properly loving himself the virtuous person forms within himself a pattern of the good that
needs to be loved and promoted in his friend. As Anthony T. Flood writes: “self-love forms the
template for how a person relates (or fails to relate) to others in friendship”.960 Improper self-love
misconstrues the true personal wealth of the person’s own self. Wrongful self-love, “which is a
principle of sin … reaches to the contempt of God”, St Thomas writes. For the sinful person so
desires “external goods as to despise spiritual good”.961 To the contrary, we ought to love ourselves
out of the theological virtue of charity and according to the wisdom of God. For God gives us the
gift of our life and, out of love for us, wills that we come to our true fulfilment. In light of this, St
Thomas distinguishes two kinds of friendship. First, under the general meaning of friendship a
man cannot be a friend to himself. However, he is more than a friend because love is a matter of
union and
a man is one with himself which is more than being united to another. Hence, just as unity is
the principle of union, so the love with which a man loves himself is the form and root of
friendship. For if we have friendship with others it is because we do unto them as we do unto
ourselves.962

Secondly, charity refers to friendship with God and that we love all that is connected with God,
which includes ourselves as loved by God.963 Here we find the ultimate source of our proper selfesteem. It is also the nexus of our self-love and our love for our friends – God loves them and in
this light we see how they are truly worthy of love.
Without proper self-love the mutual love of friendship lacks substance. As Flood explains: “If a
person does not love himself, it would be odd that he considers himself a good thing to give or
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communicate to someone else.”964 Furthermore, if he does not have the capacity to enjoy greater
goods in himself he will not be able to enjoy them with a friend. This is the problem with the
wicked person and why he cannot enjoy true friendship. As Flood explains: “a wicked man does
not know how to relate to others in love because he cannot even relate to himself properly”. 965 It
is only the affectively mature person, possessing a true self-love, who can give himself to another
in love.
St Thomas’ teaching that a man loves himself more than another, on account of being more deeply
united with himself, is not egoistic but recognizes the need to properly integrate love of self with
love for others. It is a statement about the obvious closeness we have to ourselves and does not
advocate a selfishness that excludes the proper good of our neighbor. In relation to this,
Christopher Toner points to St Thomas’ teaching that the creature, especially the rational creature,
attains its ultimate perfection by imitating God, although every creature attains this end according
to its created nature and proper measure.966 Now, the human person achieves this ultimate
perfection through “knowing and loving God”.967 Thus, this perfection is attained through a
personal relationship of love with God. As Toner argues: “This essentially relational nature of
human perfection or beatitude is also central to defending Aquinas against the broader charge of
self-centredness.”968 For, the true good of the person is essentially linked to both the common good
and the whole range of virtues that enable him to conduct relationships such as friendship. “And
therefore”, St Thomas explains, “such virtues as those which direct man’s affections to God or to
his neighbor are subjected to the will, as charity, justice, and such like.”969 Indeed, the healing role
of grace serves to orientate the human heart to love God “above all things”. 970 So, it is in this
context “of the common good of the whole universe, which is God” that we are moved to love our
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own good.971 We love ourselves because, ultimately, God finds us lovable and we see that our
good is promoted through a proper love for others who are also loved by God. Thus, the love of
self and the love of others is brought together in a unity through the love that God has for us.
Charity adds to this the love of a “spiritual fellowship with God” and “a certain quickness and joy”
in this love for God as “the object of beatitude”.972 As well as this orientation to God we have a
natural inclination to live in society. Justice perfects this inclination.973 Toner points out the
perfection of the moral agent includes serving the “welfare” of another and “being good includes”
serving another’s “well-being”.974 This accords with St Thomas’ insistence that we model
ourselves on God who loves us and calls us to love our neighbor as ourselves.975 Again, St Thomas’
vision of self-love is not to be equated with egoism or selfishness, but to be interpreted according
to his rich understanding of the person’s true fulfilment through virtuous relationships.

c. Implications for Affective Formation
Friendships are essential to the seminarian’s life and they are to be positively encouraged as an
integral part of his affective growth. At the same time, he needs to reflect on the quality of his
friendships and develop them in accord with a proper love for others. Is he only interested in
friendships of utility and pleasure? Or is he prepared to patiently develop the kind of friendship
that requires the solid basis of such virtues as intimacy, trust, loyalty and patience? Is there a
careful development of what is best in the friendship, so that the friends share true and noble goods
that enrich them as persons?
At the same time, the need for a truthful self-love is also an integral dimension of the seminarian’s
affective development. Drawing from St Thomas’ teaching on self-love the seminarian needs to
respect the proper unity of loving his neighbor and the proper love of himself. Until he has become
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mature enough to understand how to develop the inner riches of his mind, will and passions he
cannot share these personal riches with another person. This maturity includes the virtues that
enable him to love others in ways that promote their true welfare.
One application of this truth concerns the proper limits that need to be respected in friendships. At
this point, Anthony Kelly’s comments about the difference between Divine love and human love
are pertinent. The Divine Love possesses an “almighty” character and “God can communicate in
a way that is beyond the many kinds of giving found in creation”.976 However, human love can
only be authentic when it respects its essential characteristic as created and finite. Kelly writes:
Yet even in our most generous and outgoing acts, we have to acknowledge limits. There is a
point beyond which our kind of loving becomes tragic. It can end in being either selfdestructive for ourselves or oppressive of the other – or, more likely, both. Not to accept
inherent limits on time, energy, and personal capacity is to have only a tired, exhausted shell
of one’s self to offer to others. More tragically still, if any of us pretends to a quasi-almighty
loving of the other and tries to enter into their very being and become their total life, then a
destructive, oppressive possessiveness is the dismal result. If we attempt love beyond our
human limits, we are diminished in who we are and oppress those we pretend to love.977

Maintaining the right balance between answering the needs of others and caring for our own
genuine needs is presented in a prayer of St Thomas: “Grant that whatever good things I have, I
may share generously with those who have not and that whatever good things I do not have, I may
request humbly from those who do.”978 This indicates, again, the affective dimension of human
maturity needed to respond both to the needs of oneself and the needs of others.
One question that arises from the question of self-love and friendship is: should a friendship ever
be brought to an end? When one friend progresses past another in some way it can be difficult to
maintain the friendship because, as St Thomas writes, friends need to be “pleased, delighted, and
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distressed” by the same things.979 Nevertheless, a compelling reason for ending the friendship
would be another’s obstinate evil. The friendship should be broken off, St Thomas explains, “only
with those who are incurable owing to their excessive wickedness (i.e., cannot be returned readily
to the path of virtue)”.980 This teaching is instructive for the seminarian who needs to take into
account the way his friendships affect his capacity to live his priestly vocation. There is a proper
principle of self-love here by which the seminarian judges that, for the foreseeable future this
friendship needs to be moderated or ended until the friend changes his attitude. An example of the
problem we are discussing is that the friend may be aggressively negative about the seminarian’s
vocation and openly disparage it. This can cause a lack of proper confidence in the seminarian and
rob him of the peace he needs to pursue the way of life he thinks God calls him to live. However,
it needs to be noted in this kind of example that the seminarian’s particular temperament, character
and age needs to be taken into account. What one person can cope with another may find too much
at a particular stage of life. This needs to be taken into account when the seminarian is advised by
formators on the best course of action to take in such matters.

2. Beauty and Affective Formation
The aim of this section is to draw upon St Thomas’ teaching to discuss the formation of the
seminarian’s affective experience of beauty. This discussion will include a treatment of how
beauty is an important dimension of personal communication which will be applied to the
seminarian’s liturgical formation. The following will be considered: a) Beauty as a Dimension of
Personal Communication; b) Spiritual Beauty; c) Implications for Affective Formation.

a. Beauty as a Dimension of Personal Communication
In St Thomas’ understanding, the affective capacity for experiencing beauty is a distinctively
human trait. As rational beings we take “pleasure in the beauty of sensible objects for its own
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sake”.981 Hence we stand with “face erect, in order that by the senses, and chiefly by sight, which
is more subtle and penetrates further into the differences of things” we “may freely survey the
sensible objects around” us.982 Thus knowledge, whether through seeing or hearing, undergirds the
experience of love in regard to beauty. The beautiful fulfils a person’s “desire, by being seen or
known.”983 This works on the level of the senses as well as on the level of the spirit. As St Thomas
writes: “bodily sight is the beginning of sensitive love: and in like manner the contemplation of
spiritual beauty or goodness is the beginning of spiritual love”.984 In both cases, it is the capacity
to know that is the first faculty involved in a person being moved to love the beauty of some object.
St Thomas also reflects on beauty as an attribute of God the Son. In a discussion of how we apply
certain attributes to the Divine Persons, St Thomas associates beauty with the Son. He analogically
applies three basic principles in created beauty to the Son’s Uncreated Beauty:
For beauty includes three conditions, integrity or perfection, since those things which are
impaired are by the very fact ugly; due proportion or harmony; and lastly, brightness, or
clarity, whence things are called beautiful which have a bright color.985

Beauty is attributed to the Son because he perfectly shares “the nature of the Father”. 986 This is
perfect integrity. Moreover, the Son is “the express Image of the Father” and is, therefore, in
proportion to him, for “an image is said to be beautiful, if it perfectly represents even an ugly
thing”.987 Thus, there is perfect harmony between the Father and the Son. Finally, “clarity” is
attributed to the Son because he is “the Word, which is the light and splendor of the intellect”. 988
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This pertains to brightness or clarity, a quality, we could say, by which the Son’s perfection is
manifest to the mind ready to receive his truth and love.
In writing of the Incarnate Son’s clarity, St Thomas refers to the Transfiguration. When he was
transfigured on the mountain “his face shone like the sun” in the presence of Peter, James and John
(Matthew 17.1-2). St Thomas identifies this transfiguration of Christ’s body with “the glory of his
clarity”.989 That is, there is a radiance of the truth and glory of who Christ is as the Son of the
Father. Christ’s clarity was shown to the apostles to encourage them because the “road” to the
Kingdom of Heaven is “hard and rough”, while the going is “heavy”.990 Since the disciples needed
to see that the end is “delightful”, the Lord revealed a glory that is properly his as the Incarnate
Son, but which he will share with “those who follow the footsteps of his Passion”.991 This is in
accord with St Paul’s teaching, St Thomas observes, that Christ will transform our earthly bodies
into the likeness of his glorious body (Philippians 3.21).
Further to this, St Thomas’ comment that clarity “is a quality of the very person in himself”, which
“pertains to the aspect of his person”, underscores the communicational quality of beauty.992 In
this context, beauty is a communication of the identity of the person through his countenance and
bearing. The clarity of the Transfiguration, then, was an outpouring of the glory of Christ’s
Godhead and soul, manifesting him as the Beloved Son of the Father. It is also “a representation
of his body’s future clarity”, St Thomas writes, for the permanent glorification of his body would
take place in the Resurrection.993 In showing his disciples a representation of his future clarity
Christ desired “to arouse men to a desire of it”.994 For the clarity of our resurrected bodies will
reveal our “glorious freedom” as God’s children (Romans 8.18-21). Clarity here not only pertains
to Christ’s identity as the glorified Son, but also to our identity as those called to share Christ’s
Resurrection.
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Clarity is one of the qualities St Thomas ascribes to the resurrected body. Clarity, a certain
“lightsomeness”, is an overflow into the body from the soul’s enjoyment of the divine vision.995 It
is a communication, through the body, of the goodness and the wholeness of the beatified person.
For, as St Thomas notes, our Lord spoke of the just shining like the sun in the Father’s kingdom
(Matthew 13.43). To understand St Thomas’ point, it is helpful to consider that even in this present
life we see goodness, kindness and joy reflected in the countenance of healthy and virtuous people.
It is not only Christ who manifests the quality of clarity. The words of the Father are imbued with
their own clarity. At the Baptism the Father testified to his Son: “This is my Son, the Beloved; my
favor rests on him” (Matthew 3.17). At the Transfiguration the Father repeats these words, adding
an exhortation: “Listen to him” (Matthew 17.5). Since our adoption as children of God “is through
a certain conformity of image to the natural Son of God”, St Thomas explains, it was fitting for
the Father to speak at both Christ’s Baptism and Transfiguration.996 In Baptism “we acquire grace”,
which is a share in the Son’s relationship with his Father.997 This is completed by “the clarity of
the glory to come”, as foreshadowed in the Transfiguration.998 Thus the Father expresses
tenderness for his Son, confirming his identity and his redemptive mission in the light of his future
glorification.
In light of these theological considerations of the Trinity, the affective dimension of beauty can be
considered in its significance for the seminarian’s future priestly ministry. The vocation of the
priest involves the capacity to communicate the mystery of the Blessed Trinity. Already we have
a number of principles about the communication of the beauty of God to others. It involves the
complete gift of oneself in love to others. This love is communicated in a way that reveals the love
of one person through his words and deeds to another. This will be considered below in relation to
the Sacred Liturgy. Also, someone’s identity is revealed through his countenance and hence how
he looks at others and appears to them. Hence, he communicates something of himself to them.
These points will become clear below, when we consider St Thomas’ teaching on spiritual beauty
and honesty.
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b. Spiritual Beauty
St Thomas applies the three conditions for beauty - integrity or perfection; harmony or proportion;
and, clarity (lightsomeness) - to the moral life. “Integrity” refers to the wholeness of a being.
However, by the “perfection” of a being we intend two further points. The first results from the
form of a thing being whole because it has “its parts complete”.999 The second concerns the “end”
of an activity, such as the harpist properly playing the harp, or what is attained by an activity, such
as the house that the builder makes. Since the form of a thing is what enables it to act a certain
integrity needs to be maintained between its form and its actions. For example, speech is the
“proper operation” of human reason and communication with others.1000 Given its purpose to
express the person and help to build personal relationships, we need to respect the structure of
language and maintain its truthfulness. Otherwise, we neither speak coherently nor build trust with
others.1001 Thus, “both in life and in speech” we must show ourselves as we are and what we know
without duplicity, by which we show “one thing outwardly while having another” in our heart.1002
Due “proportion” or “harmony” refers to a proper relation between the goods a person desires and
how he responds to them. Now, while beauty can be ascribed to every virtue, it is ascribed to
temperance “by way of excellence, for two reasons”.1003 First, in a more general sense, temperance
“consists in a certain moderate and fitting proportion, and this is what we understand by
beauty”.1004 Second, temperance restrains us from what is not in accord with reason, which thereby
defiles us and causes a lack of the fittingness that we associate with beauty. “In consequence beauty
is a foremost attribute of temperance”.1005 Temperance forms the human desire for pleasure, so
that this desire and the actions that flow from it reveal our true dignity as human persons.1006

999

Summa Theologica I, q.73, a.1, resp.
Summa Theologica I, q.91, a.3, ad 3.
1001
See Summa Theologica II-II, q.109, a.3, ad 1: “Now it would be impossible for men to live together, unless they
believed one another, as declaring the truth to one another.”
1002
Summa Theologica II-II, q.109, a.2, ad 4.
1003
Summa Theologica II-II, q.141, a.2, ad 3.
1004
Ibid.
1005
Ibid.
1006
See Summa Theologica II-II, q.142, a.8, ad 1. For Thomas, the connection we have with other animals is a good
one and we are meant to incorporate a proper affection for animals with a proper affection for human persons. In
fact, for Thomas, a proper “affection of passion” in regard to animals disposes us to a proper affection for our fellow
human beings. In his treatment of the reasons for the ceremonial precepts of the Old Covenant about respect for
animals and the humane killing of them Thomas comments: “Now it is evident that if a man practice a pitiful
1000

222

St Thomas continues this line of thought when he writes of honor as the witness which is due to a
“person’s excellence”.1007 Glory is the effect of this honor, since by witnessing to the person’s
excellence his goodness is made clear to many people. At this point, St Thomas identifies glory
and clarity, drawing upon Romans 16.27 in which St Paul exhorts his readers to “give glory” to
God through Christ. Glory, in this context, connects the concepts of the clarity of knowledge about
a person’s goodness and the due praise rendered on account of this goodness.1008 In this way,
“glory denotes clarity”, St Thomas writes, for clarity refers to a certain pleasing brightness or
revelation of a being’s form.1009 More specifically, in regard to the development of character, St
Thomas writes about a certain clarity which is brought about by the proper integration of our
desires.
Temperance involves a certain clarity, which is the pleasing form of good character. For the
temperate person properly orders his pleasures according to the good of reason, which is the most
distinctive element of the human person.1010 It is this proper ordering of the human person’s desires
that allows the beauty of a well-formed character to be manifest in the person’s way of life. St
Thomas also identifies honesty, being honorable or morally good, with beauty. He writes that
“beauty or comeliness results from the concurrence of clarity and due proportion”.1011 This is seen
in “spiritual beauty”, which consists in “conduct or actions being well proportioned in respect of
the spiritual clarity of reason”.1012 That is, a person’s words, deeds, and personal relationships, are
conducted according to the truth about how to live a good human life.

affection for animals, he is all the more disposed to take pity on his fellow-men.” Summa Theologica I-II, q.102, a.6,
ad 8. I cannot pursue this line of thought in detail here but Thomas’ insight raises the issue of how the seminarian
and priest can be helped by a proper affection for animals kept as pets such dogs, cats and horses. Among other
benefits, this may offer the priest a consoling presence in times of loneliness and isolation and be a cause of delight
and healthy distraction when others visit him.
1007
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c. Implications for Affective Formation
The quality of beauty that St Thomas refers to as clarity has the power to attract the human heart.
Clarity, from the Latin word for light - claritas - is a radiance or a shining. By claritas the ancient
writers meant clearness or brightness to the sight, clearness to the mind, and fame or renown, that
is, the goodness of virtue that was made clear to others and recognized by them.1013 The importance
of the word clarity is that it communicates the multi-layered structure of the experience we have
of beauty. The beauty of form appeals to our whole sensitive, intellectual and affective being. As
John Saward explains, something, for instance, a beautiful work of art, “illuminates our senses,
our imagination, our intellect”.1014 Beauty is in this way an experience of a being’s intelligible
form. As Saward writes:
The form of a thing is its intelligibility, making it be what it is and so enabling us to see it for
what it is. Radiance, the splendour of form, manifests the thing to us. It is its capacity to be
known by an intellect.1015

This capacity to receive the communication of a being’s splendor, as Pierre-Marie Emonet writes,
“establishes a relationship to a person’s profound affectivity”.1016 That is, it gives us an experience
of fulfilment, delight and joy. It satisfies a desire to see and hear according to the truth and
goodness of things, people and relationships inasmuch as they are perfect, harmonious and bright.
If this is true of beautiful things, it is even truer of our meeting with persons. The beauty of
someone’s good character has a power to shine upon our minds and hearts, moving us to
admiration, gratitude and emulation. This is why the generous dedication of parents, the devotion
of truly good friends, the heroic bravery of soldiers, the steadfast fidelity and forgiveness of the
martyrs is so compelling.
It follows that the seminarian ought to be educated in this power of spiritual beauty. For example,
the seminarian ought to have many opportunities to work with people who engage in works of
mercy. The radiance of their lives can inspire the seminarian to live like them. It likewise instills
D.P. Simpson, M.A., Cassell’s Latin Dictionary, 5th ed. (London/New York: Continuum, 2000), 110.
John Saward, The Beauty of Holiness and the Holiness of Beauty: Art, Sanctity & The Truth of Catholicism
(Ignatius, 1997), 43.
1015
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in him a conviction that if he communicates his personal goodness to others it will move their
hearts to do likewise for others. Another example concerns the reading of the lives of the saints
and biographies about admirable priests. From reading and discussing the good qualities of these
holy people the seminarian is drawn to emulate their attitudes and actions. Moreover, he can speak
of the good qualities of these holy people and so move the hearts of others to live a saintly life.
St Thomas’ understanding of beauty as a communication of the person is also helpful for the
seminarian’s liturgical formation. It is fitting, then, that the Sacred Congregation for the Clergy in
its document - The Gift of the Priestly Vocation - mentions two activities among the many
ministerial skills that ought to be developed in the seminarian. First, the seminarian ought to
acquire “an appreciation of sacred art” which could aid him in his catechetical work. This
appreciation would also give him “a greater awareness of history and the ‘treasures’ to be
preserved, which are the patrimony of the particular Churches in which they will work”. The
Congregation for the Clergy also mentions “the knowledge of sacred music” and states that “a
proper appreciation of art and beauty is in itself a value, which furthermore has a clear pastoral
application”.1017 St Thomas’ theology of beauty as a communication of the person is very relevant
at this point. Beautiful art enables the faithful to be drawn into the mystery of Christ, Our Lady
and the saints. The beauty of stained glass windows, for example, opens the mind and heart to
contemplate the scenes of Sacred Scripture and the lives of the saints.
Still, more than the presentation of beautiful art, St Thomas’ reflections on beauty open up lines
of reflection on the beauty of actions that enable others to enter into the mystery of Christ. The
seminarian needs to acquire an understanding of beauty that enables him to see the significance of
how he communicates his thoughts and affections to build relationships. The way he conducts
himself by a prayerful and virtuous life in his personal relations enables him to communicate
something of the beauty of God and his love for the people of God. The words and gestures the
priest makes ought to manifest that spiritual honesty and chaste respect by which his love for God
and his people is made clear to them.
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The seminarian, for example, needs to prepare well for when he will be called as a priest to
communicate the beauty of Christ through the way he speaks and performs the actions of the
Sacred Liturgy. For instance, the words of consecration at the Eucharistic Sacrifice should be
spoken in a clear and reverent voice for the people to hear and contemplate this offering of our
Savior’s love for them. By ordination the priest has the privilege to speak in persona Christi the
words by which Christ anticipated the gift of himself on the Cross: “This is my Body which will
be given up for you.” These sacramental words are beautiful and deeply moving. They evoke the
mystery of God’s gift of himself through the Cross and Resurrection of his Son. The beauty of
these words and the sacrifice they embody call forth the deepest love from the people who hear
them spoken. Thus, the voice of the priest sacramentally embodies the beautiful voice of the
Incarnate Son of God, both in his self-offering to the Father and in the gift of himself to the
congregation.
Another dimension of the importance of beauty in the Sacred Liturgy concerns the seminarian’s
understanding of how to preach. This point is brought to light by Frederick Bauerschmidt who
writes of the aesthetics of the preached Word in connection with St Thomas’ teaching on beauty.
For St Thomas, good preaching instructs the intellect and appeals to the heart so as to draw the
congregation to love God. Bauerschmidt draws upon St Thomas’ understanding of beauty as an
experience of delight in a person when something is seen to possess the qualities of integrity,
proportion and brightness. In Bauerschmidt’s view, these qualities become apparent in the orderly
presentation of the mysteries of Christ, which can be presented so that “the sheer attractive power”
of Christ, with whom St Thomas particularly associates beauty, can become manifest. We saw
above, for instance, how St Thomas relates the theme of beauty to Christ in the Transfiguration.
Furthermore, Bauerschmidt observes that St Thomas associates beauty with order and that this
sense of order and its beauty is present in his homiletical approach.1018 St Thomas, for example, is
very careful to unfold the benefits associated with the various mysteries of salvation. When, for
instance, he speaks about the line of the Our Father - “Thy kingdom come” – St Thomas is careful
to note three benefits that appeal to the desire of the hearer. First, the coming of the Father’s
kingdom is desirable because in it there will be only those who are good and there will be no one
who does evil. Second, the kingdom is desirable because there will be complete freedom from any
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form of bondage and all will share in God’s kingship, so that the saints will want what God wills
and God will affirm what the saints want. Third, there is “supreme delight in God”, so that
whatever we seek on earth will be found in a “more perfect and more excellent” way in God.1019
Bauerschmidt notes that St Thomas’ Latin, in his explanations of the faith, is “unadorned,
uncomplicated, never seeking to draw attention to its surface by dazzling the reader, but trusting
in the beauty revealed in the manifestation of the fittingness of its subject matter”. 1020 And while
the preacher cannot prove the mysteries of faith, he can present them in a way that allows “the
beauty of their fittingness” to appear “in its full persuasive force” to lead others to a living faith.1021
Thus, the simplicity of the preacher’s language serves to allow the inherent beauty of the Gospel,
as truly good news for the congregation, to become apparent. Behind this approach is found a
recognition of the person of Christ, who is the main focus of the preaching and who ultimately
enables the faithful to receive the light of faith. This point can be illustrated by referring to a
distinction that St Thomas makes between Christ and St John the Baptist. The distinction concerns
the evangelist’s description of John in his important role as the one who bears witness to the light
(John 1.6-8):
But Christ testifies in one way and John in another. Christ bears witness as the light who
comprehends all things, indeed, as the existing light itself. John bears witness only as
participating in that light. And so Christ gives testimony in a perfect manner and perfectly
manifests the truth, while John and other holy men give testimony in so far as they have a
share in divine truth.1022

The difference between the two is highlighted by St John’s attitude that he rejoices to hear the
bridegroom’s voice, in other words that Christ has now come and that it is time for John to give
way to him (John 3.27-30). St John is very conscious of the order that he must respect: it is a
privilege to prepare the way for the Lord and it is fitting that he not get in the way of the Lord, so
The Lord’s Prayer, V, in The Three Greatest Prayers: Commentaries on The Lord’s Prayer, The Hail Mary, The
Apostles’s Creed, trans. Laurence Shapcote, O.P. (Sophia Institute Press, 1990), 125-127.
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that he may exercise his saving ministry for others. It is both the love of friendship and humility
that inspire St John’s attitude. This attitude also needs to be in the heart of the preacher, who must
in a simple, orderly, and heartfelt fashion serve to prepare the way in the mind and hearts of the
congregation, but recognize that it is Christ who saves the hearer. It is the beautiful selflessness of
the preacher that enables him to prepare the hearts of the faithful to receive Christ.
This attitude is beautiful according to the criteria of moral virtue in its appeal to the heart that we
discussed above. There is an integrity, proportion and clarity about the attitude of St John and the
preacher that allows the hearts of the congregation to perceive how beautiful Christ is. This is so
in two ways: first, that from this attitude of selflessness he seeks to present Christ in his truth so
that he can be believed. Second, because his own love for Christ and the people becomes apparent
to the perceptive and they are moved to consider that Christ must indeed be worthy of a profound
love, because he is loved wholeheartedly by his ordained minister. In fact, is this not part of the
beauty of the witness of celibacy? God is so good and beautiful that the ordained minister gives
his life to preaching the gospel, and he is prepared to surrender the beautiful love of marriage and
family life to preach Christ?

3. Eutrapelia and Leisure
For the sake of a balanced development of his affective life the seminarian needs to learn how to
properly relax his mind and affections. This pertains to the virtue of eutrapelia. Leisure, moreover,
forms the seminarian’s need to enjoy the good for its own sake. This finds its ultimate justification
both in God who is to be loved for his own sake and the human person’s intrinsic worth. One
implication of this concerns the meaning of celibacy and its expression through such activities as
contemplation which are not ultimately justified by their contribution to an affective apostolate.
Celibacy and contemplation are of intrinsic worth. They are to be enjoyed as a gift from God and
a gift of the seminarian’s self to God and his people.
To unfold these points in terms of their importance for affective formation the following will be
discussed: a) The Virtue of Eutrapelia; b) The Intrinsic Worth of Leisure; c) Implications for
Affective Formation.
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a. The Virtue of Eutrapelia
In the prayer For Ordering a Life Wisely, St Thomas prays for the grace to be “cheerful without
frivolity, mature without gloom, and quick-witted without flippancy”.1023 St Thomas sees
cheerfulness and the exercise of good wit as a part of the virtuous person’s character and how he
interacts with others. It is instructive for the seminarian, furthermore, that St Thomas’ treatment
of the virtues in Summa Theologica includes a reflection on the goodness of eutrapelia, the virtue
of knowing how to enjoy and communicate a proper relaxation of the soul. Eutrapelia forms the
human passion for play through games and witty conversation.1024
The word eutrapelia is derived from the two Greek words eu (good) and trapein (to turn), meaning
a happy turn of mind. St Thomas explains that a man is “pleasant through a happy turn of mind,
whereby he gives his words and deeds a cheerful turn: and inasmuch as this virtue restrains a man
from immoderate fun, it is comprised under modesty.”1025 Modesty is an expression of temperance
which forms our words and gestures according to what is fitting to the person and circumstances
such as place, the business at hand, and the other persons involved. Since “outward movements
are indications of the inward disposition, and this regards chiefly the passions of the soul” such
moderation forms the person’s affectivity.1026
St Thomas’ teaching on eutrapelia needs to be seen in the context of the finiteness of the human
capacity for work. The passion for work needs to be moderated so that we do not over-tax our
psychological strength. As an example, St Thomas refers to an occasion in the life of a holy man,
Blessed John the Evangelist, who had a witty reply for some people who were “scandalized on
finding him playing together with his disciples”. Blessed John the Evangelist “told one of them to
shoot an arrow. And when the latter had done this several times, he asked him whether he could
do it indefinitely, and the man answered that if he continued doing it, the bow would break.
Whence the blessed John drew the inference that in like manner man’s mind would break if its

From St Thomas’ Prayer “For Ordering a Life Wisely” in Devoutly I Adore Thee, 9.
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1025
Summa Theologica II-II, q.168, a.2, resp.
1026
See Summa Theologica II-II, q.168, a.1, resp, ad 3.
1023

1024

229

tension were never relaxed.”1027 What this scene, reported by St Thomas, indicates, is the need for
affective balance. That is, a truly virtuous life respects the need in oneself and in others to rest the
mind in recreational activities.
Both our body and our soul need rest. When we go beyond our “measure in a certain work”, St
Thomas explains, we are “oppressed” and become “weary”.1028 This affects the body also because
our soul employs the energies of our body when we are engaged in intellectual work. Such work
is performed in either theoretical study or applying our reason to practical matters, which can
demand great bodily labor. For example, the surgeon must apply his mind to the laborious work
of standing and performing a long and intricate medical operation. Moreover, St Thomas notes
that the “work of contemplation” can be particularly demanding because it concerns the raising of
our mind “higher above sensible things”.1029 This is demanding for us because we often find it
easier to deal with physical matters rather than reflect on spiritual realities.
Weariness of the soul is remedied by resting the soul through the application of pleasure. This
pleasure is found in “words and deeds wherein nothing further is sought than the soul’s delight”.
These kinds of words “are called playful and humorous”.1030 Hugo Rahner’s definition of
eutrapelia as a “nimbleness of mind which enables a man to play”, captures St Thomas’
meaning.1031 St Thomas sees such playful words as an important part of the virtuous person’s life.
“Hence it is necessary”, he writes, “at times to make use of them, in order to give rest, as it were,
to the soul.”1032 This serves to rest us from the serious pursuits of life that demand our attention.
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However, St Thomas gives some points of caution about distinguishing the virtue of eutrapelia
from its counterfeit. The proper expression of eutrapelia requires us to make sure that the pleasure
“not be sought in indecent or injurious words or deeds”. Also, we need to make sure that we do
not lose the balance of our mind altogether and engage in unbecoming or immodest behavior. And,
we should be careful to conform ourselves “to persons, time, and place, and take due account of
other circumstances”.1033 For example, we need to be careful of what we say when others are
grieving because we can say something that is insensitive to their need for consolation. Given their
present state of sorrow they may perceive certain jokes as inappropriate and offensive.1034
While St Thomas recognizes the sinfulness of immoderate expressions of fun, he is very clear
about the lack of virtue displayed by someone who interferes with the proper enjoyment of others.
Such a man falls short of virtue, St Thomas teaches, “by offering no pleasure to” them. Actually,
he describes someone “without mirth” and “lacking in playful speech” as “burdensome to others”
and “deaf” to their “moderate mirth”. As a consequence, such a person is “vicious” “boorish” and
“rude”.1035 Giving appropriate pleasure to others is, however, an act of kindness that distracts them
from the difficulties of life and so enables them to recover their affective balance.

1033

Summa Theologica II-II, q.168, a.2, resp. One example of attending to circumstances in relation to the way
games can affect us is gambling. St Francis de Sales is very critical of gambling on account of the effect it can have
on the gambler’s affectivity. He points to the intense worry that gamblers have instead of taking pleasure and rest in
games. He writes: “Can there be any sadder, gloomier, or more depressing concentration than that of gamblers? You
must neither speak, laugh, nor cough while they are playing for fear of offending them.” See Introduction to the
Devout Life, 196.
1034
An imaginative description of the importance of the virtue of eutrapelia and how it can help or hinder the
growth of virtue is found in The Screwtape Letters by C.S.Lewis. In Letter XI, Screwtape educates his nephew
demon - Wormwood - in a very crucial distinction between good and bad laughing, according to the diabolical
tempter’s point of view. Screwtape divides “the causes of human laughter into Joy, Fun, the Joke Proper, and
Flippancy”. Joy, Fun and Good Jokes can bring people together through the enjoyment of the good. Bad jokes and
flippancy, however, can be abused to make a lack of virtue seem funny and acceptable. See C.S.Lewis, The
Screwtape Letters (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1942/1950), 57-60.
1035
Summa Theologica II-II, q.168, a.4, resp. Timothy McDermott gives us St Thomas’ basic position on the virtue
of due and healthy recreation: “Just as we relieve bodily tiredness by bodily rest, so we relieve tiredness of soul by
pleasure, which is rest to the soul. We take a break from serious intent and take refuge in words and deeds which are
playful and humorous, giving us the pleasure we seek.” See Summa Theologiae: A Concise Translation, ed. Timothy
McDermott (London: Methuen, 1991), 440.

231

b. The Intrinsic Worth of Leisure
St Thomas’ teaching on leisure can help to deepen the seminarian’s understanding of virtue. A
misconception can be that working intensely is necessarily a more virtuous activity than leisure.
The point is not to neglect the duty of work, which is a service to others and a way of perfecting
human talents, but to reflect upon how leisure also promotes the dignity of the human person. The
first point to reflect on is the relationship between the good and the difficult. There are two
examples from St Thomas’ teaching that shed light on this matter. First, in considering whether
fortitude excels all other virtues St Thomas writes: “Virtue essentially regards the good rather than
the difficult”.1036 Since the good of reason is constitutive of the human good, prudence is prior in
excellence to fortitude. In other words, the reason this act of fortitude is a virtuous act is that it first
expresses the goodness of a right judgment of reason about what is to be done.
Second, in considering whether it is more meritorious to love one’s neighbor or God, St Thomas
replies to an objection about whether it is easier to love God because there is nothing unlovable in
him. In our neighbor, however, there are some things that are unlovable. Therefore, the objection
runs, it is more meritorious to love one’s neighbor because it is more difficult. St Thomas’ reply
centers upon the reason that an action could be meritorious. He writes:
The good has, more than the difficult, to do with the reason of merit and virtue. Therefore it
does not follow that whatever is more difficult is more meritorious, but only what is more
difficult, and at the same time better.1037

In other words, virtue is about what truly contributes to the good of the person performing the
virtuous deed. In this context, a way opens for us to give due place to the role of leisure as a
virtuous activity even though it does not bear the mark of arduousness. In arguing for the goodness
of leisure Josef Pieper refers to the role of virtue, not as a mere restraint upon the inclinations of
our human nature, but rather as a way of living that perfects our good inclinations. Pieper
comments of St Thomas’ understanding of the formative role of virtue: “virtue perfects us so that
we can follow our natural inclination in the right way”.1038 Hence more effort and more work does
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not necessarily imply that someone is acting in a more virtuous manner. Rather, the question
becomes: is this activity truly perfective of a good inclination, whether it be work or leisure?
Moreover, St Thomas argues that the highest actualizations of love have a certain effortlessness
about them, because they arise from love. In relation to the question whether it is better to love an
enemy more than a friend, St Thomas explains that it is not the difficulty involved that makes the
love of one’s enemies meritorious. This is so even though the greatness of this kind of love is
shown by its power to overcome the difficulty involved. “It follows, though,” St Thomas
continues, “that if the charity were so full as to overcome the difficulty entirely, that would be even
more meritorious”.1039 That is, the effortlessness is an indication of the perfection of the charity.
St Thomas also discusses the role of discipline, which is not undertaken for its own sake but is an
instrument of attaining the good. If we look, for example, at the formative role of temperance in
regard to pleasures, as a virtue it takes its rule from the attainment of the happiness of the person.
As St Thomas writes: “the end [goal] and rule [norm] of temperance itself is happiness”.1040 This
sets aside an attitude that what is pleasurable is either to be completely distrusted or is a
compromise with moral weakness. The reason for discipline is that we can properly enjoy the
good, not that we be disallowed from taking pleasure in it.
Another manifestation of a lack of appreciation for leisure is the attitude that study can only be
justified if it is useful to society, for example, for earning money or to be admired. That is, we can
never enjoy, for its own sake, some part of knowledge. This is really an argument about the
relationship between the liberal and the servile arts. The liberal arts concern those areas of study
that do not need to be justified by way of works that are useful. The servile arts are expressed in
what we would call working for payment. St Thomas, however, argues that there must be some
who are dedicated to the life of contemplation of the truth in study and prayer, for the perfection
not only of the individual, but for the sake of “the perfection of the human community”.1041 This

“aptitude to virtue is in us by nature, but the complement of virtue is in us through habituation or some other cause.
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highlights something necessary for every single human being. We are not mere functionaries. We
have worth in ourselves and we need to engage in activities that respect that innate worth and
dignity. The fact that monasteries and convents are often places of refuge and quiet prayerfulness
for lay people is a reminder of this role of the contemplative life.
There must be more to our relationships than the merely functional. There has to be time for the
arts, for literature, for enjoying each other’s company for its own sake, and time, most of all, for
the contemplation of God. In relation to this point, we can return to the ecclesial document The
Gift of the Priestly Vocation, which states in reference to the seminarian’s formation: “It should
be remembered that a proper appreciation of art and beauty is in itself a value”. 1042 Thus the love
of art and beauty is seen as something worthy in itself of the seminarian’s attention. Linked to St
Thomas’ reflections on beauty in persons, which needs to be reverenced through appropriate words
and gestures, the love of beauty can dispose the seminarian to reverence others. Such love for other
people links to the love of God, who is the ultimate source of all beauty and human dignity.
For, God is not a mere functionary for us to use and then forget. To the contrary, we do not need
to justify our enjoyment of God in meditation and contemplation in reference to other activities.
The enjoyment of God is good and fulfilling in itself. There are those who would see such leisurely
activities as prayer and contemplation as acts of idleness. In fact, it is those who work without
knowing what they are meant to be doing that enter, Pieper comments, into “self-destructive workfanaticism”.1043 They work obsessively at something when they ought to be doing something else
far more fulfilling. They are not expressing “the industrious spirit of the daily effort to make a
living”. Instead, true leisure is “the cheerful affirmation by man of his own existence, of the world
as a whole, and of God – of Love, that is, from which arises that special freshness of action, which
would never be confused by anyone with any experience with the narrow activity of the
‘workaholic’.”1044 Seeing God as intrinsically lovable enables us to see the true importance of
leisure as a condition of the soul and the true importance of activities such as work.
Pieper writes of three qualities of leisure as a condition of the soul, that is, as a mentality and a
way of living. First, leisure is the ability to be calm, let things go and be quiet. It requires a freedom
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from being preoccupied with many things and is, Pieper writes, the “disposition of receptive
understanding, of contemplative beholding”.1045 It is the attitude of someone who opens himself
so that he can receive understanding. Second, “leisure is the condition of considering things in a
celebrating spirit”, which flows from a person’s awareness that his life is a gift from God to be
enjoyed and lived.1046 This attitude of celebrating the goodness of life in a festival returns us to the
source of our being in God. It refreshes our vision of creation as truly good, because it is given to
us as a gift from God, and it manifests the nature of creation as a revelation of God’s goodness.
Third, leisure is not experienced to help us to work better. Leisure is enjoyed for its own sake
because it encourages us to rejoice in the inherent goodness of our humanity. That is why God is
at the center of true leisure – He is Eternal Rest and is loved for his own sake, not just for what he
does. Now, we are created in his image. So, we are imitating God when we rejoice both in the
Divine good and when we rejoice in the inherent goodness of the human life God has given us. St
Thomas explains:
As God, Who made things, did not rest in the things He made, but rested from them, in Himself
... just so should we learn to rest not in our things or in His things, as if they were the goal, but
rather in God Himself, in Whom our happiness consists. This is the reason why man should
work for six days in His own works, in order to rest on the seventh day, and be free for the
worship of God. But for Christians, such rest is appointed not only temporarily, but for
eternity.1047

The heart of leisure is expressed in festival or celebration. Festival has the keynote of joy, as Pieper
writes: “In festival, or celebration, all three conceptual elements come together as one: the
relaxation, the effortlessness, the ascendancy of ‘being at leisure’ ... over mere ‘function’”.1048
Festival derives its meaning from worship, because festival restores in us a harmony with the world
and God, who is the source of the being and meaning of the world.
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c. Implications for Affective Formation
St Thomas recognizes the importance of eutrapelia, a virtue which has a rightful part in Christian
life. It is in keeping with a sound theology of virtue to engage in conversations and activities that
help us to be refreshed in mind and in heart. On this point St Thomas is on firm Scriptural ground.
In Proverbs 17.22 we read: “A cheerful heart is good medicine”. It is in keeping with a sound
theological anthropology, therefore, to help the seminarian to practice eutrapelia. It is a virtue that
forms his desire to relax his mind and affections through playful words and deeds. It is a virtue,
too, that forms relationships. The virtuous person knows when to have witty conversations with
others to lighten their hearts. The seminarian does have to acquire an appropriate seriousness for
his future work as a priest. However, the priest would be seen as overly serious if he did not laugh
with others in moments of healthy relaxation.1049 Such healthy laughter can also help others realize
that the priest is human and approachable. It thus serves to bind them to the priest in affection and
allows them to feel more inclined to come to him when they need his counsel.
Benedict Ashley’s reflection on “etiquette” - an important part of socializing – is closely aligned
with St Thomas’ discussion of the moderation of our words and deeds. We want to steer, Ashley
writes, “a middle course between an exaggerated civility that betrays vanity and affectation on the
one hand, and a boorishness that is offensive and embarrassing on the other”.1050 Ashley
distinguishes between the etiquette of serious ceremonies in public, such as the Sacred Liturgy,
and etiquette in recreational events, such as social conversation or sports. He mentions decorum
as the virtue by which someone knows how to appropriately communicate his feelings and receive
the feelings of others, in accord with circumstance, occasion and people. “Lack of decorum”,
Ashley explains, “destroys the beauty and dignity of serious affairs, and the enjoyment of
recreation.”1051 That is, a lack of decorum interferes with the particular good of both serious and
enjoyable social interactions.
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Another point to be considered is that a balanced asceticism properly orders the pleasures that are
needed for the relaxation of the seminarian’s mind and affections. The enjoyment of pleasures
ought to be adapted to a person’s particular vocation. If a man has to do less physical work he
needs fewer physical pleasures. “Wherefore” St Thomas writes, “it is commendable for those who
undertake the duty of giving themselves to contemplation, and of imparting to others a spiritual
good, by a kind of spiritual procreation, as it were, to abstain from many pleasures.”1052 St Thomas
also draws our attention to the need for the spiritual pleasures of contemplation. Otherwise, an
exaggerated desire for other pleasures will be felt. For no one can live without some pleasures.1053
As Basil Cole comments:
Quite often human nature is fatigued by mental work, or loneliness, criticisms from superiors
or supervisors, or even humiliating failure of some kind. The result of these experiences leads
nature to yearn for pleasure to ameliorate the problem of this emptiness of spirit.1054

These problems can be ameliorated by good pleasures that alleviate the human spirit. One of these
pleasures is that of enjoyable conversation with friends, which can reinvigorate the seminarian’s
heart and connect him to others so that he receives and communicates joy.1055
Furthermore, St Thomas’ affirmation of the goodness of leisure acts as a helpful guide for affective
formation. Such activities as contemplation, study, and a love for what is culturally uplifting,
refresh the heart of the seminarian. They enable him to return to the God who has given him a
vocation to the priesthood. They return him to the way he is loved not as a functionary but for his
own sake as a human being. Without such a background it will be very difficult for the seminarian
to learn to love certain activities for their own sake. He will be predisposed to overlook what is of
intrinsic value in himself and others as children of God. This gift of himself transcends the various
works he may do as a priest and take on their proper value as an expression of the gift of his love
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to God and his people. The other negative side-effect will be an inability to help others be refreshed
in the activities proper to their need for leisure. Lacking a true sense of leisure’s vital importance
for the human soul, he will not encourage others to respect their need for leisurely activities.
A further point about leisure concerns the seminarian’s need to be aware of the symptoms of
boredom, which undermines the restfulness and celebratory spirit of leisure. By leisure we are
taken out of ourselves, by focusing our activity on what is of refreshing interest to us. It is an
antidote to boredom in which we feel that our life is joyless and our activity futile. The seminarian
needs to be attentive to his own feeling of boredom or soul-weariness. Donald Cozens writes:
Chronic boredom is a symptom signaling that something is amiss on the level of the soul. It
announces a crisis of the soul that deserves attention and care. If one sits with his or her
boredom, befriends it, so to speak, listens to it, it reveals a dearth of both intimacy and
transcendence.1056

The recovery of the leisure of contemplation is essential when the priest is in this state. “When
caught up in the wonder and mystery of transcendent ecstasy”, Cozens writes, “the soul delights
in intimate communion with God’s creation and at the same instant embraces all of humanity.”1057
Such moments transform the priest, he holds them “in his memory, drawing strength and comfort
from them”.1058 The priest rediscovers himself, so to speak, as someone loved by God, and he is
renewed by the rediscovery of his innate dignity before the God who created him and called him
to be a priest.1059
It is in the context of St Thomas’ teaching on leisure that the importance of the life of
contemplation for celibacy becomes clear. St Thomas defines virginity in terms of setting aside
the possibility of sexual pleasure for the sake of a greater good, namely, “the goods of the
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contemplative life”.1060 He sees virginity as a freedom to give oneself “to the contemplation of
truth”.1061 More precisely, he writes that “holy virginity refrains from all venereal pleasure in order
more freely to have leisure for Divine contemplation”.1062 Virginity is a “leisure for Divine
things”.1063 Given St Thomas’ understanding of contemplation as an activity of the person who
lovingly attends to God, we see that he defines virginity primarily in terms of the gift of oneself to
God, and the contemplation of God’s love and all that is connected with God. The state of virginity
enables one to have the physical and affective leisure to engage in this contemplation as a gift of
oneself to God. Likewise, the gift of the seminarian can be seen both in terms of the gift of himself
to be with God and the gift of his time to be attentive to God’s love and service.

Conclusion
This chapter has presented three examples of how virtue forms affective maturity. The presentation
of these virtues has drawn upon St Thomas’ teaching that virtue forms the love of friendship, the
desire to delight in beauty, and the capacity to properly rest the soul. Such virtues as appropriate
self-love and caring for one’s friend as another self, form the seminarian’s ability to maintain
mature and fulfilling relationships. Beauty is a communication of the goodness and identity of the
person. Contemplating beauty in virtuous people and, most of all, in Christ, the seminarian is
enabled to see both a life of virtue and his role as a preacher, as ways of communicating Christ’s
beauty to others. Rest is an inherent need of the human person. Thus, the seminarian needs to learn
how to rest his mind, alone and with others, in playful conversations and engage in other activities
that can be enjoyed for their own sake. Moreover, the attitude of leisure enables the seminarian to
experience human life as a gift to be enjoyed on account of his inherent God-given dignity. One
implication for his future life as a priest is that he should avoid an excessive work mentality. This
would proceed from a futile attempt to find personal worth only in the external works he performs.
Rather, he should learn to properly celebrate the inherent goodness and joy of life and teach others
to do the same. The implication for his life of celibacy is that he should not see himself as an
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ordained functionary, but as someone to be loved for his own sake and who freely gives himself
to the contemplation of the Divine.

240

CHAPTER 9
THE PRINCIPLES OF GRACE AND AFFECTIVE FORMATION
Virtue forms the seminarian’s affectivity, so that he can experience it as a perfection of himself
and so that he can share the richness of his affectivity with others to their true good. However,
there is another important dimension of this issue to be considered. St Thomas’ teaching on the
formative role of the virtues is part of his overall reflection on the Christian’s life. The development
of this life, in imitation of Christ, encompasses the development of the Christian’s affectivity as it
is unified in the love of God, vivified by his grace, and ordered by his wisdom. Accordingly, St
Thomas’ general treatment of virtue in the Prima Secundae Pars of Summa Theologica culminates
in a consideration of the Theological Virtues, the Gifts of the Holy Spirit, the Beatitudes and the
Fruits of the Holy Spirit. St Thomas thus reflects on how a person’s virtue - a perfection of the
person and a perfection of the way he acts - is brought to its completeness in the life of grace.
The aim of this chapter is to explain how St Thomas’ teaching on these principles of grace can
assist the seminarian’s affective formation. The following topics will be considered: 1) The
Theological Virtues and Affective Formation; 2) The Gifts of the Holy Spirit and Affective
Maturity; 3) The Beatitudes Form Desire; 4) The Fruits of the Holy Spirit: a Pattern of Maturity.

1. The Theological Virtues and Affective Formation
Seminary formation can derive from St Thomas’ teaching on the relationship between grace and
virtue a better understanding of how the theological virtues shape affectivity. These virtues are
principles that develop the particular faculties involved in affective experience while directing
them to one’s friendship with God. This teaching will assist the seminarian to acquire a wisdom
about the unity of his affective life with the life of grace. St Thomas’ teaching on the mean of
virtue in relation to infused virtue is very helpful here. This will be discussed below in relation to
the seminarian’s capacity to properly apply the theological virtues to his life.
Chapter 7 studied St Thomas’ understanding of virtue as a proper development of the human
person’s affectivity. However, it is important to note that St Thomas also gives a definition of
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virtue which recognizes its development within the context of the Christian’s relationship with
God. “Virtue”, as St Thomas quotes St Augustine, “is a good quality of the mind by which we live
righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us, without us”.1064 This is a
recognition of the full development of the human person’s powers which takes place through the
gift and assistance of God’s grace, without overriding their proper structure. As Nicholas
Lombardo comments: “Just as grace does not alter or destroy nature but brings it to completion,
so too grace perfects human affectivity while respecting its natural structure.” 1065 St Thomas’ use
of this wider definition of virtue indicates his concern to bring together the Aristotelian and the
Augustinian understandings of virtue. A brief discussion of this issue serves to focus our reflection
on the intimate link between the principles of grace and the affective formation of the seminarian.
St Thomas makes a distinction between acquired virtue, that which we develop in ourselves
through our natural capacities, and infused virtue, that which is given to us by the gift of God’s
grace. The distinction between acquired and infused virtue in St Thomas’ works flows from his
recognition that there is a genuine distinction between the human nature God has given to us in his
love as our Creator and the life of grace he wills for us in view of our call to eternal beatitude. In
relation to the nature of acquired virtue, St Thomas’ careful study of Aristotle’s reflections on the
life of virtue reveals his respect for the thought of those who did not have the advantage of knowing
Christ. This leads St Thomas to strike a balance between acknowledging what is helpful in the
writings of Aristotle on virtue and examining it with a view to incorporating it into a coherent view
of Christian life. St Thomas recognizes that there was authentic virtue in the life of pagans before
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the time of Christ. For example, he writes in Summa Theologica I-II, q.65, a.2, resp., that acquired
moral virtues can be present in those without charity, “even as they were in many of the Gentiles”.
These acquired virtues are in proportion to “the natural power” of the human person. These are
true virtues in their own order but they fall short of what virtue is in its fullest sense as good habits
that proceed by grace in view of our eternal beatitude. It is not the place to further discuss this
issue here, except to state that the recognition of pagan virtue raises the question of whether there
can be a point of harmony between the Aristotelian and Augustinian view of virtue. In other words,
does the view of virtue without reference to Christ bear any point of harmony with the view of
virtue as it is understood by a Christian who sees God as the ultimate source of virtue?
The source of the answer can be found in the truth that God is the source of all good, especially
the good of human nature and our capacity to reason and develop our faculties for the good. This
capacity, though wounded, remains in us so that we can acquire virtues that are appropriate to our
human nature. Grace purifies and elevates these capacities in view of our call to eternal life, not
negating but rather perfecting the gift of our humanity. God, as the source of the order of Creation
and the order of grace is the ultimate source of the goodness of virtue in those who do not know
God and its perfection in the life of Christians. There is much more to be discussed about this, but
the main point for our present purpose is that St Thomas sees that St Augustine’s definition of
virtue completes, rather than negates, the understanding of virtue in Aristotle. St Augustine’s
definition makes clear that God infuses certain virtues with the life of grace that enable the
Christian to find fulfilment in eternal beatitude. Yet, this definition respects the essential
Aristotelian insight that virtue remains a proper exercise of the person’s faculties for the true
good.1066
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St Thomas’ insight on this point indicates the profound unity he sees between the action of grace
and the humanity of the person who is sanctified. Both sides of this relationship need to be
respected. What is truly human needs to be understood if we are to develop a coherent
understanding of affective maturity. Yet this can only be fully explained in light of what God
reveals to us about the significance of our lives and how we are to live. This acts as a helpful
background to the teaching of St John Paul II in regard to the relationship between the seminarian’s
human and spiritual formation. This is a point implicit in the discussion of themes such as the
priest’s call to reflect the perfection of Christ’s humanity, chastity’s importance for priestly
celibacy, and the way the seminarian’s conscience is formed by listening to Sacred Scripture. 1067
However, the Pope directly addresses this issue when he writes: “Human formation, when it is
carried out in the context of an anthropology which is open to the full truth regarding the human
person, leads to and finds its completion in spiritual formation.”1068 Created and redeemed by God,
the human person is open to the Divine and our affections need to be directed in accord with this
truth. Still, another truth also needs to be recognized: union with God has an influence on how the
particular affective faculties and relationships of the person are developed. They are formed by the
unifying principle of friendship with God. How St Thomas’ reflections on the relationship between
these two truths can help affective formation can be made clear by a consideration of the following:
a) The Theological Virtues Perfect Affectivity; b) The Relationship of the Infused and the
Acquired Virtues; c) The Mean of Virtue and Infused Virtue; d) Implications for Affective
Formation.

a. The Theological Virtues Perfect Affectivity
St Thomas reasons that just as we are directed to human happiness by certain virtues and their
appropriate acts, we also need virtues that help us to attain our supernatural beatitude. The logic
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here is that our friendship with God and the attainment of eternal union with him requires an
appropriate pattern of life and activity. St Thomas therefore writes about principles of action that
pertain to “a happiness surpassing man’s nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God
alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead, about which it is written (2 Peter 1.4) that by
Christ we are made partakers of the Divine nature.”1069 Beyond our “natural principles”, therefore,
additional principles of action are needed and St Thomas refers to these principles as infused
virtues.1070 By the word “infused” he means that while we exercise them, they are primarily a
capacity we have because God gave them to us and it is only by the help of his grace that we
exercise them. The first three set of virtues flow directly from the Christian’s relationship with
God. The object of these theological virtues of Faith, Hope and Charity “is God, inasmuch as they
direct us aright to God”. These virtues “are infused in us by God alone” and we only know about
them because they are part of “Divine Revelation” which is “contained” in Sacred Scripture.1071
These theological virtues have a formative role in relation to affectivity. In opening the mind and
heart to God in friendship the affective dimensions of the Christian’s life are drawn into a unity
with this friendship.1072 The basis for this formation of the Christian’s affectivity is found in how
the mind and the will is formed by faith, hope and charity. The logic is that Divine Revelation
provides the necessary knowledge for the will to be moved to love and desire union with God. So,
in reflecting on the nature of faith St Thomas describes its inherent connection to affectivity:
“Faith, which is a gift of grace, inclines man to believe, by giving him a certain affection for the
good”.1073 As Lombardo comments: “for Aquinas, faith implies an affective appreciation for divine
good, and not just sheer knowledge of supernatural realities”.1074 This is an indication, which will
be confirmed as our discussion proceeds, that St Thomas sees affectivity as an important principle
in the development of the Christian’s life.
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This reflects the structure of human affectivity in which the mind needs to appreciate the truth so
that the will can tend to the good “as defined by reason”.1075 In regard to eternal beatitude, however,
the human mind is guided by the “Divine light” in regard to the mysteries of Faith, which consist
in the articles of faith and belief in God.1076 The light of faith purifies the heart according to the
principle that what is known as a good in the intellect moves our affection.1077 Thus the will is
moved to seek union with God as something attainable with God’s help and “this pertains to hope”.
The will is also transformed by a loving union with God “and this belongs to charity”. 1078 As
Lombardo comments: faith “overflows into other realms of affectivity. The appetites respond to
objects known by faith in similar ways to objects known by natural means. Since the affections
respond to knowledge, and faith imparts knowledge, faith influences the affections. And since the
knowledge of faith gives access to the true nature of things and their true value, faith orders the
affections according to the true value of things, and thus purifies the heart.”1079 For example, St
Thomas writes of how our appreciation of God “as an unfathomable and supreme good” causes us
to hold him in reverence and so dread “to be separated from” him. 1080 This is a filial fear which
makes us adhere to God through charity and thus fear to offend him and lose his love for us.
St Thomas presents the theological virtues of hope and charity as perfections of the sanctified
human appetite for the good.1081 That is, hope and charity are theological virtues that perfect human
affectivity in terms of its desire for union with God and the experience of union with God in love.
There are two basic principles involved here, St Thomas comments, movement to the end and
“conformity with the end by means of love”.1082 The theological virtues elevate these two
principles and direct them in accord with the person’s participation in the life of grace. As St
Thomas writes: “Hence there must needs be two theological virtues in the human appetite, namely,
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hope and charity”.1083 Hope moves us to trust in God’s promises for our eternal good and charity
moves us to love God as our greatest good.1084
Charity, inasmuch as it unites us to God, gives full meaning to all the virtues. Ultimately, it is for
the sake of union with God that all our virtues exist. St Thomas comments that faith and hope
receive “their full complement from charity as virtues”, and that “thus charity is the mother and
the root of all the virtues, inasmuch as it is the form of them all”.1085 That is, every virtue is infused
with meaning and purpose by charity as an expression of love for God. Thus, every virtue that
forms our passions and actions comes to its fullness when it is properly ordered by charity, by
which we love God as our greatest friend.1086 In this way, charity is not only a series of specific
acts but, as Lombardo describes it, “a habitual affective disposition that provides a stable shape to
a person’s character and affectivity”.1087 Charity is the ultimate motivating principle that gives life
and purpose to the other virtues of the Christian, inasmuch as these virtues perfect both him and
his personal relationships.
One of the associated experiences of this formative action of charity, inasmuch as it is a love for
God, is that it disposes the Christian’s heart to love others. That God loves this person and wills
what is good to him kindles a desire in our hearts to likewise love him. Thus there is a new light
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shed by this love of God on the significance of those who are close to us through family and
friendship or entrusted to our care in some way. This truth will become more apparent when we
discuss St Thomas’ teaching on the gift of piety below and the importance of the moral virtues for
applying the gifts as principles of everyday life. For the moment it is important to note that the
love of God overflows into the love of neighbor. These personal relationships are gifts from God
to be developed with the care and affection that God would expect in regard to the very people that
he himself loves.
This point is summed up in St Thomas’ teaching about the friendship of charity with God: “Indeed,
so much do we love our friends, that for their sake we love all who belong to them”.1088 St Thomas
extends this principle to the relationship between our love for God and the love we have for our
neighbor. He writes that God should be loved “before all … as the cause of happiness” and our
neighbor is also to be “loved as receiving together with us a share of happiness from” God.1089 The
point for affective formation is that love for God is not an individualistic relationship but is
intimately bound up with the seminarian’s love for his family, friends, and those he will serve in
pastoral charity. Bonnie Kent captures this sense of St Thomas’ insight into the connection
between a rightly ordered love for God and our fellow human beings: “Thomas does not regard
God as some jealous lover who insists that people care for no one but Him and for no happiness
other than the happiness they could have in his presence. God himself gave human beings bodies
and emotions; God himself made human beings social (political) animals, inclined by their very
nature to seek happiness in the company of others of their kind.”1090 In other words, it is wholly
consistent with our love for God to love those people he has entrusted to us.

b. The Infused and the Acquired Virtues
Virtues form human capacities according to the modes of action that apply “in respect of the
various matters, which constitute the sphere of virtue’s action, and according to various
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circumstances”.1091 St Thomas refers to these virtues as “acquired virtues” because they are
“humanly acquired”.1092 However, he asks, as there are moral virtues that develop our capabilities
according to the light of reason, can there be moral virtues infused in us that are proportioned to
the theological virtues and the “gift of grace”?1093 In other words, are there moral virtues that form
the Christian’s faculties and actions in harmony with the life of friendship with God?
In answering this question St Thomas appeals to the principle that “effects must needs be
proportionate to their causes and principles”.1094 By grace we have a supernatural end so we must
have the personal capacity to act according to this end in the various spheres of human action, in
order that what we do leads us to attain this end. Thus St Thomas writes:
Wherefore we need to receive from God other habits corresponding, in due proportion, to the
theological virtues, which habits are to the theological virtues, what the moral and intellectual
virtues are to the natural principles of virtue.1095

St Thomas’ logic is that the virtues which can “be caused in us by our actions … are not
proportionate to the theological virtues”.1096 Thus God must give us virtues that are proportionate
to the life of faith, hope and charity, and that perfect the other dimensions of our lives in accord
with these theological virtues. That is, God must help us to form our faculties according to his love
and the purpose of attaining everlasting union with him. The point relevant to our discussion of
affective formation is that these infused moral virtues, like the acquired moral virtues, concern the
development of passions and actions. As such these infused moral virtues shape the affectivity of
the seminarian by orienting them to act in accord with the life of faith, hope and charity. This is
achieved through the way his various faculties are formed by the object of the infused virtues. As
Lombardo explains: there is an overflowing of the infusion of sanctifying grace which “permeates
the powers of the soul and the affections of the will and the passions, thus establishing the infused
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virtues”.1097 Here is the basis for the life of grace acting as a formative principle of the Christian’s
affectivity.
The object of a virtue “is a good” towards which the activity of the virtue is directed. 1098 Now,
there is a specific difference in object between acquired and infused virtues. The difference is not
found in the person possessing different faculties of mind, will and passion through grace, but it is
found in how a particular virtue is measured and formed, either by human reason or the life of
grace. To understand this we need to distinguish the formal object of a virtue and its material
element. The formal object is the goal of the act. This is the meaning given to an act through our
intellectual grasp of its goodness.1099 The material element, however, which is understood in terms
of the activity of the senses, is what is basically involved in the act. This material element can be
the same both in the act of the acquired and the infused virtue. However, the formal object could
change according to the purpose with which the action is undertaken and the way it is measured
by either reason alone or by the light of faith.
An example is found in the difference between acquired temperance which guides the experiences
connected with the “concupiscence of touch” and infused temperance, which concerns the
Christian’s effort to imitate Christ and live a life of holiness.1100 So, in the consumption of food,
the mean fixed by human reason is that food should not harm the health of the body and not hinder
the use of reason. On the other hand, “according to the Divine rule, it behooves man to chastise
his body, and bring it into subjection (1 Cor. Ix. 27), by abstinence in food, drink and the like.”1101
St Thomas refers to another specific difference which concerns “what the virtue is directed to”. He
explains that in relation to “human affairs” and social relationships there are virtues directed to the
“forms of government”.1102 The infused virtues, however, relate to a life with others in the life of
grace, “in respect of their being fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household of God (Eph.
ii. 19)”.1103 The point is not that the issues of health and civil government are unimportant to the
Christian. The point is that the wider context of friendship with God in Christ requires a wider set
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of motivations and actions. The Christian needs to recognize how these various elements of his
life are brought into a unity according to the life of charity and grace. This leads us to the
moderating role of the mean of virtue.

c. The Mean of Virtue and Infused Virtue
We have already discussed the mean of virtue in Chapter 7. However, at this point of the thesis
there are some important principles to be added from St Thomas’ teaching, which will help to form
the seminarian’s affective balance. These principles will help him to make a proper connection
between the theological virtues and the moral virtues that concern the various acts and personal
relationships of his life. This will become clear when we consider St Thomas’ important distinction
between the infinite nature of God’s grace and the way we respond to it as finite creatures.
St Thomas writes: “The mean of virtue depends on conformity with virtue’s rule or measure, in so
far as one may exceed or fall short of that rule”.1104 The mean of virtue is the rule of reason that
measures what the action should be, especially in reference to the circumstances of the action. For
example, whether this action is truly daring rather than either foolhardy or cowardly. The action
should be neither deficient nor in excess of what is appropriate in the particular case. Relevant here
is St Thomas’ articulation of the maximum and the minimum of virtue. The maximum of the mean
of virtue refers to the action that is in accord with right reason, “where it is right, when it is right,
and for an end that is right”.1105 The excess of the mean of virtue occurs when the agent tends to
the same kind of action as the maximum, but “when it is not right, or where it is not right, or for
an undue end”.1106 There will be deficiency in an action if someone fails to tend toward what one
ought to do, “where one ought, and when one ought”.1107 Thus, the mean of virtue guides the
seminarian to carefully apply the measure of reason to a particular case.
Moreover, the mean of virtue applies the measure of reason to the kind of activity relevant to a
virtue. In regard to the intellectual virtues the mean is twofold. First, in regard to “contemplative
virtue”, which concerns the operation of the speculative intellect, the mean or rational measure is
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the truth of things, inasmuch as “there is truth in what we think or say, according as the thing is so
or not”.1108 Second, in regard to “practical virtue”, which concerns the practical intellect, which
considers “the true in conformity with a right appetite”, that is, a right desire.1109 The mean of
virtue in this case is the truth inasmuch as it is the source of proper guidance for the will.
How does all this apply to the theological virtues? Considered in themselves, the theological
virtues have “God Himself” as their “measure and rule”, and “our faith is ruled according to Divine
truth; charity, according to His goodness; hope, according to the immensity of His omnipotence
and loving kindness”.1110 Consequently, the measure of the theological virtues surpasses “all
human power” because we can never love, or hope and believe in God “as much as we should”.1111
God is absolutely truthful and to be unhesitatingly believed. He is absolutely trustworthy, therefore
we place all our hope in him. He is absolutely lovable and therefore to be loved with all our heart.
Yet, we are finite creatures and cannot love God in exact proportion to his infinite nature.
However, there is another measure of the theological virtues in relation to the human person. St
Thomas explains that we cannot be brought to God “as much as we ought” in accord with his
infinite goodness, “yet we should approach to Him by believing, hoping and loving, according to
the measure of our condition. Consequently it is possible to find a mean and extremes in
theological virtue, accidentally and in reference to us.”1112 The theological virtues have an
appropriate measure relevant to the manner in which the human person acts, the circumstances in
which he finds himself, and the connection of the theological virtues with the other virtues. This
is a crucial point for affective formation which we will return to below.
A connected question concerns the importance of the moral virtues for the life of the Christian.
Acquired human virtues can exist without charity because they are acquired by natural human
power and acts, “even”, St Thomas observes, “as they were in many of the Gentiles”.1113 The moral
virtues infused by God with the theological virtues, however, cannot exist without charity. This is
so because charity is the fundamental principle of Christian life which organizes all other virtues
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in accord with the friendship of God. Yet, there is another side to this consideration: can charity
exist without moral virtue? For St Thomas, the infused moral virtues equip the soul to perform all
the works appropriate to attaining the supernatural fulfilment of union with God. That is why St
Paul writes of those who love their neighbors as fulfilling the law. For the Law given to us through
Christ articulates the moral virtues needed to attain union with God and our neighbor (Romans
13.8). To act in a way that is opposed to these infused moral virtues would be to act in a manner
contrary to charity. As St Thomas explains: “in order that man work well in things referred to the
end, he needs not only a virtue disposing him well to the end, but also those virtues which dispose
him well to whatever is referred to the end”.1114 The virtues and acts that concern the various
activities of the Christian’s life are integral to his attaining eternal beatitude.
That is, moral virtues express our love for God by enabling us to reverence the various particular
goods and actions of human life and human relationships. This is so because God is the ultimate
source of those goods and relationships which he loves and wills as dimensions of the human
persons he loves. Since charity is the principle of all the good works that refer us to our last end it
requires all the moral virtues, because “it is through them that man performs each different kind
of good work”.1115 That is, good actions deserve to be done well according to their own proper
mode of perfection. They express attitudes that shape the various areas of life in accord with the
proper perfection of human capacities and personal relationships. Yet, they do this with a view to
attaining union with God. If both these dimensions of infused virtue – love for God and the
perfection of actions through the virtues - are not respected something of the nature of both is
diminished. The reason for this is that while we need to love God we can only do this through the
faculties he gives to us as human persons who are sanctified by his grace. Kent expresses this point
well when she writes: “Purely human goods are still genuine goods, for Christians no less than
other people.”1116 In fact, given that human goods find their source in God who loves us, these
goods take on a greater importance. The seminarian needs to see that these human goods are to be
received with gratitude and to be reverenced through a life that embodies the moral virtues.
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d. Implications for Affective Formation
In regard to infused virtue Michael Sherwin writes: “Grace transforms the source and character of
moral excellence”.1117 Drawing upon the discussion above Sherwin’s statement can be explained
through two points. First, grace transforms the source of moral excellence by orienting the
Christian’s life to friendship with God who assists the Christian to live according to this friendship.
Second, grace transforms the character of moral excellence by shaping the attitudes, actions and
relationships of the Christian through the principles that flow from and nourish this friendship.
These principles, in St Thomas’ terminology, are the infused virtues that are present through the
supernatural gift of God.
The other side of this mystery of infused virtue is that the infused virtues are also “intimately the
excellences of the agent himself”.1118 God truly does give and infuse them into the life of the
Christian so that they become his perfections and his capacities to act. This gives the seminarian a
principle by which he can interpret the unity between the development of his affective capacities
and the life of grace to which he is called. Here the importance of St Thomas’ teaching on the
virtuous development of passions and actions within the life of grace becomes clear. Grace does
not impose itself as a foreign principle which orders the affectivity of the seminarian without
respect for the inherent dynamics of his affections and passions. To the contrary, God as the
seminarian’s loving Creator and Redeemer reverences the authentic desires of the seminarian’s
heart. For God is the ultimate source of the seminarian’s affectivity and the moral teaching that
guides its development. Yet, it is precisely through the principles of infused virtue that his affective
life comes to its true maturity and truly perfects the seminarian.
St Thomas’ teaching on the need for the infused moral virtues enables the seminarian to see the
importance of his particular attitudes and actions for the development of his affectivity. The
theological virtues, as the primary principles of the seminarian’s relationship with God, need to be
expressed through the particular attitudes and actions that perfect his faculties and relationships.
Prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude are vital to the Christian’s life because they perfect
the humanity of the seminarian as he is loved by God. These virtues are rightfully developed
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through the personal relationships they entail because they are practical expressions of the good
faculties God has entrusted to him. Thus, the development of his human formation finds its
ultimate reason in the love God has for him and for the people he will one day serve as a priest.
Another implication is that the seminarian’s affective formation should not be developed as though
it stood in isolation from the proper theological foundation of his affective formation. The
seminarian’s human formation should not only draw upon secular sources of information, such as
the contemporary psychological and sociological sciences. Rather, affective formation needs to be
developed in harmony with the life of grace and the virtues appropriate to it. Accordingly, the
theological sources of reflection - Sacred Scripture, the moral wisdom of the Church, the
experience of the saints, the writings of the Doctors of the Church - are the ultimate measure of
what promotes affective maturity. This does not diminish the proper role of other levels of
knowledge and experience to help in affective formation, but it sets their formative influence
within proper theological parameters. If some suggestion of a particular science contradicts the
light of revelation it needs to be carefully examined to see what truth it may or may not hold. For
example, if a seminarian was given psychological counselling in which he was encouraged to
perform sexually immoral acts by himself, or with others, this would be clearly contrary to the
truth of his affective development. This would only be doing him affective harm.
St Thomas’ discussion of the mean of virtue in regard to the life of grace is a vital part of
knowledge about affective development. It concerns the Christian’s capacity to order his actions
according to the right relationship between the theological virtues and the moral virtues. This right
relationship acts as a guide to wise Christian action. From the point of view of who we are loving
there is a need for an unlimited response to God. However, as St Thomas observes, that truth
should not obscure the other side of the relationship – created persons necessarily have to adapt
their actions to their limited resources and various proper needs. Without the recognition and
application of this truth the seminarian cannot engage in a truthful and fruitful relationship with
God and his neighbor. For example, the seminarian should not confuse loving God with having to
be at liturgical prayer all day because his service of the needy, work, and recreation, in due
measure, are also necessary and virtuous activities for him. And he should learn to apply this
principle in regard to the people of God who will be in need of his sound counsel: each one has
his own vocation, sensitivity, needs, and strength.
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While faith, hope and charity are the foundation of his life as a future priest, the other dimensions
of the seminarian’s life need to be respected and developed too, according to their particular
dynamics. One application of this truth is that he should not think the theological virtues substitute
for the development of his affectivity. It is not enough for him to believe in God, hope in him and
make acts of love for him in prayer and worship. Rather, the affective life and the personal
relationships that flow from it have their proper place in the seminarian’s heart. While these
relationships need to be brought into harmony with his greatest friendship with God, they still have
their own goodness and specific contribution to make in his character development. Without their
proper development the seminarian cannot give full expression to the life of grace that God imparts
to him. For, his graced humanity needs to be developed through the various faculties, actions and
relationships accorded to him as a created person by the gift and wisdom of God.
What would a substitution of the theological virtues for the proper development of affectivity look
like? In other words, what does it look like when the seminarian thinks that it is enough for him to
believe, hope and love and that he doesn’t need to specifically develop his affectivity? Essentially,
we would have a man who makes acts of faith, hope and love in prayer and worship, but who lacks
the capacity to appropriately express human emotion in his personal relationships. The effect of
this would be that an important dimension of how he communicates care to others would be
underdeveloped because he lacks proper feeling for their needs. We can find an example in the
priest who is prayerful but who possesses little capacity to meet others in a warm and welcoming
fashion. Indeed, he may think that his prayerfulness is sufficient for his priestly ministry but his
lack of affective development hinders his ability to draw others into union with Christ. For
instance, he may not know how to communicate a sense of heartfelt compassion to those who are
suffering through his words and gestures. In this way, he has not integrated his affectivity with his
love for God so that he can communicate this love in a way that is credible to the human heart.

2. The Gifts of the Holy Spirit and Affective Maturity
Another dimension of the formative role of the principles that proceed from the life of grace
concerns the Gifts of the Holy Spirit. These seven gifts form the seminarian’s affectivity by
sensitizing his heart to the promptings of the Holy Spirit who works to perfect his mind, will and
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affections. St Thomas views the gifts as intimately involved in the development of the Christian’s
affectivity. For example, the gift of piety forms the “appetitive power” in our personal relations,
the gift of fortitude moderates our fear in response to dangers, and the gift of fear purifies our
“inordinate lust for pleasures”.1119 The contemplation of these gifts enables the seminarian to be
aware of how the Holy Spirit assists him to mature his affectivity as a follower of Christ. To show
how St Thomas’ teaching on the gifts can be helpful for affective formation the following will be
discussed: a) The Formative Role of the Gifts; b) The Gifts that Form the Mind; c) The Gifts that
Form Affectivity; d) Implications for Affective Formation.

a. The Formative Role of the Gifts
The gifts of the Holy Spirit have an integral place in St Thomas’ vision of the Christian’s moral
development. The gifts are a habitus and as such abide in the personality of the Christian as
dispositions to properly develop his mind and affectivity.1120 St Thomas links the gifts of the Holy
Spirit to Christ who possesses them in their perfection.1121 As such, the gifts embody certain
fundamental attitudes and modes of action that are appropriate to the one who loves God. In this
regard, St Thomas quotes Isaiah 11.2, which speaks of the spirit of the Lord communicating certain
qualities to God’s servant: “the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might,
the spirit of knowledge and the fear of the Lord”. These are called gifts, St Thomas explains,
“because they are infused in us by God, but also because by them man is disposed to become
amenable to the Divine inspiration”.1122 St Thomas also quotes Isaiah 1.5 which refers to the
attitude of the disciple who listens to God and does not resist his will. Such people are “moved by
1119
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Divine instinct” and thus they have “no need to take counsel according to human reason, but only
to follow their inner promptings, since they are moved by a principle higher than human
reason”.1123 Thus, the gifts are motivating principles that help the seminarian to live like Christ.
The gifts are sometimes called virtues in the broad sense that virtue “perfects man in relation to
well-doing”, but “in so far as they are Divine virtues, perfecting man as moved by God” they are
“over and above” the virtues.1124 The gifts proceed “from the Divine prompting”.1125 Their object
is to supply the shortcomings of virtue in the mind and the will which subsist even in the person
whose character is formed by reason and the theological virtues. Since it is difficult for the
Christian “to avoid folly and other like things”, God “safeguards us from all folly, ignorance,
dullness of mind and hardness of heart … Consequently the gifts of the Holy Ghost, which make
us amenable to His promptings, are said to be given as remedies to these defects. 1126 Thus, one
function of the gifts is to bring about a softening of the seminarian’s heart that he may be open to
God and love his neighbor.
The “most important” part of the experience of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, Nicolas Lombardo
writes, “is that they mark out an important category of graced human affectivity”.1127 They are
more intimate expressions of the Holy Spirit’s work in the Christian’s heart to bring his life and
relationships to their Christ-like perfection. For example, St Thomas explains that the Gifts enable
us to perform our duty to our neighbor by the same acts of justice but “much more heartily” and
“with an ardent desire, even as a hungry and thirsty man eats and drinks with eager appetite”. 1128
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This pertains to the graced development of the Christian’s affectivity, in this particular case, his
desire to act for the just good of his neighbor.

b. The Gifts that Form the Mind
The Gifts of the Holy Spirit first influence the formation of affectivity by perfecting the speculative
and practical powers of the intellect. To help the apprehension of truth the speculative reason is
perfected by the Gift of Understanding, by which the Christian more intimately penetrates the
mysteries of Divine Revelation. The speculative reason is also perfected by the Gift of Wisdom,
by which the Christian’s life is ordered in accord with the sweetness of God’s love and the desire
to attain it in its fullness. The practical reason is perfected by the Gift of Knowledge, by which the
Christian perceives the true meaning, purpose, and value of created things in light of God’s creative
and wise love for them. The practical reason is also perfected by the Gift of Counsel, by which the
Christian judges well of what to do in particular circumstances.
The consideration of the gifts that form the seminarian’s mind incline him to seek the Holy Spirit’s
guidance in the development of his affections and relationships. This leads him to respect the
sources that the Holy Spirit has provided for his guidance. For example, the teaching of Sacred
Scripture, the wisdom gained by the long experience of the Church, and the counsel of wise
spiritual directors. The attitude formed by these gifts is one of eagerly desiring to judge according
to the mind of Christ and seek what is to the true good of others.1129
The Gift of Knowledge, for example, deepens our vision of earthly goods and purifies our desire
to seek glory through them. Knowledge pertains to a “right judgment about creatures”, which is of
great importance for the affectivity of the Christian because “it is through creatures that man’s
aversion from God is occasioned”.1130 Wisdom 14.11, for example, teaches that creatures can be a
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trap for the unwise who “deem the perfect good to consist” in them.1131 Consequently, we can
suffer the loss of “spiritual joy” which is not caused by created goods, “except in so far as they are
referred to the Divine good, which is the proper cause of spiritual joy”.1132 This is not a requirement
to disdain creatures. While the essence of beatitude consists in the contemplation of God, it “does
consist somewhat in the right use of creatures, and in well ordered love of them.” 1133 Hence, as
Farrell and Hughes write, the child of God “learns to love created goods for what they are worth”
in light of how they proceed from and are related to God.1134 Thus, the Gift of Knowledge forms
the seminarian’s affectivity to have a properly ordered love for created goods, inasmuch as they
proceed from God’s love and lead the seminarian to God.

c. The Gifts that Form Affectivity
The Gifts also directly perfect the acts of the will and the passions. In this regard, St Thomas links
the formative role of the gifts to the formative role of the moral virtues. The Gifts perfect the
Christian, making him “ready to follow the promptings of the Holy Ghost, even as the moral virtues
perfect the appetitive powers so that they obey reason”.1135 One implication of this teaching is that
in forming the Christian’s attitude to created goods, the Gifts encourage him to make a more eager
effort to perfect his passions and actions through the moral virtues. In this regard, the Gifts
emphasize how important it is to exercise a right attitude to others. For example, the Gift of Piety
forms relations with others according to their status as beloved children of God. The Gift of
Fortitude strengthens us against “the fear of dangers” so that we do not offend God’s love. The
Gift of Fear strengthens us “against inordinate lust for pleasures”, by inclining us to act out of
reverence for God.1136 In each case, the Gift strengthens the affective life of the Christian by
pointing to the importance of the action in light of its implications for his relationship to God.
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In relation to the formative role of the gifts, St Thomas writes: “these gifts extend to all those
things to which the virtues, both intellectual and moral, extend”.1137 They “perfect man for all the
acts of the soul’s powers”.1138 Since these virtues either influence (e.g. by justice we give to another
what is due to him), or directly pertain to the guidance of the passions (e.g. chastity regards
expressions of affection between the sexes), the Gifts also form the passions. For example, St
Thomas mentions that just as temperance restrains us from evil pleasures for the sake of our good,
“so does it belong to the gift of fear, to withdraw man from evil pleasures through fear of God”.1139
Also, St Thomas writes of the connection between Wisdom and our affectivity: “Wisdom directs
both the intellect and the affections of man”.1140 Wisdom leads a man to deeply reverence God out
of love because he considers “the Divine excellence, which wisdom considers”. 1141 The Gift of
Fear, in its turn, withdraws us from evil “through reverence for God” inasmuch as we do not want
to offend God’s love for us.1142
Let us take the Gift of Piety as an example of how the gifts form affectivity. In his consideration
of the Gift of Piety, St Thomas considers piety as a virtue and applies it to how the Holy Spirit
makes the Christian tender in his affections for God and his neighbor. As a virtue, piety perfects
our affections “in matters touching a man’s relations to another”. 1143 It specifically refers to “the
reverence which we give to our father and to our country. And since God is the Father of all, the
worship of God is also called piety … Therefore the gift whereby a man, through reverence for
God, works good to all, is fittingly called piety”.1144 Thus, filial devotion is given to God as the
ultimate loving source of our being and then to others, inasmuch as they reflect his goodness.1145
Now, in working to perfect our love for God the Holy Spirit moves us to experience “a filial
affection towards God”, making us cry out to God as our Father (Romans 8.15).1146 This affection
then leads us to extend “worship and duty not only to God, but also to all men on account of their
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relationship to God”.1147 An implication St Thomas draws is that the Gift of Piety is connected
with the beatitude concerning the meek, inasmuch as the Gift of Piety disposes us, as children of
God, to extend his mercy to his children.1148 Thus, we are moved out of a tender affection for our
Heavenly Father both to seek his honor and to procure the true welfare of our neighbor.1149

d. Implications for Affective Formation
St Thomas’ teaching on the Gifts of the Holy Spirit highlights the intimate involvement of God in
affective formation. To recognize this enables the seminarian to avoid making too sharp a
distinction between the human and spiritual aspects of his formation. Rather, it is important that
he see these two dimensions of formation - the human and the spiritual - as intimately related in
himself as a person who is created and redeemed by God. The effect of neglecting this dimension
of the seminarian’s affective formation is to deprive him of a knowledge of the sources of grace
that help him to develop his affectivity. This can amount to a practical Pelagianism, in which the
seminarian’s affective formation is conducted on his own resources without reference to the
guidance and strength of the Holy Spirit. This would limit the seminarian’s hope that he can attain
an affective maturity that is Christ-like. For, without the help of the same Holy Spirit who formed
the affectivity of Christ, how can the seminarian become affectively mature in the personal
relationships that are integral to his future priestly life?
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The seminarian needs to contemplate the gifts of the Holy Spirit to increase his awareness of how
the Spirit assists the development of his affectivity. Each of the Gifts refers to a principle of grace
by which the Holy Spirit helps to develop the seminarian’s mind and affectivity in accord with the
heart of Christ. Together these principles provide a set of attitudes that forms how the seminarian
expresses his affectivity. A mature Christian acts according to a true Understanding and orders his
life according to God’s Wisdom in relation to others. Through a true Knowledge of created realities
he loves them in right relationship with God who is the source of their being. Affective maturity
involves taking care to seek the Holy Spirit’s guidance by the Gift of Counsel to make decisions
that truly serve the good of others. The Gift of Fear impresses a deep sense of reverence on the
heart of the seminarian for God and his teaching about how to relate to others. By the Gift of Piety
the seminarian loves God as a tender Father and loves other people because they are God’s
children.
The Gifts sensitize the seminarian to the action of the Holy Spirit. In this way they contribute to
the development of the seminarian’s affective formation by opening him to the guidance and
encouragement of the Holy Spirit. Yet, the gifts do not override the proper development of the
moral virtues. Rather, the virtues dispose the seminarian to the love of God, “since man, through
being well subordinate to his own reason, is disposed to be rightly subordinate to God”.1150 That
is, being open to reason’s grasp of the good the seminarian is disposed to listen to the God who is
the creator of the human capacity to reason. As Craig Steven Titus explains in relation to prudence:
Aquinas’ notion of the grace (the graced instinct) of the Holy Spirit does not constitute parallel
realms or competitive worlds that divide nature from graced-nature or law from spiritual
instinct. Rather the grace of the sevenfold gift of the Holy Spirit disposes one to the impulses
that bring a further measure to reason.1151

In accord with St Thomas’ principle that grace perfects nature, we could say that the gifts of the
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St Thomas avoids “a formalist reduction of moral goodness to the goodness of the will”.1152 St
Thomas further applies this insight to the relationships between prudence and charity. Prudence is
necessary for the proper operation of our faculties under the rule of charity and as they are guided
by the Gifts. For there is a specific perfection of the person through the judgment of the right
course of action and the proper guidance of the moral virtues. This should not be neglected by a
false appeal to the higher guidance of the Holy Spirit. In doing violence to the proper judgment of
reason, violence is done to the person who has responsibility for his own actions. For example, the
Gift of Counsel does not excuse the seminarian from carefully studying moral principles so that
he can properly guide others.
It is true that for St Thomas, “the infused moral virtues are connected, not only through prudence,
but also on account of charity”.1153 However, while charity is the virtue that directs all our virtues
in accord with our love for God, prudence is still an integral virtue. This is so according to the
principle that the lower power must be perfected if the higher power is to be properly exercised.
As St Thomas explains: “for if the principal agent were well disposed, perfect action would not
follow, if the instrument also were not well disposed”.1154 The implication is that if we are to work
well towards our ultimate end we need more than the virtue of charity, which disposes us to that
end. We need “also those virtues which dispose” us properly to “whatever is referred to the
end”.1155 For this reason, the seminarian needs to develop the virtues that perfect his various
faculties, acts and relationships. This development enables the life of charity and the action of the
Gifts to be unfolded and applied in the various dimensions of his life. In other words, the formation
of the seminarian’s affectivity through the Gifts also needs the development of prudence and
discretion. Otherwise, the Gifts will not truly enhance the affectivity of the seminarian. For
example, it is insufficient to appeal to the Gift of Piety to justify how we express a tender love for
others because they are fellow children of God. Personal relationships also require a sound
judgment about how they are to be conducted, according to both the proper human good of the
people involved and principles such as respect for the other’s freedom, fairness and courtesy.
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There is a final implication that needs to be made more explicit to appreciate the importance of the
Gifts as principles of affective formation. The Gifts are unified and motivated by charity, that is,
the love of God and the love of our neighbor as ourselves. Whether we consider the Gifts that
perfect the mind or affectivity of a Christian, we are looking at Gifts that draw us into the same
attitude to others that God has for them. The Gifts are not principles by which we look simply to
the perfection of our own character and desires but enable us to share in the attitude that God has
toward other people and ourselves. This is most obvious in a Gift like Piety which inclines us to
love God with reverence and our neighbor as a part of God’s family by grace. It is no less real,
however, in the Gifts that perfect the mind and judgment of the Christian. For example, the Gift
of Knowledge is not a mere elevation of the mind to acquire more detailed knowledge of created
realities but the ability to know created realities as they given to us by God and help us to come
know God. In other words, it is the grace filled capacity to know created realities, especially other
created persons, within the context of a relationship of love and friendship with God.
The importance of the relational nature of the Gifts is that it moves the seminarian away from an
exaggerated attitude to acquire knowledge about things that neglects a proper attention to people.
It places the quest for knowledge at the service of both promoting proper personal relationships
and the good of others. Drawing the seminarian into a stance of seeing others according to the love
of God for them and entering into relationships with them, the Gifts lead the seminarian out of a
tendency to be self-absorbed and into a true regard for the other person.1156

See Andrew Pinsent, The Second-Person Perspective in Aquinas’ Ethics: Virtue and Gifts (New York:
Routledge, 2012), for a treatment of how St Thomas’ analysis of infused virtue, the Gifts, Beatitudes and Fruits can
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3. The Beatitudes Form Desire
As a future shepherd of the faithful the seminarian will have to give a clear example of the way of
Christian life. This example ought to shine forth in the formation of his desires to reflect the life
of Christ. The seminarian ought to manifest the rightly ordered affections that flow from a heart
that yearns for the promise of eternal life. By desiring to experience the fulfilment of this promise
the seminarian’s perspective is purified, so that he rightly desires the fulfilment of earthly goods
and loves his neighbor with true affection. To explore how St Thomas’ teaching on these matters
is important to affective formation the following topics will be discussed: a) Formation of
Affectivity by the Beatitudes; b) The Beatitudes and the Motivations of the Heart; c) Implications
for Affective Formation.

a. Formation of Affectivity by the Beatitudes
The Beatitudes refine the Christian’s understanding of the attitudes that fulfill the life of Faith,
Hope and Charity so that he may attain beatitude.1157 The Beatitudes do this by appealing to the
desires of the Christian for certain dimensions of happiness, for example, mercy, that he can only
properly receive when he communicates them to others. We read of the Beatitudes in Matthew
5.3-12 and a shorter form is found in Luke 6.20-23. To the mind of St Thomas, these Beatitudes
are acts that give us a foretaste of the happiness of eternal life. Future happiness can be experienced
in us both by the predisposition or readiness for future happiness developed by a virtuous life and
by an anticipatory experience of this eternal happiness in the heart of the holy man.1158 In this way,
Servais Pinckaers observes, St Thomas recognizes the beatitudes as “Christ’s answer to the
question of happiness” and through his treatise in Summa Theologica I-II, q. 69, aa.1-4, affirms
that this teaching has “the place of honor in Christian moral teaching”.1159 Thus, the Beatitudes
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hold a pivotal place in St Thomas’ understanding of the Christian’s affective and moral
development.
The Beatitudes order the Christian’s affections in accord with the promises of God about eternal
life. In addressing the question of whether the rewards assigned by the Beatitudes are in this life
or the next, St Thomas recognizes our common psychological experience: we desire the good of
which we are aware. St Thomas sees that the promises attached to the Beatitudes “are a kind of
preparation for, or disposition to happiness”, and they also refer to certain dimensions of the
perfection of happiness in Heaven.1160 Moreover, even though there may be a lack of material
rewards in the present life the faithful “never lack spiritual rewards”. 1161 In other words, we are
enriched through living the values that the Beatitudes impart to us, over and above the material
rewards we can set our hearts on. St Thomas writes of these various goods that the Christian
believer can attain and which give a new perspective on our goals and actions.
In the Beatitudes, the Kingdom of Heaven denotes “the beginning of perfect wisdom, in so far as
the spirit begins to reign in men”, St Thomas writes in reference to Matthew 5.3.1162 The possession
of the land (Matthew 5.4) refers to “the well ordered affections of the soul that rests, by its desire,
on the solid foundation of the eternal inheritance, signified by the land”.1163 The faithful are
comforted by the Holy Spirit (Matthew 5.5). They have their fill (Matthew 5.6) of what the Lord
Jesus referred to as the will of the Father (John 4.34). They obtain God’s mercy (Matthew 5.7)
when they repent and when they forgive others. They are cleansed by understanding and so they
can, “so to speak”, see God (Matthew 5.8).1164 When they “are the peacemakers of their own
movements” they are very like God (Matthew 5.9), “and are called the children of God”.1165
“Nevertheless these things will be more perfectly fulfilled in Heaven”.1166 When our desires are
aligned with the attitudes expressed in the Beatitudes, our hearts are open to the blessings of a right
relationship with God and our neighbor.
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These blessings and dispositions of the Beatitudes influence the Christian’s affective development.
This accords with the principle given by St Thomas that the higher actions of grace “perfect man
in all matters wherein the virtues perfect him”.1167 We would therefore expect that as the moral
virtues perfect the actions and passions, so too, according to the higher principle of grace and hope
in eternal life, the Beatitudes would perfect them. We see this line of thought at work in St Thomas’
discussion of how the Beatitudes develop our attitudes and decisions. The Beatitudes are in part
exhortations to set aside incorrect ideas of what brings us happiness. The very hoping for the
fulfillment of all our desires in eternal beatitude gives us a happiness that purifies and moderates
our desires for present goods. This inchoate happiness enables us to refocus our hearts and be
drawn away from a distorted perspective of the importance of present goods, and thus we can avoid
exaggerating their importance.
Each of the Beatitudes purifies the Christian’s affective responses. The poor in spirit are called
blessed (Matthew 5.5) because they know how to set aside an improper attachment to riches and
honors. They avoid placing their hope in sensual pleasure as the source of their happiness. The
meek are called blessed (Matthew 5.4) because they can order their irascible passions in accord
with the good. Those who are meek moderate the passion of anger so that they do not violate the
principles of justice. Those who mourn are called blessed (Matthew 5.5) because they know how
to ensure the proper order of their concupiscible passions. They do not an improper desire for
wrongful pleasure. Indeed, with their hearts intent on the joy of Heaven they are enabled even to
make “a deliberate choice of sorrow”.1168 This can be interpreted in the light of St Thomas’ earlier
discussion of the passion of sorrow. Here he comments that the sorrows of this life can lead us to
the “comfort of the future life”.1169 For when we mourn for our sins or mourn for the delay of
eternal glory we merit “the consolation of eternity”.1170 Likewise, we merit that glory when we do
not avoid “hardships in order to obtain it”.1171 That is, on account of our desire to share God’s
glory we accept the sufferings that accompany a life of fidelity to God in this world.
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Furthermore, those who hunger and thirst for justice are blessed (Matthew 5.6) because they are
moved to eagerly do what is right by their neighbor. The merciful are blessed (Matthew 5.7)
because they give generously not only to their friends, according to the right rule of reason, but
beyond this they give to those in need, the poor and the maimed (Luke 14.12-13). The clean of
heart are blessed (Matthew 5.8) because they have been purified by the virtues and the gifts of the
Holy Spirit. Their hearts are not affected by disordered passions. The peacemakers are blessed
(Matthew 5.9) because they are perfected in their relations with their neighbors, according to the
virtue of justice, so that the harmony of peace is experienced.1172 The eighth Beatitude corresponds
to the other seven and confirms them, declaring their ultimate reward: heavenly glory.1173
Each beatitude has an affective dimension inasmuch as it shapes the desires of the Christian in
relation to others. By acting like Christ, according to God’s justice, mercy, purity, peace, and in
the hope of experiencing the fullness of these blessings in Heaven, the Christian forms his
affections and passions. The Christ-like attitude and the actions that flow from them shape the
Christian’s affective experiences so that they can be part of a true experience of unity with his
neighbor. Indeed, each beatitude articulates a dimension of such a true unity inasmuch as it is both
a condition for the flourishing of personal relationships and an indication that the relationship is
healthy. In other words, a true relationship for the Christian requires the Christ-like attitudes of
justice, mercy, purity, peace and hope in heavenly blessing, and these are indications that the
relationships truly flow from the heart of a person who is attuned to God’s wisdom and love.

b. The Beatitudes and the Motivations of the Heart
Why are the Beatitudes so helpful for affective development? The Beatitudes appeal to our
motivations, by imparting a knowledge of future promises that influences our attitudes and
decisions in regard to present realities. For instance, St Thomas mentions “the chief motive for
mourning is knowledge, whereby man knows his failings and those of worldly things”.1174 This
knowledge and motivation is the cause of the desire for the comfort that the Beatitude promises.
In this case, the Beatitude encourages the Christian to courageously consider his failings and look
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openly at how earthly realities can fall short of his expectations. Thus, the Beatitude encourages
him, through the promise of God’s comfort, to leave aside wrongful behavior and refuse to seek
comfort in earthly things to the detriment of his striving for heaven.
The first basic problem of motivation St Thomas mentions concerns “sensual happiness”, by which
we seek the object of our natural desire where we should not seek it, rather than seeking it in accord
with our love for God.1175 Instead, we can place too much store “in temporal and perishable
things”. Thus, the rewards of the first three Beatitudes answer the desire for external things such
as “riches and honors”, in which we seek “a certain excellence and abundance”. 1176 The promise
of the Beatitudes is essentially geared to answering the truth of these desires in God, in whom they
have their full meaning in the glory of the Kingdom. Flowing from the felt need for riches and
glory is the affective problem of feeling insecure about how much we need to live. This feeling of
insecurity inclines many to be cruel and pitiless in their fighting to possess earthly goods. “Hence
Our Lord promised the meek a secure and peaceful possession of the land of the living, whereby
the solid reality of eternal goods is denoted.”1177 It is this sense of security, built upon God’s
promise, which enables the Christian to avoid clinging to earthly riches and doing evil to acquire
them.
Another problem is that we often seek “consolation for the toils of the present life, in the lusts and
pleasures of the world.”1178 The sorrows of life, for example, can obscure our view of the truly
moral way to fulfill our desires. Thus, the promise of the Beatitude addresses the need to leave
aside what is an abuse of the goods of pleasure. There is, then, a need for a kind of mourning for
what might be perceived at a certain time as a helpful remedy, but which nevertheless harms the
moral good of the Christian. The Christian must allow himself to grieve and let go of what will
hold him back from attaining his true good in God. This leaving aside of what is evil is encouraged
by the promise of consolations that will be experienced according to God’s love and providence.
St Thomas applies the same basic structure of thought to the other Beatitudes. For some there is a
motive to move away “from acts of justice, and instead of rendering what is due” take what does
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not belong to them so “that they may abound in temporal goods”.1179 Here a hunger for possessions
has overridden the need for relating justly with one’s neighbor. This affective disorder is addressed
in the Beatitude concerning those who hunger for justice and are promised that they will have their
fill. It is not the desire for being filled that is denied but its disordered manifestation through
injustice that is purified, by relating it to a respect for the rightful needs of others.
Some are motivated to neglect the works of mercy because they do not want to “be busy with other
people’s misery”.1180 Here the fear that ensues in a passion of aversion impedes a person’s capacity
for the compassion of pity, which is so necessary for serving those in need. Thus the Lord promises
mercy to those who are merciful, thereby appealing to the motivation of the human heart to
recognize our common need for mercy. Through the experience of this need for mercy the
Christian will be inclined to recognize the need to become merciful to others.
Two Beatitudes help the Christian to properly use wealth for the good of others. First, the Beatitude
concerning the poor in spirit teaches that they will possess the kingdom of heaven (Matthew 5.3).
Therefore the poor in spirit are predisposed to overcome an undue attachment to riches. They know
the relative value of wealth. They look to the excellence and abundance of good things found in
God.1181 The true wealth they have is the love of God and the love of their neighbor, which
moderates their desire for external riches. So that “the well ordered affections of the soul”, St
Thomas comments, rest “on the solid foundation of the eternal inheritance”. 1182 The other
Beatitude counteracting covetousness is that the merciful are blessed (Matthew 5.7). This
Beatitude perfects our liberality, out of reverence for God, to consider the needs of others.1183 Some
stay away from works of mercy, St Thomas observes, because they do not want to “be busied with
other people’s misery. Hence Our Lord promised the merciful that they should obtain mercy, and
be delivered from all misery”.1184 St Thomas here touches upon the way God motivates us by the
promise of mercy which will be abundantly fulfilled for the merciful. 1185 Thus we are motivated
to set aside a false attachment to riches and answer the needs of others.
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The motivation of the noblest desires of the human heart are recognized in the Beatitudes
concerning the clean of heart and the peacemakers. The Beatitude concerning the clean of heart,
disposes us to seek an accurate understanding of other persons and how to serve their true good.
This especially concerns our relationship with God. As St Thomas writes: “the eye being cleansed
by the gift of understanding, we can, so to speak, see God.” 1186 That is, a correct understanding,
as it is guided by the help of the Holy Spirit, enables us to perceive God and the truth of his ways.
This correct perspective on the presence of God also predisposes us to correctly understand and
work for the good of our neighbor. The same appeal to a good motivation is made in the Beatitude
concerning peace, which concerns those who work to be in a right and harmonious relation with
others. To work for this kind of peace closely aligns us with God. St Thomas writes:
to make peace either in oneself or among others, shows a man to be a follower of God, Who
is the God of unity and peace. Hence, as a reward, he is promised the glory of the Divine
sonship, consisting in perfect union with God through consummate wisdom.1187

In this Beatitude, the desire we have for unity and peace is encouraged by the promise that one
will be known as a child of God, who desires such unity and peace for his children. The desire
here is live in accord with the deepest motivation of God’s heart, to have his children living
together as a true family in this world and in the next.
Underlying all the Beatitudes is a sense that God is aware of the human person’s deepest desire to
be like God and act according to God’s mind and heart. Thus God makes a promise that both
articulates that need and impresses it deeply upon the Christian’s heart. The Christian is drawn
through the well-founded hope that God will realize his promises. Moreover, in commenting on
the order of the rewards articulated by the Beatitudes, St Thomas again points to the power of the
promise to reorder and incite our desires according to the promised blessings of God. St Thomas
explains that there is a movement from possessing the land of the heavenly kingdom to possessing
it without sorrow. We are comforted in the possession of this kingdom according to a fullness that
“implies abundance of comfort”.1188 Further still, mercy surpasses this fullness because in heaven
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we receive more than we merited or can even desire. Beyond this there is the vision of God himself,
the source of all our blessings.1189
The rewards of the Beatitudes that St Thomas reflects upon refer to specific categories under the
general reward of Heaven. These rewards are promised to inflame the heart of the Christian to set
aside placing his security in a happiness that falls short of his dignity as a child of God. Since the
glory of Heaven assures us every blessing, the Christian is encouraged to sacrifice earthly goods,
if it is necessary, to attain the eternal Kingdom. For example, those tempted to give way to
unrighteous anger are exhorted to be meek. For the meek will be given the lasting security of the
heavenly homeland.1190

c. Implications for Affective Formation
The formation of the Christian’s life through the education and enlivening of his desires is an
important theme of Sacred Scripture. 1 John 3.1-3 refers to the lavishing of God’s love on the
Christian and makes him aware of the moment he will be able to see God as he is. The implication
is that the person who hopes for this moment “purifies himself”. That is, the desired future blessing
shapes how the Christian lives in the present. Likewise, St Thomas’ teaching on the Beatitudes
refers to a fundamental dimension of affective formation: the development of the seminarian’s
desires in light of the promised blessing of eternal happiness. The contemplation of the blessings
that flow from a life lived according to the Beatitudes, motivates the seminarian to live in a way
that makes him blessed.
The implication for affective formation is to adopt the language of the promise that Christ used to
evoke the love, desire, and hope of the human heart for the fulfilment of God’s blessings. Thereby,
the Beatitudes will shed light on the meaning of the attitudes and actions that express the love,
desire, and hope of the seminarian in relation to others. However, this education of the seminarian’s
desires needs to follow the logic of Christ in his teaching about the Beatitudes. Each of the
Beatitudes refers to a particular blessing that the seminarian can long for. This longing, however,
needs to be exercised in the knowledge of its importance for himself, inasmuch as in offering it to
1189
1190
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another he will experience it for himself. An example given above refers to the need for mercy.
The longing to receive the mercy of God incites the seminarian’s desire to show mercy to others,
according to his own need to receive mercy. By making him aware of his own need for the blessing,
an education in a rightful desire takes place, so that he can grow in a pattern of action that produces
a blessed form of life. In this case, a merciful attitude to others that reflects the mercy of Christ.
For the purpose of developing an analysis of affective formation, we can glean from St Thomas’
teaching a richly developed understanding of how to appeal to the human heart to respond to the
Gospel. It is a way that can open the seminarian’s heart to a richer view of how his heart can be
moved to fulfill his vocation and live a life of service for others. It is a way of understanding
affectivity in light of a promised blessedness that draws the human heart in its desire for completion
and joy. This is a teaching that can draw the seminarian to live for God and his people. It is a
teaching that he can impart to the people of God that they may share this blessed hope of the
fulfilment of their desires in God. The implication for affective formation, then, is to place a great
emphasis upon both the increase of the seminarian’s desire to receive the promises of God and to
live in such a way that he will be made ready to receive them.

4. The Fruits of the Holy Spirit: a Pattern of Maturity
St Thomas’ teaching on the Fruits of the Holy Spirit articulates the kinds of personal qualities a
fully mature person possesses and exercises in relation to others.1191 They are the kinds of acts that
manifest a mature joy in the properly formed affections and virtues of Christian life. To possess
the fruits is a goal for the seminarian who, with the help of the Holy Spirit, aims to practice the
Theological Virtues, Gifts, and Beatitudes so that he may become affectively mature. To reflect
on how these fruits are present in his life, or are not present, enables the seminarian to evaluate his
affective progress. Inasmuch as the Fruits are not present, he can develop both his responsiveness
to grace and his capacity to develop the Virtues, Gifts, and Beatitudes from which the Fruits are

Lombardo writes: “In question 70 of the Prima Secundae, at the culmination of his account of human
flourishing’s essential structure, Aquinas turns finally to the fruits of the Holy Spirit”. He also comments that before
St Thomas “the fruits had been only vaguely defined in the theological imagination” and that he “offers a creative
reinterpretation of the fruits as the final product of the Holy Spirit’s activity in the human person.” The Logic of
Desire, 145-146.
1191
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matured. This will dispose his mind and heart to bear fruit in charity, joy, peace, patience, longsuffering, goodness, benignity, meekness, faith, modesty, continency and chastity.1192 These
qualities are hallmarks of how a mature Christian conducts his personal relationships and forms
his affectivity so that these relationships may flourish.
From Christ’s teaching that the tree is known by its fruits (Matthew 12.33), St Thomas draws the
implication that a person “is known by his works”.1193 In the material world fruit “is the product
of a plant when it comes to perfection, and has a certain sweetness”.1194 In reference to the spiritual
life fruit is both what a man produces in his actions and what he gathers from them in terms of the
results in himself and his relationships. The word fruit, in its implication of being something
pleasant, also refers to our everlasting fulfilment. As St Thomas writes: “man’s fruit is his last end
which is intended for his enjoyment”.1195 Human actions also give joy inasmuch as they are
suitable to us and give pleasure to us according to their proper goodness. Accordingly, they are
called fruits.1196 If our actions proceed from and are suitable to reason, then they are the fruits of
reason. If our actions proceed from the power of the Holy Spirit, as he works in us, they are the
Fruits of the Holy Spirit.
St Thomas writes about the Fruits of the Holy Spirit in a general sense as “any virtuous deeds in
which one delights”.1197 The man who co-operates with the inspiration of the Holy Spirit finds in
such holy actions “something ultimate and delightful”.1198 Just as the fruit is the highest point of
development we expect from a fruit tree, so the Fruits of the Holy Spirit are acts that are expected
as the outcome of a life formed by the grace of God. Thus, while we delight in God for his own
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sake as our supreme good, we also delight “in virtuous deeds … for the sake of their inherent
goodness which is delightful to the virtuous”.1199 In this way, someone manifests his maturity as a
virtuous person by the joy he experiences in virtuous actions. For example, the loving father
experiences a certain joy when he acts for the welfare of his children.
St Thomas describes these Fruits as an overflow of the abundant action of grace in us. The
difference between them is inferred “from the various ways in which the Holy Spirit proceeds in
us” and sets in order three dimensions of the Christian’s life.1200 First, the order within us. Second,
the order in relation to things near us. Third, the order in relation to things below us. As Lombardo
notes, St Thomas’ point here is that, “what he sees as most essential to the fruits is that they order,
and thereby perfect, the mind and the interior affections of the human person. For Aquinas, the
fruits are not phenomena haphazardly associated with the activity of the Holy Spirit; they correlate
to the determinate ways in which the Holy Spirit perfects the various faculties of the human
person”.1201 So, the Fruits are perfections both of our inner life and our ability to relate well to the
world and other people.
In relation to the order within us: we are disposed well when we are properly disposed to good and
evil things. The fruits that pertain to this proper disposition are charity, joy, peace, patience and
long-suffering. Charity is mentioned first because “the first disposition of the human mind” is love,
the first of the passions and the cause of all the others.1202 Charity is appropriately the first of the
Fruits mentioned because the Holy Spirit is Love (Romans 5.5).1203 Joy is the next fruit because
the union of love produces joy and since the Holy Spirit as Love truly abides within us this union
with him produces joy (1 John 4.16). Peace is the third Fruit because when our hearts are “perfectly
set at peace in one object”, we account “all others as nothing”.1204 And when we are in a secure
and lasting union with the beloved, we are at peace and undisturbed in our love and joy. Patience
is the next Fruit because the Holy Spirit helps us to be undisturbed when evil threatens our peace.
Long-suffering is the next Fruit, by which we remain undisturbed when good things are delayed.
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In regard to the order of the Christian in relation to things near him, the Holy Spirit helps him to
be well disposed to his neighbor. The Fruits that flow from this proper attitude are goodness,
benignity, meekness and faith. Goodness is the Fruit pertaining to someone having a good will to
his neighbor. Benignity (generosity) relates to how he acts well and kindly with regard to his
neighbor. Meekness concerns how he peacefully suffers evil from his neighbor and restrains his
anger. Faith (fidelity) is the fruit by which he refrains from doing harm to his neighbor, by “fraud
or deceit”, and by which he is faithful to God.1205
Then there are the Fruits that pertain to the order of the Christian in relation to things below him.
“Man is well disposed in respect of that which is below him”, St Thomas writes, when he has a
proper regard for his sensitive appetite, the source of his life of passion.1206 The fruits that flow
from a proper ordering of the passions are modesty, continence, and chastity. Modesty is the Fruit
by which the Christian observes a proper “mode” or manner in all his words and deeds.1207
Continence preserves him from internal desires of what could be lawfully desired in sexual matters
but which is foregone on account of his vocation, for example, if he has a vocation to celibacy
rather than marriage. By chastity the Christian is withdrawn from “unlawful desires” in sexual
matters (such as adultery).1208
What are the implications for the seminarian’s affective formation of St Thomas’ consideration of
the Fruits of the Holy Spirit? The Fruits are a certain completion of St Thomas’ treatment of the
general principles of the Christian’s affective development. Concentrating on the theme of the
enjoyment of the good acts that proceed according to the Holy Spirit’s influence, St Thomas draws
a line of progression. This line of progression proceeds from the basic principle of love and its
orientation to enjoy the good, all the way up to the enjoyment of the actions that proceed from the
life of grace in its maturity. These actions include the ability to experience joy in the affective
dispositions that are essential to relating properly to one’s neighbor.1209

1205

Summa Theologica I-II, q.70, a.3, resp.
Ibid.
1207
Ibid.
1208
Ibid.
1209
Lombardo comments: “The fruits describe all sorts of affections and affective qualities: the joy and peace that
flow from charity; patience and long-suffering in the face of difficulties; more fervent service of others through ‘the
1206

277

Just as we enjoy the actions that proceed from our reason when they attain their proper perfection,
so too do we enjoy the actions that proceed from the Holy Spirit’s communication of his love. This
flows into our enjoyment of all the other perfections of our mind and affections that he works in
us. In reflecting on the Fruits of the Holy Spirit, St Thomas gives us an outline of mature growth
and an expectation of its outcome in the life of the Christian who co-operates with God. These
Fruits flow from both the mind that is informed by Faith and the Heart that is enlivened by Charity.
Thus, the seminarian ought to reflect in his attitudes, affections, and actions the perfections of a
mature inner life, as they are articulated in the Fruits of the Holy Spirit.
It is true that there is a certain virtue in struggling to attain a higher level of virtue. However, the
pattern of the Fruits of the Holy Spirit indicates a mature stage of affective growth that the
seminarian needs to desire, pray for and work towards. It is the stage of affective maturity in the
man who, like Christ, manifests the Fruits of the Holy Spirit both in himself and in his personal
relationships. Thus, one way of helping the seminarian to reflect on the progress he has made in
affective maturity is to ask him whether he perceives the Fruits of the Holy Spirit in himself, in his
actions, and in his personal relationships. Does he see that he conducts himself as a man who is
charitable, joyful, peaceful, patient and long-suffering? Is he good, generous, meek, and faithful
to others? Is he modest, continent, and chaste in his affections for others? Does he understand that
by these Fruits he is contributing to the good of others through an affectively mature love?

Conclusion
The central point to be gleaned from this chapter is that the perfective action of grace is the deepest
principle of affective formation. The seminarian needs to open his heart to the various principles
of grace by contemplating and exercising them as we have discussed above. By Faith he accepts
what God has revealed about how he is to live as a child of God. By Hope he is encouraged to live
so that he can receive God’s promise of Heaven. By Charity he develops a life of intimate and
loyal friendship with God and allows this friendship to overflow into his love of others. Affective
formation is thus set within the overall development of the Christian’s life. This formation is
good fire of love’; restraint of anger; and the moderation of ‘interior desire’ by continence and chastity [in reference
to Summa Theologica I-II, q.70, a.3].” The Logic of Desire, 146.
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deepened by a sensitivity to the guidance of the Holy Spirit through such Gifts as Knowledge and
Piety, which shape the seminarian’s understanding, affectivity, and how he relates to others.
Moreover, the seminarian’s desires are shaped by the Beatitudes, which embody attitudes that are
necessary to attain the promises of God. For example, the desire to receive mercy forms the
readiness to be merciful. Finally, the Fruits of the Holy Spirit give a pattern of maturity, by which
the seminarian experiences joy when he relates well to others through such qualities as generosity
and chastity. Now, having examined St Thomas’ reflections on the formative role of grace, the
work of the last two chapters is to analyze St Thomas’s teaching on infused virtue in relation to
the problem of inordinate affectivity. The aim will be to help the seminarian apply the principles
of infused virtue so that he can properly form his affective responses when they incline him to sin.
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SECTION 3
THE RESPONSE TO DISORDERED AFFECTIONS
Section 3 analyses St Thomas’ teaching on disordered affectivity and how infused virtue can help
the seminarian to respond to it with maturity. Chapter 10 considers the capital vices, from pride to
gluttony, helping the seminarian to both discern the source of his sins and a way to develop his
authentic desires through the exercise of infused virtue. Finally, Chapter 11, considers St Thomas’
teaching on lust, inasmuch as it harms the seminarian’s ability to responsibly love others, and how
the infused virtue of chastity enables him to properly form his sexual desires.
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CHAPTER 10
THE CAPITAL VICES AND AFFECTIVE FORMATION
The last three chapters have been an analysis of how St Thomas’ teaching on grace and the virtues
can be applied to the affective formation of men preparing for the ordained ministry. The purpose
of this chapter is to consider St Thomas’ teaching on how affective responses can be inordinate
and how the seminarian can respond to them in a virtuous manner. To develop this point we will
examine St Thomas’ teaching on the capital vices as principles that distort someone’s affectivity
and which incline him to sinful patterns of behavior. The aim is to understand the sources of these
inordinate tendencies and how to reorient them to the good through the virtues. To complete this
consideration, the next chapter will conduct a case study on how the virtue of chastity can foster
the healing of inordinate sexual desire.
The study of St Thomas’ teaching on the vices will help the seminarian to assimilate the teaching
of Pope St John Paul II on affective maturity. In Pastores Dabo Vobis, John Paul II calls the
seminarian to set aside any disordered forms of affectivity, because they diminish how he relates
to others and thereby inhibit his ability to communicate the goodness of Christ. For example, the
seminarian should avoid being arrogant or quarrelsome, because he is called to be a man of
communion who promotes the welfare of the Christian community.1210 And, out of fraternal charity
priests ought to set “aside all forms of jealousy, envy and rivalry”.1211 Thus, the seminarian should
seek to purify his inordinate affective tendencies, in order to relate virtuously to others and help
them come close to Christ.
To achieve this reorientation of his affectivity, the seminarian needs a coherent and detailed
explanation of the sources of affective distortions and their impact on his personal relationships.
For example, he needs to understand envy, what motivates it, and how it damages his personal
relationships. Without this kind of knowledge the seminarian lacks the instruments of selfreflection that will help him to distinguish his good and evil motivations. This also becomes the
basis for him to look to the relevant virtues that can foster his affective growth. With this in mind,
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the following discussion concerns three important dimensions of St Thomas’ teaching on vice and
how it can be helpful to the seminarian’s affective formation. First, there will be a reflection on St
Thomas’ teaching on the general relationship between affectivity and sin (1). Second, there will
be a consideration of how inordinate self-love and pride are the chief sources of sin (2-3). Third,
the discussion will move to a consideration of St Thomas’ teaching on the capital sins of vainglory,
envy, acedia (sloth), avarice and gluttony, and the virtues that help to re-order them (4-8). A
consideration of anger will be excluded from this present chapter because it has been examined in
Chapter 6.

1. Affectivity and Sin
The first step in coming to understand the negative impact of the capital vices is to consider the
general relationship between affectivity and sin. The goal is to reflect upon how our faculties can
generate inordinate desires and how these faculties can be reformed. St Thomas describes the state
in which our faculties are left without their proper ordering to virtue as “a wounding of nature”.1212
This wounding is manifested in a certain distortion of each faculty’s acts. There is a wound of
ignorance inasmuch as we do not clearly understand the truth. There is the wound of malice by
which we choose in an evil way. The wound of weakness is found in the irascible passions which
move us to either inordinately pursue the arduous good or avoid the arduous evil. The wound of
concupiscence consists in the lack of due moderation in the pursuit of pleasure through our
concupiscible passions.1213
The purpose of recognizing these wounds is to seek their purification, that is, the reorientation of
our distorted acts and habits so that we can properly pursue the good. The purpose of repentance
and grace, then, is not to diminish the proper acts of these faculties but to restore them, according
to the principle that “grace perfects nature”.1214 Grace, in other words, enables someone to properly
develop his faculties in order to live a truly virtuous life.
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Sin, on the other hand, impairs both the formative influence of grace and the proper development
of our faculties.1215 Since we find our fulfilment in God, any action that harms our friendship with
God also harms the proper exercise of our faculties.1216 This in turn inhibits the development of
our personal relationships with others because we lack the ability to act well towards them. An
analogy is found in human friendship, which is damaged through deceitfulness, by which a person
is predisposed to repeat this bad pattern of behavior in future relationships.
For the purpose of affective formation it is important for the seminarian to reflect on the impact of
disordered passions, which can distort his affective experience and incline him to wrongful
behavior.1217 The passions can move someone’s will indirectly by distracting it, either partially or
altogether. This occurs because he has a limited capacity to counteract the tendency of a strong
passion. For example, tiredness can limit his ability to resist a strong burst of anger and it can be
difficult for him to turn his attention away from an object that is the cause of a strong affective
response.1218 Thus, the passions can inhibit his reasoning process by inclining him to give too much
attention to the particular case and not enough attention to a general moral principle.
For example, St Thomas describes the thinking process of the incontinent person who reasons that
fornication is not right while a strong passion suggests that pleasure be pursued.1219 Steven Jensen
argues that in this case the weak person fails to consider the fuller picture by filtering out other
relevant considerations about the act. The person is so desirous of pleasure, “that she wants to
choose now, and she does not want to bother thinking about other aspects of the action”.1220 This
is an abandoning of reason, “at the particular level”, because the person fails to sufficiently
“investigate the nature of this particular action”.1221 Instead, she would do better to reflect upon
the true meaning of sexual love as an expression of a faithful love in marriage and that she violates
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this meaning through her lustful act.1222 Thus, she should develop her capacity for careful
reflection and avoid impulsive actions so that she can prepare well for a lasting marital union.
In studying such elements of St Thomas’ teaching on sin, it might be asked whether we are
proceeding too negatively for the purpose of the seminarian’s affective formation. On this point,
George Corbett argues that “comparatively little attention” has been given “to Aquinas’ treatment
of sin” for two reasons.1223 There is the tendency to see St Thomas as a champion of virtue ethics
and there is the cultural trend to emphasize the good, virtue, and heaven, while avoiding negative
themes such as sin and hell. But, Corbett argues, St Thomas’ careful treatment of the psychology
of sin can be of enormous help to us. St Thomas shows “how reflection on the reality of a particular
sin – which is the natural starting point for a penitent – is potentially transformative: it can, and
should, lead a person to the path of virtue of which sin is a disorder”.1224 That is, St Thomas’
teaching on the vices has a positive purpose – to set aside what is evil so that we can be free to
strive for the true good.
Furthermore, it is far better, as Basil Cole explains, to systematically study the vices rather than
allow them to become “an unconscious motivating power”.1225 Ignorance can do “damage when
emotions are repressed or denied, for all the capital vices revolve around unreasonable and illformed emotions”.1226 Consequently, the effort to purify the inner forces that distort the
seminarian’s way of relating to others is a necessary part of his self-knowledge. He “must learn
the difference between his authentic self and the false images, projected by the seeds of the capital
vices”.1227 He must learn how to discern between those desires and actions that truly develop his
identity, as someone preparing for the priesthood, and those which corrupt this identity.
Furthermore, as De Young points out, giving names to vices is an instrument of proper selfawareness. “It gives us a clearer idea of what we’re facing, helps us disentangle surface symptoms
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from root causes, and points to therapies that are likely to be most effective.” 1228 For, the capital
vices “depict for us the traits of character” which need to be purified if we are to live a more Christlike life.1229 Observing our feelings, actions and habits, or “deeply rooted patterns in our
character”, we can see what needs to change if we are to become better people.1230 Furthermore,
guided by a set of objective principles, we can more accurately reflect upon our affective
experiences and what they prompt us to do. Thus, we are able “to think through reasons for acting
one way rather than another”, writes DeYoung, and so “resist the pull of passion.”1231 This is a
positive approach that enables the seminarian to think through and reorient his inordinate desires.
So, the importance of this introductory description of inordinate affectivity is that it is the starting
point for a wise discernment of good from evil tendencies. For St Thomas, sin is not in our faculties
as they are “instituted by God”, but only as they depart from God’s ordination.1232 That is, they are
good in themselves as human faculties, but they can generate disordered desires. The point of the
following discussion of the capital vices, therefore, is carefully to describe the main inordinate
affective tendencies so that the seminarian may wisely discern them. Now, the first step in this
analysis is to consider the source from which the capital sins flow: inordinate self-love.

2. Inordinate Self-Love
St Thomas observes that love of self is commanded by God (Leviticus 19.18) and it “is right and
natural” when we desire “a fitting good” for ourselves.1233 However, this love of self can be
distorted by focusing wrongly on oneself to the exclusion of the proper good of others and it is this
“inordinate love of self [that] is the cause of every sin”.1234 Inordinate self-love inclines us to strive
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for goods in a way “that arises either from inordinate desire for some good, or from inordinate
avoidance of some evil”.1235 For example, seeking to satisfy our desire to be loved more than others
we unduly criticize someone so that others will love him less.1236
This inordinate self-love is then expressed in three basic ways that concern certain fundamental
dimensions of human life. These are called the concupiscence of the flesh, the concupiscence of
the eyes, and the pride of life (1 John 2.15-17).1237 Concupiscence of the flesh is the disordered
desire of goods directly involving the body, for example, sexual acts. Spiritual concupiscence is a
disordered desire for delights that are connected with sight and imagination. This is also called
concupiscence of the eyes, which refers to two sinful tendencies: undue curiosity and
covetousness. Curiosity, in this negative sense, is an undue interest in things that distract us from
what we ought to be doing. Covetousness is an immoderate desire to have material goods that are
beyond our true needs. The pride of life refers to “the inordinate appetite of excellence”, which
blinds us to our true state of neediness before God and inclines us to be arrogant with our
neighbor.1238
These three sinful tendencies are further specified by the capital vices. A capital vice is “one from
which other vices arise most frequently”.1239 So, the capital vices have the “character” of being
origins “in respect of several sins”.1240 Hence they are compared to “the leaders of an army”,
because they have a role in directing the specific instances of personal sins.1241 The capital vices
incline us to sin because they have “ends chiefly desirable as such, so that other sins are
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subordinated to such ends”.1242 That is, they are very attractive because they regard goods that are
vitally important to attaining happiness.1243 Nevertheless, the capital vices, as we shall see below,
involve an inordinate desire that inclines us to sinful actions to attain these goods and thus violate
them.
St Thomas divides these goods into those of the soul, of the body and of external things.1244 Pride
and vainglory aim to achieve the goods of the soul, which are excellence and honor. Gluttony and
lust aim for the goods of the body. Avarice aims to possess external things that provide security.
Furthermore, sloth, anger, and envy, aim to avoid certain goods because they are an obstacle to a
good that is desired “inordinately”.1245 Sloth is an aversion to God because we view our friendship
with him as burdensome. Anger resists justice as an obstacle to inordinate vengeance. Envy is an
aversion to the good of another because it diminishes our own excellence.
The advantage of St Thomas’ approach to the capital sins for affective formation is that he sees
them in terms of a positive psychology of the human faculties, which enables the seminarian to
make a vital distinction between good and evil desires. That is, St Thomas sees that the human
faculties are in themselves good, but that they need to be formed according to reason and that they
can generate evil desires which need to be corrected. As George Corbett observes, St Thomas
measures the evil of the capital vices by right reason, inasmuch as the person experiencing them
does not relate his desires to their “proper end or ends”.1246 This enables the seminarian to see the
vices as disorders “in the proper functioning of man’s natural faculties and are related to good
objects which may be desired or avoided”.1247 The aim of affective formation, therefore, is to help
the seminarian correctly form these desires. For example, since money promises a certain selfsufficiency, someone can experience an immoderate desire to attain it and other vices can flow
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from this.1248 St Thomas recommends, then, the proper use of money by the virtue of liberality,
which includes the ability to see that it is fulfilling for someone to share his goods for the sake of
another.

3. Pride
In De Veritate, St Thomas Aquinas offers a sobering thought that can help the seminarian to
recognize how God can allow him to experience weaknesses, so that he will become more humble.
St Thomas refers to the “wisdom” of God who leaves “the infirmity of sensuality” after baptism,
so that we will “avoid the vice of self-exaltation”.1249 That is, while sensuality and the passions
can be integrated into a virtuous life, they are also capable of being disordered and, as such, can
incline us to sin. Yet, God allows us to struggle with this disorder, acting according to the intention
of “a wise physician”, who “discharges a patient without having cured his illness if it could not be
cured without the danger of a more serious illness”.1250 Similarly, God judges that pride is a far
worse malady than disordered concupiscence, because pride is a turning away from God, a false
self-sufficiency, and an “actual contempt of God”.1251 It is far better, then, to struggle and to be
humble than to remain untested and proud. Now, the specific goal of this section is to examine the
nature of sinful pride and how it damages the seminarian’s ability to become a priest who is
concerned for the welfare of God’s people. Then, it is to consider how such virtues as humility
further the seminarian’s affective growth as a priest.
St Thomas considers pride to be the source of all other types of sin due to “its general influence
towards all vices”.1252 As Ecclesiasticus 10.15 teaches, pride is the beginning of all sin and it is the
first manifestation of sinful self-love inasmuch as it is “an inordinate desire to excel”.1253 Pride is
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a more general characteristic of all sin as an “actual contempt of God, to the effect of not being
subject to His commandment”.1254 Pride, moreover, manifests itself in certain characteristic ways.
We can think that our good comes from ourselves alone and not recognize that our good ultimately
comes from God. We can also boast, that is, we can talk as if we have some virtue or have
accomplished some good work, when in fact we know that neither is the case. This is an act of
deceit, which as an expression of “the inward arrogance of the heart” is also an act of pride.1255
Pride is a corruption of an innately good tendency. In St Thomas’ view, “human beings by every
natural appetite seek likeness to God, inasmuch as every good naturally desired is a likeness to
God’s goodness.”1256 Thus, as there is a proper love of self in accord with God’s love for us, there
is also a proper love for our own excellence. Since God has made us in his image (Genesis 1.2627), it is right for us to strive, with his help, to be like him. In fact, for St Thomas, pride can refer
to the glory and superabundant good that God promises to those who are faithful to him.1257 It can
also refer to works of outstanding quality, such as the evangelical counsels.1258
In the sinful sense of pride, however, someone does not respect right reason and he strives for what
is rightly beyond him.1259 The nature of sinful pride is indicated by the Latin word – superbia which refers to the attitude of someone who aims higher than his true good. As St Thomas writes:
“he who wishes to overstep beyond what he really is, is proud”.1260 This is exemplified by Satan’s
fall from grace. In responding to the question whether Satan sinned in trying to be like God, St
Thomas makes the following distinction: “To be like God as befits each thing is praiseworthy. But
one who desires likeness to God contrary to the ordination established by him desires wickedly to
be like God.”1261 St Thomas also describes pride as a hidden vice which can arise even in the best
of deeds: “some are even proud of their humility”.1262 Pride is so grievous because it is not a turning
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away from God for a particular good, but an aversion to God because we do not want “to be subject
to God and His rule”.1263 That is, a person desires to act as though he were the ultimate source of
his own being and fails to respect the wisdom and will of God for him. Thus, he is not open to a
relationship with God which is grounded in the truth that God is his wise and loving Creator.
The essential nature of pride is clarified in St Thomas’ consideration of the Original Sin of Adam
and Eve. They were in the state of innocence, which meant that they did not experience the tension
we feel between the sensitive and spiritual appetites. Therefore, the first sin had to be that Adam
coveted “some spiritual good above his measure: and this pertains to pride”.1264 Since the first man
coveted a spiritual good above his measure, “it follows that he coveted God’s likeness
inordinately”, by wanting to have the same knowledge of good and evil as God.1265 This means
“that by his own natural power he might decide what was good and what was evil for him to
do”.1266 He sought to act so “that by his own natural power” he might “obtain happiness”.1267 That
is, the first man thought that he should be the ultimate arbiter of what was good and evil for himself,
rather than accepting God’s help to attain his true happiness.
This is an attitude of seeing the principles of his being as restrictions, rather than as principles that
need to be respected so that he may come to the fullness of his being. Moreover, this inability to
share God’s life, wisdom, and love, is quickly transferred to his neighbor, who is then seen as a
competitor for self-excellence, rather than as a person who needs to be honored and loved. For
example, the proud man is disposed to “the observing of other people’s failings” and to “presume
inordinately on his superiority over others”.1268 In seeking to usurp the central place of God in his
heart, the proud man is inclined to take God’s place over his neighbor.1269
What is the significance of St Thomas’ teaching on pride for the seminarian’s affective formation?
Pride is an affective stance that rejects the goodness of the proper principles of his created being.
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This lack of respect for the truth, on account of an exaggerated focus on his own excellence, will
blind him to a proper relationship with God, who is the loving source of those created principles.
Pride is also an attitude that immediately overflows into a lack of respect for the excellence of his
neighbor. It therefore poisons the very source of the seminarian’s love, both for God and for his
neighbor, blinding him to the essential priestly responsibility to place God’s interests above his
own (1 Timothy 6.11). Moreover, failing to keep God’s interests as his first priority and looking
primarily to his own interests, he ceases to look after the interests of his neighbor who is entrusted
to him by God (Philippians 2.3-4, 21). This is a disastrous attitude because the priest’s life is
essentially a call to accept the love of God and help others to do the same.
An essential dimension of purifying the seminarian’s pride is to help him attain a more accurate
understanding of how God rules us. The rule of God should be understood according to his creative
love, which “infuses and creates goodness” in all things, including the good of our human
nature.1270 God cares for our dignity, because we share in “some likeness to God”, created, as we
are, in his image.1271 Thus God does not arbitrarily restrict our happiness but guides us to our true
perfection. “All created things”, St Thomas writes, “stand in relation to God as products of art to
the artist. But the artist brings his works into being by the ordering of his wisdom and intellect.”1272
God is understood here as a wise and generous giver and we are called to imitate God by wisely
communicating goodness to others.1273 In this way, the seminarian should not see his excellence
in terms of self-aggrandizement. Rather, he ought to understand his true excellence according to
God’s generosity, which is an excellence of exercising his gifts to help others.
There are certain virtues that nurture the seminarian’s ability to serve God and help others achieve
their true good. Humility, contrary to pride, “observes the rule of right reason whereby a man has
true self-esteem”.1274 Thus humility withdraws the human heart “from the inordinate desire of great
things” that are beyond him.1275 That is, humility disposes us to refrain from thinking that we are
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greater than we are before God and others. One expression of humility is the virtue of docility, by
which we are inclined to learn from others and resist the inordinate inclination to believe what we
desire to be true, even against evidence to the contrary.1276 No one can consider all points of
knowledge sufficiently, and hence we are in need of being taught by others, especially those who
have more experience than we do “in practical matters”.1277 By listening carefully to others we
open our minds to grow in knowledge and good judgment.1278
Without such docility the ability of people to help others is severely hindered, because, “delighting
in their own excellence, [they] disdain the excellence of truth”.1279 This particularly applies to
those who have to exercise authority for the welfare of others. St Thomas notes that those who are
“learned should be docile in some respects, since no man is altogether self-sufficient in matters of
prudence”.1280 The lesson for the seminarian is that he needs to attain a habitual disposition to seek
counsel so that he may make good decisions. He needs to listen to those who have expertise in
other areas of life, because pastors are required to take counsel when making certain decisions, for
example, in relation to the administration of property and finance.1281
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4. Vainglory
The aim of this section is to consider St Thomas’ teaching on vainglory, with a view to purifying
the seminarian’s desire for acclaim, so that he may work for God’s glory and the good of God’s
people. St Thomas views vainglory as the capital vice that closely follows after pride. As pride
desires excellence in a disordered way, so vainglory is a disordered desire for others to know of
our excellence.1282 In Latin, inanis gloria or vana gloria means empty glory.1283 This emptiness
follows from the “transitory nature of things”, how they lack “solidity or stability”, and how they
can fail to attain their end and the fulfilment of human desire. 1284 Thus we should not place too
much store in them. Timothy McDermott sums up St Thomas’ point about vanity by describing it
as “importance, reputation and prestige sought in a disordered way by vanity”. 1285 It is a selfconceit by which a man thinks too much of himself, over-valuing both his worth and how much
he ought to be recognized.1286
True glory, however, can refer to a person’s goodness as “known and approved by many”, and it
is right that people be honored for their virtue, especially when it is of an outstanding quality.1287
God himself reveals his glory for our sake so that we may know his goodness, which leads St
Thomas to conclude that we may “rightly” seek glory inasmuch as it is for the good of others. 1288
For example, in Matthew 5.16, Christ encourages us to do good so that seeing our good works
others may glorify our Heavenly Father. Thus, the question for the seminarian is whether his desire
for glory is related to a good end.1289 While it is true that as a priest he should be self-effacing and
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look to the honor of others, he should also tell them of the good he has done to help them
understand how they can live a virtuous life. For example, when the seminarian has successfully
helped someone in need, he can talk about this to encourage others and to help them see how they
can become helpful people.
St Thomas gives two valid reasons for seeking glory. The first is that it be to the salvation of others
who, when they see our goodness, will be encouraged to imitate our good example. This is in
keeping with Romans 15.2, where St Paul exhorts us to please our neighbor to build the
community. The second reason is that a man, when he sees that he is praised by others for his good
works, will be encouraged to persevere “more resolutely” in them.1290 St Paul, for instance, in
Romans 12.17, “often calls to the mind of the Christian faithful their good works that they may
more resolutely persist in them”.1291 In this way, it is right to encourage people in their goodness.
The desire for glory is disordered, however, when we glory in “something false or something
temporal or do not refer our glory to its proper end”.1292 Thus the desire for glory is vain when we
seek what is unworthy, or seek praise from someone whose judgement is not virtuous, or when the
glory is not properly ordered to a good end, such as God’s glory or the spiritual good of others.1293
“Glory goes bad”, as DeYoung writes, “when we desire it for the wrong things and for the wrong
ends.”1294 In this way, vainglory corrupts the human heart, inclining us to seek what is not truly
worthy of praise. Vainglory can also make someone “presumptuous and too self-confident”.1295
This occurs because he overvalues his own worth or he listens to people who overstate his good
qualities. Thus, he can be over confident of his virtue and neglect avoiding what leads him to sin.
Vainglory also causes the seminarian to lose sight of his true good at the expense of having
approval from others. Robert Massey describes vainglory as a “compulsive search for glory”.1296
He defines vainglory as: “The tendency to be driven toward the appearance of excellence when
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the individual does not actually develop the real self through productive achievements”. 1297 If he
desires a recognition that, as John-Mark Miravalle writes, is “divorced, as it so often is, from
genuine merit”, he is accepting a principle of “triviality and superficiality”.1298 Preoccupied with
the praise of others, the seminarian will not value the true development of himself. He may, also,
rely heavily on the praise of others rather than seeking God’s approval, which alone will matter
when he dies.1299
The disordered desire of vainglory can overflow into the life of the seminarian in other ways that
will badly affect his future priestly life. Through boasting, the seminarian can try to magnify his
excellence before others.1300 He can refuse “to accept a sounder opinion”, out of a desire to show
that he is not intellectually inferior to others.1301 He can argue past the point of courtesy because
he does not want “to be outdone by others in argument”.1302 He can be a hypocrite and only pretend
to live a holy life. Moreover, Cole suggests that the vainglorious priest can refuse to participate in
a common project because it is not done his way and he feels that this diminishes his honor.1303
And, the priest can neglect to preach the more difficult teachings of the Gospel for the sake of his
parishioners’ approval.1304 In each case, he is motivated by a wrongful desire for his own glory,
which inhibits his ability to fulfill his priestly ministry by honoring the needs of others. For
example, in relation to the neglect of preaching the truth, he fails to provide God’s people with a
proper explanation of the Christian life.

1297

Ibid.
John-Mark Miravalle, “Resisting the Less Important: Aquinas on Modesty”, Journal of Moral Theology, Vol. 6,
No. 2 (2017): 171. St Thomas’ teaching on modesty concerns the development of due measure in relation to such
virtues as humility, studiousness, and modesty in deportment and clothing. See Summa Theologica II-II, qq.160-161,
166, 168-169. As Miravalle notes this teaching guides the Christian away from “disordered self-promotion”, giving
our minds to “irrelevancies”, cultivating “a style of self-deportment that attracts undue attention”, excessive concern
about what we wear and undue concern about the acclaim of others (173).
1299
On Evil, q.9, a.2, ad 9. This makes sense given the tendency of the vainglorious person to excessively desire, as
DeYoung writes, “recognition and approval from others”. See Glittering Vices, 60. In such a state he easily loses the
sense of who he really is and how best to act.
1300
See On Evil, q.9, a.3, resp.
1301
Ibid. St Thomas observes elsewhere that in making “a show of his own excellence” he could become “too
persistent in his own opinion”. Summa Theologica II-II, q.138, a.2, ad 1.
1302
Ibid.
1303
The Hidden Enemies of the Priesthood, 124-126.
1304
Ibid, 119.
1298

295

Vainglory can also interfere with the seminarian’s affective formation by inducing him to fear an
appropriate self-disclosure of his affective and moral struggles. Without this kind of “selfdisclosure”, DeYoung writes, true moral and spiritual formation cannot take place.1305 The
seminarian needs to talk to an appropriate person, such as his spiritual director, about his struggles
so that he can receive appropriate advice. This is necessary for his own self-improvement but it is
also necessary so that a proper judgment can be made about his suitability for the priesthood.
How is vainglory purified in the seminarian’s heart? The first step is to see the true value of earthly
glory in light of the glory of Heaven. St Thomas writes of how our desires only find their “perfect
fulfilment” in Heaven through our union with God who alone completely satisfies us. 1306 Our
desire for earthly glory cannot ultimately satisfy us because earthly glory concerns what is
creaturely and finite. Rather, we should hope for the gift of heavenly honors, which is one of the
superabundant delights of eternal life.1307 This hope encourages the seminarian to set aside a
disordered desire for earthly honors and instead to desire praise and honor from God for having
lived a truly holy life.
Vainglory is also purified by two important virtues: magnanimity and humility. Through
magnanimity we strive for what is truly noble.1308 Magnanimity concerns honor, which is the
greatest of external goods because it is the recognition of a person’s virtue.1309 The magnanimous
man strives for what is truly worthy of “great honor”, but he does not overvalue acclaim from
others.1310 Thus he is free to perform truly great deeds whether is praised for them or not.
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Through magnanimity the seminarian can see that he is worthy of great things when he considers
the gifts God has given him. “Yet humility makes us honor others and esteem them better than
ourselves, in so far as we see some of God’s gifts in them.”1311 Focusing on the goodness of God,
the seminarian can maintain a balance between striving for his true greatness and honoring God’s
gifts in others. As Cole comments, the solution to vanity is “humility or an attitude that realizes
there are limits to one’s gifts, accomplishments and ideas”.1312 Thus humility steers us away from
a lack of truthfulness about ourselves and restrains our drive to promote ourselves beyond the truth.
Another dimension of this issue for the seminarian concerns his need for appropriate praise. Cole
explains that giving honor to someone reminds him that he “has certain virtues and gifts, and it is
given as encouragement to continue growing in deeds of virtue.”1313 There are people, however,
who deeply feel the absence of a true loving affirmation and, perhaps, desperately desiring it, seek
it in a disordered way.1314 Seminarians who may have suffered a lack of appropriate affirmation
before they came to the seminary can likewise be inclined to inordinately seek honors and
approval. They need to be appropriately praised by seminary formators to develop their self-esteem
and to encourage them on the path of virtue. At the same time, they should be educated in the
teachings that have been developed above to help them work for a true glory that is based upon
virtue.

5. Envy
The purpose of this section is to examine St Thomas’ teaching on envy and to help the seminarian
understand its negative effects on his capacity to love others. Envy is a sorrow which is
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experienced when another person’s good is regarded as an evil to oneself, “in so far as it conduces
to the lessening of one’s own good name or excellence”.1315 We experience envy because we love
“to be honored and esteemed”.1316 Thus, the sadness of envy is caused by a belief that we deserve
more honor than another. This is a manifestation of vainglory, and those who are excessively
ambitious for glory are all the more disappointed when another is honored.1317 So, we are driven
to envy by a desire to rival or surpass the reputation of another.1318 The significance of this for
affective formation is that envy contradicts charity, which seeks the good of others. Since the priest
is called to live according to charity, he needs to set aside envy, developing a spirit of
generosity.1319
There are various manifestations of envy that reveal its true nature as a contradiction of charity.
Envy is contrary to pity because “while envy grieves over” a neighbor’s good, “the pitiful man
grieves over his neighbor’s evil”.1320 Thus envy disposes us to avoid alleviating another’s sorrow.
The envious person speaks badly about others. For example, by tale-bearing someone secretly
strives to lower another’s reputation. If the attempt is successful the envious person rejoices at the
misfortune of the one he envies and if it fails he grieves.1321 Furthermore, gossip, as Cole writes,
“goes beyond harming a person’s reputation to the desire to split up friendships”.1322 This is an
offence against the love of friendship, St Thomas explains, and so is an even worse sin than
detraction because “a friend is better than honor, and to be loved is better than to be honored”.1323
Hatred also arises out of envy because we hate what we regard as an evil to us, in this case, the
good of our neighbor. St Thomas regards this as the “last step in the path of sin”, because it is a
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fundamental contradiction of the love human beings are meant to have for each other.1324 The evil
of envy is manifest in that it is by Satan’s envy death came into the world (Wisdom 2.24).
A major influence that generates envy can be pusillanimity, by which someone can neglect to
strive for worthwhile goals in accord with his true ability.1325 He wastes his abilities out of pettiness
of mind and due to the fear of failure he holds back from “the great things” of which he is
worthy.1326 This man is inclined to envy because out of his “smallness of spirit” he thinks “that he
cannot prosper among others who are prospering”.1327 In other words, his ungenerous view of what
he can achieve determines his view that among those who do well he cannot do well.1328 In terms
of the seminarian’s affective formation this attitude is very detrimental because it obstructs his
ability to achieve his own potential. Moreover, in terms of his future priestly ministry, it limits his
ability to help others attain their potential and exercise their gifts for others, lest he not have the
limelight.
Another challenge for affective formation concerns the difference between jealousy and envy.
These two words can be used interchangeably in English but they are not the same affective
experience. In De Veritate St Thomas describes jealousy in association with love. “Jealousy adds
to love a certain intensity, for it is a vehement love that brooks no sharing of one’s beloved.” 1329
This kind of jealousy can lead us to protect a friendship. Sheryl Overmeyer writes that jealousy
involves the experience of “an imagined or actual threat to something one holds dear” and envy,
in contrast, is an experience of “feeling deprived in comparison to another”. 1330 Disordered
jealousy, perhaps due to a feeling of insecurity or a spirit of domination, becomes excessively
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protective and does not leave the other person free to have other friendships. This is sometimes
called possessiveness, which can have the added sense of treating another like an object of
ownership, which is beneath that person’s dignity. The person with disordered jealousy can also
be envious because another is given the affection he seeks for himself alone and he feels slighted
by this.1331 For a man called to priestly celibacy, such possessiveness and envy undermines his
ability to love others generously with respect for their proper freedom.
A better attitude to encourage in the seminarian is emulation, which is inspired by a sadness that
we do not have the good another enjoys, and this motivates us to attain the same kind of good.
This is praiseworthy when it concerns being zealous to attain goods in harmony with a life of
virtue.1332 Emulation is, thus, a zeal by which we “strive for progress with those who are better
than we are”.1333 There is, then, a noble ambition by which someone aspires to acquire certain
good qualities or a position to properly exercise his gifts.1334 By emulation the seminarian can
strive to practice the virtues of faithful people, especially holy priests who serve their people with
generosity of heart.
The great challenge for affective formation is that envy, as Overmyer points out, “is fundamentally
a social vice” - it sees others as a threat to one’s good because they are good and enjoy a good.1335
Thus envy focuses the seminarian inordinately on the good of others to the detriment of focusing
on what he can do to better himself. As Overmyer writes: “By shifting our critical gaze from the
problem that lies in ourselves to an external threat, we further enact our own inadequacy.”1336 What
is the answer to this problem? DeYoung explains that we need to see our unconditional worth
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before God, who frees us to rejoice in our own proper good and in the good of others.1337 This
point is framed by St Thomas in terms of the friendship of charity, by which we love ourselves
ultimately because God loves us.1338 Whereas envy would make us see ourselves as defective,
Overmyer writes, “charity sees a self that is esteemed by and is worthy of God’s love”.1339 This is
a self we want the seminarian to see, one that is worthy of proper self-improvement and is capable
of contributing positively to the lives of others. Furthermore, when he seems to miss out on certain
gifts the seminarian needs to place his faith in God who will give him the gifts he truly needs.1340
An important virtue for the seminarian to acquire, for his future priestly life, is that of duly praising
others. “It takes effort”, Cole writes, “for young and old to learn how to rejoice at another’s good
fortune, such as earning money, receiving worldly honors or possessing supernatural gifts.”1341
Praising the good of others, however, opens their hearts in gratitude to the priest for his
encouraging remarks, and this deepens the bonds of mutual affection and charity. This is a foretaste
of the heavenly communion. St Thomas describes this as a mutual delight, in which “each one will
possess all good things together with the blessed”, loving each other as another self, and in which
“they will rejoice in the happiness of others’ goods as their own.”1342 In acting with such generosity
the priest enables the people he serves to experience something of this mystery and he encourages
them to do the same for others.

6. Acedia (Sloth)
The aim of this section is to analyze St Thomas’ teaching on acedia (sloth) and how it influences
the seminarian to resist the renewal of his affectivity. For St Thomas, acedia is a spiritual lethargy
which flows from a distaste for union with God and the way of life it entails.1343 Acedia is a sorrow
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which weighs us down on account of our seeing the Divine good as burdensome. 1344 It is an
“immoderate sorrow” which makes us sluggish in performing the actions to achieve this good.1345
Thus opposed to union with God acedia obstructs the love of charity, which is friendship with
God.1346 St Thomas therefore “emphasizes”, as DeYoung, McCluskey and Van Dyke write, “the
gravity of sloth by placing it in direct opposition to the theological virtue of charity”. 1347 This
enervating sadness inevitably influences the seminarian’s love for the activities involved in his
affective formation, because they ultimately find their meaning in relation to God.
A dimension of St Thomas’ teaching on acedia, that is significant for affective formation, concerns
his understanding of how acedia is experienced as a resistance to personal renewal. Commenting
on Galatians 5.17, St Thomas writes about acedia as a distaste for the spiritual good which flows
from the tension between the flesh and the spirit in the human person. He compares acedia to
having “infected taste buds”, which cause people to have a “distaste for healthy food and grieve
over it whenever they need to consume such food. Therefore, such sadness and abhorrence or
boredom regarding a spiritual and divine good is spiritual apathy.”1348 By making us avoid the
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Divine good acedia hinders the work of grace by which “the Holy Spirit stirs up and turns the
affections to right willing”.1349 There is, then, an opposition between the guidance of the Holy
Spirit and the man who lives “according to himself. Hence flesh here is taken as referring to the
whole man. Accordingly, whatever springs from disordered self-love is called a work of the
flesh.”1350 In this way, acedia makes us resist the work of the Holy Spirit who enables us to love
God and to improve in character.
Furthermore, commenting on Ephesians 4.17-19, St Thomas writes of the old way of living that is
marked by sinful desires such as covetousness, whereby a man sins “ardently, with a constant and
insatiable appetite for more”.1351 The new man, on the other hand, puts aside bitterness, anger, and
tends to kindness and mercy.1352 And in Ephesians 4.20-24 we are called to put off the old man’s
former way of life and put on the new man created by God in justice and holiness of truth. St
Thomas comments that the old man is corrupted, inasmuch as “the mind and the affections” are
corrupted by sinful choices.1353 These are the works of the flesh, such as fornication and enmity,
which St Paul writes about in Galatians 5.19-21. They “are alien to the nature of those things which
God has planted in our nature”.1354 That is, these sinful actions distort the proper development of
the human person and his ability to relate to others.
The term - “works of the flesh” - needs to be nuanced in case it be wrongly understood as a
condemnation of the body. As DeYoung comments, for St Thomas the opposition between the
flesh and the spirit “is not a battle between bodily desires and spiritual ones, but a battle between
the sinful, fallen self and the new self redeemed by Christ and transformed by his Spirit”.1355
Someone can resist becoming the new person that the Spirit of Christ desires, because she is held
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back by “all her habits and desires that are rooted in rebellion toward God and prideful attempts at
autonomy.”1356 For DeYoung, this is “more fundamentally” to be understood “as resistance to the
transformation of the self implicated in friendship with God”.1357 The effect of this, as St Thomas
explains, is that a man can loathe spiritual goods as though they were contrary to himself. Spiritual
lethargy ensues, on account of the man seeing these goods and the acts to attain them as “the
burdens of commitment”.1358 This requires a “renovation” of himself, that is, he needs to renew
his identity as someone who thinks and acts according to a friendship with Christ.1359
Acedia, however, is the sinful attitude that does not accept “the demands to become holy, to be
created anew” that this friendship entails.1360 The seminarian may be helped to grasp this point by
reflecting on DeYoung’s idea of the “accommodation of identity” that is required of married
persons.1361 There is a cost in terms of individual freedom, a restricting of priorities, a demand for
sacrifice, the altering of patterns of thought, a vision of life, that needs to be intimately shared by
the married partners. This is so because they have entrusted themselves to a common way of life
which requires certain attitudes if it is to flourish. Resistance to these attitudes will cause a lethargy
for the actions that embody and nourish the marital union.
This can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the man preparing for the priesthood who has to live in
a manner befitting his vocation. He must be accountable to the Church, diligent in his duties for
the people of God, giving himself to a life of prayer and priestly celibacy. He can, however, resist
the activities that develop his vocation, because he fails to sufficiently value the way of life that
accords with his vocation and identity. To apply the words of DeYoung: “His lack of commitment
speaks of an unwillingness to surrender himself to God.”1362 This attitude stymies his ability to
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renew his affectivity “after the pattern of Christ”, because he is not even willing to make the
appropriate steps to achieve this renewal.1363
A symptom of this state is to go after “diversionary activities”.1364 Preoccupied with these activities
a person’s attention is absorbed and he avoids facing the “demands made by divine love” for the
regeneration of his nature.1365 This problem is moderated by learning to remain stable in the way
of life he has committed himself to, learning to enjoy the good by persevering in the activities that
enable him to attain it.1366 This requires “a long process of rehabituation and transformation”.1367
It is an arduous process which involves the denial of disordered inclinations on a daily basis. Yet,
it enables the development of a character that can persevere in a virtuous life long enough to
experience the joy that is its fruit.
St Thomas’ teaching on how to respond to temptations to neglect the good can also help to
moderate acedia. He recommends that we ought to consider the good so that we can be moved to
desire it, “because the more we think about spiritual goods, the more pleasing they become to us,
and forthwith sloth dies away”.1368 That is, the more we understand the good, how it can be
attained, and how it fulfills us, the more it can attract us. The seminarian’s desire to prepare well
for the priesthood, for instance, can be enkindled when he considers that as a priest he will help
others through the priestly ministry. One consideration in this regard is that many penitents will
be deeply consoled by the communication of God’s forgiveness in the Sacrament of Penance.

7. Avarice
The priest is called to a life of simplicity, which will both witness to the supreme importance of
God’s love above all material gain and give a good example of the use of material goods for the
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service of one’s neighbor.1369 A disorder in the seminarian’s affections in regard to riches would
undermine his vocation to the priesthood, because he would be too focused on acquiring riches.
To the contrary, he must learn to be responsible for the goods of the community and be completely
honest in the administration of its goods.1370 Still, as a priest he will have to care for the finances
of the parish. Therefore, he needs a formation of his affectivity in regard to riches, that he may use
money for the glory of God and the good of others. Therefore, the aim of this section is to glean
from St Thomas’ teaching a deeper understanding of avarice and how it can be purified by virtues
like liberality and magnificence.
For St Thomas, avarice, or covetousness, is an “immoderate” desire for possessions and riches.1371
It is an inordinate desire for amassing earthly goods. This desire is the root of all sins, in the sense
that our inordinate desire for these goods leads us to turn away from seeking an everlasting good
in God. As St Paul teaches, the desire for money is “the root of all evil” (1 Timothy 6.10). This
teaching is also true in that money enables us to acquire “the means of committing any sin
whatever”.1372 Thus, avarice involves a lack of insight into the ultimate importance of God’s love
and how riches are subordinate to that love.
Furthermore, as a disordered affection for money, avarice causes a lack of balance in our desires.
By being unduly attached to acquiring possessions we impede our generosity for others by being
unduly inclined to keep it for ourselves. This opposes the virtue of liberality by which our
affections for “the possession and use of money” are tempered and we are free to use the money
to help others.1373 Avarice can even become an expression of idolatry, because we can give to a
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creature an honor owed only to God by making a temporal good our ultimate end. 1374 Yet, while
the Letter to the Hebrews exhorts Christians to be content with what they have (13.5), this does
not entail that the desire for possessions is sinful in itself, because such goods help us to live.
Instead, there needs to be a proper “measure” in the use of such goods. 1375 Otherwise, we can be
lead to the “acquisition and keeping of riches” even to the violation of justice, for instance, through
such acts as theft.1376
Avarice leads a man to regret what he has given and to give only a little (2 Corinthians 9.5). This
engenders an attitude of miserliness, in which the mark of a narrow mind is to be subject to
money.1377 Furthermore, noting the link between avarice and coldness of heart, St Thomas writes:
“if the love of riches” can become “so great as to be preferred to charity” it counters our love for
God and neighbor.1378 “Lust for riches”, he concludes, “brings darkness on the soul, when it puts
out the light of charity, by preferring the love of riches to the love of God”.1379 The worst
manifestations of avarice can be to deceive others, for example by perjury, committing treachery,
“as in the case of Judas, who betrayed Christ through covetousness”, and “preying on one’s friends,
as gamblers do”.1380 It is clear that avarice has the power to gravely harm relationships which
require attitudes of love, justice, mercy and fidelity. These are all virtues that the seminarian needs
to practice if he is to be a priest who can build relationships of trust.1381

Attachment to riches is implied in the word avarice, DeYoung also notes, as revealed in its Latin root avere, to crave.
See Glittering Vices, 101.
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1377
See Summa Theologica II-II, q.118, a.5, ad 1.
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Charles Dickens’ A Christmas Carol. It is only when he is struck by the heritage of miserliness and moroseness he
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humanity deepens and his capacity for peaceful union with others surprisingly expands. See Charles Dickens, A
Christmas Carol (London: Bloomsbury Classics, 1995), 177.
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These manifestations of avarice, so counter to relationships grounded in a care for others, suggest
a question very relevant to affective formation: how can avarice come to have such a powerful
hold on our affections? For St Thomas, things are more desirable when they provide more of what
makes us happy; and one condition of happiness is that we seek security of life.1382 “Now riches”,
he writes, “give great promise of self-sufficiency” because money enables us to get many things
which make us feel secure that we can have what we need. 1383 The problem with this attitude is
that we can excessively rely upon riches to provide this security so that we leave ourselves open
to two sinful attitudes: refusing to help the needy and an anxiety for maintaining these riches. 1384
Cole explains that the avaricious man thus “looks to things before people” and thereby “clogs” his
ability to exercise the virtue of liberality.1385 This attitude impairs the freedom from undue concern
for security and money the seminarian needs to generously serve people who need his help.
This condemnation of avarice, however, should not be confused in the seminarian’s mind with
neglecting to care for material goods. As St Thomas explains, we share in God’s providence by
taking responsibility for our needs and showing the foresight to prepare for the future. 1386 In
Scripture, for example, Joseph stored grain for the coming famine in Egypt (Genesis 41.47-49).
So, we should attend to these matters without seeking goods “in excess” of our true needs, making
sure to avoid two vices: neglect and prodigality.1387 The negligent man is imprudent and fails to
promptly act for the good.1388 The prodigal man, on the other hand, gives to others excessively,
out of an undue love to “curry favour” with them.1389 Thus, he unduly gives away “his means of
support” and he wastes what he should spend on those who rely upon him.1390 Prodigality, St
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Thomas observes, is a vice that the clergy should avoid because they are “the dispensers of the
Church’s goods”, which “belong to the poor”.1391 Thus, the seminarian should be formed to be a
pastor who will care for parish finances and responsibly use money to help those in need.
Nevertheless, meanness is another vice that undermines the seminarian’s affective formation,
because it opposes the virtue of magnificence, a word which comes from the Latin and means, to
make great things (magna facere). Through magnificence someone spends “much in order that
some great work may be accomplished”.1392 By meanness, to the contrary, an inordinate fear leads
him to “spend less” than his “work is worth” and thus fail “to observe due proportion between”
his expenditure and his work.1393 In his Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, St
Thomas mentions examples of magnificence such as the “vast outlay” that is in keeping with the
building of a house.1394 He specifies too that the expense of great amounts of money has to be for
an honorable good, according to prudence, and given cheerfully, promptly and readily. The main
objects of the virtue of magnificence are the divine worship, the welfare of the public, providing
for great events to honor community leaders, and other events that happen infrequently such as
weddings. In this way, someone should not lavish gifts on himself but make great expenditure for
the common good. Furthermore, he should ensure that each part of the project is finished in
accordance with the overall purpose of the project, and that both materials and craftsmanship are
excellent in quality.1395
A point to be taken for the seminarian’s formation is that priests are sometimes called to undertake
a great work for the common good. It should be noted that St Thomas discusses magnificence as

Ibid. As Catechism of the Catholic Church, n.2446, teaches: “When we attend to the needs of those in want, we
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a virtue in the Summa Theologica.1396 Most of all, St Thomas sets the virtue of magnificence in
the context of the greatest work, which is “in reference to the Divine honor”.1397 St Thomas thus
sets magnificence as a virtue that is a proper expression of the Christian life. The implication we
can draw is that for the sake of God’s honor and the good of his people, the priest should attend to
such needs as the providing of buildings for public worship and education. He must do this with a
rightful care for the excellence of material and craftsmanship. He should do this, however, with a
sense of responsibility because he is dealing with the money of the Church and her people.
Therefore, he must follow a proper process of consultation with various ecclesiastical structures,
for example, the parish community or the Diocesan Office headed by the Bishop.

8. Gluttony
The aim of this section is to acquire for the seminarian’s affective formation a balanced teaching
on the problem of gluttony and its purification through such virtues as abstinence. This will help
the seminarian to analyze the experience of gluttony and guide others to enjoy created goods in a
virtuous way. To achieve this aim it is necessary to be clear that St Thomas does not criticize the
enjoyment of eating and drinking in itself. Rather, he defines gluttony, not as “any desire of eating
or drinking, but [as] an inordinate desire” for these goods.1398 However, gluttony is an inordinate
passion by which we desire the pleasure of eating and drinking to the detriment of other valid
dimensions of our affective life. For example, spending too much on rich foods limits someone’s
ability to give to others who are in need. It is this disordered desire which needs to be moderated
so that it can be brought into harmony with our true good.1399 One point that will be highlighted
below is how this lack of moderation interferes with the seminarian’s ability to relate well to others.

“It belongs to magnificence to do something great”, he writes, to spend a large amount to, for instance, honour
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Some manifestations of gluttony St Thomas observes are the excessive desire of “overdelicately
prepared” food, eating hastily, or eating excessively. 1400 Peter Kreeft gives a contemporary list of
such disorders. Eating hastily means that we are “gulping”; eating sumptuously refers to
“demanding rich foods”; eating greedily is the attitude of “I want what I want when I want it”;
and, eating daintily refers to the attitude, “it must be perfectly prepared”.1401 In terms of the effects
upon the gluttonous person, St Thomas writes of a dullness of sense in the understanding, a
loquaciousness or “an excess of words”, and scurrility or a lack of restraint in outward behavior.1402
In other words, the disordered love for eating spills over into other kinds of disordered behavior.
How can the inordinate desire of gluttony be reformed? Abstinence is the virtue of going without
food for a good reason. For example, fasting is a form of abstinence by which we moderate our
desires for food and drink, disposing ourselves to exercise proper self-governance in relation to
other desires. That is, the formation of our desires in relation to one form of bodily good,
nourishment, forms in us a capacity for moderation that we can apply to another good that involves
our body, for instance, the proper expression of our sexual desires. However, St Thomas cautions
that fasting must be done moderately, so that we are not deprived of the good health we need to
perform our duties.1403 Ecclesiastical laws of fasting, therefore, need to be properly applied.1404
They ought to be adapted to the capacity and circumstances of the particular person because we
cannot fix the same amount of food for all, for “one person needs more, and another less food”.1405

consume food according to their need. And when they exceed this limit they go beyond the rule of reason and depart
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Formed in a sense of due measure for himself in such matters, the seminarian will be disposed to
guide others according to their proper need, circumstances and ability.
Another issue for affective formation concerns the consumption of alcoholic drinks which can
hinder the seminarian’s ability to make good decisions. Alcoholic consumption is moderated by
the virtue of sobriety.1406 St Thomas comments: “sobriety takes its name from measure, for a man
is said to be sober because he observes the bria, i.e. the measure”.1407 The measured use of
alcoholic drinks is “most profitable”, but excess in this matter “is most harmful, since it hinders
the use of reason even more than excessive eating”, and it can lead to excessive anger and
quarrels.1408 St Thomas goes so far as to suggest that some may need to abstain from wine
altogether because they may be so unduly affected by it that they cannot lead a virtuous life.1409
Furthermore, some have a greater need for sobriety because they have to care for others and they
need to be in a state of mind to do this. Ministers of the Church, for example, “should fulfill their
spiritual duties with devout mind” and be able to teach others in a coherent fashion.1410 Thus, the
seminarian ought to be formed in sobriety so that he can properly fulfill his duties for others as a
priest.
We could summarize this section by stating that moderation has a social dimension. It gives the
seminarian affective balance in regard to delightful goods, disposing him to appreciate their worth
in relation to greater goods, such as sharing with other people (Matthew 25.35). It leaves his mind
free to function clearly so that he can fulfill his duties to the people in his pastoral care. The benefits
of this are manifest in the lack of it. For example, the drunkard can make indiscreet and offensive
statements. For a priest this would be very damaging because his parishioners need to see him as
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a person who will converse with them in a respectful manner.1411 The priest of discretion is more
likely to be seen as someone to be trusted and approached for help and counsel.

Conclusion
What does St Thomas’ teaching on inordinate desires contribute to the seminarian’s affective
formation? It, first of all, provides the seminarian with a process of reflection to discern both why
he sins and how sin harms him by distorting his desires for important human goods. For example,
pride distorts his desire for self-excellence and in the process makes him regard his neighbor with
arrogance. In this way, pride interferes with his ability to learn and conduct his relationships with
charity and humility.
But more than this, affective formation can draw upon St Thomas’ positive presentation of how
the virtues develop authentic desires that are distorted by the capital sins. St Thomas begins with
the premise that the human faculties involved in sin are inherently good even though they can
generate inordinate desires. The implication of this for the seminarian’s affective formation is
enormous for his moral outlook and how he guides others later as a priest. One aim of responding
to sin is certainly to disentangle the good from the evil in his desires, but in St Thomas’ vision of
the affective and moral life that is not enough. There also needs to be a careful discernment of the
need that underlies the inclination to sin and the virtue that re-orders it to the good.
Thus we can suggest that a basic structure emerges from our study of St Thomas’ teaching for
developing the seminarian’s affective maturity, in response to inordinate desires that can impair
his ability to relate well to others as a priest. The seminarian can be encouraged to set aside a
preoccupation with his own excellence and glory (pride and vainglory) and, according to the heart
of God, seek to honor his neighbor. In place of seeing his neighbor’s good as a cause of sadness
(envy) he can exercise a loving appreciation for the good and joy of other people. Rather than
seeing his vocation as a burden (acedia) he can rediscover his identity as someone called to share
Christ’s pastoral charity and undertake his formation for this ministry with generosity. Instead of
restricting his heart by hoarding riches for himself (avarice) he can be formed to administer the
“Eating is linked to social bonds,” writes DeYoung, “expressions of love for one another, provision and comfort
and security and celebration.” See Glittering Vices, 154.
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goods of the Church for the true good of others. Setting aside a disordered passion for consuming
created goods (gluttony), he can acquire the ability to share them with others.
However, there is one last capital sin to consider: lust or inordinate sexual desire. This will be
considered, in the next and final chapter, in terms of its negative impact on human affectivity and
personal relationships. Following the structure of this chapter, there will also be a consideration of
how virtues such as chastity form sexual desire in the context of the seminarian’s affective
formation.
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CHAPTER 11
INFUSED VIRTUE AND THE FORMATION OF CHASTITY
Human sexuality is a beautiful gift from God which the seminarian rightly receives in a spirit of
thanksgiving. Accordingly, in Pastores Dabo Vobis, Pope St John Paul II articulates a very positive
view of sexuality, which includes the goodness of “a love that involves the entire person”, the
ability to give oneself to another, and receive the gift of that person’s love.1412 It is in this context
that the Pope asks for a formation in chastity, which prepares the seminarian to live a commitment
of celibacy for Christ and the Church, and responsibly love others with affective maturity. The
Pope also mentions other virtues that will help the seminarian to be chaste: prudence; self-mastery;
respect for men and women in his personal relationships; and, selflessness.1413 These virtues enable
the seminarian to relate to others in a way that respects their dignity as persons who are worthy of
love and esteem.
The seminarian’s formation in chastity is all the more necessary when we consider that the culture
from which he comes can encourage unchaste practices. For example, there is internet pornography
which, Gail Dines writes, presents men with the portrayal of women in degrading acts of violent
porn.1414 This encourages an attitude to women which lacks “any sense of love, respect, or
connection to another human being”.1415 The seriousness of this issue was recognized by Cardinal
Schönborn, Archbishop of Vienna, who in a retreat at Ars in October 2009, pointed out that in
seminaries devices such as firewalls should be used to exclude pornographic websites. However,
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with the availability of websites for many devices such as phones, he noted that seminarians have
to exercise great personal responsibility. He recommended support groups, too, where seminarians
are accountable to each other and, by their companionship, can ameliorate the effects of loneliness
that can lead to “harmful addictions” such as pornography.1416 These are significant statements by
the Cardinal which alert seminary formators to the real challenge to help seminarians live a chaste
life.
Furthermore, the importance of formation in chastity is accentuated in such ecclesial documents
as Guidelines for the use of Psychology in the Admission and Formation of Candidates for the
Priesthood. This document requires formators to direct away from the priesthood seminarians who
are seriously incapable of being humanly mature. It requires formators to exercise a careful
judgment in this matter, because of the tendency of some to minimize the weaknesses of
seminarians and others to unduly emphasize their difficulties.1417 The document also refers to other
possible problems, such as an “excessive affective dependency”, an “insufficient capacity for
being faithful to obligations taken on”, and “a sexual identity that is confused or not yet well
defined”.1418 If it is evident, moreover, that a seminarian cannot live celibacy with an “affective
and relational equilibrium”, he should be asked to leave the seminary.1419 The Church’s underlying
concern in all these matters is that the seminarian needs to be able to form chaste relationships, for
his own sake and the welfare of those he will serve as a priest.
The aim of this final chapter, then, is to take up the concern of the Church for the seminarian’s
affective formation in chastity. This will be done by examining St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity
and its formation by a life of virtue. There will be two main considerations. First, St Thomas’
teaching on lust will be considered to see how it enables the seminarian to understand how lustful
behavior undermines both his character and his personal relationships. Second, to complete this
study, St Thomas’ teaching on infused virtue will be considered in view of what it contributes to
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the seminarian’s understanding of how to respond to lust and grow in chastity. This will bring to
a conclusion the argument that St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity can be used as an instrument of
affective formation.

1. How Lust Damages Personal Relationships
Previous chapters (3-4, 7-8) have analyzed St Thomas’ teaching on the goodness of human
passions such as desire, love, and pleasure, when they are integrated with virtue. It is not surprising,
therefore, that St Thomas has a positive view of human sexuality. For him, it is good that people
have “beautiful and pleasing bodies”, and that properly ordered sexual acts, even in their
“exceeding pleasure”, are virtuous.1420 His negative view of lust, however, comes from his
conviction that certain acts disrespect the goodness of sexuality. Lust, for St Thomas, is the love
of sensual pleasures without moderating them in accord with the true good both of human sexuality
and the personal relationships that involve it. Lust thus interferes with the moderating influence of
temperance, which enables us to love spiritually beautiful realities, such as the virtue of fidelity,
that incorporate pleasure with good moral acts.1421 The problem with lust is that it isolates one
aspect of sexual acts - physical or emotional pleasure – from the meaning of proper sexual
relationships. For instance, adultery seeks the pleasure of sexual union to the exclusion of fidelity
to one’s spouse.
For St Thomas, lust undermines a person’s respect for the meaning of sexuality as the capacity for
husband and wife both to be united in sexual love and to give life to others. This is “a very great
good” which needs to be wisely cared for, in order to protect and nurture human beings in family
life.1422 While St Thomas has been criticized for concentrating too much on the procreative
meaning of sexual intercourse, he does, in fact, recognize the constitutive importance of affection
for married love.1423 In Summa Contra Gentiles, for instance, St Thomas establishes the
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indissolubility of marriage on the fact that “there seems to be the greatest friendship between
husband and wife, for they are united not only in the act of fleshly union but also in the partnership
of the whole of domestic activity”.1424 That is, the spouses share an intimate personal life together
both through their sexual union and in the activities of their family life.
The importance of this spousal friendship is brought out in St Thomas’ discussion of the marriage
of Mary and Joseph. St Thomas upholds their union as a true marriage, even though they had never
consummated their marriage. This is so because “the form of matrimony consists in a certain
inseparable union of souls by which husband and wife are pledged by a bond of mutual affection
that cannot be sundered.”1425 St Thomas’ point is that while matrimony has the goal of begetting
and caring for children, this is sought by spouses who are united in their love for each other and
who open this love to the gift of children. The goodness of this affection is seen in greater clarity
when we consider that children need their parent’s abiding nurture, guidance, and protection.1426
St Thomas’ point is that this mutual love is the very basis from which springs the married couple’s
love for their children. So, the evil of lust is that it interferes with the good of married affection
which is linked so intimately to the good and security of family life.
Yet, how are we to understand what makes lustful actions so attractive when they damage the great
good of human sexuality? The answer is found in the nature of the capital sins which are
expressions of an inordinate desire in regard to a great good of human life. In the case of lust, the
disorder concerns what in itself is a good capacity – the desire for the pleasure of sexual union.
Lust, St Thomas explains, has “a very desirable end, so that through desire of that end, a man
II, q.154, a.8, ad 2, that husbands should not “indecently” use their wives because this is contrary to the good of
fidelity in marriage. He states that such a man is in some sense an adulterer “even more so than he who is too ardent
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(Grand Rapids, Michigan: Brazos Press/Baker Publishing Group, 2009), 161. St Thomas also refers to the “gentle
association” that sexual intercourse produces between spouses. Summa Contra Gentiles Book Three: Providence,
Part II, trans. Vernon J. Bourke (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975, reprint 2009, first
published by Hanover House, 1956), Chapter 123, n.6.
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Summa Contra Gentiles Book Three: Providence, Part II, Chapter 123, n.6. See nn.3, 5, for St Thomas’
discussion of equity between husband and wife, and the care and personal relationship between parents and their
offspring, as reasons for indissolubility.
1425
St Thomas links this mutual affection to the begetting and upbringing of children. While Mary and Joseph’s
marriage lacked sexual intercourse, together they cared for Christ who was given into their marriage by the Holy
Spirit. Summa Theologica III, q.29, a.2, resp.
1426
Summa Theologica II-II, q.154, a.2, resp.
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proceeds to commit many sins”.1427 For sexual pleasure “is very great” and is “the end of lust”.1428
This pleasure is “very desirable” because it is intense and we easily appreciate its desirability. 1429
However, it is important to keep in mind, for the seminarian’s affective formation, that the pleasure
St Thomas refers to is not only a physical but also an emotional pleasure. This emotional pleasure
involves the enjoyment of a personal union with another.1430 If this point is not appreciated the
seminarian can underestimate the true strength of the temptation to lust, dismissing it as only a
matter of physical pleasure rather than as a desire to be with someone.
To explain how this is important we need to return to a consideration of love and sorrow. The
passion of love involves a feeling of union with another. It is a desire for this experience of unity
and of being loved and close to another that drives lust. Another dimension of this affective
experience, derived from our consideration of sorrow in Chapter 5, is that we seek to alleviate our
sense of loss by seeking pleasure. The sorrow we feel on account of isolation, for example, can
drive the felt need for the comfort of being close to another. With this in mind, one can see that
lust does not only concern physical pleasure but it also concerns affective needs that make one
long for the comfort of sexual union. The seminarian needs to be aware of this affective dynamic
in lust, lest it negatively influence his personal relationships. He needs to be aware that he may
feel unloved and that a sexual relationship could appeal to him as an answer to this problem.
However, he needs to be mindful that there are negative consequences to such lustful behavior,
which involve the way he thinks, wills and feels in relation to others.1431 The disorder in his sexual
desires engenders sinful attitudes to others that impede his respect for their true good.
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Summa Theologica II-II, q.153, a.4, resp.
Ibid.
1429
Ibid. St Thomas refers here to our concupiscence, that is, our affective capacity to strive for pleasure.
1430
We cannot treat of every issue of lust in this section. It can be stated that even in sins such as maturbation, a
sexual act that is not shared physically with another, there is still usually some connection to imaginations of having
sex with another, such as in the use of pornography. So, the dynamism to union with another, even though obscured,
still remains as the emotional drive underlying the lustful act. This point is confirmed by the impact that loneliness
has on the person tempted to such sexual sins. St Thomas writes of a range of other sins that violate the affective
unity of married life and its connection to the giving of life that is required for the proper meaning of sexual
intercourse. He mentions homosexual acts (see Summa Theologica II-II, q.154, a.11, resp.); fornication, incest,
seduction, and rape (see Summa Theologica II-II, q.153, a.5, ad 4.); and, the “abuse of boys” (Summa Theologica IIII, q.154, a.1, ad 5).
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See Summa Theologica II-II, q.153, a.5, resp.
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St Thomas refers to a certain blindness of the mind, in the sense that the capacity to perceive the
dignity of the other person is diminished by lust. In relation to this point, he quotes Daniel 13.56,
where we read that the lustful man who attempted to seduce Susanna is rebuked because beauty
deceived him and perverted his heart. This lust induced him to seek Susanna’s condemnation and
death when she refused his seductive advances. Then there is a rashness in action, driven by a
person’s impulsive desire for the pleasure of sex, so that he does not properly reflect about what
he should do. Moreover, through the habit of a lustful life he can diminish his ability to carry out
his better judgment and give up a wrongful relationship.1432
There can also be a hatred for God who forbids the immorality of lust, because there can be an
undue love for the pleasures of this world in which they are loved more than God. This can lead
someone to give up on attaining eternal life, because he is obsessed with sexual pleasure so much
that the desire for the spiritual pleasure of union with God in heaven becomes “distasteful”.1433 St
Thomas also observes that despair can cause sexual lust, in the sense that without “the hope of
future happiness” the lustful man sees no reason to give up earthly pleasures.1434
People can also manifest their lust in speech. For example, by wanton words a man directs his
speech to lustful pleasures.1435 These kinds of sinful words need to be distinguished from true
words of affection, in the same way that St Thomas distinguishes chaste and unchaste touches. St
Thomas mentions that “certain acts [are] circumstantial to the venereal act, for instance kisses,
touches, and so forth”.1436 That is, these acts are more intimately connected to arousing lustful
desire and so are to be avoided. It should be noted, though, that St Thomas distinguishes
appropriate acts of affection from those done with lustful motive. A “kiss, caress, or touch” can be
done “without lustful pleasure, either as being the custom of one’s country, or on account of some
obligation or reasonable cause”.1437 For example, family members and friends greet each other
with a kiss or a hug.
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Ibid.
Ibid.
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On Evil, q. 15, a.4, ad 3.
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Summa Theologica II-II, q.153, a.5, ad 4.
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Summa Theologica II-II, q.154, a.1, ad 5.
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Summa Theologica II-II, q.154, a.4, resp.
1433

320

St Thomas here makes a distinction that is important for the seminarian who has an authentic need
for affection. Indeed, he needs to learn how to give and receive words and gestures of affection,
distinguishing them from what is inappropriate and lustful. The people he will serve as a priest
also have a genuine need for his affection in word and gesture and they will hope that he is someone
worthy of trust in this matter. At times they will offer him gestures of genuine affection out of love
and appreciation for his presence among them and the work he does for them. In these moments
he needs to be very clear about the difference between unchaste acts and gestures of genuine
affection. He needs to respect the person before him, the relationship he has with that person as a
priest, and the circumstances in which he is with that person. For example, he must be prudent
about what he does when he is alone with someone, especially when he is stressed and tired. Yet,
he must also know how to show appropriate acts of affection, such as taking someone’s hand to
console her when she is genuinely in grief.
It is instructive to note that the Lord Jesus was very careful in these matters, though not afraid to
show appropriate affection. For example, when he raises the twelve year old girl from the dead he
holds her hand and yet he is careful to have her parents and the three apostles with him at the time
(Mark 5.35-42). The Lord shows here a good example of being aware of the context in which an
act of affection is communicated.1438
The consideration of leaving aside lustful attitudes so that the seminarian can seek a truly chaste
life is of crucial importance for his affective maturity. As DeYoung points out, respect for human
sexuality involves respect for the fundamental values of life and love, hence human existence and
human relationships.1439 As a priest, the seminarian will have to communicate this truth to those
preparing for marriage. The pastoral ramifications, however, go beyond this to how he must give
good example to those who have taken up a life of consecrated virginity, those who have never
found a spouse, and those who have suffered marriage breakdown. It is the priest’s responsibility
to give these people a good example of a chaste life in the service of others.
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On a personal note I was very impressed with how Pope St John Paul II was capable of showing affection to
others. I recall on one occasion, at Corpus Christi Mass in Rome, he tenderly embraced both the parents and their
children after they had brought up the offertory gifts.
1439
See Glittering Vices, 162.
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2. Infused Virtue and Formation in Chastity
This section will develop six principles from St Thomas’ teaching on infused virtue to guide the
seminarian in his approach to the development of chastity. To prepare for the articulation of these
principles, there will be a discussion of infused virtue from the point of view that it is a principle
of healing. This means that infused virtue enables the sinner to re-order his thinking and willing
so that his affective responses come into harmony with a renewed life of virtue. To grasp this point,
we need to recall that St Thomas’ idea of infused virtue is that it is a principle of grace which
enables the seminarian to practice certain virtues in harmony with the Christian life. (The principal
virtues considered in Chapter 9 were the theological and cardinal virtues.) It is this truth which
assists the seminarian to turn to God for guidance and strength in his affective struggles. 1440

a. The Healing Role of Infused Virtue
A key idea for appreciating St Thomas’ teaching on infused virtue is that it heals the sinner’s
faculties, which have been damaged by sin. To grasp the importance of what he means by this it
is first necessary to understand what he intends by the word “faculty”. St Thomas’ Latin term for
“faculty” is potentia, which can be translated, Paul Crittenden explains, as “capacity” or
“ability”.1441 Or, as Robert Schmidt defines it, potentia is: “A capacity for, or principle of, action;
the ability to do or to make.”1442 A faculty is, then, a particular capacity of the person to act in a
certain way.1443 St Thomas observes that some of these powers are innate in the person, like the
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We have here a meeting point of the life of faith and the affective renewal of the seminarian which we have
reflected upon in Chapter 9. In relation to priestly celibacy, Michael Heintz makes the point that there is an intrinsic
link between the principles of grace and development of the seminarian’s human maturity. He writes: “In the
formation of men for ordained ministry as priests, their developing self-awareness must never be severed from their
relationship to Christ”. See Rev. Msgr. Michael Heintz, PhD, “Configured to Christ: Celibacy and Human
Formation”, in John C. Cavadini, The Charism of Priestly Celibacy: Biblical, Theological and Pastoral Reflections,
(Notre Dame, Indiana: Ave Maria Press, 2012), 67.
1441
See Paul Crittenden, Reason, Will and Emotion: Defending the Greek Tradition against Triune Consciousness
(Houndmills, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 80.
1442
See Glossary for Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate, trans. Robert W.Schmidt, S.J., under the title Truth,
Volume III (Albany, New York: Preserving Christian Publications, Inc., 1993), 486.
1443
It is, “properly speaking”, St Thomas writes, “neither the intellect nor the sense that knows, but man that knows
through both”. Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate, q.2, a.6, ad 3, trans. Robert W.Mulligan, S.J., under the title
Truth, Volume I (Albany, New York: Preserving Christian Publications, Inc., 1993).
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capacity to see; “some are acquired by practice”, as when a musician has to repeatedly practice
playing the flute; others are acquired by “teaching and learning”, as when a person is taught the
work of medicine.1444 These human faculties are intimately linked. For example, we discussed in
Chapter 3 that there is a close association between a person’s mind, imagination, and passions.
This intimate link is the means by which the seminarian’s renewal of mind and heart influences
the re-ordering of his other faculties, such as the chaste development of his sexual desires. His
mind and heart, renewed by God’s grace, is influenced by the theological virtues, which guide him
to think and act according to faith in God, hope in his goodness, and love for him (Chapter 9). St
Thomas refers to this intimate working of God’s grace in terms of the Holy Spirit’s action, which
“perfects the intellect by the gift of wisdom, and softens the affections by the fire of charity”.1445
In other words, the action of God informs the Christian’s mind and affectivity through the truth of
Divine Revelation and the offering of God’s love to him. This is the essence of St Thomas’
teaching on infused virtue, which is then unfolded in relation to each faculty or capacity. That is,
each faculty for a particular range of acts, for example, to moderate our affections, is guided by
and incorporated into the life of the Christian’s love for God. One implication is that the seminarian
is renewed by the wise guidance of God who loves him and thereby instills in him the confidence
to live a renewed life. This point will be discussed below when we analyze the six principles of
affective formation in chastity to be drawn from our study of St Thomas’ reflections on affectivity.
This teaching on infused virtue is in harmony with Sacred Scripture where we are taught that
virtues are gifts of God. For example, in Wisdom 8.7, we read of temperance, prudence, justice
and fortitude as fruits of the labors of God’s Wisdom. Also, in Ephesians 1.8, we read of God, in
his grace, showering us with wisdom and insight. Virtue is thus presented as a gift from God who
helps us to act virtuously. Receiving what God has made known to us about how to live, and
receiving the help of his grace we are strengthened to live a new life.1446 Yet, as Michael Sherwin

Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book Nine, Lesson 4, n.1815, trans. John P. Rowan (Notre Dame,
Indiana: Dumb Ox Books, 1995). Crittenden gives a basic list of the human faculties: “the capacity for sense
perception, having desires, experiencing feeling and emotion, imagining, speaking a language, understanding,
judging and exercising purposive choice”. Reason, Will and Emotion, 80.
1445
Summa Theologica I-II, q.79, a.4, resp.
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Michael S. Sherwin, O.P., “Infused Virtue and the Effects of Acquired Vice: A Test Case for the Thomistic
Theory of Infused Cardinal Virtues”, The Thomist 73 (2009): 29.
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explains, these virtues are also “intimately the excellences of the agent himself”.1447 In other words,
infused virtue enables us to act in a way that the virtues become truly our acts and our
perfections.1448
However, for the purpose of our discussion of affective formation, there is another important
dimension of St Thomas’ teaching on infused virtue, namely, that it can be present even though
the residual effects of acquired vices are still felt by the Christian.1449 As St Thomas explains, the
beginner in the spiritual life can feel that he is not yet free of the effects of his previous sins. He
writes: “infused virtue does not always remove the experience of the emotions straight away”.1450
In this case, the beginner can feel the effects of disordered passions but “they do not take control”
and he is able to refrain from evil.1451 This is in keeping with the character of virtue, St Thomas
argues, because it is enough for virtue to do the good “without regret” and it is unnecessary for
virtue to take pleasure in doing what is burdensome.1452 For example, a man can act bravely even
though he feels great fear. An important implication is that the seminarian can feel he is unable to
exercise a virtue but God’s gift of grace still supports him to act virtuously.
An example of how infused virtue assists the repentant sinner is found in Matthew Talbot, who
lived in Ireland in the 19th century. As Sherwin relates, Talbot was a drunkard who converted and
dedicated his life to the love of God, prayer, self-sacrifice, and the service of the poor. However,
in this process of conversion he only gradually became free of his inordinate desire for alcohol.
Talbot’s experience highlights how the converted Christian can still struggle with the damaging
1447

Ibid, 29.
St Thomas writes: “virtue which directs man to good as defined by the Divine Law, and not by human reason,
cannot be caused by human acts, the principle of which is reason, but is produced in us by the Divine operation
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grace receives virtues from God to live in accordance with the hope of reaching Heaven. He argues that “acquired
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reason and not according to the guidance of Divine Revelation. William C. Mattison III, “Can Christians Possess the
Acquired Cardinal Virtues?”, Theological Studies 72 (2011): 563.
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St Thomas writes: “It happens sometimes that a man who has a habit, finds it difficult to act in accordance with
the habit, and consequently feels no pleasure and complacency in the act, on account of some impediment
supervening from without: thus a man who has a habit of science, finds it difficult to understand, through being
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effects of previous vices. Sherwin comments, in light of Talbot’s gradual affective renewal, that
the repentant person needs to be informed that infused virtue forms “a new phronesis (a new
capacity to reason practically) and a new dynamis (a new power) in his will and passions, even
though he still feels drawn to his addiction”.1453 God equips him with “the capacity to judge rightly
and do those actions that lead us to union with God in heaven”.1454 In other words, God truly helps
him to improve even though he struggles to change for the better.
However, this is difficult for the person beginning a renewed life of virtue. As Sherwin comments,
when it comes to the issue of infused virtue, “the beginner finds himself in the unique position of
having virtues that he does not psychologically feel like he has”. 1455 The words of St Thomas on
the attitude of someone beginning a life of virtue are applicable here. The beginner must believe
in God “as a disciple believes the master who is teaching him”.1456 Applying this to the purpose of
affective formation, the seminarian has to trust that God’s truth guides him and God’s grace
supports him. “This trust is necessary”, Sherwin explains, “because on the level of psychological
experience” the truth of Gospel morality may not be apparent to him.1457 That is, he may not feel
in a time of great inner struggle, that it is true. To help him in this struggle the seminarian will
have to trust the guidance of his formators who can bear witness to how God has helped them to
patiently rely on his grace. This is essential knowledge for the seminarian’s affective formation,
but it is also important for his future priestly ministry because he will have to patiently help others
to rely on God’s truth and grace in their affective struggles. Having learnt about these matters
through personal experience he will be better equipped to support others.

“Infused Virtue and the Effects of Acquired Vice”, p.37. Sherwin explains this in terms of the cardinal virtues:
“(1) the ability to judge practically about what we should do and when and how we should do it (infused prudence),
as well as (2) an inclination in the will toward a higher justice (infused justice) and (3) a receptivity in the passions to
be guided by these higher judgments and inclinations (infused courage and temperance).” Infused Virtue and the
Effects of Acquired Vice, 41. Italics added.
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1453

325

b. Six Principles of Affective Formation in Chastity
From our consideration of the infused virtues we see that they are linked to the grace of conversion
and the renewal of the penitent’s character. As Sherwin writes, infused virtue “is measured by a
wisdom that understands our wounded nature and the priceless character of our supernatural end
made possible for us by the elevating and healing action of grace”.1458 Now, St Thomas’ teaching
on the renewal of the repentant sinner is both hopeful and realistic. For example, he writes about
the loss and recovery of virginity in terms of an analogy with the man who has squandered his
great wealth and cannot recover it by his repentance. However, he can recover his life of virtue by
repenting of his sin and taking better care of money in the future. “In like manner”, St Thomas
writes, “a person who has lost virginity by sin, recovers by repenting, not the matter of virginity
but the purpose of virginity”.1459 St Thomas’ point is that grace restores the penitent’s ability to
reverently love the good of human sexuality and this is a true renewal of his character.
Now, the aim of this last section is to develop six principles that can guide the seminarian’s
approach to affective formation in chastity. In this context, “principle” means a truth of practical
thought that has become a personal and strongly held attitude of the seminarian, and which guides
his decisions in moments of difficulty. “Principle” in this sense involves the whole person and the
formation of his mind, will, and passions, in accord with the virtuous habits that we have discussed
from Pope St John Paul II’s and St Thomas’ thought, especially in Chapters 7 and 9. The six
principles are: i) infused virtue is a gift of grace; ii) infused virtue concerns affective renewal; iii)
infused virtue incorporates all the seminarian’s activities with the life of grace; iv) infused virtue
assists the seminarian to cope with the residual effects of sin; v) the seminarian needs to trust God’s
wisdom; vi) the excellences of infused virtue truly become the seminarian’s.

Ibid, p.40. See Summa Theologica I-II, q.63, aa.3-4, for St Thomas’s discussion of infused virtue and
temperance as an example which pertains to our desire for pleasure according “to the Divine rule”.
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Summa Theologica II-II, q.152, a.3, ad 3.
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i. Infused virtue is not acquired by our own unaided natural faculties but is infused by
God with the gift of grace
This constitutes the starting point for the seminarian’s growth in the virtue of chastity, otherwise
he will attempt to live chastely by his own resources which, since he is wounded by sin, are
inadequate to the task. Avoiding pride and vain self-sufficiency, the seminarian will constantly ask
for the grace he needs to become the person God desires him to be. Connected with this first
principle is another: the seminarian’s life needs to be grounded in a deep love for Christ who is the
paradigm for both affective maturity and chastity for the priest.1460 Indeed, the importance of
chastity flows from the seminarian’s vocation to reflect Christ’s pastoral love for others as a
responsible and chaste person when he is ordained as a priest.

ii.

Infused virtue is linked to the grace of conversion and the renewal of the character
of the repentant person through a renewed understanding of himself

The grace of infused virtue is geared to a renewal of life that flows from the seminarian’s renewed
view of himself as one who is loved by God. This affects how the seminarian understands what
kind of person he is and what, therefore, he is capable of doing.1461 A person who thinks of himself
as worthless, unlovable, and unchaste will probably act that way. To the contrary, the person who
thinks himself worthy of love and capable of loving chastely, because God thinks him capable of
this, will be disposed to live chastely. Here, we need to recall St Thomas’ reflections on sloth as
an attachment to our old sinful self which holds us back from attaining the new self that God
desires for us (Chapter 10). The point is that infused grace renews the seminarian’s view of himself
at its very foundation, to overcome his attachment to his former unchaste self. To take an analogy
from our human experience of love: it is the renewed sense of dignity that comes to us through
One seminarian commented, after studying the course I gave on St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity at Good
Shepherd Seminary in Sydney, that the way forward in affective growth for them was found most of all in their love
for Christ. This shows the importance of presenting St Thomas’ reflections on Christ’s affectivity (Chapter 2) so that
the seminarian can perceive the link between Christ’s affectivity and the importance of his own affective
development.
1461
This principle accords with St Paul’s teaching that it is through the modelling of one’s life according to the
renewal of one’s mind in God’s truth that one can judge of how to truly act (Romans 12.1-2). In other words, it is
through a correct grasp of the truth that one can begin the renewal of one’s moral behavior.
1460
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being loved that opens us to a new way of thinking about how we are capable of loving in a worthy
manner. Moreover, on account of God’s love for the seminarian he is moved to see that he ought
to love God’s children properly in matters concerning sexuality. This is an application of the Gift
of Piety which leads him to honor his fellow Christians as fellow children of God (Chapter 9).

iii.

Infused virtues concern the same matters as the acquired virtues but according to
a rule that flows from the Christian’s participation in the Divine life

Because he is called to love God wholeheartedly and to love his neighbor (Matthew 22.37-38), the
seminarian needs to reflect on the implications of this life of faith, hope and charity, for all the
various aspects of his life and relationships (Chapter 9). Infused virtue therefore concerns the acts
which develop the seminarian’s character in respect of how he deals with created realities, as they
come from God and help us come to God. This is an application of the Gift of Knowledge, which
enables us to see the true value of things in light of their relation to God (Chapter 9). A right
relationship with created realities involves a reverence for the regulation and measurement of
things, “while evil results from the fact that it is not being ruled or measured”. 1462 This sense of
proper measurement, or of tempering our desires and gestures, is relevant to how the seminarian
orders his sexual desires out of reverence for the proper limits of relationships. The word “limit”
here emphasizes the idea of a boundary demarcating one kind of relationship from another and
hence the different acts appropriate to the different relationships.1463 Beyond this one disrespects
the limits of one’s own proper role in another’s life and the emotional intimacy of the other person.
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On Evil, q. 1, a.3, resp.
The English word “limit” comes from the Latin word limes, limitis, for boundary or frontier. The basic idea is
that there is “a point, line or level beyond which something does not or may not extend or pass”. Bruce Moore, The
Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary, 4th ed. (South Melbourne, Australia: Oxford University Press, 2004), 815. In
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a particular personal relationship.
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iv.

St Thomas recognizes the relevance of the infused virtues to the person who
struggles with the residual effects of acquired vices

In the struggle with the effects of his previous sins, God equips the seminarian with “the capacity
to judge rightly and do those actions that lead us to union with God in heaven”.1464 However, there
is still the problem that he can feel inordinate desires that flow from his faculties of memory and
imagination. Since these faculties are linked to his faculties of mind and will, they can narrow his
perspective by presenting lustful objects to his consciousness. In response, the seminarian needs
to widen his perspective by focusing his mind and energies on other objects, which serves to
diminish his affective responses to any immorally desired objects. For example, he can shift his
focus from lustful imaginations by performing other activities such as acts of kindness for others.
This forms in him a capacity to properly express love for others in a practical way. It thus
counteracts the impulse of lust to imagine other people as sex objects, without any thought for
them as real people who need to be loved according to their dignity.

v.

The seminarian needs to believe in God “as a disciple believes the master who is
teaching him”1465

St Thomas views the person who begins the life of renewed virtue as someone who needs to trust
the wisdom of God, who guides him to experience the benefits of living according to this wisdom.
The problem for the seminarian is that this requires patience and trust in the means given to help
him progress in chastity. Among other means to this end, three will be highlighted to help the
seminarian who feels that he is struggling to really progress: the need for docility; the example of
good priests; and, trusting God’s Providence that he will meet people who will love and help him.
Docility, the virtue by which we are open to learn from others, opens the seminarian’s mind to
attentively study God’s wisdom, so that he can begin to practice it. A major part of this docility
concerns the study of God’s wisdom communicated through Sacred Scripture. This presents a
teaching that is both inspired by the Holy Spirit and deeply attentive to the long human struggle
for holiness. We could take two examples of how the sources of Divine Revelation assist the
1464
1465
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seminarian to grow in chastity. The first example concerns the very practical advice to be careful
of his lustful desires, which can flow into his actions (Matthew 5.18-19). What the seminarian
dwells upon as desirable increases his desire for it. To decrease that desire he needs to engage his
mind in other activities and thoughts that are truly good. The second example is derived from how
the virtue of chastity can be lost through a lack of care for modesty. The most obvious example is
that of King David, who lustfully gazed at Bathsheba as she bathed, so that he was overcome by a
lust which moved him to seduce her (2 Samuel 11.2-5). Thus, we understand that avoiding the
deliberate sight of what corrupts our affections is necessary to live a chaste life.
The second point concerns that of the example of priests who have endured the same or similar
struggles as the seminarian. This is a very powerful consideration because we are moved deeply
by the example of others who show us that it is possible to be chaste. This teaches the seminarian
that his struggles are not so different from others. He also perceives that the grace of infused virtue
has been as fruitful in their lives as it can be in his. Priests have loved others and cared for them
and they have been loved in return by families, friends and parishioners. For this reason it is also
necessary that seminarians contemplate the lives of priests like St Augustine. In his life it is clear
that infused grace worked to convert him when he felt at the mercy of his lustful ways. 1466 Such
true stories inspire and encourage the seminarian to trust the grace and wisdom of God.
The third point concerns a trust in God’s providence, which pertains not just to guiding the universe
to its good nor only to the good of the human race in general, but “for the individual” and “for his
own sake”.1467 God guides the seminarian to his true fulfilment and in a way that accords with his
true need. This is mentioned on account of one of the personal factors that can contribute to lust,
namely, the painful feeling that one lacks affection or is lonely. This requires great trust that God
will bring people into the seminarian’s life who will love him and help him to grow as a person.
Friends, spiritual fathers, brother priests, and families, will communicate to him their love and
affection and help him to realize that he is worthy of love and how to show love to others. With
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See Augustine, The Confessions of Saint Augustine, trans. E. M. Blaiklock (London: Hodder and Stoughton,
1983/1988). St Augustine realised that he was blinded to the truth about his sinfulness (Book Six, n.XVI); that God
was guiding him to the truth, even through his experience of sorrow (Book 7, n.VIII); how difficult it was to
overcome lust (Book 8, n.V); and, finally, how grace and the Sacred Scriptures helped him to make a decision to
start a new life (Book 8, n.XII).
1467
Summa Contra Gentiles Book Three: Providence, Part II, Chapter 113, n.1.
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this trust goes the accompanying ability to properly receive and give thanks for this affection when
it is given to him.

vi.

The infused virtues become “intimately the excellences of the agent himself”

This last principle can help the seminarian to contemplate the generosity of God, who gives the
gift of infused virtue so that it truly becomes the seminarian’s own perfection. The word excellence
connotes a worthy quality of character that the seminarian can exercise for the good of others.
There is a certain delight in this for the seminarian, inasmuch as chastity becomes a personal
perfection within him that enables him to enjoy virtuous relationships of affection. It becomes a
part of his gift to others, in that he knows how to responsibly love them according to a right
relationship and their true good. The pastoral importance of this is that he can relate to others as a
priest who loves them according to God’s wisdom and love, and so he can become a minister of
God’s goodness to them rather than harming them through the selfishness of lust.

Conclusion
Precisely because the capacity for sexual love is both natural and beautiful, the seminarian, like
anyone else, ought to receive his sexuality as a good gift from God. However, the wonderful
attractiveness of sexuality can also be subject to inordinate desires, which he can “underestimate”,
in terms of their power to incline him to sinful behavior.1468 In reflecting on St Thomas’ teaching
on how unchaste attitudes do harm to his character and personal relationships, the seminarian is
enabled to see more clearly that he needs to avoid lustful behavior. The ultimate aim here is a
positive one. Through the study of the inordinate desire of lust, the seminarian can be convinced
of the harm done to himself and others by unchaste actions and, therefore, be motivated to avoid
them. More importantly, however, the seminarian ought to honor chastity as a virtue which enables
him to engage in relationships with respect for the dignity of human sexuality in others. St Thomas’
teaching on infused virtue is very relevant to this dimension of the seminarian’s affective
formation. Chastity is an infused virtue inasmuch as it is an integration, through God’s grace, of

1468

Glittering Vices, 162.
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the seminarian’s sexual desire with his identity as a follower of Christ. The truth of this entails that
he must turn to God for help to develop the virtue of chastity and exercise it as a participation in
God’s care for the dignity of others. Moreover, he ought to rejoice in this ability to live a chaste
life both as a true excellence of his own character and a true service for the welfare of those
entrusted to his pastoral care.
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CONCLUSION

This thesis has set out an analysis of St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity that has formed an
argument, particularly for the seminary formator and the seminarian, concerning what affective
maturity is and how to attain it. Crucially, this account of affectivity respects that to live with
Christ, and to reflect his pastoral charity to others, the seminarian must be capable of relating to
all in an affectively mature way. This is because Christ, the Incarnate Son of God, both reveals the
mystery of the Trinitarian relations of love and models the true nature of human affectivity for us.
To be truly holy, therefore, we need to express our affectivity in such a way that we can conduct
fulfilling personal relationships.
St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity, its integral role in Christian life, and how to bring it to maturity
provides a way forward for seminary formation. All of the teaching unfolded in this analysis of St
Thomas’ reflections can be applied to the seminarian’s affective formation, inasmuch as he can be
guided to attain, and assessed as to whether he is progressing in, a life of affective maturity.
Affective maturity - the virtuous development of the seminarian’s affectivity in order that he may
responsibly love others - is a vital element of priestly life and service. As Pope St John Paul II
teaches in Pastores Dabo Vobis, seminarians need to be formed to relate to others in a way that
reflects the humanity and the heart of Christ the Good Shepherd. To do this, seminarians need to
become capable of loving others in a mature and virtuous manner like Christ. The argument of this
thesis is that St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity helps the seminarian to grow in his understanding
of how to attain this affective maturity.
More specifically, St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity provides a way forward for seminary
formation because it gives a coherent overview of the development of affectivity for all people. It
does this: by providing a view of affectivity that is based in a sound theological anthropology
(Chapter 2); by presenting a wise and positive view of affectivity in its relationship to the good of
the human person (Chapters 3-4); by promoting a balanced view of how to integrate affective
responses to evil (Chapter 5); by giving positive reflections on the role of the passions that help
the seminarian to cope with arduous challenges (Chapter 6); by articulating the role of virtues in
properly forming affectivity so that the seminarian can relate responsibly to others (Chapter 7-9);
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by developing a coherent response to inordinate affective desires in light of the gift of infused
virtue (Chapters 10-11).
Equally important is that St Thomas’ teaching situates affective development, not only within the
individual experience of the seminarian, but also within the wider perspective of personal
relationships. St Thomas’ teaching can help the seminarian to be more aware of the impact of his
attitudes and actions upon others, and how to exercise virtues that help him to build healthy
personal relationships with them. For example, without being just he will fail to build true mutual
relationships with others, because he does not focus on promoting their true needs and willing their
true good. To this extent, St Thomas’ teaching impresses upon the seminarian the truth that it is in
responsibly loving others that true affective maturity is found.
One aspect of the significance of this research is that it presents to the seminary formator a coherent
and systematic analysis of St Thomas’ teaching on affective maturity. It is a teaching that can be
presented to the seminarian to help him grasp the importance of his affective formation and the
principles that promote it. It is worth emphasizing again that the future priest’s own affective
maturity has the capacity to affect the lives of many others who will seek his friendship and
guidance on their paths toward integrated holiness. St Thomas’ teaching seeks its ultimate
guidance from Sacred Scripture and the life of Jesus Christ, and so it is well suited to serve as an
instrument of developing the future priest, who is called to reflect the human perfection of the
Good Shepherd.
At the same time, St Thomas’ teaching is respectful of the need for a clear and rigorous analysis
in the area of a life of virtue, which of its nature includes the development of an affectively mature
attitude. In its timeless proclamation of the truth of what it means to be human, St Thomas’
anthropology, with its theological, moral, and psychological dimensions, forms a robust response
to Pope St John Paul II’s approach to affectivity. Pope St John Paul II’s own anthropology is
influenced by St Thomas’ affirmation of the goodness of affectivity that is developed in harmony
with our true good. In comparison with the teaching of the Manuals on affectivity, which in one
respect was too negative about the passions, it allows for a more integrated view of emotion. That
is, it articulates a positive view of virtue as a way of forming emotion into a responsible expression
of love: to build friendships and to engage in relationships of pastoral service that seek to promote
the true needs of others.
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It has been the finding of this thesis that to be faithful to the vision of Pope St John Paul II, affective
formation must have a solid theological basis. We find this in St Thomas’ consideration of God’s
affections and Christ’s human affectivity, which lays the groundwork for a reflection on some key
affective dispositions the seminarian needs to develop. For instance, the capacity to properly
express generous love, joy, mercy, zeal, fear, anger, hatred, compassion, and friendship, are
qualities the seminarian needs if he is to reflect both the life of God and of Christ to the world.
That is, we are already beginning to see the qualities that an affectively mature person should
exhibit.
In terms of understanding himself, the seminarian can be presented with a teaching that encourages
in him a proper sense of receptivity. By appreciating that he needs to form his choices by truthful
judgements, he can learn to be docile, listening to the wisdom of experienced people, the Church,
and Sacred Scripture. Thus, he will be well guided to develop his capacity to feel in response to
objects, situations, and other persons, inasmuch as they are perceived to be for his good or against
it. Moreover, St Thomas’ teaching on love, desire and pleasure, sets in his mind a very positive
attitude to these passions. Yet, it enables him to be more discerning about what gives him true
pleasure, in that it needs to properly perfect his understanding, willing, and feeling. It encourages
him to grow in his appreciation for the good in himself, in others, and in God, forming his desires
so that he may truly enjoy what is truly good. It also calls him to enter into challenging personal
and pastoral experiences that will help him discover how to more wisely relate to others and so
enjoy his growth in pastoral competence.
Furthermore, in St Thomas’ teaching the seminarian finds a balanced appraisal of the role of
negative passions, which can be a sign of affective maturity in response to what harms the good.
For instance, anger can provide affective energy for the seminarian to counteract evil. Sorrow can
help the seminarian to be compassionate to others by enabling him to understand the damaging
and personal effects of evil. Moreover, the irascible passions help the seminarian cope with major
challenges. Properly formed hope, despair, fear, daring, and anger, are presented together as
affective principles of achieving the arduous good or coping with a graver evil. Yet, the seminarian
learns from St Thomas’ teaching to properly form these affective responses through virtuous
attitudes, to help him make prudent, rather than rash, decisions. For example, in regard to daring,
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the seminarian can be taught to seek counsel from others and carefully deliberate before
confronting a major challenge.
The pertinence of St Thomas’ teaching comes more fully to light when we consider the recent
Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Abuse in Australia, which was concluded
in 2018. The findings of the Royal Commission, highlight that we need to have affectively mature
priests who can live their priestly life in challenging times. This is not only a question of forming
priests that will understand how to avoid transgressing personal boundaries and so avoid further
scandal. It also regards the development of positive relationships of true esteem and genuine
respect for others. Even beyond these issues, there is the need for affective resilience. The present
negative climate, which is so fraught with anger against the Church and so critical of Catholic
clergy, on account of the abuse of children, can undermine the priest’s resolve to live his priestly
vocation. Without the capacity to harness his passions of hope and daring, and the ability to
moderate his sense of despair and fear, he will not be able to live his vocation when he feels
severely tested. He will need, not only a deep sense of the benefit of his future priestly service for
the lives of others, but also a great deal of determination and perseverance.
Also significant to the outcomes of the Royal Commission is St Thomas’ teaching on inordinate
desires, which can contribute to the seminarian’s affective formation. First of all, St Thomas’
teaching provides the seminarian with a process of reflection to discern both why he sins and how
sin harms him by distorting his desires for important human goods. For example, pride distorts his
desire for self-excellence and, in the process, makes him regard his neighbor with arrogance. In
this way, pride interferes with his ability to learn and conduct his relationships with charity and
humility. It then also contributes, sadly, to his capacity to inhibit the peace and proper growth of
the people for whom he is called to care.
More significantly still, affective formation can draw upon St Thomas’ positive presentation of
how the virtues develop authentic desires that are distorted by the capital sins. St Thomas begins
with the premise that the human faculties involved in sin are inherently good even though they can
generate inordinate desires. The implication of this is very important for the seminarian’s ability,
as a future priest, both to articulate a positive moral outlook for others and to guide them to attain
the affective maturity appropriate for their vocation. One aim of responding to sin is certainly to
disentangle the good from the evil in our desires. However, in St Thomas’ vision of the affective
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and moral life that is not enough. There also needs to be a careful discernment of the desire that
underlies the inclination to sin and with this a corresponding discernment of how infused virtue
can help to re-order that desire to the good.
This thesis has concentrated on the theological argument that St Thomas’ teaching offers a way
forward for seminary formation. Another way to consider the significance of its findings is to
indicate other major questions to be investigated in relation to the research undertaken in this work.
One worthwhile line of future enquiry would be to review the current affective formation programs
of various Catholic seminaries in light of the work of this thesis.
Also, while this present discussion has mainly concentrated on the formation of the seminarian,
there is a case for a study of how formators are to be formed. After all, formators are given a vital
task to shape the affective maturity of the coming generations of priests in respect of their pastoral
service to many thousands of people. How can they be encouraged to acquire a greater wisdom
about affectivity, communicate this wisdom to seminarians, and be guided by it in their assessment
of the suitability of candidates for ordination to the priesthood? Research into that particular area,
based on the findings of this thesis, would be a worthwhile undertaking.
Indeed, St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity could be adapted and used as a basic program of
assessment and guidance for the decisions that formators need to make. If the candidate cannot
articulate his affective experiences, for example, and manifest that he is capable of shaping them
according to the virtues, his suitability for ordination ought to be questioned. For, a lack of
affective awareness and wisdom about his personal relationships predisposes the candidate to act
according to his unformed affective impulses. Therefore, he is in need of a detailed teaching, like
that provided in this thesis, to help him become more acutely aware of his desires and how to
properly form them.
After all this, it should be emphasized that the seminarian should be formed in the affective
maturity proper to every human being because the future priest should have the same level of
affective maturity as anyone else entrusted with the welfare of others. Moreover, the seminarian
has a right to an education which enables him to develop his ability to conduct truly fulfilling
personal relationships. To do this he needs to understand his affective needs, and how to express
them properly for his own good, the good of his friends, and the good of those who are entrusted
to his pastoral care. The mature man is the one who is far more capable of positively contributing
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to the lives of others. This is the need that formators and seminarians alike can fruitfully reflect
upon systematically, in light of the best that the great saints and theologians have to offer. This is
not to preclude the knowledge that can be gleaned from other studies. At the same time, it does
affirm the need to listen carefully to the witness of Christian experience about the development of
our humanity.
This thesis has not discussed the kind of resistance that its conclusions and recommendations may
encounter from formators and seminarians. I suggest that principally there could be two reasons
for this resistance. The first is on account of the busy nature of the seminary timetable. The sheer
volume of studies and pastoral experiences the seminarian must complete could lead seminary
formators to avoid providing seminarians with a sustained study of affectivity. This tendency could
be exacerbated by a view that the writings of St Thomas are old and outdated on matters of
affectivity and personal relationships. The aim of this thesis has been to show that much of St
Thomas’ reflections on affectivity are still helpful for a sound understanding of affective maturity
and are apt to be developed in the service of the seminarian’s affective formation. This does not
prevent the application of knowledge and approaches from other authors in psychology,
philosophy and theology, which can help to further the seminarian’s affective formation. In fact,
given St Thomas’ example of seeking to derive the truth from wherever it may be found and apply
it to Christian life, seminary formators ought to complement St Thomas’ reflections on affectivity
with the best that has been discovered, thought and written.
The second reason could concern the formative influences that have shaped the formator’s and the
seminarian’s view of affectivity prior to seminary formation. Depending on family and cultural
background or personal temperament and habitual inclination, there can be a lack of proper
appreciation of the critical importance of the affective life and its development. For example, trite
phrases such as - “Do not follow your feelings” - can reveal an impoverished understanding of the
affective life without reference to its proper development. Such unreflective statements fail to help
the seminarian to accurately articulate his various emotional needs and their motivating power to
do both good and evil. As an unarticulated view of affectivity it does not enable the seminarian to
distinguish authentic affective development from its distortions. The discussion of St Thomas’
analysis of affectivity in this thesis has been undertaken to provide an articulate view of affectivity
that is orientated to a life of virtue. It enables the seminarian to reflect wisely on the proper
338

development of his affective life and his personal relationships. Yet it also gives him realistic
reference points about the avoidance of what is destructive of authentic affective personal and
relational experience.
The argument unfolded in this thesis shows that there is much in St Thomas’ teaching that is
perennially relevant to the understanding of affective maturity and how it is integral to a truly
Christian and priestly life. St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity focuses upon the humanity of Christ
as a model of affective maturity, the healthy development of emotionality in the human heart, and
its virtuous expression in human relationships. It thus challenges formators and seminarians to
reflect deeply on the crucial importance of affective maturity and how they can attain a truly human
and Christ-like affective maturity in the service of others.
It is fitting to bring these reflections to a close by relating the findings of this thesis to the pastoral
competence of the future priest in light of Amoris Laetitia, Pope Francis’ post-synodal apostolic
exhortation on love in the family (2016). This document gives the future priest a teaching on the
goodness of sexuality, marriage and family life. It challenges priests to be aware of the way that
pastoral needs of parishioners are inseparable from the affective dimensions of human life. The
question might be asked: how does St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity assist the seminarian to help
those who are either preparing for marriage or are trying to live a married life? Two virtuous
characteristics spring to mind from what we have considered in the course of this work. Prudence
directs the priest to do more than know how to explain Church teaching. He must also judge when
to explain Church teaching, taking into account the present emotional preparedness of the couple
before him. Compassion, further to this, inclines him to understand the true suffering of a person
who has been abandoned by a spouse and the difficulty he or she must endure on account of so
great an injustice. Such compassion enables the priest to support such people in their time of pain.
Moreover, St Thomas’ teaching on the goodness of sexuality, as an emotional capacity for union
with one’s spouse and the joy of a truly loving expression of sexual union, offers another
dimension of response, not only to Pope St John Paul II’s call for affective maturity, but also Pope
Francis’ admonishment toward authentic pastoral care. The seminarian can learn to present the
beauty of sexual integrity and how chastity enables people to truly build loving and faithful
relationships. With this comes the divine aid of infused grace, which can form in the hearts of
those who struggle with sexual temptation a confidence in God’s help to live chastely.
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All the virtues spoken of here and in various parts of this thesis are not only to be communicated
to those the priest teaches, guides, and supports. They are virtues that help the seminarian to
become a priest who will be capable of forming prudent judgments while at the same time relating
to others in a truly helpful and warm-hearted manner. They enable the future priest to draw others,
through his genuine charity and affection for them, into friendship with Christ by imitating his
love as the Good Shepherd, loving them with all the affective richness, and with all the
commitment, of a truly mature human heart.
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